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Event Notification Report for May 8, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/07/2015 - 05/08/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50998 51023 51024 51025 51046 51047 51053 51054 51055

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50998
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/20/2015
Notification Time: 21:26 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 90 Power Operation 90 Power Operation

Event Text

THIS IS A CONTINUATION OF EN #50351

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020)

- At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately " tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K)

- Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately " tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058276; CR 10058278

"The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M)

- A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M)

- A gap " wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A " x " defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104)

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired.

"CR 10058277

"The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

- A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration.

- A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040).

- At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal.

- A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10060228"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

-An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

-A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10061830"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).


* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016.

"The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.
2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016.

The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016):
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D.
4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, " long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.
8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR 10062254"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).

"The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014).
1. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D.
3. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below).

"The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018).
4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above.
5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D.
6. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D.
7. An opening between the conduit and the wall inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10062955"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G).
- Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G)
- Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105).
- Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10063642"

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.
- In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 [inch] deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
- In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
- In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

"The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066678"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

* * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

"During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A).

- A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F.

"The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

"CR10066844"

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

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Agreement State Event Number: 51023
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: SGS NORTH AMERICA
Region: 4
City: BARTLESVILLE State: OK
County:
License #: OK-32124-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/29/2015
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE STUCK OUTSIDE THE CAMERA

The following report was received via e-mail:

"[The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality was] notified by SGS North America, Inc. Industrial Division (OK-32124-01) that one of their crews experienced an equipment failure on April 1, 2015 while working at a temporary job site in Oklahoma. The failure, a drive cable break, made it impossible for the crew to retract the source. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was called to the site and was able to cut the drive cable sheath and successfully retract the source. SGS is licensed for source recoveries. Investigation is ongoing."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 51024
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/30/2015
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2015
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

VALVE CLASSIFIED AS ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY FAILED TO OPERATE AS DESIGNED

"On April 29, 2015 at 1000 [EDT], it was reported to EH&S [Environmental Health and Safety] that the spring loaded valve on the deionized (DI) water line, which supplies rinse water to an in-line gamma monitor in the conversion scrap recovery area, was found to have the spring-return damaged such that the valve would not automatically return to the closed position when released. This valve is listed as IROFS ADUSCRA-102. While production activities had already ceased in preparation for a Special Nuclear Material (SNM) inventory and planned maintenance outage, liquid wastewater processing activities were on-going.

"Liquid wastewater processing activities were immediately stopped, and EH&S was notified of the event by phone and the 'Redbook' reporting system (Redbook Issue #68460). At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment.

"The safety function of this IROFS is to automatically close when released by hand to prevent possible backflow of Uranium-235 containing wastewater into the DI water supply and potentially to an unfavorable geometry tank. During this time, IROFS ADUSCRP-153, a three-way valve that prevents the commingling of wastewater and DI water, remained available and reliable to prevent potential backflow of the wastewater into the DI water supply. Based on available IROFS, this accident sequence was 'Unlikely' (a failure probability of 10E-3), and not 'Highly Unlikely' (a failure probability of 10E-4 or less), and therefore does not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 [which requires that an accident sequence be 'Highly Unlikely']. The actual configuration remained safe at all times, and no external conditions affected the event. A process upset would have to occur to enable a potential backflow condition, and the remaining IROFS would have had to simultaneously fail.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:
As stated above, the process was shut down, and the upstream DI water valve was locked closed. After evaluation and with EH&S approval, maintenance replaced the valve and a functional test was completed. The event was reviewed in the conversion huddle meetings held before the start of each shift, and operations initiated a check to validate the operability of the spring loaded valve after each use until a long term corrective action is in place. Operating Experience is being shared with the site and industry personnel.

"An Extent of Condition inspection was performed for all safety-significant spring loaded valves. All other valves functioned properly.

"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #100267824."

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Agreement State Event Number: 51025
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MAYO CLINIC
Region: 3
City: ROCHESTER State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHERRIE FLAHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 04/30/2015
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL UNDERDOSE

The following was received from the State of Minnesota via email:

"Please note the medical event reported today to the Minnesota Department of Health Radioactive Materials Unit by Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN.

"The licensee reports that on April 29, 2015, a male patient was treated with Y-90 TheraSpheres. The written directive prescribed 62.1 mCi of Y-90 (120 Gy dose). The administration proceeded as expected with the assistance of interventional radiology and nuclear medicine. As part of the procedure, the licensee uses a survey meter to survey the Y-90 microsphere vial to determine that microspheres have been administered to the patient. The procedure was described as 'uneventful' and following the initial flushing the dose rate from the vial/tubing had not decreased to zero. The physician continued with three additional flushes as part of the normal procedure. The vial/tubing dose rate did not reduce to zero.

"The waste material was collected and counted according the manufacturer's instructions. The licensee determined approximately 33% of the Y-90 activity was not delivered to the patient. Administered activity was estimated to be 41.85 mCi (84 Gy). Physicians anticipate no negative impact to the patient since the 'tumoricidal' dose, according to the manufacturer, is 80-150 Gy,

"The patient has been notified. The referring physician was out of town on the day of the event and the licensee notified his fellow.

