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Event Notification Report for June 8, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/05/2015 - 06/08/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


51098 51099 51100 51101 51102 51105 51128 51129 51131 51132 51133 51134
51136 51137

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Agreement State Event Number: 51098
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: GENPAC, LLC
Region: 1
City: MIDDLEBURG State: NY
County:
License #: C2991
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HARMON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRED BOWER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO LOST NUCLEAR THICKNESS GAUGES

The following information was received via fax:

"Genpac, LLC reported that two NCR Systems thickness gauges, SS&D No. CA0471D102B, device model No. 103, each containing 150 millicuries of Americium-241 were unaccounted for. The loss was discovered after Genpac was contacted by the [New York State] Department in February 2015, in order to initiate their periodic License Renewal process. At that time the company requested a license termination. A phone interview revealed that the company no longer had any gauges with radioactive materials (RAM) in use and that the Radiation Safety Officer had left the company. However, they could not provide documentation showing that the RAM had been transferred to an authorized recipient. The company has no knowledge of its disposition. The sources were last identified as being on site during a Department inspection conducted on February 10, 2010. The facility failed to maintain inventories and leak testing after the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) left the company in 2010. The Department was not notified of the departure of the RSO.

"A Reactive Inspection was conducted by [New York State] Department staff on March 10, 2015. During the inspection, a thorough search of the authorized storage locations and potential storage locations for surplus equipment was completed and the devices were not located. The consequences for the potential loss of Licensed RAM was discussed with Genpac management during the exit interview. At that time, an acceptable action plan was developed in order to locate the potentially missing RAM.

"On May 15, 2015, the company management notified the [New York State] Department that they had determined that they are unable to locate these sealed sources. This comes after interviewing staff with potential knowledge of the location of the devices and an extensive in-house search of their premises, the storage out-buildings and other locations within the Genpac organization that make use of Radioactive Materials (RAM) in the United States."

New York State ID: NYDOH-15-04

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51099
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: NOT PROVIDED
Region: 4
City: NOT PROVIDED State: TX
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IODINE-125 MEDICAL SEEDS

The following report was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On May 29, 2015, a licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that it was unable to locate a package containing approximately 41.2 millicuries of Iodine-125 seeds. The package had been received at the licensee's facility on May 26, 2015, and per the licensee's procedures, it was delivered to the nuclear medicine department and left in the designated area. However, the staff in the nuclear medicine department had been allowed to leave due to a slow schedule. On May 27, 2015, when staff returned, they were unable to locate the package. The licensee conducted a facility wide search. The [licensee's] materials management employee that placed the package in the nuclear medicine department and the housekeeping employee that cleaned the department the previous night were interviewed. The housekeeper reported, [to have] not removed any boxes from the department. The licensee was unable to identify anyone else had entered the department. The facility's waste container had been picked up and taken to the landfill earlier that morning. The licensee checked with the landfill and learned it does have a radiation monitor but the container from the hospital had not set it off. The contents of the container had already been covered over in the landfill. The patient's procedure was canceled and re-scheduled. The licensee has changed its procedures for radioactive material package delivery by the facility's materials management to the nuclear medicine department to prevent reoccurrence. The licensee is continuing its search for the package. An investigation into this event is ongoing. The Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] has withheld the name of the licensee [and license number and location] in accordance with Texas state law. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9317

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51100
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: MINNEAPOLIS State: MN
County:
License #: 1007-27
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JURAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 16:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2015
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL TREATMENT TO INCORRECT LOBE OF THE LIVER

"The Minnesota Department of Health was notified on May 29, 2015, by a representative from Abbott Northwestern Hospital of a Medical Event. A patient was given 23.62 mCi of Y-90 TheraSpheres with an intended dose of 125.3 Gy to segment 4 of the liver. The 125.3 Gy dose was unintentionally given to the right lobe of the liver (segments 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8). The licensee was planning on treating the right lobe in the future. The patient and referring physician will be notified on May 29, 2015. The Minnesota Department of Health will follow-up with the licensee early next week."

