| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
06/02/2010 - 06/03/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45578 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ALL STATE ENGINEERING TESTING CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: HIALEAH State: FL
County:
License #: 1113-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/17/2009
Notification Time: 09:13 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2009
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via facsimile:
"[A] technician contacted this office at approximately 0810 [EST] to report that a Troxler gauge was stolen. The gauge was stored in the truck bed inside the case. The case with locked gauge inside was chained to the truck. The office compound has a locked gate and fence. The gate was found to be open upon his arrival, the supervisor was there but was not aware of the missing gauge until informed by [the technician]. The truck that had the gauge was parked in the back parking lot. [The] Miami office will investigate."
Florida Incident Number: FL09-086.
Troxler Model Number: 3411-B
Serial Number: 7648
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE FURNACE TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1419 EDT ON 6/2/10 * * *
The missing Troxler gauge has been recovered and returned to the owner. The owner is conducting a leak test and will be sending the gauge to the vendor for an operational check.
Notified R1DO (Dentel), FSME EO (McIntosh) and ILTAB (English) via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 45844 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN PIGG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 04/15/2010
Notification Time: 17:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2010
Event Time: 11:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VOIDING IN DISCHARGE PIPING
"The Unit 2 HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system was declared inoperable due to failure to meet acceptance criteria for air voiding in the discharge piping. UT [Ultrasonic Testing] inspection identified an air void of approximately 0.515 cubic ft. HPCI remains available and on-line risk remains green.
"The HPCI discharge piping has been vented. Preliminary post venting UT inspections indicate current void volume is less than acceptance criteria. Certified UT inspectors have been dispatched to validate preliminary UT results.
"The event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of the event."
The acceptance criteria for voids is less than or equal to 0.052 cubic ft.
* * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS DITCHFIELD TO JOE O'HARA AT 1431 ON 6/2/2010 * * *
"Following the void identification, an engineering evaluation was initiated to determine the impact of the non-condensable gas pocket identified in the HPCI piping. The evaluation was completed and the following results were obtained.
"The pocket of non-condensable gas in the HPCI discharge piping did not adversely affect the ability of the system to maintain peak cladding temperatures below required limits.
"The pressure that would have been experienced during an initiation of the system was determined to be within the design pressure of the system.
"Additionally, the potential force imbalances that would be experienced during a system initiation were determined to be within the piping design allowables.
"Based on the engineering evaluation, the pocket of non-condensable gas did not have a detrimental effect on HPCI system operation. The ability of the HPCI system to perform its intended safety function was maintained throughout this condition. Therefore, the above notification is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R3DO(Pelke) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45969 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NORMAN KUZEL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/01/2010
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2010
Event Time: 15:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL LOSS OF RADIATION RELEASE CONTROLS
"On May 27, 2010, during a control board walkdown, it was discovered that two sets of auxiliary building tunnel exhaust dampers were open at the same time. This configuration created a pathway from the secondary containment to the outside. The condition was immediately corrected. Additional investigation determined that this condition existed since May 11, 2010, when Millstone 3 was in Mode 5.
"Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 'Secondary Containment' is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The condition discovered on May 27, 2010, rendered Secondary Containment inoperable. Further evaluation since the discovery date concludes that the secondary containment structure was in a condition which could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function for controlling the release of radioactive material. [On June 1, at 1550 EDT the licensee determined that the event was potentially reportable].
"An investigation is on-going.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified [by the licensee]."
The State of Connecticut and the Town of Waterford were notified. A press release will be issued.
* * * UPDATE FROM FRED PERKINS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1304 EDT ON 6/2/10 * * *
The licensee reported that no press release will be issued for this event. They will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Dentel) | |