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Event Notification Report for July 9, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/08/2015 - 07/09/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51070 51187 51191 51192 51193 51196 51197 51205 51206 51207 51208 51211
51212 51213

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51070
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GUY GRIFFIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/14/2015
Notification Time: 23:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO EXCESSIVE TOXIC CHEMICALS ONSITE

"On May 14, 2015, it was determined that the number of 55 gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol analyzed to be transported and stored within the owner-controlled area (OCA) at any one time had been exceeded. It was discovered that contrary to the toxic gas analysis performed, fourteen 55-gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol were transported and stored in the OCA to support the construction of a dome being built to provide storage for FLEX equipment. The number of drums exceeded the limitation specified in the toxic gas analysis performed as part of the design project for transportation and storage could potentially impact Control Room habitability, emergency diesel generator air intake and have an adverse impact on security personnel.

"Upon determination that an unanalyzed condition existed, Operations placed the control room ventilation system in the 'isolation mode' until the number of drums on-site was reduced within the analyzed number. A substantial covering had been placed over the drums which also decreased the likelihood that any of the drums would fail and would also limit the potential dispersion of chemicals should a breach occur.

"The excess number of drums of 2-Butoxyethanol being transported and stored on-site is considered an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The allowed number of 55 gallon drums of 2-butoxyethanol allowed per the current toxic gas analysis is 4 drums. The number of drums has been reduced to 2 as of 2024 EDT.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/8/2015 AT 1657 EDT * * *

"Further investigation into the chemicals transported on-site (F183M, of which 2-Butoxyethanol is a component) revealed that an on-site spill of all fourteen 55-gallon drums will not adversely affect Main Control Room Habitability, Security Personnel, or the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

"The Control Room Habitability Determination flowchart in Attachment 3 of NMP-CH-002-002 establishes a 10 mmHg vapor pressure threshold for determining if chemicals need to be evaluated for impact on the Main Control Room. Chemicals with a vapor pressure less than 10 mmHg do not need to be evaluated for control room habitability. The basis for the threshold is found in Reg Guide 1.78 Revision 0 section C.5.a, 'For chemicals that are not gases at 100F and normal atmospheric pressure but are liquids with vapor pressures in excess of 10 torr (10 mmHg), consideration should be given to the rate of flashing and boil off to determine the rate of release to the atmosphere and the appropriate time duration of the release.' The individual chemical component (including 2-Butoxyethanol) vapor pressures are less than 10 mmHg.

"As their vaporization rate is too low to adversely affect Control Room Habitability, it is also too low to create a hazard for Security personnel or to adversely affect the Emergency Diesel Generators.

"Based on this information, the transportation and storage of these chemical barrels did NOT represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety. As such, this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 51070 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 51187
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WATSON
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 06/28/2015
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2015
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENTAL BOUNDARY DOOR FOUND UNLATCHED

"During Security checks of Control Room doors, a boundary door was found not latched. This door is capable of being manually closed and latched. The door was in this condition for 4 hours and 25 minutes. The door is currently closed and latched. This is being reported as it could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

A condition report has been written and the door is posted to require manual checks to ensure it is latched until the door closing mechanism is repaired.

* * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS CLEARY TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/8/2015 AT 1314 EDT * * *

"Event Report number 51187 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room environmental boundary door was found unlatched. This was reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Upon further review, MPS2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because even with the control room boundary door unlatched, the control room emergency ventilation system would have been able to perform its safety function during accident conditions. The MPS2 control room is pressure neutral and the hydraulic door closure mechanism was verified adequate to ensure the door would close and remain closed during accident conditions (even though it was not latching). Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 51187 is being retracted.

"The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified the R1DO (Cahill).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51191
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: SOURCE PRODUCTION & EQUIPMENT COMPANY
Region: 4
City: ST. ROSE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2966-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM M. PATE III
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/30/2015
Notification Time: 11:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2015
Event Time: 15:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
BARRY WRAY (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SHIPPED SOURCES

The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via email:

"On June 25, 2015, Source Production & Equipment Company shipped [using a common carrier] three sources to Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), . . . , [in] Worcester, MA 01609. The three sources were two Yb-169 for total activity of 65 Gbq (1.75 Ci) and one Se-75 37 Gbq (1 Ci). The package arrived at WPI damaged. The lead pig container did not have the three sources. There are no source serial numbers. The State of Massachusetts and [the common carrier] have been notified. State of Massachusetts stated that they have contacted the FBI.