"The licensee is continuing with an investigation.

"The Minnesota Department of Health considers this investigation open and will provide more information will be as it becomes available."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51046
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANCISCO MERCADO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 07:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SHUTDOWN FOR AN UNISOLABLE STEAM LEAK

"At 0700 on 5/7/15, Indian Point Unit 3 commenced a shutdown due to the inability to isolate a steam leak on a feedwater instrument line.

"Offsite power is available.

"Indian Point Unit 2 is unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power.

"The NRC Resident Inspector, the NYISO (New York Independent System Operator), and NY Public State Commission have been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51047
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 05:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 27 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP

"This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 shutdown required by Technical Specifications.

"At 0509 CDT on 5/7/2015, 1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped during transfer of 1B 4160V bus to 1B unit auxiliary transformer. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 Condition A was entered for loss of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop. Unit 1 reactor was shut down per operating procedures and entered Mode 3 at 0740 CDT.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Part 21 Event Number: 51053
Rep Org: QUALTECH NP
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)

Event Text

POTENTIAL PART 21 INVOLVING STRUTHERS DUNN RELAYS WITH CONTACT RESISTANCE GREATER THAN ONE OHM

The following is excerpted from a report submitted by QualTech NP, Nuclear Division, Curtiss-Wright Corporation:

"Subject:

"PSEG reported failures for Struthers Dunn 219BBX200 relays related to greater than 1 ohm contact resistance. Two relays were evaluated by Exelon Power Labs. Of these, one had a failure consisting of a contact resistance greater than one ohm. Struthers Dunn has also provided an evaluation in this regard and does not agree with the failure mode as inferred in the Exelon Power Labs report.

"Lab and OEM report key difference:

"The Power Labs' Report(s) shows fiberglass fiber(s) embedded into gold plated contacts on one relay believed to result in a contact resistance greater than one Ohm (1.7 Ohm Max). The second relay, from stock, had evidence of fiberglass present but was not considered to have affected functionality.

"The Struthers Dunn evaluation suggests that the fiber embedded on the gold contact is not at the mating point of the contacts and should not impact operability. Struthers Dunn also indicates that the relay's application is operating below their minimum current.

"Discussion:

"The actuator board on the evaluated relays is manufactured from a printed circuit board (PCB) type fiber board. The fibers from the edges of the board could become airborne. [. . . ] this specific board material was utilized beginning in March 2010. Since there have been no prior reports of this issue, it is possible that the 2010 material change introduced a foreign materials exclusion (FME) concern. Since then, and solely for those relays manufactured in the USA, the material changed again in November 2014 and was incorporated into the products starting January 2015. The newest version of the actuator board is a molded material that does not contain fiberglass fibers.

"Struthers Dunn relays with base part numbers 219, 236, 237, and 255 have the common PCB type fiber board. This fiber board was used in relays with date code 1009 through 1452 with or without letter suffix (where the letter indicates made outside of the USA).

"Customer Input:

"1st 219 series relay failed due to contact issue, considered a random failure & discarded. 2nd 219 series relay failed due to contact resistance & sent to Exelon Power Labs. Five parts from inventory bench tested. One had high resistance and it was sent to Power Labs

"Note: All parts provided were 100% functionally tested for contact resistance during dedication process and passed testing at QTNP.

"Vendor Input:

"Struthers Dunn has, since 2010, experienced only one field complaint (PSE&G) on continuity issues related to fiberglass on these 219 relays. The material change to ULTEM 2300 was considered an ongoing quality/process improvement process to reduce potential defects proactively. Over the four years using this PCB type material, 13,000 relays were sold.

"Struthers Dunn has also questioned the application having current below the manufacturer's recommended value of 50mA, requiring bifurcated contacts. Please see their attached report and current product catalog for details.

"Recommendation:

"The root cause of the failure is inconclusive. Exelon Power Labs said 'The irregular contact surface patterns in conjunction with the presence of the embedded fiberglass fibers are the most likely cause of the excessive resistance. This finding is considered to be a manufacturing defect.' While the manufacturer sees the failure as a misapplication of its product and that the fiber 'was not located at the 'mating point' of the 2 contacts so therefore has no effect on the performance of the contacts or relay.'

"QualTech NP recommends an application review for the named relays. A review of the Exelon Power Labs reports and the vendor's report should also be completed by the utility to evaluate the impact on the safety function."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51054
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT TUTICH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A BOATING ACCIDENT ON THE STATION COOLING LAKE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. Operations received a report from Security that a fishing boat has capsized on the station cooling lake. At 1530 [CDT] the LaSalle County Operating Department was notified that the LaSalle County Coroner confirmed that there was a fatality. The Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), LaSalle County Sheriff, Seneca Rescue Team, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 51055
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: JOHN DEVENNEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 05/07/2015
Notification Time: 18:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2015
Event Time: 17:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"Today at 1727 EDT, an automatic scram from a turbine trip occurred. The cause of the turbine trip is currently under investigation. All rods inserted into the core and all systems functioned as expected during the scram.

"The event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation."

Plant response to the scram was uncomplicated and the plant is stable in Mode 3.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, May 08, 2015
Friday, May 08, 2015