| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/15/2011 - 07/18/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 46924 | Rep Org: FLOWSERVE LIMITORQUE ACTUATORS
Licensee: FLOWSERVE LIMITORQUE ACTUATORS
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JEFF McCONKEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
JOSELITO CALLE (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PT 21 GRP VIA E-MAIL ()
| Event Text POSSIBLE DEFICIENCY IN ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING OF LIMITORQUE GEARED LIMIT SWITCH FOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT
The following is a summary of a Part 21 fax notification received from Flowserve-Limitorque Actuators:
This Part 21 evaluation is for Geared Limit Switch - Nylon Bearing Retainer Cage. Flowserve has provided the NRC an interim report that provides information concerning an evaluation that is being performed by Flowserve - Limitorque regarding a possible deficiency in previous EQ test programs which qualified Limitorque SMB-000 & 00 actuators to IEEE-382 requirements for inside containment service. An investigation to date has revealed that the non-metallic retainer cage material of the radial ball bearing may not have been properly considered when determining thermal aging requirements during EQ testing.
The safety related component affected is the geared limit switch (GLS) assembly on actuator type / size Limitorque SMB/SB/SBD-000 and SMB/SB/SBD-00 only qualified for inside containment to Limitorque EQ report number B0058 and B0212. The sub-component of the GLS under evaluation is a radial ball bearing (manufacturer's part # 1604-DC and 7304-DC) manufactured by Nice / RBC Bearing Corp / SKF which has been used in the cartridge assembly. This bearing provides partial support to the input pinion shaft of the GLS. This bearing was manufactured with a nylon (polyamide 6/6) retainer cage.
a) This bearing is used on the 2-train and 4-train geared limit switch cartridge assembly of the SMB/SB/SBD-00 and the 4-train GLS cartridge of the SMB/SB/SBD-000 only.
b) The GLS assembly used in SMB/SB/SBD-0, 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 actuators use a slightly different cartridge construction that does not contain this bearing.
The functionality of the cartridge bearing in the GLS assembly may not have been properly validated in an accident environment test with the non-metallic nylon material properly thermally aged to "end of life" condition.
Limitorque is continuing the evaluation of this issue in an effort to finalize this position.
At this point of the evaluation, Limitorque does not feel that the safety related function of the subject actuators will be affected by the existence of the nylon bearing retainer cage in the GLS assembly. Limitorque will continue the evaluation of this issue and will submit a status update on or before July 15, 2011.
To date, the use of the nylon cage bearing in the GLS assembly has shown no negative affects on operability of the switch.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/15/11 AT 1500 EDT BY HUFFMAN * * *
The following information was received from Flowserve Limitorque Actuators via e-mail:
"As identified in the interim report above, the SMB-000 & 00 geared limit switch assembly contains a ball bearing which includes a nylon ball retainer cage. A review of previous EQ testing identified that the retainer cage material may not have been thermally aged to an end of life condition prior to High Energy Line Break / Main Steam Line Break exposure. The concern was that degradation of the retainer cage could result in loss of functionality of the limit switch assembly in safety related applications.
"This bearing is a subcomponent of the geared limit switch (GLS) assembly. The purpose of the bearing is the partial support of the input pinion shaft of the GLS cartridge. The input pinion shaft connects the GLS to the mechanical drive train of the actuator. This shaft is also supported by a bronze sleeve bushing in the cartridge. The purpose of the retainer cage in a radial ball bearing is to position the individual balls in the bearing assembly. As part of the evaluation, a sample bearing was installed in a GLS cartridge. Subsequently, the nylon ball retainer cage was intentionally removed from the bearing to simulate a worst case scenario of total degradation of the retainer cage. The removal of the ball retainer cage and the subsequent uncontrolled alignment of the individual balls inside the ball bearing race did not result in loss of GLS functionality. The input pinion shaft remained adequately supported by the sleeve bushing such that it is reasonable to conclude the GLS would perform its safety related function.
"To further evaluate the adequacy of the nylon retainer cage equipped bearing for the accident environment, a thermal screening test of an SMB-00 geared limit switch assembly containing the subject bearing was performed. This test consisted of continuous exposure to a 340?F ambient temperature while cycle testing the limit switch. The test was halted after 270 hours (11.25 days) and 1600 operational cycles without failure. Post test inspection showed that the nylon retainer cage remained intact and functional which indicates that the degradation of the bearing discussed above is highly unlikely. No loss of functionality of the limit switch occurred during the test indicating acceptability of the bearing for the application. This screening test is documented in report # STLO-1125 retained on file and available for audit at Flowserve - Limitorque
"Based upon the evaluation described above and the existing EQ test data, Limitorque has determined that this issue is not reportable under 10CFR21 guidelines. The investigation has shown that in the unlikely event of degradation of the bearing retainer cage, safety-related functionality of the geared limit switch assembly will not be affected. Environmental qualification of the SMB/SB/SBD-000 & 00 actuators by Limitorque EQ reports B0058 and B0212 remains valid."
