Event Notification Report for April 24, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/23/2013 - 04/24/2013

** EVENT NUMBERS **


48481 48930 48931 48933 48948 48953 48956 48957 48958 48960 48961

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48481
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DON SHEEHAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/06/2012
Notification Time: 03:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/06/2012
Event Time: 00:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL

"On Tuesday, November 06, 2012, at 00:06 EST, during the application of a tag-out associated with feedwater level control, the 12 feedwater flow control valve (FCV-29-137) unexpectedly partially opened. As a result, reactor vessel water level rose to the high level turbine trip set point causing the main turbine to trip. The turbine trip signal then resulted in the initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) channels 11 and 12 logic. No actual system component starts or actuations occurred as a result of the logic initiation and no actual HPCI injection occurred due to the system configuration, nor was injection required.

"Actions were taken to manually isolate the 12 feedwater flow control valve and reactor vessel water level was restored to normal.

"This meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY HELKER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 12/17/12 AT 1543 EST * * *

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48481, which reported an automatic actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation logic.

"The HPCI system is automatically initiated based on conditions representing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The initiation signals are:

- Low reactor water level - This is a direct indication of a potential loss of adequate core cooling.
- Turbine trip - During a LOCA within the drywell, high drywell pressure due to the line break will cause a reactor scram, which causes a turbine trip, which then by design initiates the HPCI system.

"The event occurred with the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, with the main turbine and main turbine shaft-driven feedwater pump (#13) out of service. In the cold shutdown condition, the probability of a LOCA is low and the HPCI system is not required by the Technical Specifications to be operable. Neither of the conditions requiring actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system (high drywell pressure or low reactor water level) was present. Although the turbine trip signal was in response to an actual sensed high reactor water level condition, high reactor water level is not a plant condition satisfying the requirement for actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system. With reactor vessel water level high, the safety function of the HPCI system (i.e. to provide adequate core cooling) was already completed. Thus, the HPCI initiation signal was invalid, and the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 0158 EDT * * *

"Upon further review, it has been determined the event did constitute a valid actuation of the HPCI system and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(4)(A)."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Joustra).

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Agreement State Event Number: 48930
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNSPECIFIED
Region: 1
City:  State: NY
County:
License #: UNSPECIFIED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/16/2013
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SEED MIGRATED DEEPER INTO TISSUE AND WAS NOT REMOVED

The following information was received by facsimile:

"A patient for axillary node dissection with radioactive seed localization had an 8.33MBq 123 I [Iodine] seed placed at tumor site under ultrasound guidance by radiologist. The surgeon successfully removed the tumor and lymph node, however the seed had migrated deeper into tissue and was not removed. The surgeon determined that the new seed location prevented safe extraction due to scarring from previous node removal, mastectomy and reconstructive, surgery. NYS DOH [The New York State Department of Health] received verbal notice within 24 hours and written notice within 15 days. The patient, referring physician, medical oncologist, and radiologist have all been notified. A localized dose at 0.5 cm from the seed of 22.9Gy was calculated, negligible dose at 6 cm. As a corrective action the facility will no longer use radioactive seed localization for axillary node lesions. [Licensee] Policy updates and staff notifications are to be evaluated during the next routine inspection."

Event Report Identification Number: NY-13-01

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 48931
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CUDD PUMPING SERVICES
Region: 4
City: CRYSTAL CITY State: TX
County:
License #: G02133
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/16/2013
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRUCK ACCIDENT INVOLVING A FIXED DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by facsimile:

"On April 16, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified that one of the licensee's trucks had had a blowout on one of its tires which caused the vehicle to roll. The driver was killed in the accident. On the truck is a densitometer which includes a Thermo-Fisher Scientific Model 5192 fixed gauge that contains 200 millicuries of Cesium-137 (original activity). These devices are a USA DOT 7A Type A container. The licensee reported that the gauge is still [within] of the truck--there is no indication of radiation leakage or exposures to any individual. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer is enroute and will make necessary radiation surveys and conduct an investigation. Local law enforcement responded to the accident. More information will be provided as it is obtained, per SA-300."

