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Event Notification Report for August 26, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/25/2015 - 08/26/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51120 51228 51317 51322 51325 51326 51327 51328 51343 51344

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51120
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/04/2015
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2015
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR A POSTULATED FIRE

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203.

"In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205.

"In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105.

"2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (HAAG).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.
5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10088142"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).

* * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved.

"CR 10108999."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Nease).

* * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment.

"1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408.

"2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408.

"Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved.

"The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

"CR 10113740, CR 10113745"

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Rose).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51228
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ZACKARY DUNHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 07/14/2015
Notification Time: 05:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2015
Event Time: 23:39 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 64 Power Operation 64 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INCREASE ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT

"Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) pressure increased to above the Technical Specification Surveillance requirement of 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge for approximately 2 minutes during a planned surveillance test due to a subsequent failure of REA-FN-1A [Exhaust Fan] to manually start during restoration from the surveillance test. This event is reportable as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radiation and mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Prior to taking test data the surveillance test directs declaring Secondary Containment inoperable in anticipation of potentially exceeding 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge reactor building pressure during the conduct of the surveillance. Consequently Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4.1.A was entered with a 4 hour completion time to restore Secondary Containment to an operable state.

"Upon failure of REA-FN-1A to start immediate actions were taken to close reactor building ventilation dampers and secure ROA-FN-1A [Supply Fan]. Following closure of ventilation dampers and stopping ROA-FN-1A reactor building pressure was quickly restored to less than 0.25 inches vacuum water gauge with Standby Gas Treatment that was already in operation as part of the surveillance test.

"There were no radiological releases associated with the event.

"No safety system actuations or isolations occurred.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Maximum Secondary Containment pressure noted was 0.1 inches positive water gage.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1351 EDT ON 8/25/2015 FROM MATT HUMMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Subsequent to the initial report, Columbia has since determined that per NUREG-1022 3.2.7 the event was not reportable as Secondary Containment was 'declared inoperable as a part of a planned evolution ... in accordance with an approved procedure and [Columbia's] TS [Technical Specifications].' No condition has been discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable prior to the surveillance.

"Therefore, this event is not considered to be a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function or a condition prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LEA) per 10 CFR 50.73.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified."

Notified the R4DO (Campbell).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51317
Rep Org: MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL
Licensee: MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: MIDDLETOWN State: CT
County:
License #: 06-00649-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOAN MERTIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/13/2015
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2015
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

MEDICAL EVENT - PATIENT RECEIVED UNDERDOSE OF YTTRIUM 90

During a treatment of the left lobe of the liver, the dose delivered to the patient was discovered to differ greater than 20 percent than the intended dose. 120 Gray was prescribed by the physician and 72 Gray was delivered. During the procedure the Rados meter did not appear to be operating properly. Subsequent investigation determined that there was some radioactivity that remained in the vial. The technologist called the manufacturer who advised to perform several flushes and the Rados meter still did not change. The procedure was ended at that point. After ending the procedure when the survey was performed on the waste jar, it was discovered that only 60% of the dose was delivered. The activity appeared to be concentrated in the plunger attached to the vial. A new Rados detector will be obtained prior to the next procedure.

The patient will be informed of the issue by the physician.

Source Material: Yttrium 90, 7.03 GBq.

* * * UPDATE AT 1718 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOAN MERTON TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"On 8/11/15, a left lobe liver Y-90 embolization was performed in the interventional radiology room at Middlesex Hospital. The Y-90 therasphere activity was 7.04 GBq on 8/2/15 at [12:00 EDT] and 0.696 GBq on 8/11/15 at 10:00 am. Prior to placing the vial containing the Y-90 into the dose calibrator, the nuclear medicine technologist turned and tapped the lead pot 90 [degrees] three times. The Y-90 was infused at 12:11 pm on 8/11/15. The prescribed dose to the target volume was 120 Gray. The device and assembly were set up according to the checklist provided by the manufacturer. The authorized user turned the lead pot containing the vial 90 degrees three times and then tapped it on the table twice. The Rados meter read 1.0 mR/hr when the seal was removed from the Y-90 vial and before the commencement of the embolization. After the first flush with saline (20 ml/min) the rados meter still displayed a reading of 1.0 mR/hr. Two further flushes failed to reduce the reading of 1.0 mR/hr. The authorized user requested that the company (BTG/Nordion) representative be contacted. The lead technologist was advised by phone by the BTG representative to have the physician repeat the massaging of the tubing where the Roberts clamp had been released and perform two (2) additional saline flushes. After performing the representative's suggestions the reading was still 1.0 mR/hr. Per the lead NM [Nuclear Medicine] technologist, the BTG representative had no further recommendations. The authorized user then lifted the plexiglass cover of the apparatus and tapped on the green plunger three times and replaced the cover and flushed one more time. The rados meter reading was still 1.0 mR/hr. The procedure was ended. Following post procedure measurements on the waste jar, the calculations showed that 60% (72 Gray) of the dose was delivered to the left lobe of the liver.

