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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/30/2011 - 08/31/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47088 |
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPARGO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 07/22/2011
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/22/2011
Event Time: 08:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
N |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
0 |
Cold Shutdown |
Event Text
FIRE SUPRESSION PUMPS INOPERABLE
"Both Fire Suppression Pumps are not operable because the required monthly surveillance tests will not be completed for June and July. The surveillance tests will be completed when flood waters recede to below 1004 feet MSL. The current river level is 1006.3 feet. Both fire pumps, FP-1A and FP-1B, are available and lined up for use. Other options are also available to provide a means of backup fire water supply that include:
- Water Plant Pumps DW-8A and DW-8B aligned to the Fire Protection (FP) system.
- Temporary connection to the fire protection water distribution system by the Fort Calhoun Fire Truck that is staged on site or any other fire pumper truck via fire hydrant FP-3G.
- Admin Building/Training Center fire hydrant via fire hoses or water truck. This supply is from Blair water system and FP storage tank west of Highway 75.
- Drafting from the Missouri River via temporary pumps."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EDT ON 8/30/11 * * *
"Further review of the plant design and licensing basis determined that the plant is adequately analyzed for the reported situation and that it does not constitute an unanalyzed condition significantly degrading plant safety as originally reported. Therefore, this event is being retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 47204 |
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GREG LABORATORIES, INC.
Region: 1
City: WILMORE State: KY
County:
License #: 201-098-52
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CURT PENDERGRASS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 08/26/2011
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2011
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE - TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED BY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
The following report was received from the Kentucky Radiation Health Branch via facsimile:
"A Troxler model 3430 belonging to Gregg Laboratories, Inc, containing a Cs-137 source and a Am-241:Be source was run over by a D6 bull dozer. The company was working at a job site on the campus of Asbury College in Wilmore, KY at the time of the accident. The technician using the gauge was calibrating the gauge on the source block, source rod not exposed, when the dozer ran over the device. The technician set a 50 foot boundary and called the RSO. The RSO called the Wilmore Fire Department (FD) who responded but did not have a survey meter. The Wilmore FD called the Nicholasville, KY FD who then responded. The Nicholasville FD surveyed the damaged gauge with a GM detector and detected radiation but no contamination. Nicholasville FD called CMC Environmental Remediation in Nicholasville, KY who sent a response team to recover the gauge. The gauge was double bagged, put in a 55 gallon drum, surrounded by dirt removed from the site of the accident and everything surveyed by the Nicholasville FD with a Ludlum survey instrument equipped with a GM pancake probe. All survey readings of the site, the dozer, the equipment used to remove the gauge, and surrounding vicinity read background readings of 8 micro-R/hr. Based on [these] findings, [it is] believed that no breach of either source occurred and that there is no radioactive contamination." |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 47219 |
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 09:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(4) - NAT PHENOM AFFECTING SAFETY |
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS) |
Event Text
24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO FAILURE OF A GAMMA MONITORING SYSTEM
"On 8/28/11 at 0920 hrs. PDT, electrical storms in the area caused power surges. The site backup power generators activated as designed. However, it was later discovered that a gamma monitor associated with the waste water treatment process was damaged. When the gamma monitoring system failed, the system interlocks shut the system down as designed. The system has remained down since that time and will remain down until repaired.
"This report is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(b)(4), (24-hr. report criteria), 'Any natural phenomenon that has affected the availability or reliability of one or more Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS)'.
"An updated report with additional timeline information will be provided as the information becomes available.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low. The waste water treatment system was shut down as designed.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: The only potential pathway is gradual accumulation of uranium in the waste water treatment equipment over an extended period of time.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Concentration is controlled. Maximum concentration in the equipment is estimated to be less than 1.5 grams of uranium per liter based on gamma monitor reading when the system shut down.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT/ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Facility is licensed for 5 wt% U-235. Normal system clean out results in about 120 grams of uranium. A minimum critical mass assuming spherical geometry is [much greater than normal system content].
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: System automatically shut down as designed and will remain down until the equipment is repaired and returned to service. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 47220 |
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
DAVID PSTRAK (NMSS) |
Event Text
CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM HORN DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"On 8/29/11, it was discovered during troubleshooting on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound its local alarm horn. The module has been repaired and the system was returned to normal on 8/29/2011.
