| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/02/2015 - 06/03/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 51090 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: PIONEER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, LLC
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02451-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DARREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/26/2015
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/26/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE
The following report was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via email:
"On the afternoon of May 21, the Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] received a call from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) who explained that their portable moisture density gauge had been involved in an accident at a construction site in Barrington, IL. The gauge operator had been briefly called away from the device and during his absence, the device was struck by a piece of heavy machinery. The RSO indicated that the operator had gathered up the pieces and put them into the transportation case and was in the process of returning the broken device to the company's Chicago storage facility at the time of the RSO's notification. Pictures provided by the RSO showed that the rod which contained the Cs-137 was significantly bent some 4 inches from its end and was no longer in its shielded position. The operator secured the device in a remote location upon his return to the storage facility that night until Agency inspectors could be dispatched to the location.
"The next morning, inspectors arrived at the storage location and conducted surveys including field leak tests of the sources. Those tests showed no leakage of radioactive material but determined that elevated radiation levels of up to 60 [millirem/h] were present at the surface of the transportation case. After providing additional storage suggestions, the pieces of the gauge were reconfigured and secured at the site. Dose rates were lowered to 16 [millirem/h] near the surface of the case and less than 1 [millirem/h] at 1 foot by those efforts.
"The gauge manufacturer was contacted and asked to provide a shipping container and additional shielding for return of the damaged device. When those materials are received, Agency inspectors will return to the site and verify the gauge is properly packaged and documented for return. This item remains open at this time pending this additional action and receipt of the licensee's written report which is due in 30 days.
"Device manufacturer: Troxler
Model Number: 3430
Serial Number: 68332
Device activity content: 0.008 Ci - Cs-137, 0.040 Ci - Am/Be
"Illinois Event Number: IL15011" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51091 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BRITT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/26/2015
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351 AND EN #50998
* * * UPDATE ON 05/26/15 AT 1745 EDT FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147[foot] elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104).
"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"CR 10074859"
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2017 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 [foot] were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL.
- An issue was identified with the wall separating the el. 112 [foot] Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Station Battery Room 1B, FA 1005.
- An issue was identified with the wall separating the Station Battery Room 2A, Fire Area (FA) 2004 from the Station Battery Room 2B, FA 2005, on el. 112 [foot].
"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10077573 & 10077574."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO(O'Donohue).
* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *
"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 [foot] elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104).
"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10074859."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Rose). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51106 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/31/2015
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2015
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO FAILURE OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 1600 [EDT] on May 31, 2015, [DC Cook] operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 1 to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G, when the 14 day limit to complete Condition B Required Action could not be met.
"At 0010 [EDT] on May 18, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was removed from service for planned maintenance. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered which allows 14 days to restore diesel to operable.
"At 1049 [EDT] on May 21, 2015, Unit 1 AB Emergency Diesel Generator tripped during post maintenance testing due to high bearing temperatures. Subsequent actions to repair and restore the diesel to operable status have been unsuccessful.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, as a four (4) hour report. The DC Cook Sr. Resident NRC Inspector has been notified."
Unit 1 is expected to be in Mode 5 by 2030 EDT on June 1, 2015. There is no impact on Unit 2.
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS PEAK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 6/1/15 AT 1704 EDT * * *
"This update is to correct the information contained in the block titled 'Power/Mode After'. The power and mode after the event requiring notification (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INABILITY TO RESTORE UNIT 1 AB EDG WITHIN THE COMPLETION TIME PRESCRIBED IN LCO 3.8.1 CONDITION B) was 99% power and mode 1.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
D.C. Cook Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 and conducting a normal cooldown to Mode 4.
Notified R3DO (Passehl).
* * * UPDATE FROM CHRIS PEAK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0734 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *
"DC Cook Unit 1 reactor was shut down (Mode 3) at 0231 hours [EDT] June 01, 2015 and achieved Mode 5 at 0410 hours [EDT] June 02, 2015 to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G with all systems operating normally.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Passehl). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51112 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JACK MCCOY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 06/02/2015
Notification Time: 02:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2015
Event Time: 21:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"At 2111 [CDT] River Bend Nuclear Station sustained an Automatic Reactor Scram due to low Reactor Water Level (Level 3). The plant is currently stable, with level being maintained in a normal band of 10 - 51 inches with Condensate and Feedwater. Reactor Pressure is in the prescribed band of 500-1090 psig. The plant is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, and will remain in Mode 3 until investigation of the scram is complete. The transient began with a trip of Reactor Feed Pump 'A', followed by a Reactor Scram and a trip of Reactor Feed Pump 'C'. Reactor water level was recovered with Reactor Feed Pump 'B' to a normal post scram level band. There was a problem noted with the Reactor Feedwater Master Level Controller; this was mitigated by the Operator placing the controller to manual. There was no subsequent Level transient. Reactor Pressure was stabilized in normal pressure band with Turbine bypass valves. During the transient, a Reactor Recirculating Flow Control Valve Runback was not received as expected. Reactor Recirculating Pump 'A' responded as expected to transient [switching to low pump speed], Reactor Recirculating Pump 'B' tripped during transient. A Level 3 isolation signal was received, all expected isolations occurred.
"The cause of the transient is currently under investigation."
The reactor is stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed via turbine bypass valves, and a normal electrical line up.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JACK MCCOY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0712 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *
"At 2231 on 6/1/15, Reactor Water Cleanup System isolated on High Reactor Water Cleanup System Heat Exchanger room temperature due to loss of Turbine Building chill water during the initial transient. All Reactor Water Cleanup System Valves isolated as expected. Reactor Water Cleanup was the only system affected by this isolation signal."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Whitten). | |