Event Notification Report for January 23, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/22/2016 - 01/23/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51677
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ANDREW KRUKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ANDREW KRUKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/23/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 05:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 05:51 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER TO THE SITE EMERGENCY BUILDING
"Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building, which renders the TSC ventilation system non-functional until power is restored.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO JEFF HERRERA AT 1121 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *
"Due to a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building the Plant Process Computer needed to be secured. Due to the loss of the Plant Process Computer the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions are not available for communications to the NRC.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of úEmergency Response Data System (ERDS) communication capability."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1446 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *
Power was restored to the Site Emergency Building. TSC Ventilation and the ERDS systems were returned to service at 1440 EST.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).
"Oyster Creek Generating Station has experienced a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building, which renders the TSC ventilation system non-functional until power is restored.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the time TSC ventilation is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii) due to potential loss of the TSC. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO JEFF HERRERA AT 1121 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *
"Due to a loss of power to the Site Emergency Building the Plant Process Computer needed to be secured. Due to the loss of the Plant Process Computer the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) functions are not available for communications to the NRC.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of úEmergency Response Data System (ERDS) communication capability."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).
* * * UPDATE FROM ANDREW KRUKOWSKI TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1446 EST ON 1/23/16 * * *
Power was restored to the Site Emergency Building. TSC Ventilation and the ERDS systems were returned to service at 1440 EST.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51678
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHAUN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP,[3] M-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SHAUN MCHUGH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/23/2016
Notification Time: 19:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 17:03 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2016
Notification Time: 19:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 17:03 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
PARTIAL LOSS OF POWER RESULTS IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS STARTING
"At 1703 [EST] on 1/23/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kv Bus 3, off-site power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of 34.5kV Bus 3 resulted from feeder breaker L102 opening. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-18 automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.
"The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator. Restoration of offsite power to operable status is currently being pursued. The Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic.
"Both units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the L102 feeder breaker opening resulting in the 34.5 kv Bus 3 loss of power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"At 1703 [EST] on 1/23/16, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, the North Anna 34.5 kv Bus 3, off-site power feed to the 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer, was lost which resulted in the loss of power to the Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus and the Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus. Loss of 34.5kV Bus 3 resulted from feeder breaker L102 opening. As a result of the power loss, the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator automatically started as designed and restored power to the associated emergency bus. During this event, the Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump, 1-CH-P-18 automatically started as designed due to the loss of power event.
"The valid actuation of these ESF components due to the loss of electrical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 'H' Emergency Bus off-site power source was restored to service and the 1H Emergency Diesel Generator was secured and returned to Automatic. The Unit 2 'J' Emergency Bus power feed continues to be from the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator. Restoration of offsite power to operable status is currently being pursued. The Unit 1 'B' Charging Pump has been secured and returned to automatic.
"Both units are in a stable condition. An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the L102 feeder breaker opening resulting in the 34.5 kv Bus 3 loss of power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51679
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID O'DONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DAVID O'DONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/24/2016
Notification Time: 00:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 21:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2016
Notification Time: 00:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 21:22 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE IN DRYWELL
"At 2100 hours [EST], on January 23, 2016, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant commenced a reactor shutdown due to unidentified leakage in the drywell. At 2122 hours, drywell unidentified leakage exceeded the Technical Specification 3.4.5.d limit of 'less than or equal to 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour period in Mode 1.' The unidentified leakage increased to approximately 3.8 gpm at 2122 hours. Current unidentified leakage is 3.02 gpm.
"Technical Specification 3.4.5 actions allow 4 hours to reduce the leakage within limits or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours. The plant is required to be in Mode 3 by 1322 hours on January 24, 2016 and Mode 4 by 1322 hours on January 25, 2016.
"A drywell entry will be made in Mode 3 to identify the leak source.
"This notification is being made due to an expected inability to restore the leakage within limits prior to exceeding the LCO action time.
"Follow up question from NRC: Event times do not match (2100 versus 2122) - explained downpower was commenced at 2100 with leakage less than TS limit. When Reactor Core flow was reduced, un-identified leakage increased above the TS limit."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE DOTY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1123 EST ON 1/24/16 * * *
"At 1007 hours, on January 24, 2016 with the plant at 8% power during a feedwater shift to place the motor feed pump in service, reactor level rose to the level 8 scram set point and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) initiated, scramming the reactor. During the scram, all rods fully inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Reactor level control is currently being maintained via feedwater. The plant is stable with cool down and depressurization to Mode 4 to follow. The cause of the rise in feedwater level is under investigation. This notification is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS initiation while critical."