"Event Report ID No.: LA150011"

HOO NOTE: Also reported by the common carrier to the National Response Center on 6/29/15 [Incident Report # 1121358] and by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts [EN # 51192].

* * * UPDATE FROM JAMES PATE TO JEFFREY HERRERA ON 7/7/2015 AT 1400 EDT * * *

After discussion between Louisiana and Massachusetts, The State of Louisiana considers their event (LA150011) to be closed out. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (NRC Event Number #51192) is continuing their investigation.

Notified R4DO (Haire), ILTAB (Johnson) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51192
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: WORCESTER State: MA
County:
License #: 03-6802
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/30/2015
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
BARRY WRAY (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN TRANSIT

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"Worcester Polytechnic Institute reported on 6/30/15 that a shipment of one Selenium-75 (1 curie) and two Ytterbium-169 (1.76 curies together) brachytherapy sealed sources arrived as an empty package (no radioactive material was within the package). The received Yellow-II labeled cardboard package was visibly damaged and resealed with clear shipping tape. Survey of the received package determined background radiation readings. Carrier, shipper and various government agencies have been contacted. Search for missing items is ongoing. Radiation from the unshielded sources expected to be approximately 1 R/hr at one meter distance. Agency [MA Radiation Control Program] to perform on-site investigation in Worcester today ."

HOO NOTE: Also reported by the common carrier to the National Response Center on 6/29/15 [Incident Report # 1121358] and by the State of Louisiana [EN # 51191].

* * * UPDATE ON 7/2/15 AT 1149 EDT FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:

"Agency [Massachusetts Department of Public Health - Radiation Control Program] (MADPH-RCP) conducted investigation at receiving licensee facility on 6/30/15. Agency also conducted radiation surveys on 7/1/15 at the three carrier facilities in Massachusetts through which the package passed. No sources were identified and all radiation readings were at background levels. The three sources have been described by shipper as titanium capsules approximately 5 mm long and 1 mm diameter. Each source may still be individually contained within an approximate 1.5 inch tall glass vial with teal-colored plastic screw-on cap, each vial with white label taped to outside of vial describing the contents. The receiving licensee ordered a 0.2 curie Se-75 source (same physical description) and it is unknown at this time which Se-75 activity amount (0.2 or 1 curie) was shipped."

Notified the R1DO (Dimitriadis), ILTAB (Johnson) and NMSS Events (via Email)

* * * UPDATE ON 7/7/15 AT 1616 EDT FROM JOSHUA E. DAEHLER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program was sent via email:

"The shipper (i.e. SPEC) provided clarification that, contrary to the activities identified in shipping papers, one Yb-169 source was actually approximately 1.74 curies, another Yb-169 source was actually approximately 1.77 curies and the third source, Se-75 was approximately 207 millicuries. The sources continue to be missing."

Notified the R1DO (Cahill), ILTAB (Johnson) and NMSS Events (via email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51193
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ECS MID-ATLANTIC MANASSAS
Region: 1
City: MANASSAS State: VA
County: MANASSAS PARK
License #: 683-314-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/30/2015
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2015
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PORTABLE MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On June 30, 2015 at about 1400 EDT, the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) received a telephone report from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that a moisture/density gauge was damaged. While performing testing at a temporary jobsite in Manassas, the moisture/density gauge (CPN, Model: MC1, Serial # MD90104762, Cs-137 (9 mCi), Am-241 (44 mCi)), was hit by the subcontractor's equipment at the project site and resulted in damage to the control rod. The RSO stated that the sources were in the shielded position and the shielding integrity was not damaged. A survey of the gauge was performed by the licensee and reading observed was 2 mrem/hr on contact. The gauge was packaged and returned to the office where a wipe test was taken and the analysis will be performed by the manufacturer/distributor. There was no public health and safety threat from this incident. VRMP will review the licensee's report for corrective actions.

