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Event Notification Report for January 25, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/24/2011 - 01/25/2011

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46403 46552 46557 46560 46561 46565 46568

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General Information Event Number: 46403
Rep Org: VELAN INC
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region:
City: QUEBEC, CANADA State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR APOSTOLESCU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/08/2010
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL ()
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Event Text

PART 21 REPORT - LIMITORQUE LIMIT SWITCH DEFECT

The following report was received via fax:

"During the performance testing of our valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 we found that the limit switch contacts proved to be defective. These tests took place in July 2010. Flowserve was advised and sent in replacement parts that were installed by their representatives. The valve-actuator assemblies were cycled and proper operation was assessed. These valves have been shipped to Dominion Virginia. At the time we considered the issue isolated and did not pursue an in-depth corrective action response from the Supplier.

"Later in September when testing three valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 and two valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-2-06, we found again that the limit switch contacts were defective, exhibiting similar problems as found earlier in July. These valves are still at our factory, awaiting the response and corrective action from Flowserve.

"The limit switch boxes (4 gear train limit switches, 16 sets of contacts) appear to be identical on the two types of actuators mentioned above.

"Upon closer examination, we determined that construction and installation elements appear poorly controlled, resulting in unexpected failure to operate due to the contact blade (called finger base by the Manufacturer) not returning to a position where it can make contact again. This was documented internally on a Velan internal deviation report on September 3, 2010.

"We advised Flowserve of our findings on September 15 and issued a formal Corrective Action Request (CAR 25500-73903) on September 16, 2010, with a deadline for responding that expired on October 26, 2010. After a number of follow-ups, we managed to make contact with responsible personnel at Flowserve on October 29. An evaluation report (electrical continuity test performed on sample switch assemblies cycled 2000 times) was submitted to our attention by Flowserve. However, we determined that the test did not answer all our concerns and requested Flowserve to provide additional information. Currently the supplier is engaged in retrieving the defective parts from our facilities and performing additional examinations and tests. The Manufacturer expects to have all necessary tests, examinations and evaluations completed on or before November 19, 2010.

"Based on functional testing performed at Velan we determined that we have no record of similar defects on valve-actuator assemblies produced prior to these events, we therefore believe that the root cause is relatively recent but there is no way to know until Flowserve analyzes and evaluates the deficiency.

"This type of defect has the potential to affect other valve manufacturers who may have installed Limitorque actuators equipped with this type of limit switch but we cannot say if such deviation could create a substantial safety hazard."


* * * UPDATE FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO DONALD NORWOOD VIA FACSIMILE AT 0804 EST ON 1/24/2011 * * *

On January 14, 2011, Velan received the final report from Flowserve concerning limit switches identified in this notification. Velan has accepted the conclusions in the report.

The following is a synopsis of those conclusions: It was determined that producing a bend in the contact finger cannot occur during normal cyclic operation of the rotor. It is highly likely that the cause of the bent finger assemblies was due to the use of a flat blade screwdriver. A flat blade screwdriver can also exert enough force to damage the cotter pin hole in the spring stud. Based on testing and evaluations of all returned Velan switches and switches from Flowserve stock, a design deficiency has not been identified. Properly set switches will perform their intended functions. A maintenance update will be issued by Flowserve to guide the industry on any recommendations during their regularly scheduled maintenance outages.

Notified R1DO (Newport), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Bloomer), and R4DO (O'Keefe). Notified Part 21 Group via E-mail. Notified NRR and NRO via facsimile.

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Agreement State Event Number: 46552
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: GENERAL MILLS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: MOONACHIE State: NJ
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALLEN JACOBSEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/19/2011
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/19/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INDUSTRIAL GAUGES INADVERTENTLY SENT TO SCRAP MATERIAL RECYCLER

General Mills Company in Moonachie, New Jersey notified Terrapin Recycling of Baltimore, Maryland that they inadvertently sent three industrial gauges to Terrapin in a load of scrap material. General Mills has contracted Clym Environmental Services, LLC of Frederick, MD to locate and recover the gauges.

The gauges are Peco Controls Corporation Industrial gauges and each of them contain 100 mCi of Am-241.

The State of Maryland has notified the State of New Jersey.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46557
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERESA PUTNAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/20/2011
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2011
Event Time: 11:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 90 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

"The 1B and 2B trains of Nuclear Service Water Systems (Raw Water Nuclear RN) were declared inoperable on 1/18/11 at 0423 EST due to fouling of the respective suction strainers when aligned to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP).

"Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 was entered at 1110 EST on 1/20/11 due to the lack of reasonable assurance of operability pertaining to 1A and 2A RN trains in the event of a potential realignment to the SNSWP due to a seismic event."

The licensee plans to reduce power and place both Units in Mode 5. Unit 1 has been reduced to 90% and Unit 2 is holding at 100% and will begin reducing power later. The fouling is being caused by fish being sucked into the RN train suction strainers. The licensee has been back-flushing the strainers to clear the fouling. The pond was chemically treated approximately 1 year ago to eliminate the fish.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM TERESA PUTNAM TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1313 EST ON 01/21/11 * * *

McGuire Units 1 & 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 with a requirement to be in Mode 5 in 37 hours. A Notification of Enforcement Discretion was verbally approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 1/20/11 at 2336 EST, therefore both Unit 1 & 2 will remain in Mode 3.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NRR EO (Thomas), and IRD MOC (Gott)


* * * UPDATE FROM TERESA PUTNAM TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1313 EST ON 01/24/11 * * *

This is an amendment to Event Notification #46557 to include the following 8 hour non-emergency notifications previously omitted by the NRC from the event report:

50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE S/D
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Agreement State Event Number: 46560
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: IRIS NDT INC
Region: 4
City: DEER PARK State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/20/2011
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2011
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