R1DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Freeman), R3DO (Bloomer), and R4DO (Cain) notified. The Part 21 Group was informed via e-mail. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47043 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: State: CO
County:
License #: 828-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 07/11/2011
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/08/2011
Event Time: 07:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT OVEREXPOSURE TO THYROID GLAND
The following was received from the state via fax:
"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received notification this date from The University of Colorado Hospital, Colorado License # 828-01, that a patient received the wrong dose of I-131 on July 8, 2011 resulting in a dose that exceeded prescribed by 50 rem and 50% of the dose expected from the administration defined in the written directive. The patient was prescribed 20 mCi of l-131 for Graves disease, but instead received 100 mCi of I-l31, which was intended for another patient. The patient was discharged before the error was discovered. The patient's physician and the patient have been contacted and made aware of the situation. The patient has been given additional instructions regarding contact with family members and members of the public. No other details are available at this time.
"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment has initiated an investigation."
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47044 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: COLLETON MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: WALTERBORO State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW ROXBURGH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 07/12/2011
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRIS EINBERG (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE TO WHOLE BODY (WB) AND HANDS
The following was received via fax:
"The Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on July 12, 2011 at 10:25 AM by the licensee that it had received notification from Landauer that one of the employees WB and Ring badges exceeded the limits. The licensee stated that the WB badge had a reading of 77480 mR and the Ring badge had a reading of 65468 mR. The employee in question only administered doses to patients 6 out of the 10 days worked during the reporting period. The licensee is authorized for diagnostic administration of radioactive material (Tc-99m and TI-201 ).
"The licensee was advised by [the state] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department of Health and Environmental Control within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department, updates will be made through the national NMED system." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47052 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL HANPHO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/14/2011
Notification Time: 21:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2011
Event Time: 20:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
DAVE LEW (DRA)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
DAVE HILL (DHS)
DWIGHT FULLER (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED BASED ON REACTOR COOLANT LEAK GREATER THAN 10 GPM
"At 2053 on July 14, 2011 Salem unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to reactor coolant system leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute. While performing a monthly Emergency Core Cooling System vent of the high head safety injection piping a motor operated valve was opened and a leak developed on the high head piping greater than 10 gallons per minute. The leak rate was approximately 11-15 gallon per minute. The leak was terminated when the motor operated valve was closed. The time of the leak was about 6 minutes."
At this time the leak is believed to be from a crack on the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) relief valve line which is connected to the high head piping. A total of approximately 90 gallon of reactor coolant leaked into the BIT room. The licensee has declared the high head safety injection inoperable and is proceeding to shutdown under Tech Spec 3.0.3.
The license has notified appropriate State and local authorities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KARL HANPHO TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/15/11 AT 0025 EDT* * *
"Salem Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage being greater than 10 gpm and pressurizer level decreasing. Leakage was estimated to be approximately 15 gpm. The leakage was determined to be from a weld on the high head charging injection relief valve connection. This leaking weld impacts both trains of high head charging/safety injection. Both trains of high head charging/safety injection were declared inoperable at 2038 [EDT] on July 14, 2011, entering TS 3.0.3. Salem Unit 2 began the Technical Specification shutdown in accordance with TS 3.0.3 at 2136 [EDT]. The technical specification shutdown is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) and RAL 11.1.1.a.
"In addition since the leakage from the weld on the high head charging/safety injection piping exceeded the analyzed limit for ESF leakage outside containment, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and RAL 11.2.2.b as a condition that prevents the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Salem unit 2 is currently at 27% and reducing power."
The licensee notified the states of New Jersey and Delaware, Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), NRR-EO (Giiter) and IRD (Morris).
* * * UPDATE FROM KARL HANPHO TO CHARLES TEAL ON 7/15/11 AT 0345 EDT* * *
Salem Unit 2 has exited the Unusual Event as of 0339 EDT. The criteria for exit was the leakage rate was below the 10 gpm rate. The plant is in Mode 3 and is preparing to cooldown.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Dwyer), NRR EO (Giitter), IRD (Morris), DHS(Hill), and FEMA (Blankenship). |
| Research Reactor | Event Number: 47053 | Facility: UNIV OF WISCONSIN
RX Type: 1000 KW TRIGA (CONVERSION)
Comments:
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County: DANE
License #: R-74
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000156
NRC Notified By: ROBERT AGASIE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 07/15/2011
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2011
Event Time: 11:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
NON-POWER REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
JESSIE QUICHOCHO (NRR)
LINH TRAN (NRR)
GEOFF WERTZ (NRR)
| Event Text TEST REACTOR VIOLATED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION STAFFING REQUIREMENTS
"The following special report is being made in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.7.2(1)(c) which states in part: There shall be a report not later than the following day by telephone or similar conveyance to the NRC Headquarters Operation Center of any reportable occurrence as defined in TS 1.3. TS 1.3 defines an observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls, such that the inadequacy caused the existence of a condition which results in a violation of technical specifications as a reportable occurrence.