Minnesota Event: MN150003

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51101
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: McCARTY LANDFILL
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CS-137 FOUND IN WASTE ENTERING A LANDFILL

The following report was received via e-mail:

"On April 13, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by a landfill operator that material in a waste container set off their radiation alarms. The landfill provided a spectrum which showed the isotope as Cesium-137. An on-site investigation by this Agency confirmed the material to be dirt/mud contaminated with Cesium-137. The waste material at the landfill was isolated. The waste collection route sheet used to collect the waste was requested by the Agency. The Agency drove the route traveled by the collection vehicle using an RSI identifier in an attempt to locate the source of the contamination. The detector indicated the presence of radiation in a bar ditch along the intersection of two streets northeast of the City of Houston. Surveys conducted by the Agency identified a reading of 16 millirem on contact with the ground in one spot. Additional surveys indicated additional activity as far as 70 feet from the spot previously mentioned. The Agency received cost estimates from contractors to collect the material from both areas for proper disposal. The city of Houston had been contacted about the contamination and the steps that had been taken by the Agency. The City of Houston decided since the area of contamination was in their jurisdiction, they would be responsible for the remediation of the area. The Agency returned to the area on the evening of May 26, 2015, to inspect the area. The Agency discovered the road the bar ditch was running along had been closed by the city at both ends. There are no homes or businesses that require access to this section of road. The contractor was contacted on May 29, 2015. He stated they had begun work on remediating the area on May 21, 2015. He stated the road was blocked by the Houston City Works Department on that day. He stated they had dug down about 3 feet from the original surface of the ditch. He stated readings on contact at that location are 1 rem/hr. He stated they had come across a water line while they were digging and that it has restricted their use of tools. He stated that due to the dose rates they are seeing now (1 rem/hr) they are now using a low pressure water blaster to excavate the area. He stated they are sucking the water into barrels and monitoring the suction line for dose rates. He stated they would contact the state once the source has been located.

"On May 29, 2015, the Agency decided that due to the city closing the road to any access, the event should be reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO.)"

Event location: Near the intersection of Sunbury and Bacher Streets.

Texas Event: I-9303

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Agreement State Event Number: 51102
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: 03096
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/29/2015
Notification Time: 18:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING CS-137 SOURCE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On May 27, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] that while performing a routine survey of its source storage area, it discovered that a Barium-137 generator, originally containing 50 millicuries of Cesium-137, had leaked. The licensee investigated and found small amounts of the Cesium had been tracked into its office area (floor only and it has been remediated) and some of the licensee's work vehicles. Employees' vehicles were surveyed and no contamination was detected. The licensee continues its surveys of tools, tool boxes, and other items in the trucks. The area where the generator was stored is a restricted area (security). Access has been further restricted for greater than 24 hours due to the contamination. The licensee is working to identify and remediate all contamination outside the storage room before beginning to remediate there. The licensee has placed the generator into a type A drum to contain the material. The licensee was unable to determine the source or cause of the leak prior to placing it in the drum. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident: I-9316

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51105
Rep Org: MISTRAS GROUP
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP
Region: 4
City: PRUDHOE BAY State: AK
County:
License #: 12-16559-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEREMY DUNNING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/30/2015
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2015
Event Time: 22:10 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK IN GUIDE TUBE

"The equipment supporting the collimator, guide tube, and extension tube fell from a height of 9 feet causing the guide tube to become entangled in the piping below. [The guide tubes fell on equipment below and the short radius bends prevented source retrieval.]

"Equipment Involved:
7 foot flexible guide tube Serial Number GT060
7 foot flexible extension tube serial number EXT-15
Exposure device model: Sentinel Delta 880D, serial # D11876
Isotope: Ir-192, source Serial Number 17211G
Source Activity: 102.3 Ci
35 foot Control Assembly S/N 16681

"Place: Salt Water Treatment Plant, Central Operating Area, Prudhoe Bay, Alaska

"Actions taken to establish normal operations: The radiographer extended his restricted area and contacted the plant operator to inform him of the situation. He and the assistant radiographer then maintained security of the restricted area throughout the duration of the event. At no time did any member of the public enter the restricted area. The Radiation Safety Officer was contacted by the radiographer and arrived on the scene at 2320 hours [AKDT]. Remote handling tools were used to untangle the guide tube and extension tube. Once the equipment was properly laid out the source was retracted to the shielded position using the control assembly.

