|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/04/2011 - 02/07/2011
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Hospital |
Event Number: 46578 |
Rep Org: U.S. NAVY
Licensee: MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY
Region: 1
City: PORTSMOUTH State: VA
County:
License #: 45-93645-01NA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINO FRAGOSO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 01/31/2011
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3047(a) - EMBRYO/FETUS DOSE > 50 mSv |
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME) |
Event Text
UNPLANNED IODINE-131 DOSE TO AN EMBRYO
The following event description is from an email message:
"On 12 Jan 2011, a Nuclear Medicine patient received a dose of I-131 of 100 milliCuries for a thyroid ablation. She received a pregnancy test just before the dose was administered and the result was negative. Two weeks after the dose she made an ER visit complaining about nausea and vomiting; she was then administered a serum pregnancy test. The result indicated she was roughly two weeks pregnant. On 27 Jan the doctor notified the Navy that the patient became pregnant very close to the therapy time.
"On 28 Jan a dose calculation estimated the dose to the embryo to be 213 mGy (21.3 rads). On 31 January the Naval Radiation Safety Committee was notified that the patient was possibly pregnant prior to the therapy.
"Pregnancy test performed immediately prior to therapy was negative. Patient was not trying to get pregnant prior, but did have unprotected intercourse in the few days before therapy. She denies intercourse in the week after therapy. Standard precautions were given to the patient during a visit several weeks prior to the therapy and included the following: 1). She could not be treated if she was pregnant, and 2). A pregnancy test would be performed immediately prior to therapy.
"At a dose estimate of 213 mGy, there is a slight increased risk of failure to implant, but if the fetus survives, the outcome is expected to be good. This was discussed at length with the patient. The patient and the doctor communicated on 26 Jan after the patient discovered she was pregnant. Further follow up included a phone call the next day and a counseling visit 4 days later, after dose estimate calculations were completed. " |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46579 |
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 02/01/2011
Notification Time: 10:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME) |
| This material event contains a "Category 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENT
The following Agreement State Report was received via fax:
"The Radiation Safety Officer of QSA Global, Inc. reported the following information on February 2, 2011, to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program:
"On Wednesday, January 26, 2011, QSA shipped a radioactive [High Dose Rate] HDR source to Memorial Hospital SW Cancer Center in Houston, TX. It was scheduled to deliver on Friday, January 28. On Monday, January 31, the [common carrier] tracking website still showed it as 'At destination sort facility' in Houston, TX. [The common carrier] was called to track the package, and we [QSA Global, Inc.] were told that it was actually still in Memphis, TN. A trace was requested. The [common carrier] trace number is [redacted]. [The common carrier] said they would inform us with any new information. As of this morning, Tuesday, February 1, there was no news, so [the common carrier] was called. We were informed that the package was indeed LOST. We gave [the common carrier] a physical description of the package, and informed them of the importance of locating this package due to the fact that it was radioactive. They will call with any results.
"The specifics of the package are as follows:
Isotope - Ir-192
Activity - 10.951 Ci / 405.2. GBq
Container s/n - 81C6
Source s/n - D36C-6084
Surface reading - 26.0 mr/hr
Transport Index - 0.4"
* * * UPDATE VIA FAX FROM JOHN SUMARES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1417 EST ON 2/4/2011 * * *
"On February 3, 2011, the licensee notified the Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] that the missing / lost shipment was found. The licensee reported that the shipment was never actually lost. It had been delivered to the hospital on 1/27/11 under a different air way bill number and the licensee was not aware of the new number. On February 4, 2011, the Agency asked the licensee for the new air way bill number, received the new number from the licensee, and used the [common carrier] tracking system to confirm the shipment was received on January 27, 2011."
Notified R1DO (Dwyer) and FSME EO (Villamar).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46580 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CENTURY GEOPHYSICAL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: HENDERSON State: TX
County: HENDERSON
License #: 35-04017-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 02/01/2011
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
MEXICO () |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
STOLEN LOGGING TOOL WITH CESIUM-137 SOURCE
"On February 1, 2011, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health] was notified by the licensee operating with reciprocity in the State of Texas, that a well logging tool containing a 125 millicurie (original activity) Cesium (Cs) - 137 source was stolen from their vehicle. The source was manufactured by Gulf Nuclear. The tool was removed from its storage location without the shielding for the source. The tool is about ten feet in length and is less than four inches in diameter. The licensee stated that the dose from the source is collimated. The local sheriff was notified of the event. The licensee's representative was in Tyler, Texas and was driving to the location to search for the device. The Radiation Safety Officer stated that the source was approximately 30 years old and the current activity would be about 65 millicuries. The location where the source was stolen is rather remote and heavily wooded. The licensee does not believe that there is a health risk to members of the general public from the source. The source housing is marked with the trefoil symbol and has the words "Radioactive Materials" engraved in it. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1522 EST ON 02/01/2011 * * *
The following information was provided by the state in an email:
"On February 1, 2011, at 1400 hours, the licensee reported that they had completed a visual search and radiological survey in the area the source had been stored and did not find it. He [licensee] stated that he was going to search the roads in the area and stated that he would notify the Agency [State of Texas] if the source was found. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Linda Howell), FSME (Jack Foster), ILTAB (Daryl Johnson), Mexico (Fax)
* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN AT 1651 EST ON 02/02/2011 * * *
The following information was provided by the state in an email:
"On February 2, 2011 an Agency inspector [the State of Texas] contacted a scrap yard in Longview, Texas who [scrap yard employee] stated that he had received the source on February 1, 2011. The licensee was contacted and at 1515, confirmed the source was the one that was stolen and had not been damaged. The licensee has taken control of the source. Additional information will be provided as it is received."
