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Event Notification Report for October 20, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/19/2011 - 10/20/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46203 47155 47258 47344 47346 47353 47354 47355 47356 47357

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 46203
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES MURAIDA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/24/2010
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 11:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PLACED IN A LINE-UP THAT MAY HAVE PREVENTED ITS SAFETY FUNCTION

"At 1140 [CDT] on August 24th, Unit 2 received Essential Service Water (SX) discharge header pressure low and SX strainer delta pressure high alarms indicative of high flow. At the time, a 2B SX ASME surveillance was in progress which involved field operations by Equipment Operators (EO's). At the time of the event, SX discharge header pressure dropped to 65 psig, less than the 89 psig necessary for operability. The Control Room responded by directing the EO's to restore SX discharge header pressure, which was promptly restored.

"The 2B SX ASME surveillance sets initial conditions prior to data collection. The surveillance has the total SX flow be adjusted to 24000 gpm via the U2 Component Cooling Water (CC) heat exchanger outlet throttle valve, 2SX007. The subject flow was intended to be measured via an installed ultrasonic flow gauge 2FE-SX147. The EO's, instead used the U2 CC heat exchanger flow gauge 2FE-SX031. As a result, in an attempt to achieve 24000 gpm through the U2 CC heat exchanger, total SX flow exceeded the 24000 gpm since the U2 CC heat exchanger is but one of many loads the 2B SX pump is serving.

"For the 5 minutes described above, the SX system was in a lineup that may have prevented it to fulfill its safety function and placed Unit 2 in a potentially unanalyzed condition. This condition is still being evaluated."

Site Engineering has determined no runout conditions existed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOE KLEVORN TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/19/2011 AT 1626 EDT* * *

"The evaluation of the condition has been completed. Based on Essential Service Water (SX) system flow model runs performed, the conditions that existed at the time of the low SX header pressure would have resulted in low flow supplied to multiple safety related components. However, the safety function to provide necessary cooling to required safety-related safe shutdown equipment would have been met under design basis conditions with the auto-start of the 2A SX pump. Therefore, this did not result in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, ENS notification 46203 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Daley).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47155
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: HRK SERVICES
Region: 4
City: HOOD RIVER State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-91120
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/15/2011
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2011
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received via email:

"On Friday August 12, 2011, the gauge owned by the licensee had been run over by a roller. The licensee reported that the gauge was in the shielded position and there were no elevated readings on the gauge. The gauge was placed into the shipping case and returned to the office for disposal."

The device was a CPN MC moisture density gauge serial number M390104801 containing 10 milliCuries Cs-137, Am-241/Be 50 milliCuries.

Incident #: 11-0028

* * * UPDATE FROM DARYL LEON TO PETE SNYDER AT 1253 ON 10/19/11 * * *

On August 17, 2011, the above source was received by Qal-Tek of Idaho Falls, ID who possesses NRC license 11-27610-01, for disposal. Both sources passed a leak test performed by Qal-Tek.

Notified R4DO (Campbell).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47258
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KLINE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/13/2011
Notification Time: 01:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2011
Event Time: 17:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On September 12, 2011, at 1745 PDT operators declared the control room envelope (CRE) inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10 Action B. This was due to discovery of inadequately documented CRE in-leakage test data.

"On September 12, 2011, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] personnel reviewing the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 determined that the test report provided inadequate information to conclude that the most limiting alignment for control room pressurization would result in zero cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage into the CRE, contrary to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis for the most limiting design basis accident. Three of the four ventilation alignments tested had reported values of in-leakage greater than zero CFM.

"Plant staff implemented compensatory measures by placing the control room ventilation system into its pressurization accident alignment at 1828 PDT using the alignment from the test which had a reported value of zero CFM in-leakage. Additionally, administrative controls are being established to maintain post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System leakage at a rate that would ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the test.

"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."


* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL KENNEDY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1816 EDT ON 09/16/2011 * * *

"On 9/13/11 procedure revisions were approved with reduced limits for post-Loss of Coolant Accident Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage. These reduced limits ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analysis results for the highest in-leakage rate reported by the CRE in-leakage test. Plant staff have since determined that the potential benefit of operating the control room ventilation system in its pressurization alignment was unnecessary with the ECCS leakage restriction and on 9/16/11 operators restored the control room ventilation system into its normal operating alignment."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Greg Pick)


* * * UPDATE FROM SHANE GUESS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0042 EDT ON 10/19/2011 * * *

"This is an update to EN #47258 reported on 9/13/11 where it was reported that operators had declared the Control Room Envelope inoperable. [This report was subsequently] updated on 9/16/2011.

"On 10/18/11 at 16:45 PDT, plant staff determined that the CRE testing dated February 3, 2005 was not performed using a bounding configuration which would result in greatest consequence to the control room operators. The recorded in-leakage from the test was therefore considered to be non-bounding.

"[As a result of this determination, plant staff have] implemented additional compensatory measures by issuing a shift order requiring the use of self-contained breathing apparatus and potassium iodide tablets under certain accident conditions in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.196 and NEI 99-03.

"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R4DO (Campbell).

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Agreement State Event Number: 47344
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES INC
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L00087
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/14/2011
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT

The following report was received by the Texas Dept of State Health Services Investigations Unit Radiation Branch via e-mail:

"On October 14, 2011, the Agency [Texas Dept of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that on October 14, 2011, a radiography team was unable to retract a 32 curie Iridium - 192 source to the exposure device. The QSA model 880 D exposure device was set on a pipe to perform radiography on an adjacent pipe. The exposure device fell off the pipe approximately 18 inches and the return portion of the crankout tube was crimped preventing the radiographer from fully retracting the source. The radiographer contacted his Radiation Safety Officer and notified them of the event. The radiographer is qualified to perform source recoveries, so he dismantled the crankout device, pulled the drive cable out of the crankout device, and manually retracted the source to its fully retracted and locked position. No member of the general public received any exposure during this event. The radiographer received a total of 20 millirem for the day. Visual inspection of the exposure device did not find any damage to the camera. The licensee has removed the exposure device and crankout device from service and will send them back to the manufacturer for inspection and repair. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-8893

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Agreement State Event Number: 47346
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION TESTING AND ENGINEERING, INC
Region: 4
City: OXNARD State: CA
County:
License #: 7361-56
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/14/2011
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2011
Event Time: 07:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/14/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME)

Event Text

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE LOST AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED

The following is a summary of information received from the California Department of Health - Radiologic Health Branch via e-mail:

"On October 14, 2011 Construction Testing and Engineering, Inc., contacted [the California Department of Health Radiologic Health Branch] about a portable moisture/density gauge (Troxler Model 3411B, S/N 8349, 8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am:Be-241) that was lost while being transported to a jobsite at California State University, Channel Islands. The gauge operator had picked up the gauge at their facility around 6:45-7:15 A.M. and left for the jobsite, which is approximately 8-12 miles east of their facility. When nearing the jobsite, while travelling on Laguna Rd., around 7:15 and 7:30 A.M., the gauge operator noticed that the lid on the gauge transport box was open, the operator stopped the vehicle and noticed that the gauge was gone. He immediately contacted his office and Ventura County Sherriff's to report the incident. After filing a report with the police, the gauge operator then proceeded to search for the gauge.

"[The licensee] stated that the fire department and police were also searching for the gauge. [The licensee] stated that their employees had also looked for the gauge inside and outside of their facility and asked their neighbors if they had seen the gauge and to look out for the gauge. The gauge had been used by the same operator at the same jobsite for the last few weeks, and had used it the day before. [The licensee] also stated that the gauge should have been chained to the truck bed and should have had two locks in place.

"[Shortly after 10:00 A.M, Oxnard Fire Department reported that] the gauge had been found and one of their trucks was enroute to verify that the gauge was intact. [The] gauge had been found intact with the handle securely locked and minor scratches and that the police/fire department verified that there was no unusual radiation readings. The gauge was found in the vicinity of 601 E. Bard Rd., Oxnard, approximately 2 miles from Pacific Coast Highway. The individual who found the gauge, who works for another construction company, brought the gauge to 601 E. Bard Rd. and notified the police. The Oxnard Police and Fire Department and the gauge operator arrived at the scene and verified the gauge was intact.

