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Event Notification Report for May 18, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/15/2015 - 05/18/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50998 51048 51049 51050 51051 51052 51056 51057 51058 51059 51071 51073
51074 51075

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50998
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately " tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)

- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately " tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058276; CR 10058278

"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)

- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A " x " defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058277

"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration.

- A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040).

- At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal.

- A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10060228"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

-An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

-A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10061830"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).


* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016.

"The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.
2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.

The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016):
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D.
4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10062254"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

"The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).
1. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D.
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below).

"The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018).
4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10062955"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G).
- Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G)
- Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105).
- Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10063642"

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.
- In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 [inch] deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
- In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066678"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A).

- A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066844"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025).

- Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10067163"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL.

"An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013.

- A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified.
- A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068138"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).


* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows;

- A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10068842"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional:
- A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A).
- A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).
- A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L).

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10069898; CR 10069995"

The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

* * * UPDATE FROM R.S. STONE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/15 AT 1807 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, the following discrepancies were identified with the wall separating the Unit 1 Working Floor, Fire Area 0001, from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008 that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

A inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H553C.

A inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 1/8 inch wide x inch tall x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the foam block out, below penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 3 inch x 3 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around a 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduit.

A inch x 1 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around 1-1/2 inch continuous run and 1-1/4 inch continuous run conduits.

2 inch deep gaps in the grout around 1-1/2 inch and 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduits.

A inch hole x 1 inch deep gap in the grout around penetration 1Z43H060C.

A inch x inch x 2 inch deep gap around the annulus of a 1-1/4 inch continuous run and 2 inch continuous run conduits.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10070439"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51048
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MANUEL DIAZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

INDIUM-111 SOURCE LOST IN TRANSIT

A consolidated package was shipped to New York on April 7. When the shipment arrived it was missing one of the packages within the consolidated shipping container. At the time of shipment, the package contained 12.7 mCi of In-111 (half-life 2.8 days). The package was a UN 2915 Type A with a 0.1 TI (transportation index) and a weight of 3 lbs.

An investigation was conducted with the common carrier. The package was not located. It was declared lost on April 21.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51049
Rep Org: HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Licensee: HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-03075-07
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SATYA BOSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

CONTAMINATION DETECTED IN SOURCE STORAGE ROOM IN 2008

The following is excerpted from statements recorded by the RSO on Aug 26th, 2009, concerning contamination discovered by the licensee in [the source storage room] Feb/Mar 2008, of their facility:

"1. A source being held in storage was discovered to have external contamination about Feb/Mar 2008. The source was being prepared for an upcoming disposal of sources. The source was in storage in a vault in the [source storage room at their facility]. This room is primarily used to do survey meter calibrations.

"2. When the contamination was discovered the techs were directed to not use the room. Any activities (detector calibrations) requiring that area were conducted by the RSO. The area was evaluated for contamination. Spots of contamination were found and found to exist only in the back room area. Decontamination of the area was done. The room was back into use for all techs to use by the summer of 2008.

"3. [The RSO] was made aware of the question of personnel contamination the spring of 2009. A device to assess such contamination is not readily available. A scanner to assess any such contamination does exist at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center. [The RSO] has recently made contact with the Commander in charge of the unit and have obtained information necessary to have access to the device. The basic detail for access is a cost of $1200 to have a scan performed.

"4. There are policies and procedures in place to deal with contamination.

"5. The question of contamination has only been raised recently and through the union as a grievance. An assessment of any contamination requires the availability of the device to obtain the information. Access to a scanner has been found and steps are to be taken to schedule the scan. The initial step will be the approval and allocation of funds to pay for the scan. Then arrangements can be made to have access to the Bethesda Naval Medical Center in order to do the scan."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51050
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: DAE & ASSOCIATES LTD
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03923
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

"A representative of the licensee called [the Texas Department of State Health Services] and stated that two weeks ago a Troxler 3430 (sn 24971) had gone missing. He [the licensee] could not find it after calling his service companies and employees. He further said that the serial numbers for the sources are 75-3877 and 47-17874. He does not know what the activity of these sources is. He says that he will begin a written report. Further information will be provided in accordance with SA300 guidelines."