Texas State Report # I-9067

* * * RETRACTION FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1708 EDT * * *

The following retraction was received via email:

"This event does not meet the reporting criteria referenced in SA-300, specifically 49 CFR171.15 (b)(1) and (2), in that the individual's death in this incident was not the 'direct result of hazardous materials' as stated in the 171.15(b)(1)."

Notified R4DO (Drake), NMSS (Benner), and FSME EVENTS Resources via email only.

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Agreement State Event Number: 48933
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: HI-TECH TESTING SERVICE
Region: 4
City: SEILING State: OK
County:
License #: OK-32150-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 04/16/2013
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2013
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The State of Oklahoma received a report from the licensee, that a new SPEC-150 Radiographer camera was giving an unexpected high radiation reading of 20 mrem. The State responded to the licensee's location to investigate. Contamination was detected on the exterior of the camera, guide tube, and cable. Contamination was also detected on the truck used to transport the camera. The camera had been used at a natural gas plant in Wheeling, Texas. There was no apparent damage to the camera and efforts to decontaminate the camera were unsuccessful. The licensee has placed the camera in a container and stored it in a secure location. It is believed the camera may have a manufacturer defect. The manufacturer has been notified. The truck has been decontaminated.

The State of Texas has been notified and they will determine if any contamination is present at the natural gas plant in Wheeling, Texas. The radiographer and his assistant were checked for contamination and none was found and no internal exposure is expected. The radiographer's dosimeter indicated 10 mrem and the assistant's dosimeter indicated 0 mrem. Both radiographer's film badges have been sent out for processing.

The States of Oklahoma and Texas will continue their investigations and provide additional information when it is available.

* * * UPDATE AT 1557 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA EMAIL * * *

The following update was received from the State of Oklahoma by email:

"On Monday afternoon, April 15, 2013, radiographers of Hi-Tech Testing Service, (Oklahoma license OK-32150-01 located in Seiling, OK) were working at a natural gas plant near Wheeler, Texas. After doing their survey following retracting the source, they noted high levels of radiation coming from the right rear truck bed. The camera was not nearby, and there was no obvious source for the radiation. They contacted their RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and after ensuring that the source was properly retracted and in the camera, and all known sources of radiation were accounted for, they still had the anomalous high reading. The RSO instructed them to return to the office. After some work, the RSO was able to remove the contamination with duct tape. He reported that using an ND-2000 radiation meter in near contact, the duct tape registered approximately 1 R/hour [Rem] (1000 mrem/hour). He reported that the bed was now showing no radiation, and that the radiography camera and associated equipment were showing no radiation. He secured the contaminated tape in his vault, and advised Oklahoma DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality] of this on Monday evening. On Tuesday [4/16/13] morning, DEQ inspectors arrived at the facility to investigate. As a courtesy, we [Oklahoma DEQ] had advised Texas DSHS [Department of State Health Services] radiation control of the report, and possible contamination concerns at the work site in Texas.

"[Oklahoma] DEQ inspectors checked the area and equipment, including the radiography camera and associated equipment, the radiography truck used during the event, and the shop area where the camera and equipment had been worked on by the RSO. Contamination was found on the bed of the truck in a location where radiographers reportedly assemble and disassemble the camera and associated equipment. Removable contamination was found on the collimator that had been used during the exposures. Radiation was measured from the guide tube and from the crank cable. The radiation in the crank cable extended for several feet from the end of the cable that attaches to the radiography camera, consistent with contamination of the cable from contact with the (presumably contaminated) interior of the guide tube. Other than the bed of the truck, no contamination of the truck was found in this survey. The exterior of the camera was wiped, but no removable contamination was found. Analysis with a portable gamma spec showed that all contamination was Ir-192. Measured radiation levels in near contact on the equipment and truck varied, but were in the hundreds of microR/hour, with the highest being about 800 microR/hour on the collimator. It is important to note that none of this contamination was detectable with the radiography company's instrument, an ND-2000.