"An investigation into the cause of the failure has been initiated. There are indications that the apparent cause of the failure is an AC to DC converter that had a component short circuit.
"There were no active fissile material operations impacted by this failure. Consequently, no unsafe condition existed.
"This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2)."
The licensee stated that the system had been tested satisfactorily within the last month.
The licensee will notify state and local authorities. The licensee also plans to notify NRC Region 2 (Sykes). |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47221 |
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ALEX MCLELLAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 13:19 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY |
Person (Organization):
EUGENE DIPAOLO (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PROGRAMMATIC DEFICIENCY IDENTIFIED IN FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM
"At 1319 [hrs. EDT on] 8/29/2011, a programmatic deficiency was reported involving the SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] Fitness For Duty (FFD) program and compliance with 10CFR26. Current contractual agreement with PPL vendor to perform Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counseling and treatment for self referrals does not require appropriate reporting to the utility as mandated by 10CFR26.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4, 'Any programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program."
The licensee has obtained an informal agreement by the vendor to report appropriate information until the contract can be amended.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47222 |
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERESA PUTNAM
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN |
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO FEDERAL AGENCY REGARDING EXCAVATION ACTIVITIES
"On April 16, 2011, a suspected buried pipe leak was identified in the plant yard. Subsequent investigation revealed that the source of the water was a leak in the Unit 1 Condenser Circulation Water (RC) intake pipe. In order to perform a repair, the ground in the vicinity of the pipe, including the toe of the dike berm, required excavation. McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) site personnel recognized that excavating into the dike would require Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) involvement. Duke Hydro was contacted, and confirmed that the dike across the MNS intake is an extension of the Cowans Ford Dam and would require FERC authorization to dig into it. On the morning of April 20, 2011, Duke Hydro personnel contacted the FERC engineer assigned to Duke Energy's Cowans Ford Hydroelectric Development to seek FERC authorization for the excavation. Duke Hydro hosted a conference call later that same morning between FERC's Atlanta Regional Office and MNS site personnel to discuss the details of the situation and planned repairs. FERC later dispatched their personnel to the site to observe the repair effort.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) requires a 4-hour notification to be made for any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. º50.72(b)(2)(xi) further states that such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.
"Although a phone call to an outside government agency (FERC) was made, Duke Energy made the decision at the time to not make a 4-hour notification to the NRC. This decision was based on the belief that 1) the RC leak and impact on the dike had no safety significance, 2) there were no concerns regarding protection of the environment, and 3) the situation did not involve an on-site fatality or an inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials. However, based upon how the matter was characterized in discussions between NRC and FERC, the NRC is not in agreement with the Duke Energy position. Therefore, the purpose of this phone call is to provide the necessary 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) notification retroactively." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 47223 |
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN GOELZER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 08/30/2011
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2011
Event Time: 17:24 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
MAINTENANCE INADVERTENTLY RENDERS CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On August 29, 2011, at 1724 PDT, plant operators discovered that the Control Room Envelope (CRE) boundary required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10, 'Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS),' lost its integrity. This was due to maintenance personnel removing a blank flange on the line to Unit 2 CRVS dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A with the dampers inoperable.
"On August 29, 2011, at approximately 1400 PDT, plant personnel completed maintenance on Unit 2 control room dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A and planned to perform static testing of the CRE on the morning of August 30, 2011. Prior to reporting off the clearance, maintenance personnel removed a blank flange from the upstream side of the dampers. This blank flange was maintaining the integrity of the CRE boundary while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were inoperable during the maintenance. Upon completion of maintenance on the dampers, the blank flange was removed with shift foreman authorization. Later, personnel recognized that the flange had been removed prematurely while dampers MOD-2 and MOD-2A were still inoperable. Personnel took required actions associated with TS 3.7.10 and re-installed the blank flange on August 30, 2011, at 0110 PDT.
"The loss of the CRE boundary rendered the CRVS incapable of performing its specified safety function of mitigating the exposure of control room personnel to the consequences of an accident.
"The cause of the event was inadequate coordination between maintenance personnel and plant operators to maintain the integrity of the CRE boundary.
"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
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