| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/01/2010 - 07/02/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 46049 | Rep Org: SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: F&ME CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: NORTH CHARLESTON State: SC
County:
License #: SC-293
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MELINDA BRADSHAW
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/28/2010
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2010
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM JOB SITE
The following information was received from the State of South Carolina via fax:
"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC DHEC) was notified on Monday, June 28, 2010 at 8:00 a.m. that a Humboldt Model 5001 B, SN 2508, portable moisture density gauge had been stolen from a job site storage unit in North Charleston, SC. The gauge contained 11 milliCuries maximum of Cesium 137 and 44 milliCuries maximum of Americium 241:Be. [An] F&ME employee, notified the SC DHEC that a gauge technician arrived for work Monday morning and discovered that the job site storage trailer had been broken into. [The site RSO] was notified immediately and he in turn called local police and fire department personnel. He also notified SC DHEC of the occurrence. The RSO indicated that the trailer had been secured on Friday evening (June 25) with the gauge locked in its storage container in the locked storage cabinet within the trailer. No work was performed over the weekend. The theft was discovered, as outlined above, early Monday morning. There were a few other items stolen as well - a GPS unit and a computer. An inventory was still underway at the time of this notification. The local police responders were made well aware of what type of gauge this was and were in the process of filling out the police report. The RSO was advised to fax the police report to SC DHEC once he obtained it."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46050 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: STANDARD TESTING AND ENGINEERING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: OK-17054-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/28/2010
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2010
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
MARK THAGGARD (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
The following report was received via email from the State of Oklahoma:
"On June 28, 2010, the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) received notification from Standard Testing and Engineering Company (Standard) of Oklahoma City operating under license number OK-17054-03 that one of Standard's nuclear gauges was stolen from the home of an employee living in Tulsa, OK. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3411B moisture/density gauge, serial number 16968. The gauge contained a 0.30 GBq 137-Cs source serial number 506707 and a 1.48 GBq 241-Am source serial number 4712391. Standard stated that it is against company policy to store gauges at employee residences and that the employee has been terminated. It is unclear at this time if the gauge was properly stored within the gauge restraints that are installed in all Standard company vehicles.
"There is no reason to believe that this is anything other than a common theft. The licensee has notified local law enforcement. The ODEQ is notifying the FBI. The company has not issued a press release. ODEQ will seek to either issue a press release, or have the company issue a press release to help raise public awareness of the appearance of the gauge and the level of risk it poses, in case it is abandoned in a public place."
* * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO JOE O'HARA VIA EMAIL AT 1724 ON 7/1/10 * * *
"The portable gauge reported stolen on June 28th at approximately 4:15 PM has been recovered. A citizen contacted a company that provides services to portable gauge users, and the company contacted Oklahoma DEQ and provided us with information to contact the citizen. We [OK DEQ] placed the licensee in contact with the person who had found the gauge, and the gauge was recovered at about 11 AM on June 30. The gauge appears to be undamaged.
Notified R4DO(Lantz), FSME EO(Luehman), and ILTAB via email
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46055 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TETRA TECH, INC
Region: 3
City: JEFFERSON State: WI
County:
License #: 073-1165-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KURT PEDERSEN
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 06/29/2010
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/28/2010
Event Time: 20:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DESTROYED IN FIRE
The following report was received via fax from the State of Wisconsin:
"On June 28, 2010 at 20:35 the Department of Health Services (DHS) on-call State Radiological Coordinator (SRC) was informed that there had been a fire involving two trailers at the Dodge Concrete Ready Mix plant, W6298 US Hwy 18, Jefferson, WI. One of the trailers contained a Troxler 3440 portable moisture density gauge owned by Tetra Tech, a Wisconsin Radioactive Materials Licensee who was performing licensed activities at the concrete plant. The gauge contains a maximum of 9 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and 44 milliCuries of Americium-241:Beryllium as radioactive sealed sources. The original call to the DHS 24 hour emergency hotline was made by the Tetra Tech Radiation Safety Officer (RSO).
"The SRC subsequently received a page from the Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) Duty Officer at 20:45. The Duty Officer explained to the SRC that he had been informed of a fire in Jefferson, (WI) involving two burning trailers involving radioactive material. The SRC informed the duty officer that DHS intended on following up on the incident and would provide additional information.