"Corrective actions taken and planned to prevent reoccurrence: Retrain personnel on setup techniques with an increased focus on the stabilization of equipment.

"Qualifications [and dose] of personnel involved in incident:
(1) IRRSP card holder, dose received, 7mR
(2) Assistant Radiographer, dose received, 17mR
(3) IRRSP card holder, dose received, 2mR
(4) Jeremey A. Dunning, Site Radiation Safety Officer, IRRSP card holder, Source Retrieval trained by LAMCO & Associate February 25, 2011, dose received, 23mR (Dosimeter)"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51128
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WARREN PAUL
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS
Notification Date: 06/05/2015
Notification Time: 14:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2015
Event Time: 19:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The following was received via phone call and email:

"This 60-day report, as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of containment isolation valves.

"At 1930 EDT on May 24, 2015, a loss of power to Reactor Protection System (RPS) Train B occurred. Initial investigation found the RPS Motor Generator (MG) Set B not running, with its Motor Off light illuminated caused by both Normal EPA breakers and MG Set B output breaker being tripped. Visual inspection at the distribution cabinet was inconclusive at the time and revealed no abnormalities and no abnormal odors in the area. Further investigation of the RPS MG Set B verified normal voltages on all fuse clips, and all power and control power fuses were operational.

"As a result of the loss of RPS B, the following containment isolation valves closures occurred: Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Outboard Isolation valves, Torus Water Management System (TWMS) Outboard Isolation valves, Division 2 Drywell Pneumatics Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring System Inboard and Outboard Isolation valves, Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Flow Outboard Isolation valves, and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Inboard Isolation Valves.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 51129
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HOMER
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS
Notification Date: 06/05/2015
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2015
Event Time: 18:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - INCORRECT PART NUMBER RELAY SHIPPED TO BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT

The following is an excerpt of communication received via fax:

"Summary:
Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 04/13/15 upon discovery that governor control panels shipped to Brunswick Nuclear Plant contained an incorrect part number relay. The evaluation was concluded on 06/05/15 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR Part 21. Under certain adverse conditions, a panel with the incorrect part number relay may lose power thereby resulting in inoperability of the electronic control portion of the control system. This could prevent the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety-related function during an emergency event.

"Discussion:
The relay in question is the Governor Control At Setpoint (GCASP) relay installed in the governor control panel assembly P/N 8002096-PANEL. The panel provides speed control functions for the emergency diesel generator (EDG). In the original panel design the part number specified was 219XBX282NE. During the course of EMC testing, it was determined that the EMI suppression diode within in the GCASP relay must be removed in order for the EUT to comply with the requirements of [International Electrotechnical Commission] IEC 61000-4-5. When the diode was installed and the negative polarity portion of surge testing forward biased the diode, this resulted in a short circuit connection between the supply and return conductors of the control panel's power. This caused the fuses designed to protect the panel from overcurrent conditions to fail open; resulting in a loss of power to the control panel.

"In place of the EMI suppression diode, a [Metal Oxide Varistor] MOV (P/N V150LA10AP) was added across terminals 6 & 7 of the GCASP relay socket. The MOV provides similar EMI suppression to the removed diode and responds appropriately to either polarity of surge waveform. The MOV is external to the relay and is considered a separate component. The MOV is not affected by this notification.

"Removal of the internal EMI suppression diode for the GCASP relay resulted in a part number change. The relay part number that should have been installed is P/N 219XBX283NE. The part number of the relay actually installed was P/N 219XBX282NE. The difference between the two relays is that P/N 219XBX282NE contains an internal suppression diode whereas 219XBX283NE does not.

"Impact on Operability:
During normal operating conditions, the EDG will perform its safety related function with the incorrect GCASP relay installed in the governor control panel. Both relays provide the same switching function.

"However, if a negative polarity surge similar to the requirements of IEC 61000-4-5 were to occur on the 125 VDC bus with the incorrect relay installed, the control panel may lose power. The 27GP relay would de-energize, alerting plant personnel of an under-voltage condition within the governor control panel. The EDG would remain operable on the mechanical governor though the electronic control portion would be inoperable.

