Event Notification Report for December 14, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/13/2013 - 12/14/2013
Agreement State
Event Number: 49636
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: REDMOND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR011-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: REDMOND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR011-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/16/2013
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2014
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME_Events Resource (EMAI)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME_Events Resource (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following was received via facsimile:
"Event Narrative: While performing radiography operations at Microsoft Bld. 32 in Redmond, Washington, the radiography source could not be retracted from the collimator back into camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Mistras then called the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) emergency line (206 Nuclear) and an inspector was dispatched to the scene. At the scene was the RSO, Assistant RSO (trained in source recovery), assistant radiographer, and another radiographer. Assistance was being provided via telephone by QSA Global. It is not known yet if previous attempts brought the source through the camera and into the crank cable tube. However, while attempting to remedy the situation the (0-200 mR) pocket dosimeter of the radiographer had gone off scale. The radiographer was removed from the scene and his TLD has been sent in via overnight mail for emergency processing. The collimator was attached to the camera with a 2-3 inch long fitting (there was no guide tube). After disconnecting the crank cable from the camera, the crank cable was pulled back to the crank (while observing survey meters), and it was discovered that the connector at the end of the cable where it was attached to the pig tail was broken. The camera and collimator were loaded onto a dry wall cart and covered with several bags of lead shot. A moving 2 mR/hr barrier was established around the cart during this movement. The apparatus was then moved to a remote area of the parking lot. Once in the parking lot, 2 mR/hr barricades were set up. Eight foot long tools were made in order to unscrew the fitting from the collimator. Once the fitting was removed, the connector end of the pigtail was exposed and could be pulled out (with eight foot grappler) of the collimator and inserted into another camera. This procedure was practiced several times with a dummy source prior to the actual transfer. The highest dose received on the retrieval team was 93 mR. An investigation is about to begin, and Mistras was performing reenactments earlier today. More information pending."
* * * UPDATE ON 12/19/13 AT 1439 EST FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO DONG PARK * * *
The retrieval team leader received 43 mR with pocket dosimeter, the licensee RSO received 93 mR with pocket dosimeter, the assistant radiographer received 85 mR with pocket dosimeter, and the radiographer received 40 mR with pocket dosimeter.
Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/29/2014 AT 1616 EDT FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"This incident has been closed as of May 29, 2014. The two sides of the crankshaft fractures were analyzed to determine the nature of the fracture mechanism. A reenactment was performed at the licensees facility. Radiographers were re-trained with respect to not attempting retrieval procedures without training or contacting the RSO, and supervision of assistants has been adequately addressed by the licensee. Details of any of these issues are available upon request."
Washington Incident #WA-13-062
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez) and FSME Resources (via e-mail).
The following was received via facsimile:
"Event Narrative: While performing radiography operations at Microsoft Bld. 32 in Redmond, Washington, the radiography source could not be retracted from the collimator back into camera. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Mistras then called the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) emergency line (206 Nuclear) and an inspector was dispatched to the scene. At the scene was the RSO, Assistant RSO (trained in source recovery), assistant radiographer, and another radiographer. Assistance was being provided via telephone by QSA Global. It is not known yet if previous attempts brought the source through the camera and into the crank cable tube. However, while attempting to remedy the situation the (0-200 mR) pocket dosimeter of the radiographer had gone off scale. The radiographer was removed from the scene and his TLD has been sent in via overnight mail for emergency processing. The collimator was attached to the camera with a 2-3 inch long fitting (there was no guide tube). After disconnecting the crank cable from the camera, the crank cable was pulled back to the crank (while observing survey meters), and it was discovered that the connector at the end of the cable where it was attached to the pig tail was broken. The camera and collimator were loaded onto a dry wall cart and covered with several bags of lead shot. A moving 2 mR/hr barrier was established around the cart during this movement. The apparatus was then moved to a remote area of the parking lot. Once in the parking lot, 2 mR/hr barricades were set up. Eight foot long tools were made in order to unscrew the fitting from the collimator. Once the fitting was removed, the connector end of the pigtail was exposed and could be pulled out (with eight foot grappler) of the collimator and inserted into another camera. This procedure was practiced several times with a dummy source prior to the actual transfer. The highest dose received on the retrieval team was 93 mR. An investigation is about to begin, and Mistras was performing reenactments earlier today. More information pending."