"Specifically, on Thursday July 14, 2011, while performing routine surveillance checks, an operator left the control room while the console key remained in the console key switch and the switch was in the TEST position. This is in direct violation of the staffing requirements defined in TS 6.1.3(1)(a) which states a licensed reactor operator must be in the control room when the reactor is not secured. The reactor was not secured by the fact that the console key switch was not in the OFF position and the key remained in the console key switch. However, all control elements were fully inserted, the reactor was shut down, no work was in progress involving core fuel, core structure, control elements or drives and no experiments were being moved. This condition remained for a period of approximately 7 minutes until the cognizant senior reactor operator entered the control room and secured the reactor."
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT AGASIE TO PETE SNYDER ON 7/18/11 AT 0846 EDT * * *
After a records review the licensee determined that: the actual event time was 1055 AM CDT and the actual duration of time that the operator was not in the control room was 85 seconds.
Notified R3DO (Duncan) and NRR (Tran). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47054 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL WOJTKIEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/15/2011
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2011
Event Time: 10:16 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2011 | Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
MARK SATORIUS (RA)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
BILL GOTT (IRD)
BILL FLINTER (DHS)
LAURIE BURCKHART (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ALERT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS RELEASE RESTRICTING ACCESS TO A VITAL AREA
"An alert was declared due to a leak of sodium hypochlorite at the unit 2/3 cribhouse. Access to the unit 2/3 cribhouse, which is a vital area, was restricted. The leak has been isolated."
The licensee has notified State authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee stated that the sodium hypochlorite leak was actually outside the cribhouse and went into a sump. The fumes from the sodium hypochlorite restricted access to the cribhouse which contains safety related ultimate heat sink equipment (containment cooling service water pumps, emergency diesel generator cooling water pumps). Other than restricting access to the cribhouse, the leak has had no other impact on plant operation. The alert was declared under EAL H.A.7 - release of toxic gas within or restricting access to a vital area.
* * * UPDATE AT 1626 EDT ON 7/15/11 FROM MIROCHNA TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The alert has been terminated on 7/15/11 at 1520 CDT. The conditions which caused the alert no longer exist. A press release was made for the event. Two employees were sent for offsite medical attention as a precautionary measure; neither employee was contaminated."
The licensee stated that the sodium hypochlorite had leaked from a pipe into a sump under the storage trailer near the cribhouse. The sodium hypochlorite that leaked into the sump has been pumped out. Access to the cribhouse has been restored and there are no other access restrictions at the site. Both units continue to operate at full power.
The licensee will notify appropriate state and local authorities. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has also issued press releases concerning this event.
R3DO (Bloomer), NRR EO (Giitter), IRD (Morris), DHS(Knox), and FEMA (Burckhart) have been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47056 | Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS YARASHEVICH
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/15/2011
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2011
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 0500 on Saturday, July 16th and 0700 on Saturday, July 23rd, a sequence of activities are planned that will render the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional by removing all normal and emergency power. These activities are being performed in support of planned TSC facility upgrades. In preparation for this power outage(s), the TSC emergency responders were notified that use of the alternate TSC will be required in accordance with station procedures. Each TSC emergency response function has performed a walkdown and verification that required functions can be established in the alternate location. The duration for each of these TSC power outages is expected to be less than 24 hours. The NRC Operations Center will be provided an update to this notification when power has been removed and restored during this time period."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICK VIRGIN TO CHARLES TEAL @ 0730 ON 7/16/11 * * *
On 7/16/2011 at 0707 power was removed from the TSC. If necessary, the alternate TSC is ready for use.
* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN DEAGLE TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 1800 ON 7/16/11 * * *
On 7/16/11 at 1729 EDT, power was restored to the TSC. The TSC has been restored to a normal operational status and can be utilized for emergency response.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Freeman) notified. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 47061 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/15/2011
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2011
Event Time: 16:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
| Event Text INOPERABLE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM WARNING HORNS
"As part of the corrective actions for the event reported on 7/13/11 [EN #47047], GNF-A performed a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) audibility test covering the Controlled Access Area (CAA) at approximately 1655 on 7/14/11. The subsequent test revealed that the installed CAAS system failed to immediately activate the horn signal generators as expected. Activation of the associated warning horns was delayed approximately 3 minutes. This response time to activate horns did not meet the design requirement. Additionally, a review determined an approximately 3 minute horn signal delay was noted in a previous test on 7/12/11. An investigation into these matters is ongoing.
