| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/19/2010 - 05/20/2010 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45928 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: AMERICAN AIRLINES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 16:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following was received from the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:
"On May 14, 2010, Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) received telephone notification from American Airlines Maintenance and Engineering Center (AA) that they had lost one (1) tritium (H-3) radioluminescent exit sign containing a maximum total of 3.5 Ci of H-3. At this time, no further information is available; however, updates will be made to NMED as ODEQ receives updates from AA."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45932 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: PB AMERICAS INC.
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3976-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/17/2010
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES
"[The State of Florida] received a report from the company's RSO at 0945 that three soil moisture density gauges and cases were stolen. [A] Conex box at [the] site was locked and broken into. All three gauges were chained and locked to [the] interior of [the] Conex box. All three locks were broken. [The] cases were locked with the gauges inside when stored. [The] owner still has keys to the cases and gauges. [The] licensee will offer a reward. Local police have been notified and [the] licensee is currently awaiting their arrival."
All three stolen gauges were Troxler Model 3430, Serial Numbers 31318, 25778, and 19575. Each gauge contained a 40 mCi AmBe source and a 8 mCi Cs-137 source.
FL:10-067
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45935 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 05/19/2010
Notification Time: 15:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2010
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/19/2010 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
JOHN GROBE (NRR)
CINDY PEDERSON (R3)
PAM VESTAL (DHS)
DAVID BARDEN (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIALLY TOXIC ATMOSPHERE IN AN ACCESS FACILIITY
"At 1315 hours personnel performing repairs to an air conditioning system inside the Access Facility (AF) reported a Freon leak from a valve packing failure. All personnel were evacuated from the building. Radiation protection personnel entered the building and atmospheric sampling commenced. Sample results indicated a potentially toxic atmosphere in portions of the AF, and at 1330 hours an Emergency Plan Unusual Event was declared on EAL HU7, 'Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Security.'
"The AF was locked down and plant access and egress have been halted pending the restoration of AF atmosphere. Required security compensatory measures are in place.
"The Freon completely discharged from the affected air conditioner through the leak. Actions to establish a habitable atmosphere inside the AF continue.
"Units 1 and 2 are unaffected by this event and continue to operate at full power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARK BRIDGES TO PETE SNYDER AT 1551 ON 5/19/2010 * * *
"A habitable atmosphere has been re-established and conditions no longer meet an emergency action level. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1438 CDT on 5/19/2010."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron), IRD (Gott), NRR (Ruland), DHS (Vestal), and FEMA (Barden). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45937 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 05/20/2010
Notification Time: 01:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/19/2010
Event Time: 16:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2010 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) INOPERABLE
"On 5/19/2010 at 1209 CDT, Unit 2 entered Mode 4 from Mode 5 and started realigning RHR from a shutdown cooling to an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) lineup. During this transition, the suction check valves for the RHR pump are tested for safety function closed per the in-service testing program . The valves are closed to provide train separation for the RHR trains and to prevent diversion of flow from suction sources.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT, both Unit 2 trains of RHR were declared inoperable due to the failure of the pump suction line check valve for each RHR pump (2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2) to meet In-Service Testing (IST) acceptance criteria. Technical Specification 3.5.2 Condition A was entered for inoperability of the one required ECCS train (RHR) in Mode 4 with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg temperatures above safety injection pump disable temperature.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1640 CDT, both RHR pit sump covers were opened to facilitate multiple entries into each sump while performing a revised test procedure to verify the operability of check valves 2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2. The pit sump covers are required to be closed in [Modes 1 through 4] for each operable RHR train. Since both trains of RHR were inoperable both covers were opened.
"On 5/19/2010 at 1947 CDT the pit sump cover was closed for one train of RHR.
"On 5/19/2010 at 2005 CDT the revised test procedure was approved and completed satisfactorily. The train of RHR with the pit sump cover closed was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.5.3 Condition A was exited. Both suction check valves passed the closed safety function and a loss of safety function did not occur as originally thought on 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT.
"On 5/19/2010 from 1640 CDT to 1947 CDT both trains of RHR were inoperable due to both pit sump covers open on both RHR trains. The inoperability of both trains of RHR represents a condition that prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structure or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |