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Event Notification Report for March 24, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/21/2014 - 03/24/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **


49755 49761 49912 49917 49940 49941 49942 49943 49947 49948

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Agreement State Event Number: 49755
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: ASHLAND State: VA
County: HANOVER
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/22/2014
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GENERAL LICENSED DEVICE

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia by email:

"Event description: On January 20th the Radioactive Materials Program (RMP) received a call from Simms Metal Recycling in Petersburg, that a load of scrap metal being received set off the radiation monitoring detector. A DOT exemption form was completed and the scrap load returned C&C Cullet, Inc. in Ashland, where it originated from. They dumped the scrap load and found the item using a survey meter, which indicated 87 microrem/hr. Pictures were sent to the RMP and upon review concluded that the device was a liquid scintillation analyzer. The RMP contacted the manufacturer, Perkin Elmer, and began a conversation regarding the analyzer. The analyzer is secured at C&C Cullet, Inc. as an investigation is ongoing to determine the serial number and owner of the analyzer. It is believed to contain an 18 mCi source of either Ba-133 or Ni-63. There are no health or safety impacts as the source is secured in the analyzer."

Virginia Event: VA-14-01

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE WELLING TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/28/14 AT 1541 EST * * *

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On Tuesday January 28th, the source was removed by the manufacturer for disposal. The company will try to ascertain a serial number from the source to determine the General Licensee whom the device was provided to."

Notified R1DO (Burritt) and FSME Event Resource via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE WELLING TO CHARLES TEAL ON 3/21/14 AT 1036 EDT * * *

The following was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On Tuesday January 28th, the source was removed by the manufacturer for disposal. The source serial number (432228) was ascertained by the manufacturer which allowed for tracking to Virginia State University (VSU) as the recipient of the device. The source activity was incorrectly stated at 18 mCi in the initial report, the actual activity is 18 microcuries (uCi) of Ba-133.

"An investigation was performed by VSU in regards to when and how the device was disposed of. VSU stated the device was given to the Department of General Services (DGS) as surplus equipment in 2012 and was then subsequently sold as scrap metal. The RMP will contact DGS and discuss the proper disposal methods of radioactive material."

Notified R1DO (Welling) and FSME Event Resource via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 49761
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: POLAR CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: WORCESTER State: MA
County:
License #: G0118
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/23/2014
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING DEVICE CONTAINING AMERICIUM-241

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"Immediate report in accordance with 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1) of missing device containing a 100 millicurie americium-241sealed source.

"After [a] billing inquiry by Massachusetts Radiation Control Program [the Program] [to] the licensee about generally licensed devices registered with [the] Program, the licensee reported on January 23, 2014 that one Industrial Dynamics Co., LTD Model FT-12 device [a fill level gauge], S/N 102282, containing a 100 millicurie americium-241 sealed source, cannot be located or is missing.

"The licensee informed the Program that the device is obsolete and has been out of service for about 15 years and may have been returned to manufacturer or might be in storage at licensee's facilities. The licensee informed [the] Program that it is making the effort of contacting a person that may have known about the device and is conducting a search of it's storage facilities.

"The Program notified the licensee of it's responsibility for providing [a] written report in accordance with the requirements of 105 CMR 120.281(B).

"Root cause and corrective actions are not known at this time and the Program intends to make site visit.

"This event remains open."

* * * UPDATE FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 2/18/14 AT 0828 EST * * *

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"The Commonwealth of Massachusetts performed an on-site inspection on 2/17/14. Licensee has been in contact with the gauge manufacturer and has been searching numerous potential storage locations on licensee's property which covers multiple city blocks to determine possible long ago return to manufacturer or possible long-term on-site storage. There is no change in status and the device is still missing. The investigation is ongoing and the event remains OPEN."

Massachusetts Event Number: 14-1155

Notified R1DO (Krohn) and FSME Event Resource via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 3/21/14 AT 1235 EDT * * *

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"[The] licensee confirmed via telephone on 3/21/14, that subject gauge was still missing. Based on current information, the Agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts] presumes gauge lost. The Agency considers this matter to be closed."

Massachusetts Event Number: 14-1155

Notified R1DO (Welling) and FSME Event Resource via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Agreement State Event Number: 49912
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ACUREN INSPECTION, INC.
Region: 4
City: LA PORTE State: TX
County:
License #: 01774
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO A RADIOGRAPHER'S HAND

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On March 13, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee's Site Radiation Safety Officer (SRSO) that one of its radiographer trainees may have received an overexposure while performing radiography at a field site on March 12, 2014. The radiographers were using a QSA880D camera containing a 69 curie iridium - 192 source. At 2100 hours [CDT], the radiographers had completed a shot and the trainee went to the camera to disconnect the guide tube from the camera. The trainee stated while attempting to disconnect the guide tube he observed the reading on the dose rate meter had gone back up. The trainee backed away from the camera and the source was returned to the fully shielded position. It is unknown at this time where the source was located in the guide tube. The SRSO stated the trainee may have been in contact with the guide tube for as long as 15 seconds. The SRSO stated the radiographer trainer was near the trainee during the event. The SRSO stated the trainee's self-reading dosimeter was off scale. The SRSO did not know if the trainee's alarming rate meter was alarming at the time of the event. The SRSO stated he was not at the licensee's facility when he contacted this Agency, but he was returning to the facility. The SRSO stated he would provide additional information as soon as they had a chance to interview the individuals involved. The Agency contacted the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer who stated they were on their way to the company's facility to do reenactments and preliminary dose assessments. The SRSO stated the trainee's dosimetry had been collected and will be sent for processing. No other individual received an exposure due to this event. The Agency contacted the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) and informed them of the event. REAC/TS agreed to provide the licensee with assistance when requested. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident # I-9167

* * * UPDATE FROM TUCKER TO KLCO ON 3/14/14 AT 0957 EDT VIA FAX * * *

"The Agency was contacted by the licensee's Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (CRSO) at 1700 [CDT] on March 13, 2014 and provided with additional information on the event. The CRSO stated they had interviewed the radiographers involved in the event and discovered a second radiography trainee was involved. The CRSO stated the three individuals were shooting welds on a tank. The two radiography trainees were inside the tank in a man lift basket operating the camera. The camera would hang on the side of the tank. The radiography trainees would place the collimator to perform the shoot and then back off from the camera the distance of the control cables, approximately 35 feet, and operate the camera. The trainer was in a man lift outside the tank placing film. The CRSO stated the camera had been retrieved from the wall of the tank and placed in the basket with them while they waited to set up for the next shoot. The radiography trainees stated they were in the basket for as long as 15 minutes, with the source not fully shielded. The radiography trainee who tried to remove the guide tube stated he had difficulty removing the guide tube, so the 10 to 15 second estimate for the time he spent trying to remove the guide tube was accurate. The radiography trainee stated when they retracted the source to the fully locked position, it took about one quarter turn of the crank handle to fully retract the source.

"During the interviews with the radiographers, it was discovered that the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube was not wearing any personnel monitoring devices. He had left them in the truck. The other radiography trainee was wearing their dosimetry, but failed to turn the alarming rate meter on. The CRSO stated the dosimetry will be sent to their dosimetry [lab] for processing.

"The CRSO stated they had contacted REAC/TS for assistance. They have taken the radiography trainee who attempted to remove the guide tube to the hospital for blood samples to be provided to REAC/TS. The radiography trainee will be taken to a medical facility again on March 14, 2014.

"The Agency contacted the CRSO at 0700 [CDT] on March 14, 2014, and asked the condition of the radiography trainee's hand. The CRSO stated they were not aware of any issues with the individual's hand. The Agency discussed the previous event in Texas with similar circumstances. The consultant for the licensee working with the CRSO was also the consultant in the previous event and is providing the licensee with information gained in that event.

"The licensee currently plans to have the Site RSO to manage the health aspects of this event. The CRSO will manage the investigation of the event. The CRSO stated the former Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director for NRC Region IV will meet them in La Porte on March 14, 2014, to help with the reenactment."

Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (McIntosh) and FSME Resources via email.