"Separately, we [Oklahoma DEQ] verified the licensee RSO's measurements of the contaminated duct tape that he had used to remove the bulk of the contamination from the truck bed. The tape was under lead shielding in an ammo box that had been used as a transport container, and we did not remove the tape from the container, but got readings in the hundreds of milliR/hour, consistent with the one R in contact figure reported by the company RSO.

"The radiographers involved live a long distance from the licensee office and were not available to be surveyed or interviewed in person while we were on site. The licensee reports this was the first time that the camera, guide tube, and crank cable had been used (see dates below). We are told that this equipment had been used only together, and had not been used with other equipment, and that it had only been used at the Wheeler, TX. job site.

"[Oklahoma] DEQ staff worked with the company RSO to remove the remaining contamination from the bed of the pickup truck. Contamination appeared to be in discrete spots on the bed, and removal appeared to be an all or nothing matter Attempts to remove the contamination with duct tape would fail repeatedly, then after another attempt it appeared that all contamination associated with that spot had been removed. Some of the people participating claimed to be able to see a small dark spot on the tape after the successful removal, consistent with a small chip of Ir-192 remaining on the tape. When we concluded our work, all levels we could find on the truck bed were 10 microR/hour or less in near contact.

"The contaminated guide tube, crank cable, collimator, and all wastes associated with the decontamination efforts were placed in plastic bags where possible, placed in a large trash can, and secured in the licensee's vault for removal. The work bay where all surveys had taken place was surveyed and found to be uncontaminated.

"[Oklahoma] DEQ staff and the licensee RSO called SPEC, manufacturer and distributor of the equipment, and advised them of the situation. DEQ requested that SPEC arrange for packaging and shipment of all contaminated material back to SPEC. SPEC representatives were at the licensee facility on Wednesday, April 17, 2013 and packaged all contaminated material and equipment for shipment to SPEC. To our knowledge, the actual shipment has not occurred yet. We were advised verbally that the SPEC staff found very low (no further information is available at this time) contamination on the truck, and that they surveyed the two radiographers and the clothes they had worn during the incident, and found low (no further information available at this time) contamination on one radiographer's shirt sleeve. The radiographer estimates he wore the shirt for about 13 hours on the day of the incident, and had not worn it since. SPEC has taken custody of the contaminated shirt. We were told that SPEC personnel surveyed the homes and privately-owned vehicles of the radiographers last night and found no contamination. We are expecting a written report from SPEC.

"The tentative opinion of the [Oklahoma] DEQ inspectors and the licensee RSO is that our findings are consistent with the presence of a limited number of particles of Ir-192 that had been present on the outside of the source. How the contamination came to be there is unclear. However present, it seems likely that the contamination was deposited inside the guide tube during the initial exposures, and some contamination fell out of the guide tube during assembly and disassembly of the camera. The 'all-or-nothing' removal of contamination from each area suggests that the contamination was in the form of relatively sizable chips, not in the form of a very fine particulate.

"[Oklahoma] DEQ will continue to investigate. We have cooperated with Texas [DSHS] staff as described above, and have informed the state of Louisiana. We were told that Texas staff visited the job site in Texas, and were guided to a single location of use by facility staff, where Texas staff found no contamination. In interviews with the radiographers, Oklahoma DEQ staff were told by the radiographers that radiography had been conducted at several sites in the plant over several days. We informed Texas of this discrepancy and the possibility of additional sites that might need to be checked for contamination. We understand that Texas staff are meeting at the job site this afternoon with the licensee RSO, one of the radiographers, and SPEC staff to check for contamination at all sites where radiography was performed.

"This is an interim report based on initial investigations and phone conversations with many of the actors, and has not undergone substantial review. More information will be provided later of further actions, or of any corrections or clarifications needed.

"Camera was used for shooting at the job site from April 8-12, 2013 and on April 15, 2013.