"Root cause evaluation:
An error by a technician in conjunction with a lapse in oversight allowed this problem to occur. Contributing to the issue was that only one digit differentiates the two part number relays and both have the same overall appearance (size, shape, case style, etc).

"Evaluation of previous shipments:
This issue only affects one part number (qty 4) supplied on one customer purchase order.

"Corrective Action:
The customer was advised of the situation via letter 'Notice of GCASP Relay Discrepancy - Governor Control Panel' sent on 04/15/15. The correct relays were then supplied to the customer as dedicated, safety-related replacements on ESI IWO 8002474 (Brunswick PO 00786240) for installation in the panels. There are four panels affected, each containing one of these relays. ESI supplied four replacement relays which were [Certificate of Conformance] C-of-C'd and shipped on 04/17/15. These are plug-in style relays and to replace the relay only requires pulling out the old relay and plugging in the new relay. No special tools or instructions are necessary."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51131
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE PEAK
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/05/2015
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2015
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL TO THE 'A' STEAM GENERATOR

The following information was provided via email and telephone.

"Fort Calhoun Station is currently completing a scheduled refueling outage. On June 5, 2015 at 1330 during performance of surveillance testing on the auxiliary feed water system, [Hydraulic Control Valve] HCV-1107A, Steam Generator RC-2A Auxiliary Feedwater Inlet Valve, did not open when given an open signal. HCV-1107A has been declared inoperable. HCV-1107A is required to open to meet the decay heat removal safety function for Steam Generator A. Fort Calhoun Station is in Mode 3 (Reactor Coolant System temperature is greater than 515 degrees Fahrenheit and not critical). With HCV-1107A inoperable and unable to feed the A steam generator both auxiliary feedwater trains are considered inoperable. HCV-1107A is inside the Containment Building.

"Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specifications 2.5(1)D. requires:
With both AFW trains inoperable, then initiate actions to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status immediately. Technical Specification (TS) 2.0.1 and all TS actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

"Fort Calhoun Station is evaluating the best approach to repairing HCV-1107A.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified"

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CHARLIES SMITH TO RICHARD SMITH AT 2300 EDT ON 06/05/2015 * * *

"Fort Calhoun Station has determined plant cooldown required to perform repairs. Plant cooldown in progress."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Whitten)

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Part 21 Event Number: 51132
Rep Org: THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC
Licensee: MIRION TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BARNES
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS
Notification Date: 06/05/2015
Notification Time: 18:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - POSSIBLE SAFETY DEFECT IN NON-INSTALLED POWER RANGE DETECTOR AT PALISADES

The following is an excerpt of a report that was received via email:

"This letter provides information concerning an evaluation performed by Thermo GammaMetrics LLC, a part of Thermo Fisher Scientific, regarding potential noncompliance of our dual uncompensated ion chamber power range detector.

"Based upon the evaluation, Thermo Gamma-Metrics has determined that a Reportable Condition under 10 CFR Part 21 exists for plant listed herein. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from Thermo Gamma-Metrics' preliminary evaluation of this issue.

"An evaluation [was] performed by Thermo Gamma-Metrics LLC, a part of Thermo Fisher Scientific, regarding potential noncompliance of our dual uncompensated ion chamber power range detector.

"Based upon the evaluation, Thermo Gamma-Metrics has determined that a Reportable Condition under 10 CFR Part 21 exists for [Palisades]. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from Thermo Gamma-Metrics' preliminary evaluation of this issue.

"The detector in question is in storage at Entergy Palisades and has not yet been installed in their Power Range Systems per discussion with [the System Engineer at Palisades].

"A potential defect has been identified by Mirion IST. Thermo Gamma-Metrics cannot determine by itself if the potential defect would represent a substantial safety hazard to Entergy Palisades if installed in a safety related application.

"We supplied just one potentially defective part from [Mirion] IST to Palisades. [Mirion] IST may have supplied two other potentially defective parts to other vendors per discussions with [Mirion IST.]

"The immediate corrective action is for Thermo Gamma-Metrics to notify Entergy and the NRC of this potential defect. Thermo Gamma-Metrics notified Entergy Palisades on June 2, 2015.