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK ON 3/15/14 AT 2120 EDT VIA EMAIL * * *

"On March 15, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that based on the reenactment of the event, they have calculated the exposure to the hand of the radiography trainee to be 3,680 rem. The calculation is based on the trainee's hand being 0.5 centimeter from the source for 10 seconds. The licensee reported the whole body deep dose equivalent was 6.0 rem for the trainee. The licensee stated they examined the trainee's hand today and did not see any visual effects of the exposure. The licensee stated the trainee has not experienced any pain in his hand. The licensee stated they will continue to monitor the trainee's hand. The licensee stated they are still corresponding with REAC/TS.

"The badge for the second trainee in the basket was read by the dosimeter processor and reported to be 3.327 rem. The licensee stated based on the reenactment they believed the reading to accurately reflect the individual's exposure."

Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz), FSME EO (Dudes), FSME Resources via email.

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Agreement State Event Number: 49917
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: EMORY UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: ATLANTA State: GA
County:
License #: GA 153-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID CROWLEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/14/2014
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/27/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - YTTRIUM 90 MEDICAL EVENT

The following information was received from the State of Georgia via email:

"Event Narrative: A patient was treated with Y-90 microspheres for cholangiocarcinoma. This was a bilateral disease that would require the treatment of both lobes of the liver. Significant tumor burden was in the central (segment IV) and medial sections. The medical team decided to treat the left lobe first as a result.

"For the first treatment, 54.05 mCi was to be delivered to the left lobe. It had an expected dose of 69.0 Gy to the liver. Due to issues with hepatic arterial anatomy not previously anticipated, the medical team could not properly position the catheter. Because it was a bilateral disease that would eventually require the treatment of both lobes, they decided to move forward with the procedure.

"Of the calibrated activity of 52.6 mCi, a post-therapy survey of the vial showed 88% of the dose or 46.3 mCi was delivered. A post-delivery Bremsstrahlung scan showed excellent coverage of Segment IV, with some minor coverage in the right lobe due to the arterial anatomy. 21.8 mCi was localized to Segment IV, and the approximate remainder, 24.5 mCi, ended up in the right lobe. There was no significant extrahepatic activity seen.

"The medical team considered the treatment to be successful due to the patient's bilateral disease. The authorized user intended to treat the right lobe next, and the team reports that the treatment plan will be adjusted to take into account the diseased areas which were treated. There should be no adverse reaction from this initial treatment.

"Cause and Corrective Actions: Occurred due to an arterial aberration causing a the interventional radiologist to be unable to canulate the artery. The hepatic arterial anatomy was different the day of treatment than the initial shunt study suggested on 5 February 2014. The patient's medical team decided to proceed with the catheter orifice just at the origin of the segment IV hepatic artery. The shunt fractions then resulted differently from the intended treatment for that day.

"The medical team and RSO are continuing to discuss if any preventative actions can be achieved. Treatment with Y-90 microspheres is reported to be complicated by the degree that the disease and prior treatments have affected liver vasculature. This makes it hard to plan for these scenarios pre-treatment.

"Generic Implications: Post treatment scans for Y-90 were reported by the licensee not to be a common practice, but they seem vital for determining if a treatment meets reportable limits.

"Procedure Administered: Bilateral radioembolization of liver with Y-90 microspheres.

"Intended Dose: 54.05 mCi (69.0 Gy) to left lobe of liver.

"Actual Dose: 21.8 mCi to Segment IV of left lobe and 24.5 mCi to the right lobe.

"Patient and Referring Physician Notified: Informed following the procedure's post-delivery Bremsstrahlung scan."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Part 21 Event Number: 49940
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: NORCROSS State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KORINA LOOFT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 - SBM SELECTOR SWITCHES CONTACT ASSEMBLY UNPLANNED MANUFACTURING CHANGE

The following is an excerpt from a fax received from Unified Controls International (UCI):

"...there was a significant manufacturing process change to the General Electric SBM series switches in 2009. The high resistance across switch contacts in the GE SBM switches could lead to a failure of the switch to change state when required. Concerns have been raised regarding tin plated movable contacts used for make or break service and in use without protective lubrication. UCI is not capable to complete an evaluation of the affect that this change may have on in storage SBM switches or already installed SBM switches that were provided to the customers on the purchase orders listed in section [below]. UCI does not know the storage conditions, in service environmental conditions or in service cycling rates of the switches or how the each of these items may affect the change in contact resistance. Each affected customer needs to evaluate their in storage and in service switches and determine if the change in contact material could possibly create a safety hazard and effect the ability of the switches to perform in their safety related application."