"Event Report ID No.: VA-15-10"

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Agreement State Event Number: 51196
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNIFER OPILA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/01/2015
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2015
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIUM-226 DISCOVERED AT SCRAP YARD

The following information was obtained from the State of Colorado via email:

"The Colorado Radiation Program [CRP] is investigating an incident at 711 S. 6th Ave. in Grand Junction, CO. A number of weeks ago, we [CRP] were asked to investigate a crushed car that was rejected at a scrap yard because it set off the radiation detector. Yesterday, [CRP] found in the car, a metal plate approximately 1.5 ft. long, 5 inches wide and less than a half an inch thick that contains Radium-226. The readings on contact with this piece of metal are higher than what our instrument could read which means it's an unknown amount, over 200 mr/hr. Last night, the item was placed in a locked room in a warehouse on the property with no one around it and [CRP] instructed the property owner to not let anyone near it.

"Today, the Colorado Civil Support Team is responding to the site to verify the isotope and try to determine the dose rate and activity. Additionally, they will help secure the source on site."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51197
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: NORTHWEST HOSPITAL, L.L.C.
Region: 4
City: TUCSON State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 10-097
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN GORETZKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO
Notification Date: 07/01/2015
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2015
Event Time: 08:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO POTENTIALLY LOST IODINE-125 SEEDS

The following information was obtained from the State of Arizona via email:

"At approximately 0800 [MST] on July 1, 2015, the licensee reported that two (2) 0.256 millicurie Iodine-125 seeds were potentially lost on June 24, 2015. The licensee stated that while implanting 84 I-125 seeds into a patient in the operating room, the doctor realized that one of the syringes, which was supposed to have two (2) I-125 seeds in it, was empty. The licensee surveyed the entire operating room and hot lab but did not locate the seeds. The manufacturer was also contacted in an attempt to see if the syringe was shipped to the licensee without the seeds in it.

"The Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] is investigating the event.

"The Governor's Office is being notified of this event."

Arizona First Notice: 15-012

* * * UPDATE ON 7/2/15 AT 1741 EDT FROM BRIAN GORETZKI TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was provided by the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via email:

"On July 2, 2015, the two lost seeds were discovered to be actually implanted into the patient. After a review of the new CT scan, the licensee was able to identify that all 84 seeds were in the patient."

Notified the R4DO (Okeefe) and NMSS Events (via email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51205
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 07:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2015
Event Time: 01:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SEISMIC MONITOR INOPERABLE

"At 0130 [CDT] on 7/8/15, the seismic monitor was found inoperable. The seismic monitor was inoperable such that emergency classification at the Alert level could not be obtained with site instrumentation. The seismic monitor was restored to operable status within 11 minutes.

"The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Part 21 Event Number: 51206
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC.
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON KLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - NOTIFICATION OF PRESSURE SEAL VALVE YOKE MATERIAL COMPLIANCE

The following information was received via fax:

"This letter provides interim notification of Crane Nuclear's investigation into ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel [B&PV] Section Ill Code design Pressure Seal Valve orders for yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings. The information required for this notification is provided below:

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Jason Klein
Sustaining Engineering Manager

Rosalie Nava
Director Safety and Quality
Crane Nuclear
860 Remington Blvd
Bolingbrook, IL 60440

"(ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect

This is an interim report. Crane Nuclear is currently investigating Pressure Seal Valve orders potentially having misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for Yokes with integral hub retaining ring designs. The material requirements are specified per Crane Procedure 03-107 which utilizes ASME B&PV Code Case N-62-7 as guidance for material classification.

"(iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

Crane Nuclear
860 Remington Blvd
Bolingbrook, IL 60440

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, is guidance for appropriate material and NDE requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62-7. A yoke incorporating a threaded hub should be treated in the same manner as a threaded retaining ring requiring the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62-7). Yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings may have been processed to material requirements without required CNI Classification per Procedure 03-107.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

Crane Nuclear Engineering initiated investigation correspondence to Crane Nuclear Director of Safety and Quality via email correspondence dated Feb 20th, 2015.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Crane has yet to determine the extent of Pressure Seal Valve designs sales order numbers (SO#) affected prior to 2001; the following Utility and Sites were supplied non-compliant CNI Procedure 03-107 Classification yokes for the following valve assemblies:

1. CNI SO# 24237-01, TVA, Browns Ferry, P.O. 00031943 - Quantity shipped = 1, Chapman, 8 [inch], Figure L953, Class 900, ASME Class 2, 95 Ed., 96 Add., no N stamp

2. CNI SO# 3950101, Georgia Power, Hatch, P.O. SNG10016537 - Quantity shipped = 3, Crane, 3 [inch], Figure 776U, Class 600, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., W71 Add.

