Event Notification Report for April 10, 2014

PART 21 - BARTON MODEL 288A AND 289A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH DEFECT

Cameron Measurement Systems is reporting a defect affecting versions of the Barton Model 288A and 289A differential pressure indicating switches and spare switch assemblies for these products. The defect being reported is an out of specification concentricity issue with the roller that actuates the switches. This represents a switch setpoint repeatability concern.

Any additional safety significant issues that might be identified in our ongoing investigation will be addressed in subsequent advisories that will be published. If you have any questions please contact Chuck Rogers, Director of Quality and Safety, at (281) 582-9507 or Jim Greer, Engineering Manager, at (800) 291-3550.

* * * UPDATE AT 1626 EDT ON 6/9/2014 FROM CHUCK ROGERS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was excerpted from an e-mail:

"Cameron has performed switch setpoint repeatability testing which has verified that rollers, even those with out of tolerance run-out, can meet the published 0.25% repeatability specification as long as the roller moves freely along the switch operating cam. However, if the roller were to 'skid' or 'skip' on the cam, or rotate when the roller is off the cam due to vibrations such that the roller does not return to the exact same radial position when it's on the cam at the switch setpoint there may be a setpoint shift unless the roller has no run-out. A change in the switch setpoint could be as much as ñ0.32% even for the current run-out specification of 0.0003 inches. As such, given that Cameron could ship product with switch repeatability verified to be 0.25% during production testing and that an additional 0.32% could be possible due to the allowable roller run-out, a field performance of 0.57% is possible. Given wear and other uncertainties Cameron would recommend that a user consider a conservative field repeatability value for switch setpoint calculations.

"An important piece of information that was gleaned from the current testing effort is that switch repeatability testing is very dependent on the sensitivity of the calibration equipment utilized. Most calibration pressure sources and measurement displays have lags in the indication of the actual pressures applied that can cause errors and, even more critical, is the lag that occurs between the operator's response to the indication of the switch trip and the reading of the pressure source display. Cameron discovered that the observation of the indicator pointer (properly calibrated) is more accurate in verification of switch repeatability than any pressure source and electrical switch contact monitoring device we utilized. Once the switch setpoint is established, a pencil mark at this trip point on the indicator scale can be utilized to verify subsequent trip points.

"In conversations with customers that called to discuss the original Advisory concerns, Cameron became aware that some users may believe that the Model 288A and 289A switch performance is not impacted by changes in the environment where they are located. The Barton qualification for these products was a radiation augmented mild environment test program. A sample of products was exposed to 3 Mrads of radiation and then subjected to a 12G maximum seismic simulation. The products performed within specification for this limited testing at standard factory environmental conditions. In our opinion, field calibrations and switch setpoint testing should be performed at the same temperature conditions as expected when the instruments are required to perform their safety functions. Performance testing at one temperature may not necessarily ensure appropriate performance at another temperature.

"If you have any questions, want to place an order for a replacement instrument, switch actuation arm (with roller) or a switch and plate assembly, or want to begin the RMA process for an instrument factory repair please contact Mabel Loo, Customer Service Manager, Cameron Measurement Systems, City of Industry, CA at (800) 291-3550."

Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Freeman), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Werner), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A DEAD DUCK FOUND ON SITE

"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant personnel discovered the remains of what appeared to be a deceased duck on plant property. The cause of death was not immediately apparent, no work was ongoing within the vicinity at the time. Notifications to the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the Division of Fish and Wildlife will be made for this discovery. This event is reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

Plant personnel could not determine if the duck was an endangered species.

PROCESS GAUGE WITH SOURCE EXPOSED

The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email:

"The assistant RSO of BP Husky refinery called the Ohio Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Protection [Department] at 0933 EDT on April 10, 2014 to report an incident that happened overnight.

"Thermo Fisher had been contracted to remove an old Ohmart gauge for disposal. During the removal of the gauge, the gauge and the gauge rigging fell. The gauge was still attached to the source well and was being removed as a single unit. The damaged gauge fell and became stuck inside the vessel tower skirt. During the fall, the gauge was damaged and the source became exposed. The dose rate from the device is 640 mRem/hr at 1 ft. The area, which is located inside a secured refinery, is roped and barricaded. No personnel were injured during the incident.

"The gauge is an Ohmart SHRM-BW. It contained 1000 mCi of Cs-137 when installed in 1966.

"The Department sent an inspector to the site to observe the source and gauge recovery efforts on April 10, 2014. VEGA (the successor company of Ohmart) sent a field service representative to provide technical assistance. As of 1830 CDT on April 10, 2014, efforts to return the source to the shielded position were unsuccessful.

"The Department continues to monitor efforts to secure the source in a shielded position."

* * * UPDATE FROM KARL VON AHN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/11/14 AT 1556 EDT * * *

"At 1530 EDT on April 11, 2014, the BP Husky Refinery RSO called the Department to report that the VEGA and Thermo Fisher service personnel were able to retract the sealed source back into the shielded position. A preliminary check of the sealed source leak tests did not indicate any leakage of the sealed source."

Notified R3DO (Pelke) and FSME Events Resource.

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A LICENSED EMPLOYEE

A licensed employee violated the site Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) policy. The affected individual will be evaluated under for-cause FFD testing. The employee's plant access has been suspended.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

* * * UPDATE AT 0100 EDT ON 04/25/14 FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided additional clarifying information.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. Notified R3DO (Cameron).

PART 21 - MODEL 1154HP TRANSMITTERS WITH INTEGRAL 1159 REMOTE DIAPHRAGM SEALS MAY EXHIBIT DEGRADED FUNCTIONAL RELIABILITY

"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b), Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that certain Model 1154HP transmitters with integral 1159 Remote Diaphragm Seals may exhibit degraded functional reliability.

"The standard maximum working pressure for Model 1154 transmitters with integral 1159 Remote Diaphragm Seals is 2000 psi.

"Per the unique requirements of Point Beach Nuclear Generating Station, Model 1154HP5RAGN0080 pressure transmitters with integral 1159A50AS0111 Remote Diaphragm Seals were manufactured to operate at a non-standard maximum working pressure of 2750 psi.

"Once installed in the field, two transmitters exhibited unexpected drift in the output signal when operated at line pressures of approximately 2235 psi.

"To date there are no known additional reported functional reliability issues with other Model 115x Series transmitters with integral 1159 Remote Diaphragm Seals in a similar configuration.

"RNII does not have complete information relating to specific plant applications and therefore cannot determine the potential effects of the condition on plant operation.

"This notification affects seven Model 1154HP transmitters with integral 1159 Remote Diaphragm Seals shipped to Point Beach Nuclear Generating Station since March 2013."

Name and address of the individual providing the information:

Mr. Marc D. Bumgarner
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317