Event Notification Report for March 25, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/24/2011 - 03/25/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
46698466994670046779
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46698
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RETT GARNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RETT GARNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/25/2011
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2011
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
MARISSA BAILEY (NMSS)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
MARISSA BAILEY (NMSS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH NUHOMS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
"This 24-hour report is being issued in accordance with the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance 1030, Amendment 0, for the NUHOMS Storage System, Technical Specification (TS) 2.2, Functional Operating Limit Violations.
"During a review of historical Surry NUHOMS Dry Storage Canister (DSC) loading certification documents, a discrepancy was identified. The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance 1030 Amendment 0 Technical Specifications include a Figure 2, 'Heat Load Zones' which specifies the maximum decay heat load for each of the 32 assembly locations in a DSC. The figure includes limits for two zone '1b' locations and two zone '1a' locations in the four center locations of the DSC. The zone '1b' decay heat limit of 0.800 kw is specified for the two 'upper compartments' and zone '1a' decay heat limit of 1.05 kw is specified for the two 'lower compartments' on the figure. Contrary to this, the loading certifications for 6 of 12 DSCs already loaded at Surry were not developed to maintain this orientation when loaded in the horizontal storage module (HSM). As a result, the DSC zone '1b' heat load limits were exceeded in some cases for these 4 DSCs.
"The heat load limit for all other zones in the DSCs are symmetric, and those assemblies were verified to the correct limit and are unaffected by this error. In addition the total heat load limit for the sum of the center assemblies was met for all DSCs. The maximum heat load of any zone '1b' assembly at the time of loading was 0.806 kw, which is slightly higher than the 0.800 kw limit. The lower heat load of assemblies in the other compartments offset the slightly higher heat load effects, and it is expected that the thermal analysis acceptance criteria would still have been met at the time of loading.
"The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading and all assemblies currently meet the upper central compartment limits. The affected fuel assemblies are in a safe condition as required by NUHOMS TS 2.2.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"This 24-hour report is being issued in accordance with the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance 1030, Amendment 0, for the NUHOMS Storage System, Technical Specification (TS) 2.2, Functional Operating Limit Violations.
"During a review of historical Surry NUHOMS Dry Storage Canister (DSC) loading certification documents, a discrepancy was identified. The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance 1030 Amendment 0 Technical Specifications include a Figure 2, 'Heat Load Zones' which specifies the maximum decay heat load for each of the 32 assembly locations in a DSC. The figure includes limits for two zone '1b' locations and two zone '1a' locations in the four center locations of the DSC. The zone '1b' decay heat limit of 0.800 kw is specified for the two 'upper compartments' and zone '1a' decay heat limit of 1.05 kw is specified for the two 'lower compartments' on the figure. Contrary to this, the loading certifications for 6 of 12 DSCs already loaded at Surry were not developed to maintain this orientation when loaded in the horizontal storage module (HSM). As a result, the DSC zone '1b' heat load limits were exceeded in some cases for these 4 DSCs.
"The heat load limit for all other zones in the DSCs are symmetric, and those assemblies were verified to the correct limit and are unaffected by this error. In addition the total heat load limit for the sum of the center assemblies was met for all DSCs. The maximum heat load of any zone '1b' assembly at the time of loading was 0.806 kw, which is slightly higher than the 0.800 kw limit. The lower heat load of assemblies in the other compartments offset the slightly higher heat load effects, and it is expected that the thermal analysis acceptance criteria would still have been met at the time of loading.
"The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading and all assemblies currently meet the upper central compartment limits. The affected fuel assemblies are in a safe condition as required by NUHOMS TS 2.2.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46699
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/25/2011
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 10:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 10:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO POWER LEVEL GREATER THAN LIMIT
"During performance of maintenance to troubleshoot the B feedwater regulating bypass valve, the Thermal Power Monitor (TPM) indication exceeded the maximum thermal power assumed in the Safety Analysis Report. Operators were maintaining 12 Steam Generator (SG) water level in a band from 40 to 48 percent by controlling the B Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) in manual from the Control Room. Operators noted a power increase; adjustments were made via the FRV to reduce SG water level, however the valve response was sluggish and thermal power exceeded 100%. Immediate steps were taken to reduce power to below 100% by reducing 1st stage turbine pressure and inserting Bank D control rods 7 steps.