The licensee notified the Houston Police Department (report #0496748-15).

Texas Incident #: I-9312

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51051
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA - LOS ANGELES
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2015
Event Time: 10:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING LESS THAN THE PRESCRIBED DOSE DELIVERED TO PATIENT

The following report was received from the State of California via email:

"At approximately 1000 PDT on May 5, 2015, a medical event occurred during a Y-90 Therasphere procedure. The prescribed dose to the organ (liver) was 12,000 rem, but the delivered dose was 6,920 rem. This event meets the 10 CFR 35.3045(1)(i) 24-hour report criteria since the dose differed from the prescribed dose by more than 50 rem to an organ (5080 rem under dose) and the total dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more (42% under dose). Although the equipment indicated the entire dose had been delivered to the patient, a large amount of the dose was is still in the tubing and vial and had not actually been delivered to the patient as indicated. The licensee will contact the manufacturer to assist in finding the root cause of the malfunction to determine whether it was an equipment malfunction, operator error, or both. The treating physician is also the prescribing physician. The licensee has contacted the physician to verify if the physician has notified the patient and if there was any effect on the individual from this event. The licensee will provide the written report within 15 days as required which will also describe what actions will be taken to prevent reoccurrence."

California Report Number: 050616.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 51052
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: METRO METAL RECYCLING, LLC
Region: 1
City: WATERVLIET State: NY
County:
License #: C3062
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL D. SOUCIE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN THERMO FISHER XRF ANALYZER

The following information was received from the New York Department of Health [DOH] via fax:

"The Department of Health (DOH) became aware of this incident on 5/6/15. The DOH phoned the Vice President of Metro Metal Recycling, LLC on an unrelated detail of license C3062 renewal. The licensee stated on 5/6/15 that he did not need the license anymore because on 1/27/15, his Thermo Fisher XRF, Model XLP 818, Serial Number 13149, had been stolen. He had not contacted DOH to report the stolen XRF, which contained 30 millicuries of americium-241. He did notify Colonie Police and obtained a police report. He e-mailed a copy of the police report and photographs of a damaged metal fence to DOH. The police report states that an unknown person broke the lock to their gate, broke an office window and entered the office where they stole the XRF from an unlocked desk drawer. There was no surveillance video. The guard dogs have access to the metal storage area but not the office area. The Vice President was sent an e-mail requesting additional information."

The Thermo Fisher XRF (X-Ray Fluorescence) Analyzer is used to identify metal alloys.

NY Event Report ID No.: NY-15-03

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51056
Rep Org: CARDINAL HEALTH NUCLEAR PHARMACY
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH NUCLEAR PHARMACY
Region: 3
City: DUBLIN State: OH
County:
License #: 34-29200-01MD
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN HILL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/08/2015
Notification Time: 08:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2015
Event Time: 05:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
BARRY WRAY (ILTA)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS

The following event occurred in Kansas City, MO.

The corporate office of Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy was notified that a vehicle being used to deliver material to the VA [Veterans Affairs] Hospital in Kansas City, MO had been stolen at approximately 0540 CDT on 5/8/2015. Inside the vehicle were two packages, each containing Tc-99m. The maximum combined activity of the Tc-99m in the two packages was less than 250 millicuries.

Both VA security and the Kansas City, MO police were notified. VA security is reviewing security videos for possible leads. The Kansas City, MO police case number is 15-31091.


* * * UPDATE FROM DAN HILL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1052 EDT ON 5/8/2015 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail:

"The vehicle was located in Overland Park, KS by the police in Overland Park. Cardinal Health Kansas City sent drivers to retrieve the vehicle. It is now back at the Cardinal Health Kansas City nuclear pharmacy as of 0935 CDT on May 8, 2015. Packages containing radioactive materials in the vehicle with tamper resistant seals are intact and unopened."

