Event Notification Report for May 04, 2015
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/03/2015 - 05/04/2015
EVENT NUMBERS
51195510405104151088
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51195
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM PLOWER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TOM PLOWER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/01/2015
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 20:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2015
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 20:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM PARTIAL ACTUATION
"On May 4, 2015 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, during performance of the 'A' channel Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) monthly functional test, an invalid 'A' channel AFAS actuation occurred. The monthly functional test resulted with AFAS-1 in a half trip condition. Due to a poor contact on a manual actuation switch, a pathway was dropped out causing the partial AFAS actuation to occur. The faulty mechanical switch was replaced and the post maintenance testing was satisfactory.
"The partial AFAS actuation resulted in the successful start of 'A' AFW electric driven pump and the opening of its motor control valve, feeding the 'A' steam generator. The system responded to the invalid actuation as designed.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this notification of the invalid actuation is provided in lieu of a written LER."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On May 4, 2015 with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, during performance of the 'A' channel Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System (AFAS) monthly functional test, an invalid 'A' channel AFAS actuation occurred. The monthly functional test resulted with AFAS-1 in a half trip condition. Due to a poor contact on a manual actuation switch, a pathway was dropped out causing the partial AFAS actuation to occur. The faulty mechanical switch was replaced and the post maintenance testing was satisfactory.
"The partial AFAS actuation resulted in the successful start of 'A' AFW electric driven pump and the opening of its motor control valve, feeding the 'A' steam generator. The system responded to the invalid actuation as designed.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this notification of the invalid actuation is provided in lieu of a written LER."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51040
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/04/2015
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2015
Notification Time: 21:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 14:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"On May 4, 2015 at 1439 [EDT], during maintenance activities on Unit 2 Zone 3 fan discharge exhaust dampers, the control room received a low DP [Differential Pressure] alarm and other confirmatory indications of a loss of building DP.
"Secondary Containment DP was restored after approximately 2 minutes. The fan exhaust dampers are outside the isolation dampers, therefore, there was no impact on the SGTS [Standby Gas Treatment System] ability to drawdown secondary containment.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3. section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On May 4, 2015 at 1439 [EDT], during maintenance activities on Unit 2 Zone 3 fan discharge exhaust dampers, the control room received a low DP [Differential Pressure] alarm and other confirmatory indications of a loss of building DP.
"Secondary Containment DP was restored after approximately 2 minutes. The fan exhaust dampers are outside the isolation dampers, therefore, there was no impact on the SGTS [Standby Gas Treatment System] ability to drawdown secondary containment.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3. section 3.2.7, as a loss of a Safety Function. There is no redundant Susquehanna Secondary Containment System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 51041
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ANTON PESTKA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ANTON PESTKA
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/05/2015
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 03:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2015
Notification Time: 00:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 03:20 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On May 4, 2015 at 0320, seismic monitoring (SM) system force balance accelerometer R0006 was determined to be non-functional due to an emergent equipment failure. On May 4,2015, at approximately 1600, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability.
"This specific accelerometer functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with accelerometer R0006 out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition is in-progress.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS). On May 4, 2015 at 0320, seismic monitoring (SM) system force balance accelerometer R0006 was determined to be non-functional due to an emergent equipment failure. On May 4,2015, at approximately 1600, further review of this equipment failure and the related impact to the capability of the SM system determined that this was a reportable loss of emergency assessment capability.
"This specific accelerometer functions to provide indication that the Operational Basis Earthquake threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event and is used in the PVNGS Emergency Plan to perform classification for emergency action level HA1.1, Natural or Destructive Phenomena affecting Vital Areas. As a compensatory measure, PVNGS procedures for seismic event evaluation provide alternative methods for HA1.1 event classification with accelerometer R0006 out of service. Maintenance to correct the condition is in-progress.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."
Agreement State
Event Number: 51088
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: ELEKTA, INC.
Region: 1
City: HAMPTON State: VA
County:
License #: GA-1153-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: ELEKTA, INC.
Region: 1
City: HAMPTON State: VA
County:
License #: GA-1153-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2015
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRANSPORTABLE HIGH DOSE RATE UNIT DAMAGED WHILE BEING UNLOADED
The following report was provided by the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:
"On May 4, 2015, a transportable HDR [high dose rate] unit (Elekta microSelectron Model 106.900, serial number 14514) licensed for use by a Virginia licensee was damaged while being unloaded from its transport trailer. The source activity at the time was approximately 8 curies of IR-192. The damage appeared to be limited to the unit's covers. The licensee contacted Elekta, Inc., (which performs work in Virginia under reciprocal recognition of its Georgia license) and a field service engineer was sent to investigate. The service engineer found the head covers and collar cover were broken and other damages, but tests indicated the unit functioned properly. New covers were ordered. During the following week the source was uploaded into an emergency container while the covers were replaced. After the source was returned to the HDR it was found to be stuck in the safe. A kink was found in the cable and a new source was ordered. A source exchange was scheduled on May 19th, but the source could not be manually unloaded as before. Instead, it had to be removed from the back of the HDR. The frayed cable was cut and the source was placed in the emergency container by the service engineer. The source fell to the bottom of the emergency container and the service engineer could not retrieve it. The container was placed in storage at the Virginia licensee's facility after additional shielding was placed around it to reduce the exposure rate to 200 microR/hour. The dose received by the service engineer as a result of the event was estimated by Elekta, using a worst case scenario, as 327 mrem whole body. The service engineer's dosimeter was sent to the dosimetry supplier for an emergency evaluation. Elekta has contacted the source manufacturer (Alpha-Omega Services) [AOS] to assist in the retrieval of the source from the emergency container and to send it to AOS for further investigation. Elekta will provide additional information as it investigates the event.
"Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-15-06"
The following report was provided by the Virginia Department of Health via facsimile:
"On May 4, 2015, a transportable HDR [high dose rate] unit (Elekta microSelectron Model 106.900, serial number 14514) licensed for use by a Virginia licensee was damaged while being unloaded from its transport trailer. The source activity at the time was approximately 8 curies of IR-192. The damage appeared to be limited to the unit's covers. The licensee contacted Elekta, Inc., (which performs work in Virginia under reciprocal recognition of its Georgia license) and a field service engineer was sent to investigate. The service engineer found the head covers and collar cover were broken and other damages, but tests indicated the unit functioned properly. New covers were ordered. During the following week the source was uploaded into an emergency container while the covers were replaced. After the source was returned to the HDR it was found to be stuck in the safe. A kink was found in the cable and a new source was ordered. A source exchange was scheduled on May 19th, but the source could not be manually unloaded as before. Instead, it had to be removed from the back of the HDR. The frayed cable was cut and the source was placed in the emergency container by the service engineer. The source fell to the bottom of the emergency container and the service engineer could not retrieve it. The container was placed in storage at the Virginia licensee's facility after additional shielding was placed around it to reduce the exposure rate to 200 microR/hour. The dose received by the service engineer as a result of the event was estimated by Elekta, using a worst case scenario, as 327 mrem whole body. The service engineer's dosimeter was sent to the dosimetry supplier for an emergency evaluation. Elekta has contacted the source manufacturer (Alpha-Omega Services) [AOS] to assist in the retrieval of the source from the emergency container and to send it to AOS for further investigation. Elekta will provide additional information as it investigates the event.
"Virginia Event Report ID No.: VA-15-06"