3. CNI SO# 39745-01, Southern California Edison, San Onofre, P .0. 4500456451 - Quantity Shipped = 1, Aloyco, 4 [inch], Figure N5247PSB, Class 900, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., S73 Add.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

Crane Nuclear has completed sales orders search of Pressure Seal Valve designs with integral retaining ring hubs from 2001 to present identifying a total of 25 orders where three orders are impacted, as identified in part iv of this report (see above). Crane Nuclear is currently investigating sales orders previous to 2001, which will require an additional 30 days to complete (estimated completion date, August 6th, 2015).

Corrective action by Crane Nuclear is to review documentation of supplied material to determine if yokes can be recertified as currently supplied. A revision to Crane Nuclear Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations, and clarify classifications with applicable training, is in-process.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

Crane Nuclear is notifying sites affected and are developing a plan to address the valve items.

"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

Not applicable.

"Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager at (630) 226-4953 or Rosalie Nava, Director of Safety and Quality at (630) 226-4940."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51207
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES DUDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2015
Event Time: 08:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
BERNARD STAPLETON (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WORKER FATALITY NOT RELATED TO PLANT OPERATION

"This notification is being reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification of a fatality of an employee. Station personnel intend to notify OSHA of the individual fatality.

"At approximately 0629 [EDT] on July 8th, 2015, Control Room personnel received an emergency call requiring station medical first responders. The individual was transported offsite via ambulance. The site has been notified of the individual fatality. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related. The individual was not contaminated.

"A press release is not planned at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The individual was inside the Protected Area but not within a Radioactive Control Area.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51208
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2015
Event Time: 01:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE DIVISION 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"The following information is provided as 60-day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Division 2 emergency diesel generator (DG). The event occurred on May 11, 2015, at 0119 CDT. As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), the notification is being made via telephone.

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that actuated were:

"During the restoration from surveillance test procedure CPS 9080.25, 'DG 1B Test Mode Override, Load Reject Operability and Idle Speed Override,' the Division 2 DG automatically started. The Division 2 DG started when the maintenance technicians improperly removed a temporary toggle switch installed for simulation of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial:

"Upon receiving the simulated LOCA signal, the Division 2 DG started as expected. No additional actuations occurred.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully:

"Upon receiving the simulated LOCA signal, the Division 2 DG started and was verified to have properly started in response to a start signal.

"The NRC resident has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51211
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 15:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2015
Event Time: 14:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVELS

"Indian Point Unit 3 was manually tripped at 1427 EDT due to lowering steam generator water levels. At 1425 EDT, #31 condensate pump tripped, causing the lowering water levels. There were no immediate complications on the trip and the unit is stable in Mode 3. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as expected and is in service. All rods inserted and decay heat is being rejected to the condensers. Offsite electrical power is in service. Unit 2 is stable at 100% power."

The licensee plans on issuing a press release.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and New York Public Service Commission.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51212
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RAYMOND MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/07/2015
Event Time: 11:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE

"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

"A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on July 7, 2015 at 11:05 EDT. The issue involved a loss of cooling capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. Maintenance started repairs immediately following the discovery of the component failures and completed repairs to restore functionality of the TSC Ventilation system on July 8, 2015 at 17:07 EDT. On July 8, 2015, at approximately 15:30 EDT, further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability.

"If an emergency were declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC became necessary, the Emergency Director would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51213
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BRADLEY BRUMUND
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/08/2015
Notification Time: 21:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2015
Event Time: 18:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportability manual SAF 1.10, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"On July 8th 2015 at 1837 [CDT], it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO [Emergency Response Organization] activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"The licensee has notified the [NRC] Senior Resident Inspector of the issue."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, July 09, 2015
Thursday, July 09, 2015