All safety shutdown systems are available. The electric plant is in its normal shutdown alignment being supplied by offsite power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron). NRR (Morris) and IRD (Gott) were notified via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID O'DONNELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1915 EST ON 1/24/16 * * *
"Following a shutdown required by plant Technical Specifications a small leak was identified coming from the Reactor Recirculation Loop A Pump Discharge Valve vent line. The Recirculation Loop is part of the reactor coolant system making this reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition. It was subsequently determined to require a plant cool down in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.5, Action C which requires the plant to be in MODE 4 within 36 hours. Technical Specification 3.4.5 was previously entered for increased unidentified leakage in the drywell. The plant is required to be in Mode 4 by 1322 hours on January 25, 2016."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron). NRR (Morris) and IRD (Gott) were notified via email.
"At 2100 hours [EST], on January 23, 2016, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant commenced a reactor shutdown due to unidentified leakage in the drywell. At 2122 hours, drywell unidentified leakage exceeded the Technical Specification 3.4.5.d limit of 'less than or equal to 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour period in Mode 1.' The unidentified leakage increased to approximately 3.8 gpm at 2122 hours. Current unidentified leakage is 3.02 gpm.
"Technical Specification 3.4.5 actions allow 4 hours to reduce the leakage within limits or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and Mode 4 within 36 hours. The plant is required to be in Mode 3 by 1322 hours on January 24, 2016 and Mode 4 by 1322 hours on January 25, 2016.
"A drywell entry will be made in Mode 3 to identify the leak source.
"This notification is being made due to an expected inability to restore the leakage within limits prior to exceeding the LCO action time.
"Follow up question from NRC: Event times do not match (2100 versus 2122) - explained downpower was commenced at 2100 with leakage less than TS limit. When Reactor Core flow was reduced, un-identified leakage increased above the TS limit."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE DOTY TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1123 EST ON 1/24/16 * * *
"At 1007 hours, on January 24, 2016 with the plant at 8% power during a feedwater shift to place the motor feed pump in service, reactor level rose to the level 8 scram set point and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) initiated, scramming the reactor. During the scram, all rods fully inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Reactor level control is currently being maintained via feedwater. The plant is stable with cool down and depressurization to Mode 4 to follow. The cause of the rise in feedwater level is under investigation. This notification is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS initiation while critical."
All safety shutdown systems are available. The electric plant is in its normal shutdown alignment being supplied by offsite power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron). NRR (Morris) and IRD (Gott) were notified via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID O'DONNELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1915 EST ON 1/24/16 * * *
"Following a shutdown required by plant Technical Specifications a small leak was identified coming from the Reactor Recirculation Loop A Pump Discharge Valve vent line. The Recirculation Loop is part of the reactor coolant system making this reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition. It was subsequently determined to require a plant cool down in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.5, Action C which requires the plant to be in MODE 4 within 36 hours. Technical Specification 3.4.5 was previously entered for increased unidentified leakage in the drywell. The plant is required to be in Mode 4 by 1322 hours on January 25, 2016."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron). NRR (Morris) and IRD (Gott) were notified via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51680
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CRAIG LOHR
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CRAIG LOHR
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 01/24/2016
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 22:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2016
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2016
Event Time: 22:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 89 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING INTAKE LEVEL
"At 2241 [EST] on 1/23/2016, James A FitzPatrick inserted a manual scram from 89 percent power due to lowering intake level. Following the successful scram, a residual transfer occurred, resulting in a loss of the non-vital busses, loss of all Circulating Water Pumps, and a manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). The cause of the residual transfer is unknown.
"RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. Reactor Vessel [level] and pressure are being maintained with the High Pressure Coolant Injection System which was manually started. A cooldown is in progress."
FitzPatrick will proceed to Mode 5 until the cause is identified and corrected. The Emergency Diesel generators auto started as a result of the loss of power to the non-vital busses. Offsite power remained available throughout the event. Operators are controlling pressure manually via the relief valves. FitzPatrick will notify the Public Service Commission of the event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"At 2241 [EST] on 1/23/2016, James A FitzPatrick inserted a manual scram from 89 percent power due to lowering intake level. Following the successful scram, a residual transfer occurred, resulting in a loss of the non-vital busses, loss of all Circulating Water Pumps, and a manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). The cause of the residual transfer is unknown.
"RPV [Reactor Pressure Vessel] level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. Reactor Vessel [level] and pressure are being maintained with the High Pressure Coolant Injection System which was manually started. A cooldown is in progress."
FitzPatrick will proceed to Mode 5 until the cause is identified and corrected. The Emergency Diesel generators auto started as a result of the loss of power to the non-vital busses. Offsite power remained available throughout the event. Operators are controlling pressure manually via the relief valves. FitzPatrick will notify the Public Service Commission of the event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.