"The TPM indication was above the maximum thermal power limit of 100.36% for 1.68 minutes. The TPM indication peak was 100.39%. No concurrent increase in power was observed by the nuclear indication system.
"NRC Resident had been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN KEMPKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1350 EDT ON 03/29/11 * * *
"An eight hour report (EN #46699) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on March 25, 2011 for Thermal Power Monitor indication above the maximum thermal power limit of 100.36% for 1.68 minutes.
"Subsequent engineering investigation has determined that this specific transient had been previously analyzed. The transient was within the bounds of the safety analysis.
"The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(8) report (EN #46699) is retracted.
"NRC Resident has been informed."
Notified R3DO (Peterson).
"During performance of maintenance to troubleshoot the B feedwater regulating bypass valve, the Thermal Power Monitor (TPM) indication exceeded the maximum thermal power assumed in the Safety Analysis Report. Operators were maintaining 12 Steam Generator (SG) water level in a band from 40 to 48 percent by controlling the B Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) in manual from the Control Room. Operators noted a power increase; adjustments were made via the FRV to reduce SG water level, however the valve response was sluggish and thermal power exceeded 100%. Immediate steps were taken to reduce power to below 100% by reducing 1st stage turbine pressure and inserting Bank D control rods 7 steps.
"The TPM indication was above the maximum thermal power limit of 100.36% for 1.68 minutes. The TPM indication peak was 100.39%. No concurrent increase in power was observed by the nuclear indication system.
"NRC Resident had been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN KEMPKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1350 EDT ON 03/29/11 * * *
"An eight hour report (EN #46699) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on March 25, 2011 for Thermal Power Monitor indication above the maximum thermal power limit of 100.36% for 1.68 minutes.
"Subsequent engineering investigation has determined that this specific transient had been previously analyzed. The transient was within the bounds of the safety analysis.
"The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(8) report (EN #46699) is retracted.
"NRC Resident has been informed."
Notified R3DO (Peterson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46700
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/25/2011
Notification Time: 21:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2011
Notification Time: 21:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
BOTH TRAINS OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE INOPERABLE
"On March 25, 2011, the Train B emergency diesel generator (2EGS-EG2-2) was inoperable and unavailable due to being out of service for scheduled maintenance. At 1400 hours, the Train A emergency diesel generator (2EGS-EG2-1) was declared inoperable, but available, after questions were raised about the adequacy of the assembly method for fuel injection line compression fittings by the manufacturer. Without assurance that the fittings meet full qualification requirements, the Train A emergency diesel generator was declared inoperable.
"The Unit is currently in Mode 6 with fuel loaded and the upper internals installed in the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel head is removed with 23 feet of water in the cavity, two Operable Residual Heat Removal trains one of which is in operation. With both emergency diesels inoperable, the safety functions needed for accident mitigation could be impaired in the event of a loss of off-site power. Actions are currently in progress to restore one emergency diesel generator to an Operable status.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable. This event will be evaluated for 10 CFR Part 21 applicability."
The licensee is in Technical Specification 3.8.2. With both diesels declared inoperable, they have to suspend all core alterations and possible reactivity additions and return an EDG to service. The licensee plans to return the B train EDG an available status (but not Operable per Technical Specification) by tomorrow. The licensee will then replace the discrepant fuel injector line compression fittings on the A train and return it to Technical Specification Operable status.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0226 ON 3/27/11 FROM DANIEL SCHWER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Following replacement of the questionable fuel injection line compression fittings and successful surveillance and post maintenance testing, the Train A emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS-EG2-1) was declared OPERABLE at 0058 hours on 3/27/2011. One Diesel Generator was maintained available at all times while the issue was being addressed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Rogge).
"On March 25, 2011, the Train B emergency diesel generator (2EGS-EG2-2) was inoperable and unavailable due to being out of service for scheduled maintenance. At 1400 hours, the Train A emergency diesel generator (2EGS-EG2-1) was declared inoperable, but available, after questions were raised about the adequacy of the assembly method for fuel injection line compression fittings by the manufacturer. Without assurance that the fittings meet full qualification requirements, the Train A emergency diesel generator was declared inoperable.
"The Unit is currently in Mode 6 with fuel loaded and the upper internals installed in the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel head is removed with 23 feet of water in the cavity, two Operable Residual Heat Removal trains one of which is in operation. With both emergency diesels inoperable, the safety functions needed for accident mitigation could be impaired in the event of a loss of off-site power. Actions are currently in progress to restore one emergency diesel generator to an Operable status.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable. This event will be evaluated for 10 CFR Part 21 applicability."
