Event Notification Report for April 16, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRUCK ACCIDENT INVOLVING A FIXED DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by facsimile:

"On April 16, 2013, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified that one of the licensee's trucks had had a blowout on one of its tires which caused the vehicle to roll. The driver was killed in the accident. On the truck is a densitometer which includes a Thermo-Fisher Scientific Model 5192 fixed gauge that contains 200 millicuries of Cesium-137 (original activity). These devices are a USA DOT 7A Type A container. The licensee reported that the gauge is still [within] of the truck--there is no indication of radiation leakage or exposures to any individual. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer is enroute and will make necessary radiation surveys and conduct an investigation. Local law enforcement responded to the accident. More information will be provided as it is obtained, per SA-300."

Texas State Report # I-9067

* * * RETRACTION FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1708 EDT * * *

The following retraction was received via email:

"This event does not meet the reporting criteria referenced in SA-300, specifically 49 CFR171.15 (b)(1) and (2), in that the individual's death in this incident was not the 'direct result of hazardous materials' as stated in the 171.15(b)(1)."

Notified R4DO (Drake), NMSS (Benner), and FSME EVENTS Resources via email only.

POTENTIAL CABLE SIZE AND BREAKER MISMATCH

"During investigation of a documentation discrepancy, a potential cable size and breaker mismatch was identified to exist in a non-safety related DC panel. Initial evaluation has shown that the cable may heat and be potentially damaged if exposed to a 'smart' high impedance fault for an extended period. This discovered condition has not been previously analyzed for NFPA [National Fire Protection Association] 805 common enclosure circuit coordination.

"Fire watches were established as a compensatory measure immediately following identification of the issue on April 8, 2013. An initial review of fire protection analysis was completed on April 16, 2013. Fire watches remain in place until a modification which will restore coordination is complete.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN CAVES TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1400 EDT ON 6/4/13 * * *

"An analysis demonstrated that adjacent cables in the common enclosure would not be damaged, therefore, the condition does not significantly degrade plant safety."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (McCoy).

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED OPERATOR HAD A CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL

A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's plant access has been revoked.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Connecticut.

POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL TRANSPORTED TO OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY

"Contract worker suffered a non-occupational medical emergency while working inside the Unit 2 Containment Building (105' elevation). The worker was working in a contaminated area when the event occurred. He was transported to Southeast Alabama Medical Center via ambulance. The worker is potentially contaminated. Health Physics provided escort in the ambulance.

"Farley Nuclear Plant [was] notified by Health Physics on 4/17/13 at 0028 [CDT] that [the] individual was surveyed and no contamination was found."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOSH CARROLL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 4/18/13 AT 2243 EDT * * *

Farley Nuclear Plant is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification: Health Physics personnel have completed surveys that determined that the contract worker, ambulance, and hospital are free of contamination. The initial report was made based on the individual being potentially contaminated due to radioactive surveying being deferred to allow prompt medical attention. Based on the subsequent determination that the individual was not contaminated the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) are not met and this event report is being retracted.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Vias).

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING TURBINE STOP VALVE LOGIC TESTING WHILE SHUTDOWN

"During outage main turbine stop valve RPS logic surveillance testing, an invalid RPS actuation occurred due to an error in executing main turbine surveillance testing procedures. A Turbine Stop Valve closure RPS signal occurred due to an error in the restoration sequence of restoring the RPS bypass signal and a subsequent manual trip of the main turbine. This resulted in a full scram and a trip of both reactor recirculation pumps.

"The site post-scram response procedure was entered, which required that the mode switch be placed in the locked SHUTDOWN position. This caused an expected but valid RPS actuation.

"No control rod motion occurred due to all control rods were inserted at the time of the invalid RPS actuation and subsequent valid RPS actuation."

The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

DEGRADED FLOW IN EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 'A'

"The Perry Nuclear Power Plant is reporting an event or condition pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"On April 16, 2013, at 2323 EDT, it was identified that Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump 'A' was inoperable due to an inability to maintain minimum flow requirements. As a result, ESW 'A' and the supported Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) were declared inoperable. Coincident with this discovery, a test of the Division 2 emergency systems was in progress with the associated ESW 'B' pump and Division 2 EDG inoperable. Division 2 EDG was available to support the Shutdown Defense In-Depth Strategy. Division 3 EDG was operable and could supply High Pressure Core Spray system injection, if needed.

