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Event Notification Report for May 22, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/21/2015 - 05/22/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50998 51069 51083

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50998
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately 1/4" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)

- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately 1/4" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058276; CR 10058278

"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)

- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)

- A gap 1/2" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A 1/4" x 1/2" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058277

"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration.

- A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040).

- At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal.

- A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10060228"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

-An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

-A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10061830"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).


* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016.

"The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.
2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.

The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016):
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D.
4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10062254"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

"The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).
1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D.
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below).

"The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018).
4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall 1/2 inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 1/2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10062955"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G).
- Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G)
- Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105).
- Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10063642"

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.
- In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 [inch] deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
- In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066678"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A).

- A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066844"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025).

- Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10067163"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL.

"An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013.

- A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068138"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).


* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows;

- A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068842"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).
- A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10069898; CR 10069995"

The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE FROM R.S. STONE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/15 AT 1807 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, the following discrepancies were identified with the wall separating the Unit 1 Working Floor, Fire Area 0001, from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008 that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H553C.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 1/8 inch wide x 1/2 inch tall x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the foam block out, below penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 3 inch x 3 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around a 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduit.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around 1-1/2 inch continuous run and 1-1/4 inch continuous run conduits.

2 inch deep gaps in the grout around 1-1/2 inch and 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduits.

A 1/4 inch hole x 1 inch deep gap in the grout around penetration 1Z43H060C.

A 1/4 inch x 1/4 inch x 2 inch deep gap around the annulus of a 1-1/4 inch continuous run and 2 inch continuous run conduits.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10070439"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE ON 1638 EDT ON 05/21/15 FROM GUY S. GRIFFIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, the following discrepancies were identified in the Unit 1 Control Building 130[foot] elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- Six 3[inch] x 3[inch] holes in the wall of the Men's Rest Room (separating Fire Areas 0014M and 1104). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Deficiencies were also observed in the Diesel Generator Building 130[foot] elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- Through-wall gap around the conduit that passes through penetration 2Y43H511D on the south wall of the U2 Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 2F (separating Fire Areas 2408 and 2409). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10073041; CR10073187"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Ernestes).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51069
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 05/13/2015
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2015
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)

Event Text

INCORRECT DOSE RECORDED ON PRESCRIPTION DIRECTIVE

"This is a notification, pursuant to 10 CFR 35.3045(a)(1), of a medical event that occurred at the VA Salt Lake City Health Care System, Salt Lake City, Utah.

"On February 24, 2015, a dosage of 30.8 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide (capsule form) was administered to a patient for a thyroid ablation. The prescribed dosage on the written directive was incorrectly annotated as 3 millicuries.

"The basis for identifying this as a medical event is the administered dosage differed from the prescribed dosage, as annotated on the written directive, by more than 20 percent.

"The medical event was discovered today (May 13, 2015) during an inspection, conducted by the National Health Physics Program (NHPP).

"Interview of the Radiation Safety Officer revealed the standard dosage for a thyroid ablation is 30 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide (capsule form). Interview of the authorized user (a physician) revealed the intended prescription was for 32 millicuries of I-131 sodium iodide (capsule form).

"No biological harm to the patient is expected since the thyroid ablation was successfully performed. The patient and attending physician were not informed of the incorrect annotation on the written directive since the thyroid ablation was successfully performed, as clinically intended, with a dosage of I-131 sodium iodide (capsule form) within an acceptable range of the authorized user's intent.

"The inspection is ongoing with causal factors and corrective actions being developed. Additional information will be provided in a 15-day written report, to be submitted to NRC Region III. National Health Physics Program notified NRC Region III (Patricia Pelke, Chief, Materials Licensing Branch Chief) of the medical event by telephone.

"The Department of Veterans Affairs holds NRC License No. 03-23853-01VA, a master materials license. Permits are issued under the license to Veterans Health Administration facilities. The VHA permit number for the facility involved in this medical event is 43-03299-01. National Health Physics Program makes required notifications to NRC. "

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51083
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JACK McCOY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/21/2015
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2015
Event Time: 03:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DC ELECTRICAL ROOM HEAT LOAD CALCULATIONS NOT UPDATED AFTER NEW INVERTERS INSTALLED

"At 0309 CDT on May 21, 2015, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, the shift manager was notified of a condition that could potentially lead to the failure of safety-related inverters in the DC electrical distribution system. This condition was identified while reviewing completed probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) calculations. It was discovered that control building ventilation system heat load calculations were not updated when new AC/DC inverters, with significantly higher heat output, were installed in 2007. Since the heat load calculations were not updated, it was not realized at the time that, under post-accident conditions involving a specific single failure, the DC electrical equipment rooms (i.e., inverters and battery chargers) could exceed their design basis ambient temperature, potentially leading to the failure of the inverters or battery chargers, and the loss of DC power in both divisions of the distribution system. The postulated scenario is the loss of offsite power (LOP)/loss of coolant accident (LOCA), followed by the failure of a single emergency diesel generator. If within 20 minutes prior to the onset of the event, the control building ventilation system had been shifted to the division in which the emergency diesel generator successfully started, the chiller in that division would, by design, be prevented from re-starting for as much as 20 minutes by its anti-recycle feature. (That feature limits successive starts of a chiller to prevent over-heating the motor.) The other chiller in that same division must be manually aligned for service, so it is not assumed to be available for these purposes. During the period in which the anti-recycle timer is running, no chiller would be in service, and the actual heatup rate of the inverters/battery charger could lead to room temperatures in excess of their design basis assumptions. As stated above, this condition (no ventilation cooling) would only exist for a maximum of 20 minutes from the time the associated divisional chiller was started, concurrent with a LOP/LOCA and a single failure. After expiration of the 20 minute timer, the chiller would perform the required function and lower room temperatures as expected. For best estimate PRA purposes, River Bend assumes an equipment survivability criteria of exposure to temperatures above 122 degrees F, but below 150 degrees F, for up to four hours. This is based upon the industry Station Blackout guidance of NUMARC 87-00, which was endorsed by the NRC as the basis for industry response to the Station Blackout Rule. This condition exists only after planned chiller swap and can be mitigated by opening the door to the inverter room should a LOP/ LOCA occur prior to the expiration of the 20 minute timer. Measures are in place for a dedicated operator to perform this function pending a modification to resolve the issue.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as the potential loss of the safety function of the DC electrical distribution system."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 22, 2015
Friday, May 22, 2015