"The SRC then contacted the licensee RSO. The RSO was at the scene of the fire interacting with the fire department. He (RSO) indicated that a fire had consumed two of their job trailers at Dodge Ready Mix and that one trailer contained a portable gauge which housed both a Cs-137 and an Am-241/Be radioactive source. The RSO indicated that radiation surveys around the trailer indicated radiation levels of less than 1 mR/hr around the burned trailer containing the gauge. After the RSO proposed his course of action to the SRC, they agreed that it was unsafe to attempt to extract the gauge from the trailer in the dark. The RSO cordoned off the trailer with yellow "Caution-Do Not Enter" tape pending an attempt to extract the gauge the following morning. All of the licensee's proper radiation postings and equipment were also destroyed in the fire. All postings and labels on the gauge transport container and the gauge itself were destroyed. DHS informed the RSO that they would arrive at the scene of the fire the next morning to supervise the extraction and provide technical radiation safety support.
"DHS investigators arrived at Dodge Ready Mix in Jefferson, Wl at 09:30. The Tetra Tech RSO and Authorized Users (AU) were present. Both trailers were completely destroyed by the fire and the gauge housing, transport case and associated equipment were melted together and fused to the trailer floor. The melted plastic, gauge and trailer housing had to be removed as a block. The maximum radiation level was ~8 mR/hr near contact with the Cs-137 shielding, which appeared to be intact. The radiation levels indicated that the shielding for both sources had retained its integrity. Contamination wipes were taken on the source rod, source shielding and the source exit point. No evidence of contamination was found. The DHS investigators were informed that the fire department had moved the trailers away from the site garage to reduce the risk of the fire spreading. All debris, trailers and trailer sites were surveyed. No elevated radiation levels were found. These surveys gave the DHS investigators and RSO confidence that the source remained in the fully shielded position.
"After consulting with Troxler, the gauge manufacturer, the RSO decided to remove the melted plastic and debris from the gauge remnants so it could be transported and shipped back to Troxler in a standard transport case. The licensee succeeded in removing the debris and melted plastic and at 12:45 was able to package the gauge in the Type-A transport container for return to their office in Wausau. The gauge was to be leak tested prior to shipment to Troxler for disposal. All debris removed from the gauge and the gauge itself was surveyed for contamination and radiation levels. The maximum radiation level remained at ~8 mR/hr and no evidence of contamination was found. The transport index was consistent with what the RSO typically finds with an intact gauge."
Event Report ID: WI100011 |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 46059 | Rep Org: 3M COMPANY - ST. PAUL, MN
Licensee: 3M COMPANY
Region: 3
City: ST. PAUL State: MN
County:
License #: 22-00057-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRED ENTWISTLE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON | Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2010
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text SAFETY EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION - SHUTTER STUCK ON NUCLEAR GAUGE
"At approximately 10 AM on June 30 an operator at the 3M Springfield plant determined that the shutter of an LFE beta gauge was not closing. This was reported to supervision and subsequently to the Radiation Safety Officer. The gauge is otherwise functioning normally and has been posted as having an open shutter. A licensed service provider has been contacted to make repairs, scheduled for end of the day, July 1.
"The gauge is an LFE model SULP-77A, serial number OS-713. The source is a 1 Curie Kr-85 sealed source dated 1/8/2007.
"The 3M facility is located at 3211 E. Chestnut Expressway, Springfield MO 65802.
"There has been no personnel exposure as a result of the stuck shutter." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 46060 | Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP ()
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING FAILURE OF TURBINE OVERSPEED RESET CONTROL VALVE DIAPHRAGM
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from GE Hitachi; Report MFN 10-192 dated July 1, 2010.
Background:
"A diaphragm used in a 1" HPCI turbine stop valve / mechanical trip hold valve operator failed at a domestic BWR 4 in July 2009. The failure resulted in a HPCI turbine lube oil leak, which was the indication that the diaphragm had failed. The BWR 4 plant completed an Apparent Cause Evaluation and concluded that a material defect in the diaphragm allowed the diaphragm to tear after being installed for 2 years 8 months."
"The diaphragm that failed was a Robertshaw (RS) part number 25471-A2, and was installed in a Robertshaw model VC-210 diaphragm control valve operator. The diaphragm was made from Buna-n rubber and was designed to have two layers of Dacron reinforcement fabric over all pressure bearing surface areas of the diaphragm. The diaphragms are manufactured by Chicago-Allis using a 2-plate compression mold process."
"The diaphragms are purchased as commercial grade and are dedicated by GEH and supplied as safety related under GE part number Q25471-A2. The failed diaphragm was manufactured in 2006."
Discussion:
"Reinforcement fabric is considered a critical design requirement that is essential to ensure durability, reliability, and prevents tearing of the diaphragm material when these diaphragms are used in the HPCI turbine lube oil system as turbine trip and reset valves."
"An inspection was performed on six diaphragms, three manufactured in 2006 and three manufactured in 2008. All six of these diaphragms were found to have areas without fabric reinforcement. Inspection of the three samples from 2006 found non-uniform reinforcement. Inspection of the three samples from 2008 found all diaphragms were void of reinforcement in the sidewalls and inspection indicates that the reinforcement fabric was torn away from the inner sidewall during the manufacturing process. The inspections identified no diaphragms that were in full compliance with the design requirements for two layers of reinforcing fabric over all pressure bearing surfaces of the diaphragm."