"[The California Department of Health - Radiologic Health Branch informed the licensee] that a leak test was needed to be done prior to using the gauge again and that a written report needed to be provided within 30 days. While the investigation is still ongoing, pending licensee's findings in their 30 day report, the licensee is likely to be cited for improperly securing the gauge, and loss of control of the gauge. Also a site visit will be conducted to verify the licensee is properly securing their gauges during transport."

California Report Number: 101411

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47353
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVE FIELDS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 07:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 05:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 86 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM

"On October 19, 2011, at 0528, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to rising condenser backpressure. All (Control Element Assembly) CEAs fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat Removal is from Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. The cause of the rising backpressure was an unplanned trip the Circulating Water Pump 1A1, which degraded the Circulating Water System performance. At the time of the trip, an additional Circulating Water Pump 1A2 was secured for planned maintenance.

"The cause of the Circulating Water Pump 1A1 trip is under investigation.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip."

The plant is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47354
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY DIESEL NON-FUNCTIONAL

"At 1000 (CDT), on October 19, 2011, the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was declared non-functional due to its failure to maintain required voltage during routine testing. The plant is currently in the process of determining the cause of the failure. Normal power to the TSC is currently available."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47355
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 12:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OPENED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTAINER IN PROTECTED AREA

"At 1244 CST a prohibited substance (can of beer) was discovered open in the protected area. The non-supervisory, non-licensed individual involved did not consume any alcohol and was tested under the FFD program. The prohibited substance (alcohol) has been confiscated and FFD test results were negative for consumption. The can of beer was inadvertently brought in the person's lunch box and opened before the individual realized the error.

"This report is being made in accordance Significant Fitness-Far-Duty Events 10 CFR 26.719 (b) Significant FFD policy violations or programmatic failures. The following significant FFD policy violations and programmatic failures must be reported to the NRC Operations Center by telephone within 24 hours after the licensee or other entity discovers the violation: '(1) The use, sale, distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area.'

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 47356
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING INC.
Licensee: FAIRBANKS GOLD MINING INC.
Region: 4
City: FAIRBANKS State: AK
County:
License #: 50-29098-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN MCDARIS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 19:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)

Event Text

SHUTTER STUCK OPEN ON DENSITY GAUGE

Fairbanks Gold Mining Inc. discovered a density gauge for the number 2 South Cyclo-Pac Area of its Fort Knox Gold Mine had its shutter stuck open. There is no personnel radiation hazard with the situation of the gauge. The gauge is a Ronan Model SA1-C5 with a 1000 millicurie Cs-137 source. The source serial number is 0606GK. All on-contact readings were less than 5 millirem per hour.

Fairbanks Gold Mining has contacted Ronan who will send a representative to the site to repair the gauge.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 47357
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/19/2011
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/19/2011
Event Time: 20:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Standby
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS CONTAINING ALUMINUM MATERIAL

"With Unit 1 in Mode 4 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 an issue was identified with the body material of existing installed pressure instruments for both the Personnel and Emergency Airlocks of both units. The pressure instruments were determined to have an aluminum body which is not suited for safety related use in containment.

"Aluminum is a restricted/limited material in containment because it is not compatible with accident conditions and has failures with multiple adverse effects. Due to this condition, the pressure instruments would potentially lose pressure integrity during a LOCA with containment spray actuation.

"These pressure instruments are located inside containment and are connected to tubing that penetrates the airlock barrel. In event of a failure of any pressure instrument the integrity of the airlock would be compromised. The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and, as such, a loss of pressure boundary integrity would no longer meet general design criteria.

"Compensatory measures have been taken to prevent a failure of the airlock integrity due to containment spray actuation and at this time the airlock is operable.

"Luminant power determined this to be reportable at 2002 on 10/19/11 per 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012