"Theraspheres may have been stuck in the vial and plunger. On 8/12/15, the Middlesex Hospital RSO/physicist measured the exposure levels from the separated out items in the waste jar. The highest reading was from the vial and plunger. The plunger was still attached to the vial.

"There is no anticipated adverse effect on the patient despite the fact that a lower dose (72 Gy) was delivered to the left lobe. Most of the patient's tumor burden is localized to the right lobe. Therefore, no additional Y-90 administration is necessary.

"Actions taken or planned: 1. BTG was notified. 2. The BTG RSO is working with the Middlesex Hospital RSO to determine the cause of the event. 3. In approximately 30 days, the Y-90 waste container will be sent to BTG for their investigation

"On 8/13/15, the patient and the referring physician were notified of the medical event."

Notified the R1DO (Krohn) and NMSS Events (via email).


A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51322
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: ENID State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/17/2015
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
PAMELA HENDERSON (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ORPHANED SOURCE DISCOVERED / POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE INVOLVED

"[The Oklahoma Environmental Agency, Radiation Management Section] has been informed [on 8/17/2015] that a member of the public was cleaning out a warehouse belonging to Northern Oklahoma College in Enid, Oklahoma on August 15, 2015 when they came across an unusually heavy box. When opened, they found what was apparently a lead pig and about 10 glass vials. The pig was not secured and when tipped over a metal rod approximately 1.25 inches by 3 inches fell out. A piece of masking tape on the rod was labeled 'HOT' and '4 Radium tubes 1 broken.' One of the workers picked up the tube and handled it for a few minutes before they noticed the Radioactive label on the box. At this point, they returned the contents to the box and notified the University. The University does not possess a radioactive materials license. The person who handled the rod is now seeking medical attention complaining of nausea, dizziness, pain like arthritis in his hands, and blistering on his feet. [The Oklahoma Environmental Agency, Radiation Management Section] will be sending an inspector to the University, probably today. More information [will be provided] as it becomes available."

* * * UPDATE AT 1013 EDT ON 8/24/15 FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

The following update was received from the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality via email:

The original report documented that the material was discovered on 8/15/2015 while cleaning out a warehouse. This update revised this report to document that the discovery of the radioactive material occurred on 8/11/2015. The individual that handled the material with his hands was wearing leather work gloves when handling the radioactive material, but they were discarded with the other trash. On 8/14/15 the [member of the public] who handled the object reported feeling ill and on 8/17 went to a doctor complaining of nausea, dizziness, pain in his hands, and blisters on his feet.

"On 8/17/15 [The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality, Radiation Management Section] conducted a reactive inspection of the facility. Surveys of the facility using a microR meter and survey meter with GM detector did not find any contamination. Wipe tests of various objects and areas were collected and are being counted. The pig was as described in the original report and surveys of it produced readings from 1.5 to 3.5 mR/hr on the exterior and approx. 70 mR/hr directly above the open mouth. A variety of other sealed and unsealed sources were also found, many dating from the late 1950s. The college has secured these and will arrange for their disposal as soon as possible.

"On 8/18/15 [The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality, Radiation Management Section] again spoke with one of the workers who stated that the man who handled the source had been diagnosed with a reaction to mold exposure and given a cortisone injection. He was reportedly much better and had returned to work."

Notified the R4DO (Campbell), NMSS Events (via email) and NMSS Mgr. (Henderson).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51325
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DESERT NDT
Region: 4
City: BRIGHTON State: CO
County:
License #: CO 902-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEREK BAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/16/2015
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK DARKROOM ATTEMPTED BREAK-IN

"On Sunday August 16, 2015, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Radioactive Materials Unit, received a phone call on the after-hours emergency response line. The Corporate RSO for Desert NDT, CO 902-01, reported an attempted break-in on a radiography truck. The attempt occurred while the vehicle was parked overnight at the Cotton Wood Suites, 12095 Mariposa Street, Westminster, CO 80234. The radiographer's reported that the door to the darkroom had been tampered with, the door was not breached, therefore the alarm never activated. Evidence of the attempted break-in was identified the following morning, Sunday, August 16, 2015. All radioactive materials were accounted for by Desert, NDT, no theft occurred.

"The approximate time of break-in occurred between the hours of 1755 MDT, Saturday, August 15, 2015 and 0815 MDT, Sunday, August 16, 2015. The radioactive material involved in this incident was 39 Ci of Ir-192, Source SN: Y560, Model: Industrial Nuclear Company Model 7. The source was inside a QSA Delta 880 camera. The Westminster Police were called and a police report was filed. The police report number is: 2015-14914."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51326
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: H & H X-RAY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: WEST MONROE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2970-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/17/2015
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2015
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE RETRIEVAL

"The crew [for H&H X-Ray Services] was x-raying pipe at a temporary job site in Elm Grove, LA. Due to the configuration, the camera was above the guide tube and the source and guide tube were on a surface below. The camera slipped and fell approximately 18 inches and landed on the guide tube and crimped the guide tube not allowing the source to be returned to the shielded position. A survey indicated the source was still in the guide tube. The boundaries were maintained until the RSO and his assistant arrived to perform the retrieval. Following the source retrieval procedure, the source was placed into a shielded source changer, QSA Global 650L, and returned to the company's West Monroe, LA storage location. Except for the guide tube, none of the equipment was damaged. Exposures to the crew and the retrieval crew were minimal.