Apparently the vehicle was stolen by a patient of the VA Hospital. The identity of this individual was able to be confirmed.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski), ILTAB (Wray), and NMSS Events Notification..

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51057
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: TONY ENGLAND
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (NMSS)

Event Text

INADVERTENT INTRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL INTO THE PROTECTED AREA

"On May 7, 2015, at 1515 hours, B&W NOG-L Security management determined alcohol had been inadvertently introduced into the Protected Area through the shipping and receiving process. 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) requires that the licensee report to the Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery, the use, sale distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area. The item in question was a six pack of bottled beer which was part of a box of promotional items personally delivered by a sales representative from Graybar Electric.

"The B&W employee addressee first became aware of the package through an email and voicemail left by the salesman advising of a package delivery and indicating the presence of alcohol in the package. The B&W employee immediately contacted Shipping and Receiving management at approximately 1300 hrs. in an effort to intercept the package before delivery; however the package had already been processed into the Protected Area.

"Shipping and Receiving Management contacted the delivery driver via radio and instructed the driver not to deliver the package. The delivery driver separated the package from the delivery items. The package was removed from the Protected Area and returned to the Shipping and Receiving Manager located in the Owner Controlled Area at approximately 1500 hrs. The package was returned unopened. B&W Security Management was notified of the incident at approximately 1515 hrs.

"All items processed through Shipping and Receiving undergo security x-ray inspection. Containers of liquid are commonly processed items and therefore did not create an elevated level of suspicion which would have led to the officers conducting a visual inspection.

"B&W NOG-L Management will conduct an evaluation of the incident to include root cause analysis and corrective actions to prevent recurrence."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 51058
Rep Org: BROOKE ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: BROOKE ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 42-01368-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID BYRD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/08/2015
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 11:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST IODINE-125 SEED

"On May 7, 2015, [Command Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO)] was notified by Brooke Army Medical Center [BAMC] Pathology that they could not find a I-125 seed. The seed was from a radioactive seed localization procedure for a breast biopsy. [The licensee's] Health Physics Service sent two personnel to investigate the loss and attempt to find the seed. After tracking the chain of custody and attempting to find the seed [the licensee] concluded that the seed was thrown away into the bio-hazard waste in pathology with the specimen tray.

"On May 6, 2015, the pathologist transferred a biopsy specimen from a receiving tray to an examination tray. [The pathologist] then discarded the receiving tray in the bio-waste and used an RSL [radioactive seed localization] node seeker to confirm seed presence in the specimen. [The pathologist] misread the meter, marking on the seed tracking chain of custody form that the seed was present. [The licensee] examined the radiograph of the specimen, taken just before arriving at pathology, and found that the seed was on the edge of the biopsy specimen. [The licensee] believes the seed fell into the receiving tray upon transfer of the specimen and the seed was discarded along with that tray.

"The bio-hazard waste was disposed after this point, [approximately] 0600 [CDT] on May 7, 2015. On May 7, 2015, during clinical examination of the specimen and during the procedure to extract the seed, the pathologist could not find the seed. The RSO was called at this point and the investigation began. [The licensee] notified our environmental services branch and the waste disposal company to notify them that they may encounter a radioactive seed.

"The seed is I-125. The initial activity was 0.300 mCi on March 27, 2015, and was 0.185 mCi as of May 7, 2015.

"Today, BAMC Health Physics Service conducted an inventory and has accounted for all other I-125 RSL seeds besides the one mentioned in this email. [The licensee] will retrain the pathology section on proper procedures and conduct an in-service on how to read the RSL node seeker for confirming the presence of the seeds. [The licensee] will also discuss with pathology additional physical measures that can be implemented to ensure this does not happen again.