"On January 20, 2010, the Agency (State of Texas) was notified by the licensee that while performing radiography operations at a field location, a radiography camera containing 29 curies of Iridium 192 fell approximately six feet to a concrete surface. The radiographer attempted to retract the source, but it would not move out of the collimator. The locking device on the camera appeared to be damaged and was restricting movement of the drive cable. The radiographer worked on the locking device and was able to retract the source after a period of about 10 minutes. The front source stop was installed to prevent the source from moving from the shielded position. The maximum dose rate taken on contact of the camera was 32 millirem after the event. The survey done on the camera prior to starting work that day was 19 millirem. The radiographer could not disconnect the drive cable from the source pig-tail due to the damage to the locking device. The camera was transported to the licensee's facility for further action. The licensee contacted the manufacturer and with their assistance, was able to disconnect the drive cable from the source pig tail. The rear dust cover was placed on the camera, and both covers secured in place using tape. The camera will be returned to the manufacturer for inspection and repair.

"The total exposure received in this event was less than three millirem. Additional information will be provided as it is received."

Texas Incident #: I - 8813

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Agreement State Event Number: 46561
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GEOSOILS CONSULTANTS, INC
Region: 4
City: VAN NUYS State: CA
County:
License #: 4741
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/20/2011
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2011
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
BILL VON TILL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOIL MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"A CPN MC1DR soil moisture density gauge was run over by a piece of earth moving equipment at a jobsite in Bel Aire, CA on 1-18-2011. This gauge contained 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241 sealed sources. The source rod was retracted at the time. The work was immediately stopped, people were kept away, and the area was secured until a CDPH [California Department of Public Health] representative arrived. The sources were leak tested and analyzed on 1-19-2011. The leak test results were negative - less than 0.0005uCi of removable contamination.

"GeoSoils Consultants, Inc. is arranging for proper disposal."

CA Notification # 011811

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46565
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS WEICHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/24/2011
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2011
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL AND RELEASE

"On 01/24/2011, at 0900 EST, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station had a spill and release of Sodium Hypochlorite from our water treatment plant's Sodium Hypochlorite tank. The quantity [rate] of release has been estimated at approximately 1 gpm to the surrounding soil area. The leak was into a moat surrounding the tank but it appears it has subsequently leaked from the moat. The leak was identified on 01/24/11 and was quantified as reportable at approximately 0900 EST. The leak is currently in progress with actions being taken to mitigate and control leakage to the area storm drain. This is a release of CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act) reportable quantity of substance.

"The release impacted or potentially impacted the Susquehanna River due to release through a storm drain and additional impact to the surrounding soil. Additional measures being taken include installing additional barriers to release. Lewis Environmental Hazard Mat team has been contacted and is responding to the site. In addition a truck has been dispatched to the site to pump out the moat.

"This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a result of a notification of other government agencies."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and state and local government agencies.

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Part 21 Event Number: 46568
Rep Org: CATAWBA NUCLEAR SITE
Licensee: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
Region: 1
City: YORK State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY BURGESS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 01/24/2011
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
Part 21 GRP by email ()

Event Text

POTENTIAL PART 21 - BUS DISCONNECT STAB ASSEMBLY - 600V ESSENTIAL MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS

"During 2004, 2006 and 2010, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) ordered spare parts for the 600V Essential Auxiliary Power System (EPE) motor control center, installed at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations. The spare parts were ordered under Purchase Orders 15488, 38585, 132512 and 134626 from Electrical Power Systems, Inc. (EPSI). The specific part is a NEMA Size 1 stab (disconnect) assembly for connecting motor control center feeder circuits to the motor control center main bus. The McGuire and Catawba motor control centers were manufactured by Nelson Electric in Tulsa, OK. Spare stab assemblies were needed for QA-1 applications but they were no longer available to purchase from an approved vendor. The parts were evaluated and approved for Commercial Grade procurement.

"When the stab assemblies were received they were dedicated on site at Duke for Commercial Grade application at McGuire and also at Catawba. Inspection of the parts and application of the commercial grade process did not identify that the parts were not manufactured to the specifications used in the commercial grade evaluation process. The manufacturer, who was different from the original parts manufacturer, had revised the detail drawing of the stab assembly. The revised drawing allowed a different method for soldering the lead wire to the stab. During parts dedication, the new stab assemblies passed basic electrical checks, but there was no visual inspection of the soldering because the connections had been inserted into the stab assembly molding.

"Catawba Unit 1 experienced a failure of the Jacket Water Keep Warm Pump Motor circuit for Diesel Generator (D/G) 1B on June 05, 2010 due to failure of the soldered connection on a stab assembly that had just been installed. The pump motor is QA Condition 1 and it is powered from a QA Condition 1 motor control center. The failure of the Catawba Unit 1 D/G Keep Warm Pump Motor was not significant from a plant risk standpoint.

"Of the 21 spare stab assemblies purchased and dedicated for use at Catawba and McGuire, only one was placed in service. That stab assembly was installed at Catawba on 6/3/2010 and failed on 6/5/2010. The remaining suspect stab assemblies at Catawba and McGuire were put on HOLD shortly after this failure. Other than the failed Catawba stab assembly, no other suspect stab assemblies were placed in service in the past or currently at McGuire or Catawba Nuclear Stations. None of these dedicated stab assemblies were sold or transferred to another nuclear utility. Following the failure of the stab assembly at Catawba, stab assemblies were tested, a failure investigation was performed, design information was requested from the vendor and the commercial grade program implications were investigated. It was not until January 2011 that the issue was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR Part 21."

The licensee provided courtesy notifications to the North Carolina and South Carolina Warning Points and York, Gaston and Mecklenburg County agencies.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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