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Event Notification Report for October 25, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/22/2010 - 10/25/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46316 46343 46344 46352 46353 46354 46355 46358 46359

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General Information or Other Event Number: 46316
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: FULTON State: AR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/07/2010
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT

"On October 4, 2010, the Arkansas Radiation Control Program was notified by Team Industrial Services, Arkansas license number ARK-0344-03320, involving the failure of a radiography source to retract into the camera. The radiography crew involved in this incident was based in Sulphur, Louisiana.

"On October 3, 2010, radiography work was being conducted in Fulton, Arkansas using a rented SPEC-300 Camera, serial number 017, containing a 27 Curie SPEC G-70 source, serial number GE2503, both manufactured by Source Production and Equipment Company. The source was last leak tested on 10/1/2010. A J-Tube manufactured by QSA, owned by the licensee, was also employed in the radiography work.

"The source was cranked out of the SPEC-300 and the radiographer was unable to retract the source back into the camera. The radiography crew contacted the RSO and the crew attempted to safely straighten out the guide tube. After realigning the guide tube, the source was retracted into the camera.

"After the source was determined to be safely stored in the camera, the crew returned to the office to determine the cause of the inability to retract the source. SPEC was also notified.

"At this time, no overexposures have been reported by the licensee.

"The Radiation Control Program is awaiting a written report on the incident from the licensee."

Report #: ARK-0344-03320

* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE MACK TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1500 EDT ON 10/22/10 * * *

The following report was received from the State of Arkansas via e-mail:

"The [Arkansas Department of Health (ADH)] received a written report in accordance with RH-1801.k of the Arkansas Regulations describing the event, root cause and exposure information.

"The SPEC G-70 source is a Cobalt-60 source.

"During the initial exposure, it is believed that the source did not reach the end of the J-Tube and was temporarily 'hung up' at the connection between the guide tube and J-Tube. The radiography crew re-verified the controlled area boundaries and made notifications. After consulting with the local RSO for the radiography crew and the Corporate RSO an attempt was made to 'straighten' the guide tube to decrease the likelihood of any binding of the crank-out/source and the guide tube. After the utilization of a 'long pole' the source was able to be retracted and locked into the exposure device. Surveys were made and the exposure device was transported to the office of the radiography crew. The total time the source was exposed was 60 minutes.

"Inspections of the exposure device, guide tubes, crank out, and source revealed all were in proper working condition. SPEC has stated that the J-Tube utilized is not approve for use with the device and that no J-Tubes are approved for use with the SPEC-300 and G-70 Co-60 source configuration.

"Total exposure from the direct reading pocket dosimeters: lead radiographer 90 mRem; radiographer A, 12 mRem; and radiographer B, 8 mRem. There were no exposures above the annual limit to any members of the public due to this event.

"It appears that the root cause of the event was incompatibility of the J-Tube and source. The State of Louisiana has been notified of this event and the written report will also be forwarded.

"The [ADH] considers this event closed."

Notified R4DO (Campbell) and FSME EO (Einberg).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 46343
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UTAH INSPECTION LLC
Region: 4
City: DE BEQUE State: CO
County:
License #: 1043-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/19/2010
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2010
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE

The following report was received via fax:

"This memo is to serve as a preliminary report for an incident with a Colorado radiography licensee. Utah Inspection, LLC (Colorado license 1043-01) reported to the [Colorado Department of Health (CDH)] on October 18, 2010 a stuck source/source disconnect for a radiography source. The job site was at a gas compressor station in De Beque, Colorado. Initial reports indicate the source was approximately 60 Ci of Ir-I92.

"Utah Inspection contacted the CDH at approximately 2:30 pm on October 18,2010 to report the incident. The licensee reported that while performing a radiography shot, the camera slipped off a wet pipe and landed on the guide tube causing a crimp in the tube which prevented the source from being retracted. The licensee extended the boundaries around the source and maintained surveillance of the source. The licensee contracted with a local Radiation Safety Officer trained in source retrieval activities and was able to retract the source to the shielded position at approximately 7:15 pm on October 18, 2010.

"A member of the CDH responded to the incident scene as the retraction efforts were being completed. The RSO contracted for the source retrieval reported an estimated 138 mrem whole body, and the radiographer estimated doses at 50 mrem whole body for himself and 25 mrem whole body for his assistant. Individual overexposure does not appear to be an issue at this point for this incident. The individual from the CDH confirmed that the area was very isolated and the radiographer and assistant were able to maintain their distance from the source."

Colorado Incident I10-13.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 46344
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: QUALITY TESTING LLC
Region: 4
City: GILBERT State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-491
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 10/19/2010
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/15/2010
Event Time: 08:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
MEXICO VIA FAX ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via email:

"Date and Time Agency Notified: 8:00 AM, 10/15/2010.

"Type of Incident: Missing Radioactive Material.

"Device Manufacturer, Model No. and Serial No.: Humbolt 5001C, SN 1143.

"Sources and Activity: Cs-137, 10mCi; Am-241:Be, 40mCi.

"Date last seen or used: 12/03/2007.

"Circumstances: The missing gauge was in need of servicing or replacement therefore it was removed from service. The program that generated the inventory list for all equipment, omits the equipment removed from service. The licensee discovered this part of the program on 10/14/2010.

"Conclusion: The gauge could have been removed from licensee control any time after 12/03/2007.

"The Agency continues to investigate the actions of the licensee and timeliness of reporting the missing device.

"The U.S. NRC and the Arizona Governor's office have been notified of this event.

"Press coverage is anticipated."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46352
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 10/22/2010
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2010
Event Time: 06:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 0 Startup 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING PHYSICS TESTING DUE TO PROBLEMS WITH THE ROD CONTROL IN HOLD OUT SWITCH

"On 10/22/2010 at 0636 hours, North Anna Unit-1 reactor was manually tripped during physics testing and 1-E-0 was entered due to problems with the Rod Control In Hold Out Switch. The out direction of the switch was not functioning properly and the reactor was tripped to put the plant in a condition to perform maintenance. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor core. This was an uncomplicated reactor trip with no automatic ESF actuation required.

"Unit 1 is currently stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in MODE 3 (Hot Standby)."

The plant electrical line-up is normal. Decay heat removal is via the steam dumps. Notification will be made to the local county administrator's office.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46353
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAD DEIHL
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 10/22/2010
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2010
Event Time: 10:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c )(1) - SPENT FUEL, HLW, RX GTCC DEFECT
72.75(c )(2) - SPENT FUEL, HLW OR RX-REL GTCC RED. EFECT
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
BRITTAIN HILL (NMSS)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SPENT FUEL STORAGE RELATED DEFECT - CASK LEAKAGE RATE GREATER THAN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

"On 10/22/10, at 1058 EDT, a troubleshooting of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Cask TN-50-A indicated that a leak existed in the cask lid sealing area at a rate greater than allowed by ISFSI Cask Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.1.3, Cask Helium Leak Rate. TS 3.1.3 limits the Cask Helium Leak Rate to 1.0 E-05 ref-cc/sec. The cask is currently in unloading operations and is located within the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 3 containment building. Preliminary review indicates that a leak exists at the weld plug that provides sealing of the drilled interseal passageway associated with the drain port penetration of the cask lid. This leak effectively provides a bypass of the main lid outer confinement seal.

"This report if being submitted pursuant to 10CFR72.75(c)(1) as a result of a material defect in a weld in the cask main lid. This report is also being submitted pursuant to 10CFR72.75 (2) as a result of a resolution in the effectiveness of the cask confinement system.

"The Certificate of Compliance for this cask is 1027 (Amendment 1).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46354
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PRATER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/22/2010
Notification Time: 23:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2010
Event Time: 17:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL INOPERABILITY OF OSCILLATION POWER RANGE MONITORS

"At 1751 [CDT] on Oct 22, 2010, Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) determined that current Oscillation Power Range Monitors (OPRM's) setpoints, as outlined in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR), for Dresden U2 are non-conservative. This renders the Technical Specification (TS) function of the OPRM's in the Reactor Protection System (RPS) inoperable.

"This event was initiated as a result of notification by Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels (NF-BEX-10-157) that an error exists in the McSLAP computer code which affects the Safely Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratios (SLMCPR) for Dresden. Currently the COLR and installed, amplitude setpoint (Sp) is 1.13 and the confirmation count setpoint (Np) is 15. This is required to be adjusted to 1.12 (Sp) and 14 (Np).

"Alternative methods to detect and suppress thermal hydraulic instabilities were initiated as required by Technical Specifications.

"This non-conservative computer code error could potentially have prevented fulfillment of the OPRM system's safety function and is therefore reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), 'An event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function - shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.'"

Corrective actions include the following:

"1. Revise U2 Core Operating Limit Report (COLR) to reflect correct values as determined by Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels Letter (NF-BEXl0-157).

"2. Adjust OPRM setpoints to comply with COLR values."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46355
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/23/2010
Notification Time: 02:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2010
Event Time: 00:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO POWER SUPPLY FAILURE

"The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to an instrument power supply failure. The cause of the failure is under investigation.

"All other ECCS, Emergency Diesels, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) are operable."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46358
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KEPLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/24/2010
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2010
Event Time: 12:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

'A' TRAIN RHR INOPERABLE DUE TO TEMPERATURE SWITCH FAILURE ON 'A' CONTROL ROOM CHILLER

"On 10/24/2010, while in Mode 5 in natural circulation cooling and no fuel movement in progress, the 'A' Control Room Chiller (AK400) tripped apparently due to an equipment failure of a temperature switch. This system was providing cooling for the Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) room coolers. This caused the 'A' train of SACS and 'A' Train of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to be administratively declared inoperable with the remaining train out of service for maintenance. As a result of the inoperable systems, the ability to remove residual heat could have been prevented. The 'A' RHR train, the alternate 'C' RHR train and the 'A' SACS Loop remained continuously available. No personnel were injured."

The licensee is in Technical Specification 3.9.11.1 Shutdown Cooling and 3.8.1.2 for SACS inoperable. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available but inoperable as a result of SACS being inoperable. Offsite power is not affected and plant risk remains 'Green'. There were no significant events on-going at the time of the event. The licensee is bench testing a replacement switch at this time, and the chiller has been returned to service. The licensee is maintaining natural circulation and ensuring the availability of redundant RHR once a shift.

The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloyways Township have been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46359
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK EGHIGIAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/24/2010
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2010
Event Time: 16:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
TIM McGINTY (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 97 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP RESULTING FROM A LOW CONDENSER VACUUM

"At 1641 EDT 10/24/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip, caused by a loss of [condenser] vacuum. The scram was uncomplicated, Control Rod 10-35 did not fully insert on scram and was manually inserted from position 38. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 137 inches, and as expected, HPCI, RCIC. & SRVs did not actuate. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the CRD [Control Rod Drive] and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected.

"The loss of condenser vacuum is under investigation.

"All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and EDG's [Emergency Diesel Generators] were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.

"Decay heat is being removed through the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser."

Electrical offsite power lineups are normal. Reactor pressure is 882 psig and reactor temperature is 515 degrees F (NOP and NOT). The reactor is stable in mode 3.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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