"Both EDGs were inoperable simultaneously and Technical Specification 3.8.2 'AC Sources-Shutdown' was entered and required actions taken. These actions included immediately suspending core alterations and immediately initiating actions to restore the required EDG. The test of Division 2 emergency systems was suspended and ESW 'B' and the Division 2 EDG were restored to operable status at 0135 EDT on April 17, 2013.

"The failure of ESW 'A' minimum flow is currently under investigation.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN PELCIC TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/13 AT 1355 EDT * * *

"Engineering personnel performed an immediate investigation of the ESW 'A' minimum flow condition. The investigation results showed that the ESW 'A' pump flow exceeded the minimum flow requirement to protect the ESW 'A' system. Therefore, continued operation of ESW 'A' was acceptable and the minimum flow condition originally reported did not cause the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator to be inoperable.

"The condition would not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Reporting is not required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and this notification is retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Orth).

TEST REACTOR EXCEEDED LICENSED POWER LIMIT DURING A SCRAM

The following information was excerpted from an email from the licensee:

On April 16, 2013 at 1701 EDT, the research test reactor automatically shutdown from 100% power (1 MW) due to a valid high power condition. The duty Senior Reactor Operator removed a timed irradiation sample from the core that added positive reactivity. Both the digital (non-safety system) and the analog safety system acted on the high power condition and initiated the shutdown. All systems functioned as designed. The short duration power transient reached a peak power of about 1.3 MW. There was no increase in radiation levels, personnel radiation exposure, or release of radiation from the facility. No emergency event entry criteria were met. The plant was placed in a secured condition and an event review investigation was conducted.

The event is (potentially) reportable in that the Maximum Power Level observed during the short duration (< 1 second) transient exceeded the steady state power limit for non-pulse mode operation as described in Technical Specification(TS) 3.1.1 Non-pulse mode operation sub-section b. The maximum power level shall be no greater than 1.1 MW (thermal).

The reactor was returned to routine service at approximately 1300 EDT on April 17, 2013.

LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATION DURING LOSS-OF-OFFSITE-POWER TEST

"This is an 8-hour report of a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 0037 CDT on 4/16/13, during the performance of an 'A' train loss-of-offsite-power test per procedure FNP-2-STP-80.14, Farley Unit 2 experienced a complete loss of main control board annunciation. Emergency Power Board annunciators are unaffected. No emergency action level criteria have been exceeded as a result of the loss of annunciation, however, annunciators normally relied upon for emergency assessment are not functional. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the loss of annunciation is in progress. No estimate for restoring annunciator power is currently available. Compensatory measures for critical parameter monitoring have been established and implemented. Unit 2 plant conditions remain stable in mode 5. Unit 1 is unaffected by this event. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM DARRIN GARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1444 EDT ON 4/16/13 * * *

The Unit 2 main control room annunciators were restored at 0907 EDT on 4/16/13. The cause of the failure was determined to be a relay in the annunciator power supply circuit.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias).

INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION DURING WEEKLY TESTING DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) to notify the NRC of the inadvertent actuation of the Oswego County emergency notification sirens at approximately 0845 [EDT] on 4/16/13. Oswego County was performing routine weekly testing and siren #17 was inadvertently actuated for approximately 2 minutes.

"The Oswego County Emergency Management Office issued a News Release identifying the inadvertent actuation of the emergency siren.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on LOSS of ASSESSMENT capability. This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 0414 [EDT] on April 16, 2013, preplanned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean all Air Handler Units, Fans, and Outside Air Condensing Units that support TSC Ventilation. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 50 hours.

"TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degrees F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, Main Control Room - Site Emergency Coordinator, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

"On Tuesday April 16, 2013 at approximately 0914 EDT, the Oswego County Emergency Management Office notified Nine Mile Point via the Radiological Emergency Communications System RECS line of an inadvertent activation of Siren 17. The activation occurred during a normally scheduled Oswego County bi weekly test and was due to a human performance error. Activation occurred at approximately 0845 EDT and lasted for approximately 2 minutes.

"This notification is applicable to both NMP Unit 1 and 2 as well as the James A Fitzpatrick station, a separate notification will be communicated from JAF station. The Oswego County Emergency Management Office has issued a press release and the NRC resident inspector has been notified."

The licensee will also notify the State.

See related EN #48927.