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Event Notification Report for January 9, 2015

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/08/2015 - 01/09/2015

** EVENT NUMBERS **


50712 50722 50725 50726

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 50712
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER ORF
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/01/2015
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2015
Event Time: 19:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MAIN CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR DID NOT PROPERLY LATCH

"During [surveillance] checks of Control Room doors, a boundary door did not latch after being accessed until the door was opened and closed. This is being reported as it could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The door is currently closed and latched. The door was in this condition for between 5 and 10 seconds."

The licensee notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Town of Waterford and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY THOMAS CLEARY TO JEFF ROTTON ON 01/08/2015 AT 1539 EST * * *

"Upon further review, Millstone Power Station Unit 2 has concluded that there was no loss of safety function, because even with the control room door latch degraded, the control room door and its closing mechanism would still be able to maintain the control room envelope's boundary intact. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 50712 is being retracted.

"The basis for this conclusion will be provided to the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Jackson).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50722
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LUKE HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/08/2015
Notification Time: 10:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2015
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 45 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH CHANNELS OF REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK INSTRUMENTATION

"At 0400 [EST], Indian Point Unit 3 entered LCO 3.5.4 Condition C due to both Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Low Low Level Alarm channels failing. The failure was a result of freezing in the instrument lines. LCO 3.5.4 Condition C requires at least one channel of RWST Low Low Level Alarm be restored to Operable within 1 hour. At 0500, Unit 3 entered Condition D due to the required action and completion time of Condition C not being met. This requires the unit be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours. This failure also has resulted in a loss of safety function. Operators rely upon the RWST Low Low Level Alarms during an accident to alert them of the need to transfer injection from the RWST as a source of water to the containment sump. At 0700, Indian Point Unit 3 commenced a shutdown to be in compliance with the requirements of LCO 3.5.4 Condition D. Investigation and repair efforts were immediately put in place to correct the failure and return the function to operable. At 1000, one Channel of RWST Low Low Level Alarm was returned to operable. LCO 3.5.4 Conditions C & D were exited. The shutdown was stopped and safety function was restored. Unit 3 remains in a 7-day shutdown [LCO action statement] for one RWST Low Low Level Alarm Channel inoperable as per LCO 3.5.4 Condition B.

"Unit 2 is unaffected and remains at 100% power."

The State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector were notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50725
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/08/2015
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2015
Event Time: 16:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOW LEVEL TRITIUM SPILL

"On January 7, 2015, at approximately 0700 CST, a leak to the environment was identified. Tritium was present at a concentration of 7.52E-3 uCi/mL, which is above the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water standard of 20,000 picocuries per liter. No other radioactive isotopes were identified. The leak rate was estimated at approximately 0.5 gpm and determined to be from the condensate head tank. Water was accumulating on the concrete-lined reactor/refuel air zone air intake plenum with some accumulation of water on the ground in the area. The intake plenum contains three floor drains. Actions were immediately taken to terminate the leak once the flowpath was identified. The flowpath was terminated two hours and 45 minutes after identification. Based on system review and analysis, any tritiated water that would have made it to the floor drains would then be mixed with incoming raw water at two million gallons per minute. This mixed volume of water would then be circulated through the plant and discharged to the river with a resultant tritium concentration that is much less than detectable levels and well below US EPA drinking water standards. The station has established increased monitoring of groundwater at designated sample wells.

On January 8, 2015, at approximately 1645 CST in accordance with TVA procedures and the guidance of NEI 07-07 [Nuclear Energy Institute] for the Groundwater Protection Initiative, the licensee notified the Alabama Radiological Protection Department and Alabama Department of Environmental Management. The Limestone County Emergency Management Department will be notified."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Part 21 Event Number: 50726
Rep Org: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC.
Licensee: AZZ - NUCLEAR LOGISTICS INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/08/2015
Notification Time: 18:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2015
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

POTENTIAL FAILURE OF SBM TYPE SWITCHES

The following is a summary of information that was provided by the reporting organization via facsimile:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (b), AZZ - NLI [AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc.] has provided written notification to the affected licensees of the potential failure of GEH SBM type switches manufactured (by GEH) [General Electric - Hitachi] in the period from January 2012 to December 2014.

"This condition has been reported in GEH document SC 14-19 (dated Dec. 11, 2014) in which GEH notified their affected licensees of the potential failure of SBM type switches, manufactured and shipped January 2012 through December 2014, due to incorrect installation of a conical spring. AZZ - NLI procured and dedicated commercial grade SBM type switches, manufactured during this time-frame, and subsequently provided to: Exelon - Peach Bottom; OPPD - Fort Calhoun; TVA- Watts Bar; KHNP [Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power].

"On the basis of our evaluation, it is determined that AZZ - NLI does not have sufficient information to determine if the subject condition would, or has, created a Substantial Safety Hazard or would have created a Technical Specification Safety Limit violation as it relates to the subject plant applications.

"Therefore, purchasers are being advised to perform a visual inspection of the switches at the earliest opportunity to determine if the condition exists.

"The following information is provided per 10 CFR 21.21(d) (4). Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Tracy Bolt, Director of Quality Assurance, AZZ - Nuclear Logistics Inc., 7410 Pebble Drive, Ft. Worth, TX 76118"

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, January 09, 2015
Friday, January 09, 2015