The licensee is in Technical Specification 3.8.2. With both diesels declared inoperable, they have to suspend all core alterations and possible reactivity additions and return an EDG to service. The licensee plans to return the B train EDG an available status (but not Operable per Technical Specification) by tomorrow. The licensee will then replace the discrepant fuel injector line compression fittings on the A train and return it to Technical Specification Operable status.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0226 ON 3/27/11 FROM DANIEL SCHWER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Following replacement of the questionable fuel injection line compression fittings and successful surveillance and post maintenance testing, the Train A emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS-EG2-1) was declared OPERABLE at 0058 hours on 3/27/2011. One Diesel Generator was maintained available at all times while the issue was being addressed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Rogge).
Agreement State
Event Number: 46779
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: LAMOTHE CARDIOLOGY
Region: 4
City: LAS VEGAS State: NV
County: CLARK
License #: 03-12-0435-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: LAMOTHE CARDIOLOGY
Region: 4
City: LAS VEGAS State: NV
County: CLARK
License #: 03-12-0435-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/22/2011
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2011
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISPLACED SOURCE
The following information was received by e-mail from the State of Nevada:
"A vial with serial # S358015-011, containing 198 microcuries of Cs-137, belonging to the licensee, is unaccounted for. Cardinal Health removed all equipment from the licensee's office on the last day of patient care and stored it at Advanced Isotopes. The source was originally from Biotech (currently Cardinal Health). The licensee allegedly tried working with Cardinal Health to clear this up, but to no avail. The licensee plans to contact the RSO of Advanced Isotopes, who is currently out of town, and let the [Nevada] Radiation Control Program know if they have any additional information. The matter is being taken very seriously and is being investigated."
This incident is documented as Nevada Incident- NV110012 and was initially reported to the State of Nevada on 4/12/2011.
* * * UPDATE AT 1705 EDT ON 09/01/11 FROM SNEHA RAVIKUMAR TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Nevada via email:
"NV 110012 has been closed. The source has been deemed missing. The license had been revoked. The Responsible Person for the license had been prohibited from being listed on a RML in Nevada, for a period of 3 years, from the date of revocation, though his eligibility to perform work under the supervision of an authorized user is not affected by this prohibition. Since the radiological material license is being revoked, not terminated, the licensee remains responsible for the proper disposal of the lost Cs-137 source. Should the source be found or discovered, the licensee is responsible and liable for the costs associated with disposal of the source, any damages or losses caused by source, and, if necessary, any cleanup, remediation, and/or decommissioning efforts that may be required as a result of the source."
Notified R4DO (Proulx) and FSME (Hsueh).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was received by e-mail from the State of Nevada:
"A vial with serial # S358015-011, containing 198 microcuries of Cs-137, belonging to the licensee, is unaccounted for. Cardinal Health removed all equipment from the licensee's office on the last day of patient care and stored it at Advanced Isotopes. The source was originally from Biotech (currently Cardinal Health). The licensee allegedly tried working with Cardinal Health to clear this up, but to no avail. The licensee plans to contact the RSO of Advanced Isotopes, who is currently out of town, and let the [Nevada] Radiation Control Program know if they have any additional information. The matter is being taken very seriously and is being investigated."
This incident is documented as Nevada Incident- NV110012 and was initially reported to the State of Nevada on 4/12/2011.
* * * UPDATE AT 1705 EDT ON 09/01/11 FROM SNEHA RAVIKUMAR TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received from the State of Nevada via email:
"NV 110012 has been closed. The source has been deemed missing. The license had been revoked. The Responsible Person for the license had been prohibited from being listed on a RML in Nevada, for a period of 3 years, from the date of revocation, though his eligibility to perform work under the supervision of an authorized user is not affected by this prohibition. Since the radiological material license is being revoked, not terminated, the licensee remains responsible for the proper disposal of the lost Cs-137 source. Should the source be found or discovered, the licensee is responsible and liable for the costs associated with disposal of the source, any damages or losses caused by source, and, if necessary, any cleanup, remediation, and/or decommissioning efforts that may be required as a result of the source."
Notified R4DO (Proulx) and FSME (Hsueh).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source