Event Notification Report for October 13, 2014

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A SPURIOUS OVERPOWER / DELTA TEMPERATURE SIGNAL

"Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped at 0758 [EDT] hours on 10/13/2014, due to a spurious overpower/delta temperature signal on all three channels. The cause of the spurious signal is unknown at this time. Currently, reactor coolant system temperature is being maintained stable at 546 [F] degrees. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically initiated as designed on low-low steam generator level following the trip. All systems responded as expected with the exception [both] of the intermediate range neutron indication[s], which was determined to be under-compensated. The source range indication did not automatically energize and was energized manually. All other systems operated as required.

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of reactor protection system activation and 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(3)(iv)(A) for 8-hour notification of automatic actuation of auxiliary feedwater. The NRC resident has been notified of this event and is on site.

"There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination events."

There was no testing in progress when the reactor trip occurred. The reactor trip was considered uncomplicated. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being released via main feedwater and the condenser steam dumps. Normal offsite power is available. There was no effect on Surry Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee is investigating the cause of the overpower/delta temperature actuation.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - DROPPED CONTROL ROD DURING REFUELING OPERATIONS

"At 1530 CDT on 10/13/14, Cooper Nuclear Station will make a press release to the local media. This press release is with regards to the control rod blade which was dropped over the core during refueling operations when the control rod blade fell from the lifting tool and came to rest on the reactor vessel top guide in a section that contained no fuel. This press release was authorized at 1327 CDT."

The control rod was dropped on 10/11/2014. There was no damage to the reactor fuel. The control rod is being replaced and is in the spent fuel pool.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A MISSING FIRE BARRIER

"As part of a fire modeling analysis evaluating a missing fire barrier reported in ENS notification 50475 (a gap where the ventilation duct passes through the wall from the Bus 150/160 room to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump room), an additional missing fire barrier was identified. The barrier is related to separation of redundant pressurizer heater banks credited for safe shutdown. For Fire Area 32 (AFW pump room), Group E Pressurizer Heaters are credited for safe shutdown because Group A and Group B Pressurizer Heater cables could be affected by a fire in this area. It was determined that a cable associated with the Group C, D, and E Pressurizer Heaters is routed in Fire Area 32. Therefore, a fire in Fire Area 32 could affect all five Pressurizer Heater Groups. An evaluation has previously demonstrated that Mode 3 Hot Standby could be maintained with no charging pumps or pressurizer heaters available, but it has not been determined if Mode 5 could be achieved. Therefore, this missing fire barrier meets the reporting criteria for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"The protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue. Unit 1 is in mode 6 and no fire has occurred. Compensatory measures (fire watches) are in place for Fire Area 32.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

Unit 2 has a different cable routing and is not affected.

HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION DEGRADED ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITY

"During the plant response to the trip of the B Recirculating water pump, reactor water level rose to the HPCI [High Pressure Core Injection] high water level trip setpoint as indicated on the associated instrumentation. With this high water level trip actuated, the HPCI high drywell pressure initiation signal would not have allowed the HPCI system to perform its intended safety function if required. If the HPCI system received the low water level initiation signal, the system would have been able to perform Its intended safety function. This high water level signal was actuated from 1935 [EDT] until reset at 1940 [EDT]. This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)."

The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY DAVID CALLAN TO JEFFREY HERRERA AT 1404 EDT ON 12/08/14 * * *

"Further review has determined that the condition was not a result of procedural errors/inadequacies, equipment failures, or design / analysis inadequacies. Plant systems responded as per design when the HPCI system high water level trip actuated when reactor vessel water level rose to the HPCI high water level trip setpoint. HPCI initiation has two logics: one for low-low vessel water level and the other for a high drywell pressure. A vessel low-low water level is an indication that reactor coolant is being lost with a need for HPCI injection for core cooling. High drywell pressure could indicate a line break in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary inside the drywell. The HPCI level instrumentation is designed to shut down the HPCI system upon high water level to prevent HPCI turbine damage due to gross moisture carryover and will re-initiate HPCI if vessel water level drops to the initiation water level setpoint. A HPCI high drywell pressure initiation signal, above setpoint, would have made up the logic for HPCI initiation and as per design, HPCI would have injected at the vessel low low level setpoint without operator action to reset the trip. In this instance, the trip was reset as prescribed by station procedures. HPCI was capable of performing its safety function after the high water level trip reset either by operator action or instrumentation (low low level initiation)."

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Rogge).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE GAUGE STOLEN AND LATER RECOVERED

The following report was received via e-mail:

"Yesterday, we [North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services] had a stolen gauge incident here in NC. The gauge was recovered the same day. The gauge in question is a Troxler portable nuclear gauge, model 4640B. This gauge has a sealed source with 9 milliCuries of Cesium 137. We have uploaded a record of this incident to NMED. Our local incident number for this event is NC140039.

"What follows is a brief narrative supplied by one of our inspectors:

"At 0745 [EDT] this morning [a North Carolina inspector] received a phone call from the assistant to the RSO at Barnhill Contracting:

"At approximately 2300 [EDT] October 13, 2014 on exit 22 off I-95 in Lumberton, NC, one of their trucks with a PNG [portable nuclear gauge] was stolen. The employee had stepped away from the truck to speak with the project foreman when an individual jumped into the truck and drove off. The Lumberton police and the RSO were contacted. The RSO contacted the Division of Emergency Management at 919-825-2500. The RSO travelled to the site. The truck, with the gauge still locked and secured, was located by the Lumberton Police within about an hour and a half. The individual ran from the scene when the police located the truck. It appears the only thing stolen was the light from the top of the truck. The gauge was still securely locked in the metal box on the back of the truck. There were no injuries reported. The RSO again notified the Division of Emergency Management that the gauge had been found. [The assistant RSO] will forward a copy of the police report (#14-42002) to [the State] when she receives it."