"Areas of interest that appear to [Oklahoma] DEQ at this time include:

"1) The licensee RSO was not able to detect contamination remaining on the truck bed, and had never identified any contamination on the associated equipment. [Oklahoma] DEQ found contamination at levels of definite concern present on both of these. The RSO was using an NDS-2000, a very common industrial radiography survey meter that is optimized for measuring high levels of radiation. Based on this experience, this model (and possibly similar instruments optimized for radiographer use) may not be sensitive enough to reliably detect contamination of this sort. [Oklahoma] DEQ was readily able to detect the contamination with a MicroR meter, portable gamma spec, and with a pancake probe.

"2) How the source came to be contaminated with Iridium is of interest, especially how the source was shipped with external contamination present, if that was indeed the case."

* * * UPDATE FROM KEVIN SAMPSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1208 EDT * * *

The following update was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"On Thursday afternoon, Texas radiation control and SPEC personnel met with the licensee RSO and one of the radiographers involved in the incident at the Wheeler, TX job site. We are told they did surveys of all locations where radiography had been performed, and no contamination was detected."

Notified R4DO (Drake) and FSME Event Resource via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48948
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/19/2013
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2013
Event Time: 17:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
VICOTR MCCREE (R2RA)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
DAVID SKEEN (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 A/R Y 29 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES

"An Unusual Event was declared on Unit 4 at 1730 EDT due to a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. Emergency buses are being powered from the Emergency Diesel Generators. All rods inserted. The plant is stabilizing on natural circulation in Mode 3. Emergency buses failed to auto-transfer to the startup transformer."

AFW initiated and is supplying water to the steam generators. There was no impact on Unit #3. The failure of the auto-transfer of the startup transformer is under investigation.

Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email. The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1911 EDT * * *

"At 1854 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 continues to be in an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. The emergency buses were energized from the start up transformer at 1824 EDT. Two reactor coolant pumps have been started and are running. The plant is stabilizing in Mode 3. In addition, per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notifications are being made for the Reactor Protection Actuation for loss of power and the Emergency Safety Function actuations of the Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Feedwater."

The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant).

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT PELL TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/19/13 AT 1943 EDT * * *

"All emergency buses are powered from offsite power. Unit 4 is stable in Mode 3. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1915 EDT on 4/19/13."

The licensee notified State of Florida, Miami Dade county, the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias), NRR (Skeen), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS, FEMA, NICC and NuclearSSA via email

* * * UPDATE FROM KEITH MAESTAS TO BILL HUFFMAN ON 4/23/13 AT 1959 EDT * * *

"In addition to the 10 CFR 50.72 sections initially identified, this event is also reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Turkey Point was performing a 3rd Harmonic Relay Power Ascension Test after an Extended Power Upgrade outage. Unit 4 was approximately 173 MW electric with the auxiliary transformer supplying the site safety related 4.16KV busses. The test required maneuvering the Unit 4 main generator voltage downward to place the generator in the lead. As the Unit 4 main generator voltage was lowered, the Load Center degraded voltage relays initiated sequencer operation, 4.16KV bus stripping, starting the EDGs, and loading the 4.16KV buses onto EDGs.

"Offsite power was available at all times."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Sykes) notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48953
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE NIEMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/22/2013
Notification Time: 14:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2013
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 45 Power Operation 45 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY NOT AVAILABLE

"The Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not available due to the loss of HVAC and filtering capabilities resulting from a failed Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ventilation fan. The condition was discovered at 0900 CDT on 4/22/13. Repair parts are expected by the morning of 4/23/13 and the EOF is projected to be available by the end of the day on 4/23/13.

"Compensatory measures are in place to staff and activate the Alternate EOF in the event of a declared emergency.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE STAKES TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1426 EDT ON 4/23/13 * * *

The Emergency Operations Facility vent fan was returned to service at 1400 EDT on 4/23/13. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Whitten).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48956
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GERALD BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/23/2013
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2013
Event Time: 08:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

STACK RADIATION MONITOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"System Affected: Site Stack Radiation Monitor; RM-8169
"Causes: Planned Maintenance
"Effect on Plant: Loss of Assessment Capabilities
"Actions Taken or Planned: Pre-planned maintenance of the RAD monitor.
"Additional Information: RM-8169 will be removed from service at approximately 1100 [EDT] on 4/23/13 for a period of approximately 3 hours."