Safety Analysis:
"The failure of the HPCI turbine over-speed reset control valve's diaphragm would result in a loss of HPCI turbine lube and control oil through the failed diaphragm. Depending on the amount of oil lost and the system demands, this loss could ultimately result in a failure of the HPCI System. Failure is not imminent, but cannot be precluded. Other safety related equipment is sufficient to mitigate design basis events in the event of a loss of HPCI."
Conclusion:
"Because of the similarity of the defects in all diaphragms inspected, it is credible to believe that this type of deviation from technical requirement also exists in other diaphragms manufactured by Chicago Allis and sold by GE as part number Q25471-A2 and 25471-A2Q, and as part of Control Valve Assembly DD233A3600P001. The identified defective diaphragms were present in two lots; one manufactured in 2006 and one in 2008. Based on the observations it is reasonable to believe that other diaphragms manufactured in 2006 and 2008 have similar deviations. GEH has been unable to determine if the identified manufacturing deviation exists in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006. Since GEH is not able to rule out defects in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006, it is credible to believe that similar deviations existed in diaphragms manufactured prior to 2006. In order to determine the possible extent of condition, all diaphragms in service or in stock at plants as spare parts inventory are suspect. Since the diaphragms have a designated service life of 5 years, and a shelf life of 10 years, the extent of condition is bounded by replacement of all diaphragms purchased by plants since 1995."
"GEH has evaluated the consequences of the failure of this diaphragm and concluded that this type of failure could result in the HPCI system not performing its safety function. The HPCI system is considered an essential safety related system. Failure of the HPCI system is considered a major degradation of essential safety related equipment. Therefore this condition is determined to be a Substantial Safety Hazard and is a Reportable condition per 10CFR Part 21."
Recommended Action:
"GEH has evaluated the consequences of the failure of this diaphragm and concluded that this type of failure could result in the HPCI system not performing its safety function. The HPCI system is considered an essential safety related system. Failure of the HPCI system is considered a major degradation of essential safety related equipment. Therefore this condition is determined to be a Substantial Safety Hazard and is a Reportable condition per 10CFR Part 21."
US Plants With Affected Diaphragms:
Fermi 2
Limerick
Peach Bottom
Duane Arnold
Cooper
Susquehanna
Brunswick
Hatch
Browns Ferry |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46062 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEENAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2010
Event Time: 09:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ONSITE LEAK FROM CONDENSATE STORE TANK RESULTING IN LOCALIZED TRITIUM CONTAMINATION
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notification of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) of an unpermitted release of radionuclides at LaSalle County Station. This notification was made at 0903 on July 1, 2010. A news release is planned, which is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), this notification satisfies the additional reporting requirement.
"On June 30, 2010, a small leak of radioactive water from the Unit 1 Cycled Condensate Storage (CY) Tank to the ground was confirmed by analysis of water from an adjacent groundwater test well. The IEMA / IEPA require notification when a release to soil, groundwater or surface water results in tritium concentrations of 200 pCi/I or more outside the licensee controlled area, or contains tritium at quantities of 0.002 Curies or more on-site. Positive groundwater test well sample result was obtained at 1800 on June 30, 2010 from the well adjacent to the Cycled Condensate Storage Tank. Samples found a tritium concentration of 715,000 pCi/I, with a confirmatory sample result of 696,000 pCi/I. The concentration of tritium in the sampled well makes it likely that the release is in excess of 0.002 Curies.
"Based on sampling data obtained to date, the tritium in the groundwater is confined to Exelon property and poses no threat to public safety. The Station continues to track this issue by monitoring groundwater test wells. Plans to repair the leak in the Unit 1 CY tank are in progress."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. The licensee also plans to notify authorities and will be issuing a press release. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 46063 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM KOBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2009
Event Time: 12:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HISTORIC CONDITION WITH CONTAINMENT COOLER FAN RELAYS
"[This is a] historical condition previously reported in LER 2009-001 [that] should also have been reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Due to misapplication of Potter and Brumfield Rotary Relays, both operating Containment Air Cooler Fans were declared inoperable on October 13, 2009, and the fans switched from their normal fast speed alignment to the slow speed alignment used for accidents, which eliminated the relay issue and allowed them to be declared operable. This issue was reported in LER 2009-001 as an operation prohibited by the Technical Specifications on December 14, 2009. The fan control circuitry was modified to correct the condition.
"Upon further review, this condition should have been reported per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to both required Containment Air Cooler Fan trains being declared inoperable for the condition. A revision to LER 2009-001 will be submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." | |