"[The CRSO] will send a full report along with memorandums and status on measures taken to prevent future occurrences."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 51059
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RIO TINTO MINERALS / U.S. BORAX
Region: 4
City: BORON State: CA
County:
License #: GLD57
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/08/2015
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER STUCK OPEN ON A FIXED GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of California via email:

"At 1510 [PDT] on May 7, 2015, the licensee notified us [California Radiation Control Program] that the shutter on their belt weight scale on the Coarse Gangue Belt in Plant 1 is stuck in the open position. This is a generally licensed device (Berthold Technologies, Model: LB300L, s/n: 17729-1061-10003 containing 18 mCi Cs-137). The shutter malfunction was initially found during their six month shutter check in October 2014, however, the licensee only became aware of the reporting requirement last week when they contacted the manufacturer to repair the device. The device is in a restricted area 100 feet above the ground on a conveyance structure. The source is below the belt and the beam path is upward with no real exposure potential to any personnel in the area. The only way to access the belt and the source is via a catwalk which is not in the beam path. The dose rate on the catwalk is approximately 0.4 mRem/hr."

CA 5010 Number: (Date Notified): 050715

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51071
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM FAIRCLOTH
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 05/15/2015
Notification Time: 07:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2015
Event Time: 04:36 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO 2 AC INVERTERS INOPERABLE

"Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was found tripped at 0436 [CDT]. As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment were declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 0530 [CDT]. No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 95 % power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 1136 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51073
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DWAYNE LEGLER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/15/2015
Notification Time: 21:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2015
Event Time: 17:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

INADVERTENT SIREN ACTUATION

"A South Texas Project Offsite Emergency Notification siren was [inadvertently] going off. The Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified the Emergency Response organization at the station that a siren had actuated during a severe thunderstorm moving through the area. Station personnel are addressing the issue with the siren.

"The Matagorda County Sheriffs office was the only offsite agency that was contacted during this event."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51074
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM FAIRCLOTH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/15/2015
Notification Time: 23:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2015
Event Time: 21:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/16/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO 2 AC INVERTERS INOPERABLE

"Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was found tripped at 2148 [CDT]. As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment were declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 Volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 2244 [CDT]. No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 99% with power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 0448 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

See EN #57071 for an earlier T/S required shutdown required at 0436 CDT on 5/15/15, due to the same conditions.

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Part 21 Event Number: 51075
Rep Org: CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON
Licensee: CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON
Region: 4
City: THE WOODLANDS State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ADAM MOHR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/17/2015
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 03/18/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

The following information was received by facsimile:

"This report is being provided as an interim report in accordance with 10CFR 21.21.

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Adam Mohr; President, Fabrication and Manufacturing; CB&I; One CB&I Plaza; 2103 Research Forest Drive; The Woodlands, TX; 77380.

"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

This is an interim report. The deviations being evaluated pertain to deficiencies identified within the Measuring and Test Equipment program at Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) Laurens, 366 Old Airport Road, Laurens, SC.

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

This is an interim report. The construction activities for the V.C. Summer [Units 2 and 3] and Vogtle AP1000r [Units 3 and 4] nuclear projects, which include procurement of the piping assemblies, are being performed by CB&I Power, 128 S. Tryon St., Charlotte, NC 28202.

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

This is an interim report. The evaluations of vendors and previously performed calibrations is under evaluation and equipment in question is being re-calibrated by an approved lab and evaluated for extent of condition. Additionally, causal analysis is being performed that is expected to provide relevant information pertaining to the cause of the deviations and if any quality assurance breakdowns may have occurred that could have produced a defect. Evaluation of the condition is expected to be completed by June 26, 2015.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

The discovery date of the deviations that require evaluation is March 18, 2015, based on the nonconformance reports and C/PAR that identify the deviations. Evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 was not able to be completed within the 60 day evaluation period. Additional time is needed to collect additional data pertaining to the identified nonconformances, perform causal analysis, and complete the evaluation.

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured. or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

No basic components have been determined to fail to comply or contain a defect. This is an interim report.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

No basic components have been determined to fail to comply or contain a defect. This is an interim report.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity. Or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

None at this time.

"(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

Not applicable."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, May 18, 2015
Monday, May 18, 2015