Notified R4DO (Howell), FSME (Foster), ILTAB (via email) and Mexico (via fax).
Texas Incident # I-8816
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3" |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46586 |
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: YUMA CARDIOLOGIST ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: YUMA State: AZ
County:
License #: 14-029
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GOODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 02/02/2011
Notification Time: 15:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2010
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
JACK FOSTER (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN UNPLANNED FETAL EXPOSURE
This information was provided by the state via email:
"On 12/23/10, the patient was administered the radiopharmaceutical for a nuclear stress test. Notices were posted in English and Spanish to [advise the patient to] inform the staff if you [the patient] think you are or could be pregnant. The patient was scheduled to return for the resting portion of the study on 12/28/2010. At this time, the patient and the husband raised the possibility of the patient being pregnant. The resting test was canceled and a pregnancy test performed which was positive.
"The Agency continues to investigate the actions of the licensee and timeliness of reporting of this event. The U.S. NRC and the Arizona Governor's office have been notified of this event. Press coverage is not anticipated.
"Source: Tc99m; Activity: 30 milliCuries"
Arizona First Notice: 11-001
* * UPDATE FROM AUBREY GODWIN TO DONG PARK AT 1046 EST ON 2/4/11 * * *
This information was provided by the State via email:
"Doses: The licensee estimates the fetus exposure is 1,300 mRem.
"Corrective Actions: The licensee now requires a signed statement on pregnancy."
Notified FSME EO (Villamar) and R4DO (Howell). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 46587 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY LP
Region: 4
City: ORANGE State: TX
County:
License #: 00031
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 02/02/2011
Notification Time: 16:07 [ET]
Event Date: 02/01/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
JACK FOSTER (FSME) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON GAUGE
This information was provided by the state via email:
"On February 2, 2011, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Ronan model SA1-F37 nuclear gauge was stuck in the open position. The gauge contained an original activity of 100 milliCuries of Cesium (Cs) - 137. The gauge is mounted on a vessel 100 feet above the ground and does not pose an exposure risk.
"The licensee has contacted the manufacturer and expects the gauge to be repaired in the next few days. Additional information will be supplied in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident Number: I-8817 |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 46589 |
Facility: B&W NUCLEAR OPERATING GROUP, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU FABRICATION & SCRAP
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-42
Agreement: N
Docket: 070-27
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 02/03/2011
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2011
Event Time: 14:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS |
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP email () |
Event Text
DISCOVERY OF AN UNFAVORABLE VOLUME CONTAINER IN THE URANIUM RECOVERY CONTAINER CONTROLLED AREA
"On February 2, 2011 at 1430 hrs [EST], an unfavorable volume container was found in the Uranium Recovery Container Controlled Area (CCA). The container was immediately removed from the area. At the time of the discovery, the facility was not processing SNM due to planned maintenance work. Also, there was no SNM found in the container. Based on interviews with area personnel, it is believed that the container had been in the area when SNM operations were in progress in the past. The control of container volume is an [Item Relied On For Safety] IROFS. Having this container in the CCA in the past constitutes a loss of an IROFS.
"The as-found condition did not have any safety significance since no SNM was present in the area or in the container. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event.
"An evaluation is currently being performed [by the licensee].
"B&W NOG-Lynchburg is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) - Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of º70.61.
The container is used during maintenance and had been left in the area during previous maintenance activities.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility |
Event Number: 46592 |
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 02/04/2011
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2011
Event Time: 09:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN |
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS) |
Event Text
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION UNDER BULLETIN 91-01 CONCERNING LEAKAGE OF MODERATING LIQUID
"At 0930 CST on 02-03-11, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a steam condensate line broke above the C-310 withdrawal room and water leaked through the ceiling into the withdrawal room on the ground floor. Water accumulated greater than 0.5 inch in depth in the diked area above the withdrawal room in violation of NCSA [Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval] 310-004. NCSA 310-004 requires that open containers with volumes greater than 5.5 gallons shall not contain pre-existing moderator greater than 0.5 inches in depth. During the walk down, it was discovered that the sprinkler heads currently installed above the withdrawal room are rated at 160F in violation of the NCS [Nuclear Criticality Safety] limit. NCSE [Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation] 032 requires the minimum activation temperature to be no lower than 200F. The sprinkler system was taken out of service and drained at 2131 CST on 02-03-11 and the level of water accumulated in the diked area was verified to be less than 0.5 inches at 0426 CST on 02-04-11.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS
"The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing a release of fissile material greater than the safe mass of uranium. This event did not release fissile material greater than the safe mass of uranium.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)
"In order for a criticality to be possible, a large UF6 release containing greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to occur and accumulate greater than the critical configuration.
