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Event Notification Report for June 9, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/08/2011 - 06/09/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46771 46920 46921 46922 46931 46936 46937

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 46771
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ED TIEDEMANN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/20/2011
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2011
Event Time: 09:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power Operation

Event Text

WATERTIGHT DOORS LEFT AJAR SIMULTANEOUSLY DURING ROOM CHECKS

"During the performance of operator rounds in the Lake Screenhouse Safe Shutdown System (SX) pump rooms, two water tight doors were left opened simultaneously during the room checks. These two doors opened simultaneously [which] allowed for communication between the Division 1 SX room and Division 2 SX pump room. The operator was in constant attendance in the Division 2 SX pump room during the performance of the equipment checks.

"During site review, it was determined that a flood in either the Division 1 or Division 2 SX pump rooms would not be isolated to the initiating room, but potentially affect both trains of SX. This could result in a loss of cooling for both Residual Heat Removal systems, therefore, a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B).

"The NRC Senior Resident has been notified."

Offsite power is normal and emergency diesel generators are operable and available.

* * * RETRACTION FROM ED TIEDEMANN TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/8/11 AT 1141 EDT * * *

"A subsequent plant barrier impairment evaluation consistent with Exelon Procedure CC-AA-201, 'Plant Barrier Control Program' has determined that no loss of safety funct ion would have occurred. Each of the following door functions and related postulated events were reviewed for impact: ventilation; flooding, internal and external; high energy line breaks; missiles; radiation protection; and fires. For the condition with the SX pump room water tight doors being open with an operator in the area, the conclusion is an SX division remains protected to ensure that in any of the evaluated events the safety function of SX has been maintained."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Agreement State Event Number: 46920
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BEVERAGE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: G0024-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 15:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)

This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING DEVICES POSSIBLY MIXED WITH SCRAP METAL

The following information was sent by the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:

"[The licensee's two] fill detectors were bought in the 1990's and were not in use. The fill detectors were stored in a spare room full of scrap metal. The room was cleaned out in early May and the scrap sent to Alpha Metal Recycling, 2392 NW 147 Street, Opa-Locka, Florida 33054. The recycling plant manager said that the load has already been sent overseas to either China, Pakistan or India. Loss of the material was found when the application for license renewal was being filled out. The licensee will send a written report to Radioactive Materials. Any further action is referred to Radioactive Materials. This office will take no further action on this incident."

The two fill detector sealed sources each contained 100 mCi of Am-241 and were manufactured by Industrial Dynamics (Fil Tech; Model Number FT50; Serial Numbers 1296 and 126).

Florida Incident: FL11-045

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

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Agreement State Event Number: 46921
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: DOCTORS HOSPITAL INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL GABLES State: FL
County:
License #: 3823-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2011
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DELIVERED DOSE DIFFERENT THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE

The following information was sent by the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via email:

"[On June 2, 2011], a patient with over 100 tumors was being treated. One lesion was supposed to get 16 gray, but received only .85 gray. The physicist forgot to adjust for the weight factor. The physicians have been notified. The patient will receive the correct dose during the next visit. The licensee will submit a written report to the Radioactive Materials. Any further action is referred to Radioactive Materials. No further action will be taken on this incident by this office."

The patient was undergoing Gamma Knife Stereotactic Radiosurgery using 3073 Ci of Co-60.

Florida Incident: FL11-046

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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Agreement State Event Number: 46922
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CITY PUBLIC SERVICE
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: 02876
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/03/2011
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2011
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

The following information was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of State Health Services concerning an event that occurred at the Calaveras Power Station in San Antonio, Texas:

"On June 3, 2011, at 1330 CDT, the agency [Texas Department of State Health] received a phone call from the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer reporting a fixed nuclear gauge failure. He stated that on Tuesday, May 31, 2011, the licensee's employees had closed the gauge shutter while they were calibrating the detector. When one of the employees attempted to re-open the shutter, the employee said he felt something 'sort of give' and the shutter would not open. The handle was loose. The RSO was called and he came to the location of the gauge. He checked the handle and it was loose, so rather than try to open the gauge he left it closed. He verified that the shutter was completely closed by performing a survey with a portable survey meter. The equipment the gauge was mounted to was not necessary to be in operation so it was shut down until the gauge could be repaired.

