| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/17/2013 - 05/20/2013 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 48864 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROSA OF NORTH DALLAS LLC
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 06186
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/28/2013
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDER DOSE IN BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT DUE TO USE OF WRONG LENGTH GUIDE WIRE
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On March 28, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that a medical event occurred on March 27, 2013. The licensee stated that the wrong length guide wire was used during 3 of 4 HDR [High-Dose Rate Brachytherapy] treatments. The error was discovered after the third treatment. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) stated the desired area of treatment was under dosed by more than 50 percent. The treatment plan prescribed 2400 cGy over 4 treatments. He stated that the patient and their physician were notified as soon as the error was discovered. The RSO is not at the facility and is trying to gather the information on the event over his phone. The licensee has suspended all HDR treatments until their process and procedures have been reviewed. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300.
"Texas Incident #: I-9059"
* * * UPDATE ON 4/11/13 AT 2126 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:
"On April, 9, 2013, the licensee provided the following information: The Physicist of record retrieved tube connectors from the HDR supplies on shelves in the dosimetry area. The tube/connectors were stored, coiled in Ziploc bags. The Physicist selected green tubes when he saw the black tubes used previously were not on the shelf. He was unaware that there were two sets, each a different length when he selected the green set. The black tubes measure 120cm in length and the green tubes measure 132cm. The Senior Physicist, who was on vacation during the first two out of the four treatments, stored the black tube set in a drawer across the room. Physicist selected tubes which attached to the patient's treatment device. The Physicist planned the patient's treatment with the treatment lengths (119.9 cm) stated in our facility's HDR tandem and ring treatment planning procedure and forms but used the 132cm tube for the treatment delivery for three out of four fractions. Only the black tubes were used historically in tandem and ring HDR procedures and since their given length were known, they were not measured at the time of treatment delivery. The green tubes were also not measured prior to treatment delivery. The Physician of record saw the green tubes and believed their use was intentional. This medical event meant the patient's tissue to be treated (cervix) received less total radiation dose than that prescribed: 1,390 cGy (mean dose delivered) vs. the 5,139 cGy the cervix would have received over the four treatments. This is more than a 50 cGy (50 rem) effective dose equivalent difference to the cervix. In addition, the mean total dose delivered to the cervix over the four treatments differed from the prescribed dose by more than 20% (42.1% is the actual variance) and the delivered dose for at least one of the fractions differed by more than 50% from the prescribed dose (fraction #1 cervix mean dose delivered was 42.5 cGy vs. the 1,192.4 cGy expected) (fraction #2 cervix mean dose delivered was 34.6 cGy vs. the 1,416.3 cGy expected) and (fraction #3 cervix mean dose delivered was 45.2 cGy vs. the 1,262.2 cGy expected). The patient's urethra received a mean dose of 1,607 cGy for the four fractions. The maximum dose to 1 cc of the urethra for the four fractions was 1,849 cGy. The patient's anterior vagina received a mean dose from the four fractions of 1,549 cGy. The maximum dose to 1 cc of the anterior vagina for the four fractions was 3,049 cGy. The Agency [Texas Department of Health] has requested additional information from the licensee. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA 300."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1107 EDT ON 5/17/2013 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The reference to a guide "wire" in the initial report was incorrect. An incorrect guide "tube" was used. Additionally, the title should have stated "GUIDE TUBE."
Notified the R4DO (Walker).
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 48998 | Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: WOLLASTON ALLOYS, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHESWICK State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES DRAKE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/03/2013
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class:
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - INSUFFICIENT PROCESS CONTROL ON PUMP IMPELLER
The following is a summary of information received via fax:
"In January 2013, Curtiss-Wright Electro Mechanical Corporation completed final testing on AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Serial Number 9, part number 6D70795G05, Revision 8, which contained a sand cast impeller (S/N 3021) cat by Wollaston Alloys of Braintree, MA. When it was disassembled for inspection it was discovered that a piece of an impeller blade approximately 3 inches by 2 1/2 inches had separated from the main impeller casting. The separated piece was the leading edge of one blade, and it was subsequently recovered intact from the pump test loop.
"This incident was investigated as a significant condition adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard; but, was deemed not a reportable incident since all cast impellers were either:
1) in CW-EMD control, or
2) exported to customers in the Peoples Republic of China.
"Our customers (Westinghouse Electric Company and the Chinese customers and regulatory authorities) were kept informed as the investigation progressed and root cause was identified.
"The physical cause of the failure is most likely due to a flaw present in both the cast material and weld overlay applied to the impeller blade. The original flaw was most likely a consequence of tensile overload failure due to cooling stresses introduced by the welding process. Subsequent weld repairs were insufficient in remediating the original flaw, which went undetected by NDT methods. Ultimately, AP1000 RCP Serial Number 3021 failed by high cycle fatigue followed by ductile failure.
"As a result of the above investigation, CW-EMD is concerned that the identified lack of process control at Wollaston Alloys, Inc., could result in other significant conditions adverse to quality with the potential to create a substantial safety hazard.