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)
"The two process conditions relied upon for double contingency are mass and geometry.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS)
"Product withdrawal assay at the time of the event was less than 4.95 wt% U235. However, no UF6 release occurred.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
"The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing a release of fissile material greater than the safe mass of uranium. Since a UF6 release containing greater than the safe mass has not occurred, the mass parameter has maintained. The second leg of double contingency limiting moderating liquids in open containers to less than 0.5 inches and requiring the sprinkler head activation temperature to greater than 200F. Since the diked area above the withdrawal room did accumulate water level greater than 0.5 inches, the control was violated. Additionally, since the installed sprinkler heads activation temperature is less than 200F, a design feature of NCSE 032 was violated. Therefore, double contingency was not maintained.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED
"Shiftly checks of the diked area above the withdrawal have been initiated to ensure water level is not accumulating. The condensate leak above the withdrawal room was repaired and solution level verified to be less than 0.5 inches (0426 [CST] on 2/4/11). The sprinkler systems associated with the sprinkler heads above the withdrawal room have been isolated until the sprinkler heads can be replaced with heads that comply with NCSE 032 (Systems isolated at 2131 [CST] on 2/3/11)." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46593 |
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ANDERSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 02/04/2011
Notification Time: 16:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2011
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED REPLACEMENT OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER
"The implementation of a planned replacement of the Unit 3 plant process computer, also known as the Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS), with a new Plant Integrated Computer System (PICS), resulted in the loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Meteorological Radiological Plant Data Acquisition System (MRPDAS), and Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS) is also impacted. MIDAS will function but the automatic download of Unit 3 plant parameters will not be available and the MIDAS Operator (SM or Dose Assessor) will have to manually input this data to perform dose assessment. Meteorological data will remain available. All Unit 2 functions remain available. Other systems such as the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS), and the Emergency Notification System (ENS) remain available. As a compensatory measure, a proceduralized backup method is available to FAX applicable data for ERDS and MRPDAS. As discussed in a letter to the NRC data October 6, 2010, the plant process computer is being replaced due to obsolescence. The new Unit 3 computer processors will be located in the Unit 2 Computer Room which will become the Computer Room for both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Plant Computers. The new Unit 3 plant process computer work stations will be located in the Unit 3 Control Room. The new PICS was previously installed in the Unit 3 plant simulation facility. The modification was initiated on February 4, 2011 and is scheduled to be completed by March 6, 2011. The new PICS will not affect the transmitted data points nor affect the transmission format and computer communication protocol to ERDS. In accordance with the site reporting procedure, a loss of ERDS is reportable as a major loss of emergency assessment capability."
The licensee expects the duration of the ERDS outage to be from one to three weeks. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the following: New York State, Putnam County, Westchester County, Rockland County, and Orange County. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46594 |
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD |
Notification Date: 02/04/2011
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2009
Event Time: 08:02 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNSEALED PENETRATIONS DISCOVERED IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE
"On September 9, 2009, the NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) Team identified Fire Protection penetrations on the west side of the Intake Structure were not sealed and it has been determined that the penetrations were below the USAR [Updated Safety Analysis Report] credited flood level. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of all the station Raw Water Pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. Reference Fort Calhoun Station Condition Report 2009-4166.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). This report should have been made on September 9, 2009, and is late. Subsequent review of the issue determined this reportability."
The penetrations have since been sealed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See EN #46590 dated 2/3/2011 for a similar event at Fort Calhoun. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 46595 |
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK |
Notification Date: 02/06/2011
Notification Time: 03:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2011
Event Time: 22:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2011 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP |
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
1 |
Startup |
1 |
Startup |
Event Text
BOTH TRAINS OF AUXILIARY FEED WATER DISABLED
"On February 5, 2011, both trains of the Auxiliary Feed Water system were disabled while transitioning from Auxiliary Feed Water to Main Feed Water during plant start up. While performing OI-AFW-4 attachment 3, FW-6 Electric Driven AFW Pump Operations, both Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Water inlet valves (HCV-1107A and HCV-1108A) control switches were placed in 'CLOSE'. This action defeated the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) ability to open the valves, rendering both trains of Auxiliary Feed Water to the Steam Generators inoperable. The condition was subsequently recognized and the control switches were placed in 'AUTO' restoring both trains to operable. The duration of the condition was 3 minutes from start to finish. Reference Fort Calhoun Station Condition Report 2011-0839.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
|