"The FMO [Fuel Manufacturing Operations] complex fissile material process operations were suspended on 7/14/11 and personnel evacuated. The emergency organization was activated and efforts to troubleshoot the root cause in the horn signal activation circuit delay initiated. All production activities involving Special Nuclear Material are shut down.
"The installed CAAS is a safety-significant system and is maintained through routine response checks and scheduled functional tests conducted in accordance with internal procedures. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50(b)(2)."
The licensee notified NRC Region 2 personnel (Sykes), State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County EMA.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/17/11 AT 1826 EDT FROM OLLIS TO HUFFMAN * * *
The cause of the inoperable Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has been identified as a hardware failure - specifically a capacitor on a circuit board. The CAAS has been repaired and a comprehensive testing plan is under development. The licensee continues to withhold personnel from the Controlled Access Area and all production activities remain shut down. A root cause analysis and recovery plan are underway.
The licensee has contacted R2 (Sykes) and will be notifying state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman notified).
See related Events #47047 and #47066. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 47063 | Rep Org: QUALTECH NP
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KURT MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/15/2011
Notification Time: 20:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
PART 21 GRP by EMAIL ()
| Event Text POTENTIAL DEFECT IN QUALTECH NP SAFETY RELATED MOTOR CONTROL CENTER BUCKETS
The following information was received via facsimile from QualTech NP:
"This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP safety related MCC buckets, which were commercial grade dedicated at our Cincinnati facility. On June 9, 2011, TVA Watts Bar Unit 2 notified QualTech NP of a failure on a transformer module associated with an indicator light on the MCC bucket. Based on our investigations, QualTech NP has identified quality and performance issued relating to the 480 VAC input (primary side) portion of the subject indicating light. The light in question has shown the potential to flash/arc internally on the primary winding side of the built in transformer and create a substantial fault current. This fault current not only disables the light but can be large enough to trip the upstream circuit breaker, thus disabling all associated safety related circuitry.
"The issues appear to revolve around inconsistent and poor quality fabrication methods employed during manufacturing, primarily with how the wires were wrapped in critical areas of the primary and how they were routed and attached to the termination points.
"The recommended corrective action for existing safety related MCC buckets is to replace the indicator light and transformer module with a newly qualified acceptable substitute. The new indicator light and transformer module will go through a series of dedication inspections and tests to ensure that a similar failure does not occur.
"Based on review of our records, Tennessee Valley Authority is the only customer to have these defective modules." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47064 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN COCHRAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 07/16/2011
Notification Time: 09:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2011
Event Time: 06:12 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4DO)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
ART HOWELL (DRA)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
MARC DAPAS (NSIR)
DENNIS ALLSTON (ILTA)
DAN GATES (DHS)
DENNIS VIA (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED TO LOSS OF COMPUTERS
The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 0612 PDT due to safeguards system degradation related to access to protected and vital areas of the plant. Compensatory actions were taken. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.
The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DANIEL CRUZ TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1255 EDT ON 7/16/11 * * *
The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 0950 PDT. The plant security safeguards systems have been returned to normal. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.
The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified NRR EO (Giitter), R4DO (Cain), IRD MOC (Morris), ILTAB (Allston), DHS SWO (Gates), and FEMA (Via). Also notified 73.71 Group via E-mail. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47065 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN SELLERS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 07/16/2011
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2011
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM NON-FUNCTIONAL
"The Technical Support Center ventilation system was found to be non-functional on 7/16/2011 at 1830 EDT. The time period that the Technical Support Center ventilation system was non-functional exceeded the 30 minute time limit that is delineated in the Technical Requirements Manual T3.10.1.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, rev. 2 since this adversely affects an emergency response facility. Also, this 8 hour notification is made in accordance with Technical Requirements Manual T3.10.1.B.2
"The alternate Technical Support Center facility was functional immediately and remains functional."
Per the licensee, the Technical Support Center ventilation system remains out-of-service. The cause was due to a loss of refrigerant in the system. Repairs are currently underway.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 47066 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/17/2011
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
MERAJ RAHIMI (NMSS)
| Event Text PREVIOUS INOPERABILITY OF CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM WARNING CIRCUIT NOT IDENTIFIED
"As part of the corrective actions for the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) events reported on 7/13/11 (EN #47047) and 7/15/11 (EN #47061), GNF-A is performing an investigation into the cause of the delayed audible alarm actuation. The investigation has determined that this delay existed at the time of the May and June 2011 functional tests and was not adequately identified and thus not reported. The response time to activate the horns did not meet the design requirement for CAAS. These events are being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2)."
The licensee states that the delay in the alarm actuation existed during surveillance testing in May and June of 2011 but the delay was not recognized at the time. This condition rendered the system inoperable since May 2011.
The licensee has notified R2 (Sykes) and will notify state and local authorities. R2DO (Freeman) notified. | |