Event Notification Report for January 11, 2014

PART 21 - AP-1000 SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES LEAKAGE

The following was excerpted from a fax received from Valcor Engineering Corporation:

"Background:

"Valcor was chosen by WEC [Westinghouse Electric Corporation] as a supplier to the AP-1000 for the ASME Section Ill Class 1, 2 and 3 Solenoid Operated Valves. As part of the specification requirements Valcor is required to perform qualification testing in accordance with the requirements of IEEE-323-1974, IEEE-344-1987 and IEEE-382-1996.

"Discovery:

"On Saturday January 11th, 2014, Valcor's lab technician discovered that the hard faced seat of an AP-1000 Solenoid Operated qualification valve had a crack through the thickness of the valve seat to the outlet port that caused the valve to leak in the closed position beyond its Technical Specification requirement (WEC Specification APP-PV13-ZOD-101). The subject valve had undergone heat rise testing to determine actuator temperatures during its specified design basis conditions. As part of the qualification process (IEEE-323) and in accordance with the test procedure the subject valve is given a factory acceptance test (FAT) at each stage of the qualification program.

"The valve design is unique to the model (V526-5631-36/40) in that the dimensional constrain resulted in a web thickness of the hard faced seat that is thinner than our standard historical valve designs. A total of eight (8) valves of this configuration (four (4) for Valve Model Number V525-5631-36 and four (4) for Model number V526-5631-40) have been delivered to Westinghouse for installation in the Sanmen and Haiyang nuclear power plants located in the People's Republic of China. Neither of these plants have loaded fuel or are operational.

"The investigation, failure analyses, and stress analyses completed to-date have not provided a firm conclusion of the root cause of the crack. Westinghouse, the purchaser who imposed 10CFR21 on the procurement document of the valve models identified in question, has been informed of the condition and current status of investigation."

Submitted by Jimmy Shieh Quality Assurance Director.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JIMMY SHEIH TO JEFF ROTTON VIA FAX AT 0944 EDT ON 08/15/2014 * * *

"Subject: An update to Interim Report initially filed on 3/12/14, revised 3/13/14

"Reference: SKA23651 previously submitted

"Investigation activities since the Interim Report:

"Computer Flow and Thermal Analysis conducted from March to April 2014.

"Finite Element Stress Analysis rerun using Computer Flow and Thermal Analysis in April 2014.

"Both analysis above suggest that the design is adequate and that stress induced by rapid temperature rise would not cause the seat to crack.

"With Westinghouse assistance and permission [two] 2 production valves were disassembled and NDE (Visual, LP, radiographic, and Eddy current) of body seat area performed during May. The examinations did not identify any defect in the valve seat area.

"Contrary to all stress/thermal analysis, cracking of valve seat was reproduced early June when one of the above mentioned bodies was subjected to the same thermal shock condition that caused the initial observed cracking. The second valve was tested at the same pressure and end temperature without the thermal shock. The valve seat remained intact without cracking.

"Westinghouse has been supporting the Part 21 investigation that Valcor is leading. Westinghouse has reviewed all metallurgy, CFD, FEA, NDE, heat rise laboratory and other data Valcor collected during our thorough investigation. All of this information is currently being evaluated by Westinghouse. At this time, the only outstanding issue is for Westinghouse to review all AP1000 transient conditions that are applicable to PV13 solenoid valves. Westinghouse anticipates having the preliminary transient research completed imminently and estimates to take until Nov. 30, 2014 to have all calculations and transient research validated.

"As stated in the original notification, the condition does not affect any operating plant. Affected valves are limited to overseas construction, none have been installed to date."

Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY JIMMY SHEIH TO JEFF ROTTON VIA FAX AT 1620 EDT ON 09/05/2014 * * *

"Westinghouse has informed Valcor that none of the affected valves have been installed and they are quarantined from accidental installation. Valcor therefore is not required to pursue 10CFR21 reporting further and we [Valcor] consider the report closed."

Notified R2DO (Seymour) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DECREASING DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE

"At 0205 CST [on 1/11/14], Xcel Energy Environmental Services made a report to the State of Minnesota due to cooling water return to the Mississippi River via the plants discharge canal dropping by more than 5 degrees F in an hour. The cause of the temperature drop was due to an emergent reduction in reactor power and generator load in response to a degrading condenser vacuum.

"This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on a notification to another Government Agency.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"On January 10, 2014, at 0919 CST, the plant voluntarily entered multiple required action statements in Technical Specifications 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System to conduct surveillance testing of the B-train Solid State Protection System (SSPS). During testing, abnormal indications were received. As a result of the abnormal indications, the SSPS has not been returned to operable status within the required completion time of 24 hours. At 1100 CST on January 11, 2014, Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown required by technical specifications and will be in Mode 3 by 1519. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by technical specifications.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

DIGITAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM COMMUNICATION FAILURE

"At 1605 EST on January 11, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) had a communication loop failure resulting in a loss of control room radiation monitor indication and alarm capability. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared nonfunctional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were established.

"At 2040 EST on January 11, 2014, BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was returned to service and declared functional.

"The failure of the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS communication loop resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee notified Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio emergency management agencies as well as local authorities of this notification.