"Because of the nature of the issue, CW-EMD is unable to complete a full extent of condition investigation, and is reporting this issue to the Commission to ensure full awareness within the industry.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission
James A. Drake, General Manager
Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation
1000 Wright Way
Cheswick, Pa 15024"
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE GRIEF TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/17/13 AT 1549 EDT * * *
Subject; Report of Potential Substantial Safety Hazard in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21.
Wollaston Alloys is submitting this interim report as a result of product concerns discovered by Curtiss Wright EMD during the investigation of an impeller blade failure occurring during testing as noted in Curtiss Wright EMD's notification to the NRC dated May 3, 2013. Wollaston is requesting an additional 30 days to identify any current or previous orders where 10 CFR 21 is invoked and to determine if there is evidence that a condition exists that could create a substantial safety hazard.
Notified R1DO (Schroeder), R2DO (Bartley), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Walker), and PART 21 REACTORS via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49009 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP, INC.
Region: 4
City: PASCAGOULA State: MS
County:
License #: MS-995-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 05/07/2013
Notification Time: 15:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following information was received via E-mail:
"Licensee reported a stuck radiography source that occurred at approximately 2315 CDT on May 6, 2013. Licensee's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] responded to incident site, increased barricades, maintained perimeter, and notified Chevron RSO. Licensee's source was fully retracted into the shielded position at 0100 CDT [on May 7, 2013]. The Licensee's RSO received 20 mR conducting the source retrieval."
The incident occurred while performing work at the Chevron Pascagoula Refinery.
Mississippi Report Number: MS-13002
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM JAYSON MOAK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 5/17/13 AT 1250 EDT * * *
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On 5/6/2013, the Licensee had a two man crew performing industrial radiography at the Chevron Plant. The radiographer was unable to crank the source back into the camera after his third exposure. The source was then cranked back into the collimator. The radiographer repositioned the cranks and tried to retract the source again without success. The radiographer and assistant radiographer extended the restricted area boundary and called the Licensee's night safety officer on site. The Licensee's RSO then notified Mistras Group's CRSO [Corporate Radiation Safety Officer] and plant personnel of the incident.
"The Licensee's RSO, once on site, discovered from conversation with the radiographer that the drive cable was hitting a melted area of the conduit and not letting the drive cable pass through. The melting of the (black) return conduit of the cranks occurred because it was placed over a non-insulated pipe from the plant's furnace. The Licensee's RSO made the decision to cut the conduit at the melted area of the cranks to save time and reduce exposure while trying to retract the source. This provided clearance for the drive cable to pass through and allowed the source to retract back into the fully shielded position inside the camera. The camera, guide tube, and cranks were surveyed by the RSO upon source retraction."
The State (Mississippi) has closed this case.
Notified the R4DO (Walker) and FSME Events Resources via email. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49016 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: MATERON PRECISION OPTICS
Region: 1
City: TYNGSBOROUGH State: MA
County:
License #: G0272
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/09/2013
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST IONIZING STATIC DISSIPATER
The licensee reported to the state that a ionizing static dissipater, licensed under a General License and used on lines for clearing small parts of dust, was lost. The device is Model: NRD P-2021-8101 with Serial Number: A2HN439 and contained a Po-210 with an up to a 10 mCi source, on 1/18/12, which has decayed to approximately 0.9 mCi as of 5/9/13.
The licensee has properly returned all other devices for destruction from the facility.
The State has initiated an investigation and will assign an event number as new information is obtained.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 49018 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: VARIOUS
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: VARIOUS
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JENNIFER OPILA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/09/2013
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2013
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - REPORT OF MISSING GENERAL DEVICES
The following is a list of missing general devices reported by the State of Colorado, missing between 1998-2011, via email.
The following table details the type and number of devices that the State previously neglected to report:
Type of Device Number Reported as Missing 1998-2011
- Exit Signs 1096
- Calibration 7
- Dust Monitor 1
- Electron Capture Detector 13
- Gas Chromatograph 6
- Standard Reference Materials 1
- Gauge 2
- Static Eliminator 44
- Unknown 1
- X-Ray Florescence 14
The State does not believe these devices represent a risk to human health or the environment and has taken steps to improve the general licensing registration program to ensure accurate reporting in the future.
See EN #48609 for a list of missing general devices in 2012.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. OPILA TO V. KLCO ON 5/13/2013 AT 1634 EDT * * *
The following information was excerpted from a received facsimile:
The State of Colorado checked with the general licensee and there was a report error. A Pepsi Bottling Group LLC source (Am-241; 100 mCi) was never missing and still is in the possession of the licensee.
Notified the R4DO (Hay), ILTAB and FSME Resources via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49027 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: CHUCK TACK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/13/2013
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2013
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text PLANNED OUTAGE OF SIRENS DUE TO SCHEDULED UPGRADES
"Planned intermittent outages of all FCS sirens will occur the week of 5/13/13-5/17/13 due to scheduled upgrades to the radio system. Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional for various amounts of time. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement will be completed with compensatory measures established prior to work each day to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. Updates will be made to the NRC on 5/13/13 when the work starts, and upon completion of the work not to exceed 5/17/13. Work is currently scheduled to be complete 5/17/13.