"Reported to the LA Department of Environmental Quality 08/13/2015 at 1533 CDT.

"Exposure Device AEA/QSA Model 880 Delta, SR D2767, Source: 58 Ci Ir-192, Model A424-9, SN 18108G"

State Event Report ID No.: LA 150013

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Agreement State Event Number: 51327
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: JERSEY CITY State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES McCOLLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2015
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ORPHAN SOURCE FOUND IN A GARBAGE TRUCK

"A garbage truck containing a radioactive source was reported by local police in Union City, NJ. NJ State police preliminarily identified Ra-226, which was confirmed by NJDEP Radiation Program staff who responded to the event. Exposure rate was measured as 60 mR/hr on contact on the truck. Based on measurements, activity was estimated to be 10 mCi. The US DOT was contacted, and approved issuance of a DOT Special Permit 11406 even though readings exceeded 50 mR/hr. Truck was moved to truck owner's (Galaxy Sanitation) location in Jersey City, NJ., where the hired contractor sorted the load and found a small radium source. No identifying information was on the source. It has been adequately shielded and secured at the site pending disposal.

"NJDEP will continue to monitor the situation and provide updates as necessary."

The garbage truck made a pickup in Union City, New Jersey and was stopped by the police because the truck was leaking liquid. As the officer approached the truck, his paging radiac alarmed.

New Jersey Incident: C569188

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Agreement State Event Number: 51328
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STERIGENICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: HAYWARD State: CA
County:
License #: 6268-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NIKA HEWADIKARAM
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2015
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2015
Event Time: 00:11 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR SOURCE RACKS FAILED SAFE

The following report was received via e-mail:

" On 07/21/15, Sterigenics Corporate RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] contacted RHB-Sacramento office [California Radiation Health Branch] via an email and telephone to report the following event in accordance with 36.83(a)(4). His email stated the following:

"Last night [7/21/15] at approximately 12:11 AM PDT at the Sterigenics Hayward Facility (Radioactive materials License 6268-1), the pneumatic cylinder used to raise one of the two source racks (Hoist #1) failed to function as designed. The failure did NOT cause a 'stuck source' nor was there any risk of exposure to any individual as a result of this failure. The source did return to the 'down' position in the pool as designed, however, the pneumatic cylinder experienced a failure and a broken flange and is not operable.

"We [Sterigenics} will review in detail the cause of this failure and implement appropriate corrective action including any necessary changes in maintenance and equipment and report these changes to you [California] in writing within 30 days as required by 10CFR36.83 (b).

"In the interim, the facility will not commence operations until repairs are completed to the hoist and approval to commence operations is granted by the Corporate RSO and Corporate Engineering.

"[Sterigenics] further stated that there is no emergency or current issue. A corporate engineer will arrive in San Francisco by 2:00 on 7/21/15 to work on the irradiator. Facility is staffed 24/7 and will notify RHB before resuming any operations.

"[California] RHB will be following up with the licensee."

California Event 072115

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51343
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT HORN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/25/2015
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2015
Event Time: 12:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNPLANNED LOSS OF PRIMARY AND BACKUP METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

"On August 25, 2015, at approximately 12:52 EDT, an unplanned loss of power to the Vogtle Meteorological Towers occurred. The loss of power was the result of an electrical disturbance in the Plant Wilson switchyard. Power was restored 14:45 EDT. The electrical disturbance impacted meteorological instrumentation only and did not impact operation of either Unit 1 or Unit 2.

"The TSC and EOF remained functional and compensatory measures existed within emergency plan implementing procedures to obtain meteorological tower data locally and with the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC Operations Center.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.' The Emergency Response Organization was notified and necessary compensatory actions were established.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Part 21 Event Number: 51344
Rep Org: FURMANITE
Licensee: FURMANITE
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KERRY J. KOSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 08/25/2015
Notification Time: 18:31 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 FURMANITE NUCLEAR GRADE LEAK SEAL MATERIAL FSC-N-1B

"Furmanite FSC-N-1B Batch #1026 was discovered (post-delivery) to have Chloride levels above acceptable limits. As Discovered: 2400 ppm Chloride. Furmanite Specification: 100 ppm Chloride.

"Part Name: Nuclear Grade Leak Seal Material FSC-N-1B.

"Specification: Furmanite Material Specification 1220.1 R2.

"Furmanite Notice Number: 25.08.2015

"Potential affected customers:
America Electric Power - DC Cook
Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde
DTE Energy - Fermi Power Plant 2
Duke - Catawba Nuclear Station
Duke - McGuire Nuclear Station
Exelon Nuclear - Limerick Generating Station
Florida Power & Light Co. - St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
Florida Power & Light Co. - Turkey Point Nuclear Plant"

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Wednesday, August 26, 2015