"Thermo Gamma-Metrics will supply a final report on this issue by July 2, 2015 that details the plan for all corrective actions.

"Entergy Palisades should review the letter from Mirion IST. Thermo Gamma-Metrics will help the utility to address and remedy the situation before the power range detector is installed in the power plant."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51133
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: STEVE CHURCHILL
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS
Notification Date: 06/06/2015
Notification Time: 17:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2015
Event Time: 12:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION

The following was received via fax and phone:

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with Exelon Reportabllity manual SAF 1.1 0, 'Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities', and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"On June 6th 2015 at 12:13 [CDT], it was determined that the onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System Supply Fan belts had failed, resulting in loss of ventilation for the facility. Repairs were not completed within the time required had the TSC needed to be staffed. There is currently no emergency event in progress requiring TSC staffing. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with
applicable site procedures.

"The licensee has notified the Senior Resident Inspector of the issue."

*** UPDATE PROVIDED BY TODD CASAGRANDE TO NESTOR MAKRIS AT 2305 EDT ON 06/06/2015 ***

"After repairs were completed, the TSC ventilation was restored to service at 2300 [EDT] on 06/06/2015.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R3DO (Passehl) via email

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Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Event Number: 51134
Rep Org: DIABLO CANYON
Licensee: PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
Region: 4
City: AVILA BEACH State: CA
County: SAN LUIS OBISPO
License #: SNM-2511
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-26
NRC Notified By: JEREMY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/06/2015
Notification Time: 23:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/06/2015
Event Time: 17:03 [PST]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Event Text

NOT MEETING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO INCORRECT LOADING OF CASKS

'On June 6, 2015, during a review of Independent Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) cask loading, plant personnel discovered that for two casks, preferential loading was not used during uniform loading as required by ISFSI Technical Specification 2.1.2, Uniform and Preferential Fuel Loading.'

'ISFSI Technical Specification 2.1.2 requires that a preferential fuel loading configuration (i.e., that fuel assemblies with the longest cooling times shall be loaded into peripheral fuel storage locations) is used during uniform loading. Preferential loading was only partially met for two casks, designated MPC-253 and MPC-257. For these two casks, fuel assemblies with the longest cooling times were placed in the four center cask locations, which are only ones allowed for those assemblies containing control rods.'

'Engineering has performed an evaluation and determined that the fuel casks remain in a safe and analyzed condition.'

'There is no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.'

'The NRC resident inspector has been informed.'

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51136
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: NESTOR MAKRIS
Notification Date: 06/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/07/2015
Event Time: 07:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM TURBINE TRIP ON LOW OIL PRESSURE

The following was received via phone and fax:

"On June 7, 2015, at 0735 CDT, the Unit 2 Reactor automatically tripped while operating at 100 percent power due to an automatic Turbine trip due to low bearing oil pressure. The crew entered the reactor trip emergency operating procedure and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip. All safety functions operated as designed. The automatic Reactor trip is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated to start the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps as designed on low narrow range Steam Generator level and provided makeup flow to the Steam Generators. The Auxiliary Feedwater actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Steam Generator levels have been returned to normal. Auxiliary Feedwater has been secured. Steam Generators are being supplied by [the] 22 Main Feedwater Pump and decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. The cause of the Turbine trip remains under investigation. There was no effect on Unit 1 as a result of this trip. The health and safety of the public and site personnel were not at risk at any time during this event.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51137
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RONNIE WALTERS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 06/08/2015
Notification Time: 00:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2015
Event Time: 22:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2015
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
ALLEN HOWE (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 92 Power Operation 92 Power Operation

Event Text

FIRE IN PROTECTED AREA LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES

At 2359 EDT on June 7, 2015, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event in accordance with Emergency Action Level HU4 for a fire in the protected area lasting greater than 15 minutes. The fire started in the wiring of a terminal box for Electro Hydraulic Pump C, the running pump located in the turbine building. The running pump was then deenergized by operators and the standby pump started. The site fire brigade responded and extinguished the fire. The emergency was terminated at 0030 on June 8, 2015.

The licensee notified state and local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Whitten), NRR EO (Howe), and IRD (GOTT).

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA via email.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, June 08, 2015
Monday, June 08, 2015