* * * UPDATE ON 12/19/13 AT 1439 EST FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO DONG PARK * * *
The retrieval team leader received 43 mR with pocket dosimeter, the licensee RSO received 93 mR with pocket dosimeter, the assistant radiographer received 85 mR with pocket dosimeter, and the radiographer received 40 mR with pocket dosimeter.
Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/29/2014 AT 1616 EDT FROM STEPHEN MATTHEWS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"This incident has been closed as of May 29, 2014. The two sides of the crankshaft fractures were analyzed to determine the nature of the fracture mechanism. A reenactment was performed at the licensees facility. Radiographers were re-trained with respect to not attempting retrieval procedures without training or contacting the RSO, and supervision of assistants has been adequately addressed by the licensee. Details of any of these issues are available upon request."
Washington Incident #WA-13-062
Notified the R4DO (Vasquez) and FSME Resources (via e-mail).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49633
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: BRYAN EAGAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: BRYAN EAGAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/14/2013
Notification Time: 06:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 03:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2013
Notification Time: 06:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 03:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO RISE IN REACTOR PRESSURE DURING TURBINE VALVE TESTING
"Today at approximately 0337 [EST], during quarterly turbine valve testing with reactor power at 100% of rated thermal power, the plant experienced reactor pressure control abnormalities. Reactor pressure rose to 1042 psig [at which point] the Operators inserted a manual SCRAM. The cause of the rise in reactor pressure is currently under investigation.
"All control rods inserted into the core. Main steam isolation valves remained open, [however], bypass valves did not open as expected. The plant is in its normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via isolation condensers. No electronic (EMRVs) or safety valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and all parameters are stable.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State.
"Today at approximately 0337 [EST], during quarterly turbine valve testing with reactor power at 100% of rated thermal power, the plant experienced reactor pressure control abnormalities. Reactor pressure rose to 1042 psig [at which point] the Operators inserted a manual SCRAM. The cause of the rise in reactor pressure is currently under investigation.
"All control rods inserted into the core. Main steam isolation valves remained open, [however], bypass valves did not open as expected. The plant is in its normal electrical lineup and decay heat is being removed via isolation condensers. No electronic (EMRVs) or safety valves lifted during the transient. The plant is currently shutdown and all parameters are stable.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49634
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL QUITTER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL QUITTER
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 12/14/2013
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 15:03 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2013
Notification Time: 19:32 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2013
Event Time: 15:03 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION AFFECTING UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 1503 PST on December 14, 2013, Pacific Gas and Electric Company identified that, if atmospheric conditions were to develop that had both sustained high winds exceeding 60 miles per hour from the NW to NNE direction, and ambient air temperature exceeding 97 degrees Fahrenheit, the combination of these conditions could result in inadequate heat removal to support continuous operation of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators. Upon identification of this condition, shift orders were issued requiring implementation of existing procedural guidance to open plant doors to allow additional air flow that would provide adequate emergency diesel generator cooling to support continuous operation of the U1 emergency diesel generators.
"This report addresses a condition as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."
This condition was discovered during a license basis verification review.
"At 1503 PST on December 14, 2013, Pacific Gas and Electric Company identified that, if atmospheric conditions were to develop that had both sustained high winds exceeding 60 miles per hour from the NW to NNE direction, and ambient air temperature exceeding 97 degrees Fahrenheit, the combination of these conditions could result in inadequate heat removal to support continuous operation of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators. Upon identification of this condition, shift orders were issued requiring implementation of existing procedural guidance to open plant doors to allow additional air flow that would provide adequate emergency diesel generator cooling to support continuous operation of the U1 emergency diesel generators.
"This report addresses a condition as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition."
This condition was discovered during a license basis verification review.