The applicable purchase orders are:

Duke Energy, Purchase Orders: 131116,133980, 147875,129193,130989 (Non-Safety Related), 133920, 148974 (Non-Safety Related), 152090 (Non Safety Related), 133972, 169525

Antung Trading Company, Purchase Order: PP120210

CFE, Purchase Order: 700327408

Fluor, Purchase Order: A3PB-6-0016-00Q1

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49941
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2014
Event Time: 15:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM VULNERABILITY

"A significant Fitness for Duty (FFD) programmatic vulnerability was discovered during an NRC inspection. A potential exists that some members of the FFD site's random drug test pool could control and predict the date and time that the random list is run; thus mitigating the effectiveness of the 'random aspect' for the staff. Per 10 CFR 26.31(d)(2)(i), 'Random testing. Random testing must - Be administered in a manner that provides reasonable assurance that individuals are unable to predict the time periods during which specimens will be collected.' Since, these individuals may be able to predict the timeliness of random drug test events this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) as a discovered programmatic vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49942
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/21/2014
Event Time: 07:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

60 DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On January 21, 2014, at 0746 hours Central Standard Time (CST), during performance of the 3C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) post modification test instructions, the EDG was supplying a shutdown board in isochronous mode when the 3B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started causing the voltage to drop to 2100 volts. At this time, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3, received a half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals as a result of losing the 3B Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a time delay relay failure on under voltage. The PCIS groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and the Refuel fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and placed affected systems back in service.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

"The apparent cause for this condition was a failure of a 3B RPS MG set time delay relay due to lack of a preventive maintenance strategy. The vendor manual for the time delay relay did not specify a qualified life. The replacement relay specified a replacement schedule of 10 years. The relay that failed was installed for approximately 13 years. To address this condition, preventive maintenance is being developed for MG set time delay relays. In addition, the only remaining relay, similar to the failed relay, is scheduled be replaced on August 25, 2014, for the 2A RPS MG set."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49943
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE INGALLS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 14:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2014
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SHIELD BUILDING VENT GAS RAD MONITORS OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 1330 CDT on March 21, 2014, 1R-22 and 2R-22, Shield Building Vent Gas Radiation Monitors will be removed from service for planned preventative maintenance and therefore [will be] nonfunctional. These monitors have no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs); NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. They are also used for offsite dose projection calculations. This will result in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while 1R-22 and 2R-22 are out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Unit 1 and Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation Stacks are also monitored by high range monitors, 1R-50 and 2R-50, which are used for the same purpose in Site Area or General Emergency classifications. 1R-50 and 2R-50 are being monitored and are indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Buildings as evidenced by normal readings on 1(2)R-22 prior to their removal from service. Preventative maintenance (belt inspections) is expected to last approximately 1 hour. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49947
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONNIE WILKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/21/2014
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2014
Event Time: 17:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY INVOLVING A LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A licensed supervisor violated the company's fitness-for-duty policy. The employee's plant access has been suspended.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 49948
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CARL JONES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/24/2014
Notification Time: 05:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2014
Event Time: 00:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAKE WELLING (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 18 Power Operation 18 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE AND UNPLANNED ISOLATION OF THE REACTOR BUILDING VENT RADIATION MONITOR

"At 0031 [EDT] on March 24, 2014, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was lowering power for the planned refueling outage. The loss of reactor building heating resulted in the isolation of the reactor building to maintain building temperature. Isolation of the reactor building resulted in the isolation of the reactor building vent radiation monitor (Vent WRGMS) which is a loss of emergency assessment capability. The isolation of the reactor building also resulted in declaring secondary containment inoperable due to secondary containment differential pressure being positive. Secondary containment was declared operable at 0034 [EDT] when differential pressure was restored to greater than negative 0.25 inches water gauge.

"Secondary containment being inoperable is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The unplanned isolation of Vent WRGMS is a 8-hour report for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee will notify the New York Public Service Commission.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, May 14, 2014
Wednesday, May 14, 2014