The licensee notified the state and local government. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48957
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON SAWYER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/23/2013
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2013
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

STATE NOTIFICATION LINE OUTAGE

"Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMP1 and NMP2) was notified by NYS Warning Point that the RECS [Radiological Emergency Communication System] line and all land lines to NYS were nonfunctional beginning at approximately 0330 [EDT] on 4/23/13. Due to this condition, NMPNS did not have any communications with the NYS Warning Point available via NORMAL or BACKUP methods per Emergency Plan Procedures.

"At 0734 [EDT], the NMP1 and NMP2 control rooms were provided an alternate means of contacting the NYS Warning Point via cell phone and hence a viable means of BACKUP communications was established. Per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) any event that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability (offsite notification system between licensee and off site officials - NYS) is reportable via 8-hour report.

"Subsequent to this event at approximately 0930 [EDT], functionality of the RECS line was restored."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48958
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN A WALKOWIAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/23/2013
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2013
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

STATE NOTIFICATION LINE OUTAGE

"James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF NPP) was notified by NYS Warning Point that the RECS [Radiological Emergency Communication System] line and all land lines to NYS were non-functional beginning at approximately 0330 [EDT] on 4/23/13. Due to this condition, JAF NPP did not have any communications with the NYS Warning Point available via NORMAL or BACKUP methods per Emergency Plan Procedures.

"At 0449 [EDT] on 4/23/13, the JAF NPP control room was provided with an alternate means of contacting the NYS Warning Point via cell phone and hence a viable means of BACK-UP communications was established. Per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii), 'any event that results in a major loss of off-site communications capability (off-site notification system between licensee and off-site officials - NYS) is reportable via 8-hour report.'

"Subsequent to this event at approximately 0930 [EDT] 4/23/13, functionality of the RECS was restored and tested satisfactorily."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector as well as the State and local governments.

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Part 21 Event Number: 48960
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM HORNER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/23/2013
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2013
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - ESI REFURBISHED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDER HEADS MAY HAVE VALVE KEEPER SEALS MISSING

The following information is a summary of a report faxed to the Operations Center from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) concerning a condition reportable under 10 CFR 21:

"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10 CFR 21 evaluation on 02/19/13 following the failure analysis of a cylinder head returned by South Texas Project (STP). The cylinder head had been installed on an emergency diesel generator set at STP and, during routine prestart checks, oil was found leaking from the Kiene valve while barring over the engine. This cylinder head had been previously refurbished in 2004 under ESI's 10 CFR 50 Appendix B program. ESI's investigation revealed that the refurbished cylinder head was returned to the customer without keeper seals installed.

"The evaluation was concluded on 04/19/13 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10 CFR 21. Omission of the keeper seals from the cylinder head of the KSV emergency diesel generator set could allow engine lubricating oil to migrate through the cylinder head and into the combustion chamber during engine standby conditions. Presence of this oil could damage the engine to the point that it is unable to perform its safety related function."

ESI began dedicating refurbished cylinder heads in 2001 but the refurbishment scope did not include valve train components. Refurbishments that included valve train components were first shipped in 2003. Procedure steps were included in 2007 to verify valve keepers were installed. Therefore, only cylinder heads refurbished between 2003 and 2007 are affected. A review of purchase orders have determined that the following plants received a total of 26 cylinder heads that may not have valve keeper seals installed:

Byron Station - 3 heads
South Texas Project - 21 heads
Cooper Nuclear Plant - 2 heads

Affected cylinder head part numbers are 10-KSV-11-3-RR, 12-KSV-11-3-RR AND 13-KSVR-11-6-RR.

ESI will be notifying affected customers.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 48961
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER ORF
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/23/2013
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2013
Event Time: 20:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES FROM A RADIATION MONITOR USED FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

Secondary leak collection and release radiation monitor RE19 A/B power supply was removed from service at 2058 EDT on 4/23/13 for planned maintenance activities. This radiation monitor is relied upon for emergency classifications. Expected duration of the maintenance activities is 72 hours.

The licensee notified the State of Connecticut, the town of Waterford, and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021