"On Friday, June 3, 2011, ThermoFisher Scientific (TFS) service came on-site and repaired the handle. The RSO stated that the TFS said the pin at the bottom of the handle had corroded and broke. The pin that holds the handle to the mechanism that opens/closes the shutter is inside the gauge housing. Gauge is a K-Ray Model, 7062BP, serial number 27118E, which contains a 50 millicurie cesium -137 source.

"An investigation by the licensee into the cause and potential corrective actions in underway."

Texas Report I-8860

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Agreement State Event Number: 46931
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: SEATTLE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-C001-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELEE ATTEBERY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/06/2011
Notification Time: 20:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2011
Event Time: 18:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE DURING LABORATORY WORK

The following information was provided via e-mail from the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection:

"A Nuclear Medicine technologist received an overexposure to her extremity dosimeter for March 2011 while working in the basement of the Magnusen Health Sciences Building on the UW Campus. The Extremity Dose was reported as 56,440 mrem. During the month of March, she performed several cell-labeling procedures involving 75mCi, 111mCi, and 108mCi amounts of Y-90. There were also several labeling procedures involving the use of I-131 during the same time frame. However, because the whole body badge showed no significant exposure, it is believed the majority of the exposure came from the technologist's work with Y-90.

"Licensee: University of Washington
City and State: Seattle, WA
License Number: WN-C001-1
Type of License: Broad A
Date and time of Event: March 1 - March 30, 2011
Location of Event: UW Magnusen Health Sciences Building

"Investigation is ongoing."

Washington Report #WA-11-030

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46936
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/08/2011
Notification Time: 12:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2011
Event Time: 10:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2011
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MARK SATORIOUS (RA)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
BILL FLINTER (DHS)
BLANKENSHIP (FEMA)
BILL RULAND (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO FLOODING THAT POTENTIALLY AFFECTED SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

"Flushing activities were in progress on the 2A Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Pump suction line from the Essential Service Water System (SX). At 1011 [CDT], during this flushing activity, the flushing hose ruptured and caused flooding in the Auxiliary Building that had the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the current operating mode. This was due to the flood waters contacting the motors of the 1A and 2A AF Pumps.

"At 1026, an Unusual Event was declared by the Shift Emergency Director because the conditions for EAL entry were met for EAL HU5. Specifically the EAL conditions were 'Flooding in the Auxiliary Building that has the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the current operating mode.' Auxiliary Feedwater is required to be operable in Mode 1 for each unit.

"The leak was immediately isolated (within 45 seconds of hose rupture) and remains isolated. Maintenance personnel are in the process of testing the 1A and 2A AF Pump motor to determine operability. The appropriate Tech Spec Action Statements have been entered on each Unit for the AF Pumps. The leak also caused the wetting of MCC [Motor Control Center] 132X1, which feeds the 1B AF Pump control power. The Unit 0 [Common] Component Cooling Pump feed breaker cubicle was also wetted. Investigation into these components are also in progress."

The licensee has entered Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 Condition A which requires restoration of the one of the AF pumps within 72 hrs. There were no personnel injuries. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BUTLER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1227 EDT ON 6/8/11 * * *

At 1122 [CDT] on 6/8/11, the Unusual Event was terminated due to the flooding conditions no longer existing. Evaluation of wetted components are still in progress.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of event. Notified IRD (Gott), R3DO (Lara), NRR EO (Thorp), FEMA (Blankenship), and DHS (Flinter).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46937
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRANDON DIGGS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/08/2011
Notification Time: 14:12 [ET]
Event Date: 06/08/2011
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO VENTILATION ALIGNMENT ISSUE

"Secondary containment was declared inoperable after transferring refuel floor supply fans. Secondary containment D/P [Differential Pressure] lowered to 0.17 inches of water vacuum which does not meet the surveillance requirement to have secondary containment vacuum greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of water vacuum. Refuel floor ventilation was restored back to the previous configuration and secondary containment D/P was restored back to greater than 0.25 inches of water vacuum. Vacuum was less than 0.25 inches of water for approximately 4 minutes.

"There were no actual radiological releases associated with the event.

"Actual secondary containment integrity was not challenged. The lowered secondary containment D/P was a result of a ventilation lineup change."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Minnesota.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012