"Also, contingencies have been established to back out if required in support of the plant or Law Enforcement activities.
"Work is scheduled to commence today, 5/13/13, at 10:10 AM.
"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0915 EDT ON 5/17/2013 FROM LUKE JENSEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The work was completed on 5/16/2013 at 1700 CDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Walker). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49047 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GERALD BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/17/2013
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2013
Event Time: 04:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE BELOW REQUIRED VALUE
"On May 17, 2013 at 0439 EDT, with the unit in Mode 3, operators identified RCS temperature decreased below 551 deg. F with the reactor trip breakers closed. The condition existed for approximately one hour after which operators identified this was below the procedurally required value identified to support power range nuclear instrumentation trip operability. The condition was then immediately corrected.
"The plant remains stable is Mode 3.
"This condition is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The reactor trip breakers were closed to support rod testing at the time this event occurred. RCS temperature was decreasing due to Terry turbine testing which was being performed at the same time. The reactor trip breakers were opened when the operators identified RCS temperature below 551 degrees. The RCS temperature was returned to above 551 degrees. This temperature limit is specified in Millstone 3 FSAR section 15.4.1, "Uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup condition".
The licensee notified state and local authorities. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49048 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANGEL BRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/17/2013
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2013
Event Time: 15:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
ERDS GROUP (EMAI)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE AND UPGRADES
"This is a non-emergency 8-hour notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activities affects the functionality of the Plant Process Computer System. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant will remove the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) from service on 5/17/13 at 1527 [CDT] to perform system upgrades and planned maintenance. The PPCS system is planned to be non-functional for less than 4 hours. While the system is out of service, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means and communication of the assessment results using communication equipment. ERDS will be out of service during this period. Compensatory measures for the loss will be implemented. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49050 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: LUKE JENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/17/2013
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | Event Text EMBEDMENT DEPTH FOR SEISMIC ANCHORS INADEQUATE
"It has been determined that some instrument racks in the Containment and Auxiliary buildings do not meet their design basis capacity due to inadequate embedment depth of the seismic anchors. Assumptions made about embedment depth for a previous event were determined to be incorrect; therefore, the design basis capacity cannot be assured. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed condition'."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 49051 | Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR INC
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR INC
Region: 3
City: BOLINGBROOK State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROSALIE NAVA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 05/17/2013
Notification Time: 20:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
| Event Text NOTIFICATION OF VALVE BODY LEAKAGE
Subject: 10CFR21 Notification on Potential Valve Body Leakage - 20 Valve Assemblies.
Crane Nuclear, Inc. has been advised by one customer about leakage on the body of an installed 2" valve assembly. The valve body identified as leaking or weeping was cast from alloy SB 148 UNS 95200.
While it was the customer that identified the valve body leakage to Crane Nuclear, a notification letter with their purchase order history was sent to Dominion / Millstone today in accordance with their purchase order notification requirements. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 49052 | Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TONY PACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/19/2013
Notification Time: 18:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2013
Event Time: 14:21 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2013 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text PLANNED OUTAGE OF RADIOLOGICAL AND SEISMIC MONITORING CAPABILITY
"During Refueling Outage 21, at approximately 0700 PDT on May 20, 2013 the following plant's gaseous effluent radiation monitoring systems and seismic monitoring systems will be removed from service due to a planned power outage:
" - Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitor: Low Range; Intermediate Range; and High Range Detectors. [NOTE: The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors were removed from service as of 1421 PDT on 19 May 2013 (24 hours before the power outage) to allow for a gradual warming up of the sensors]
" - Rad Waste Building Vent Exhaust Low Range Radiation [Rate Meter] and Exhaust Air Monitor Radiation Indicating Switch
" - Turbine Building Radiation Indicating Switch and Exhaust Air Radiation Indicating Switch
" - Seismic Instrument Accelerometers
" - Seismic Instrument Accelerographs
"The listed equipment is expected to be re-energized at approximately 1400 PDT on May 22, 2013. The Reactor Building Stack Radiation Monitors is expected be operational approximately 48 hours after they are re-energized to allow for sensor cooling requirements to be established.
"To compensate for the loss of the radiation monitoring equipment, an additional Health Physics (HP) Technician trained to acquire offsite dose assessment information on offsite releases will be on shift. The additional personnel will be pre-staged in support of the radiation monitoring system outage and will be deployed in accordance with guidance in site procedures and the compensatory measure instructions.
"To compensate for the loss of the seismic monitoring capability, an entry into the abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' will be made when an earthquake is felt in the control room or when information is received from plant personnel that an earthquake has been felt. Earthquake severity will be estimated in accordance with abnormal operating procedure 'EARTHQUAKE' in lieu of instrumentation being available. Information from the US Geological Survey (USGS), if available, will supplement the estimation of earthquake severity.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow up notification will be made when the equipment has been returned to service.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |