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Event Notification Report for August 27, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/26/2010 - 08/27/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


46146 46200 46205 46208

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 46146
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DEDAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 20:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTION

"On 8/3/10 South Texas Project Unit 2 was in a scheduled A Train work week with the following equipment inoperable for planned maintenance; Essential Cooling Water Pump, Essential Chiller, Component Cooling Water Pump, Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Diesel Generator (DG), High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump.

"At 0754 [CDT] on 8/3/10 the B train sequencer trouble alarm was received. The immediate operability determination was the sequencer remained operable. It was later identified during testing that the sequencer was inoperable. The B train sequencer was declared inoperable at 1506 [CDT] on 8/3/10. Due to loss of the automatic load sequencing support function, all associated train B safety equipment that is sequenced on the B train
14.16 kv bus during a Mode 1 Safety Injection (SI) was also declared inoperable.

"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the A and B train HHSI, LHSI, and CS pumps. All C train safety injection pumps remained operable. Pending a formal operability determination, this is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure of the accident mitigating function.

"This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The B train trouble alarm, an auto test feature, was discovered by operators during their rounds. The licensee entered their configuration risk management plan within the 1 hour as required. Currently, the licensee is working on completing the scheduled A train maintenance and restoring operability sometime in the morning. Also, a work package is under development to repair the faulty B train sequencer. The risk based time limit for restoring operability requires completion by 0449 [CDT] on 8/8/10.

Unit 1 is unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1638 EDT ON 08/26/2010 FROM JIM MORRIS TO S. SANDIN * * *

"The purpose of this update is to retract the notification made in ENS Report #46146 (August 3, 2010).

"Following the ENS notification, troubleshooting determined the cause of the Train B sequencer alarm to be the failure of an Output Mode I Actuation Timing Switch Module. An engineering evaluation of the event has been completed and determined that a failure of this module did not affect the ability of the ESF load sequencer to perform its design function. Therefore, the Train B sequencer and associated Train B ESF equipment remained technically operable during the time that Train A equipment was inoperable due to scheduled maintenance, and a condition reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) did not exist.

"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R4DO (Walker).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 46200
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: SHIVE-HATTERY INC
Region: 3
City: CAMANCHE State: IA
County:
License #: 0174152PG
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RANDAL DAHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/23/2010
Notification Time: 16:21 [ET]
Event Date: 08/20/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE MODEL 3411B DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE

The following was received from the State of Iowa via e-mail:

"The licensee reported [to the IDPH (Iowa Department of Public Health)] on Saturday, August 21, 2010 of an event that occurred the previous day. A Troxler, model 3411B moisture/density gauge was run over at a temporary job site in Camanche, Iowa by a large dump truck. The construction vehicle was backing up and the driver did not see the gauge or the gauge user. The licensee's RSO reported the following to IDPH on August 23, 2010. The source rod was severed from the handle at the upper weld. The index rod was bent, and two of the faceplate screws were bent. The source rod was lifted up by hand and brought back into the gauge (safe position, with the exception that the source rod could pull completely out the top of the gauge). The bottom shutter closed as usual. No physical damage to the source rod was evident on the bottom half of the source rod. A leak test was completed on the gauge and the swabs were overnighted to Qal-Tek Associates (3998 Commerce Cr. Idaho Falls,
Idaho 83401) on Friday night. Once the results are known, delivery of the gauge will be made to Qal-Tek to repair the gauge or dispose of as required. Direction will be given to us [IDPH] from Qal-Tek based on the leak test results. They are a certified disposal site. A survey was conducted on the soil surrounding the site of the accident. Based on a background radiation check 200' away from the site, no change in reading was observed at the actual accident site. The survey meter was also used to check the gauge itself compared to another gauge with a current leak test that had passed, and no change in reading was observed. The gauge is stored in a metal storage container on the jobsite in Camanche, Iowa. The windows are barred shut. The gauge is locked in its case to the inside of the storage container, and the container is locked shut at all times. Only the authorized user has access to this container. The gauge's source rod is duct taped to the index rod, and will have a ubolt binding the source rod to the index rod to prevent movement of the source rod from the gauge."

The Troxler gauge contained .009 Curies Cs-137 and .044 Curies Am-241/Be.

Item Number: IA100003

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 46205
Rep Org: ARCELORMITTAL BURNS HARBOR
Licensee: ARCELORMITTAL BURNS HARBOR
Region: 3
City: BURNS HARBOR State: IN
County:
License #: 13-32670-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SARVANIDIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

LEVEL DETECTION GAUGE SHUTTER CONTROL ROD DISENGAGED

"After completion of casting operations at our #1 Slab Caster, a trained worker proceeded to the mould strand area to remove the Berthold Co-60 rod source from the mould and place it in proper storage. The source is 3.97 mCi and is used to measure mould level of liquid steel. After properly securing the source into its shielded source holder, the trained worker began transporting the holder to the storage cabinet. During transport, the holder fell over and hit the ground. When it hit the ground, the steel 'D' arm (for lifting the holder) structure on the outside of the holder was bent.

"Also, the device is designed such that the source insertion/removal rod is stored on the outside of the holder. It actually slides through openings on the 'D' arm and screws into the shutter door when in the closed position. After the fall, the threaded portion of the shutter door which receives the insertion rod broke. I immediately removed the rod and replaced it with a positive lock.

"During this event, the source rod and its shielding were not compromised and there was no exposure to employees. Also, we are making immediate modifications to the transporting device to prevent this from recurring."

The shutter was closed throughout this event.

* * * UPDATE AT 1339 EDT ON 8/26/10 FROM CHRIS SARVANIDIS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following text provided by the ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor Radiation Safety Officer (RSO):

"Further investigation has revealed new information which we feel warrants a retraction of the reported event as a non-reportable event.

"Originally, we stated that the Co-60 source rod was removed from the mould and safely inside the holder (post-casting) when the holder fell over, however, it was actually not in the holder. The source rod had actually been properly installed in the mould (pre-casting), and the employee was actually returning the empty holder to the storage cabinet when the holder fell over.

"I also have three very important attachments. One is our Steel Producing department's preliminary investigation report which reveals more accurate facts of the event. The second is a quote from Berthold's Source and Device Registry document which can be interpreted as indicating that the insertion rod screwing into the shutter 'door' is not part of a safety design function of the device (see attached photo). The photo shows a positive lock installed on a separate portion of the shutter 'door' which serves as the actual safety locking function. The insertion rod screwed into the shutter 'door' serves merely as a storage location for the insertion rod when the device is not in use. Therefore, the damaged (de-threaded) opening on the shutter 'door' which receives the insertion rod is strictly for insertion rod storage only. Also, the insertion rod and its threading were not damaged in this event. The insertion rod itself is still able to be installed into its stored position (without being screwed-in) and can be used in operations if necessary. Lastly, we would have redundancy of insertion rods if necessary.

"Further, there was no loss of functionality to the source holder, Co-60 source rod, or shutter mechanism as a result of this event, and the shutter is still lockable. The device is fully functional and no safety features have been breached. Nonetheless, I have taken the device out of service and secured it in a location controlled by me as RSO. I've begun the process of having the manufacturer repair the device."

The above information was discussed with the NRC Region III staff prior to submittal as a retraction. Notified R3DO (Lara) and FSME (McIntosh).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 46208
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT G. HADDOCK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 08/26/2010
Notification Time: 22:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/26/2010
Event Time: 16:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1, while operating at 100% full power, performed Ultrasonic Testing on the High-Head Emergency Core Cooling System Pump suction headers (6" and 8") following a fill and vent of the 'A' High Head Emergency Core Cooling System Pump. This is required because the fill point for the out of service Emergency Core Cooling System Pump 1CH-P-1A, is it's suction valve from the 8" Charging header, 1CH-19, which was opened. Preliminary indications were such that the 6" suction header was full of water and an air void did exist in the 8" suction header, but the size was indeterminate and had to be calculated by System Engineering. Operations commenced additional monitoring for cavitation of the running charging pump with none identified. Operations then vented the 8" suction header multiple times. At 1649 hours today, the results of the Ultrasonic Test (UT) was provided by System Engineering indicating that an air void existed in the Emergency Core Cooling System Pump 8" Suction header that was in excess of the Acceptance Criteria. At 1649 hours, both trains of High Head Safety Injection pumps were declared Inoperable but remain Available. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 - ECCS operating is not met. Required Action C.1 requires entry of TS LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

"Per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)&(D) - Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition, this event is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours.

"At 1715 additional venting of the 6" Charging Pump suction header revealed no air present. Additional venting of the 8" Charging Pump suction header revealed additional air pockets. The 8" header was then vented multiple times, with a short delay in between each venting, until no air was identified.

"At 1718, follow up UT on both Charging Pump Suction headers revealed it remained full of water with no voids present. Both trains of High Head Safety Injection are declared OPERABLE restoring compliance to TS LCO 3.0.3 and 3.5.2. Reactor power remained at 100% during these evolutions.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."

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Thursday, March 29, 2012