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Event Notification Report for April 26, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/23/2010 - 04/26/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45791 45858 45863 45864 45869 45871 45872 45873

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 45791
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROGER MONTGOMERY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/25/2010
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2010
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO VOIDS IDENTIFIED IN PIPING

"At 1540 on 3/25/2010, engineering identified a gas void in the Unit 4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pipe which exceeded the station's allowable gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg injection flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1540. The void was immediately vented and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1750."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 0830 EDT ON 04/23/10 FROM MARK JONES TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"At 2018 on 3/25/2010, an event notification (#45791) was reported to the NRCOC as follows:

"'At 1540 on 3/25/2010, engineering identified a gas void in the Unit 4 B Cold Leg High Head Safety Injection [HHSI] pipe which exceeded the station's allowable gas accumulation acceptance criteria. This condition rendered the cold leg injection flow path inoperable and required entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1540. The void was immediately vented and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at 1750 [on 3/25/2010].'

"The decision to enter TS 3.0.3 was based on the plant procedural guidance and the results of ultrasonic testing.

"Following the discovery of the void, the failure investigation process required that an engineering evaluation be performed. The evaluation performed calculations to determine if, during a hypothetical HHSI pump start with the measured gas void present, the resulting water hammer conditions would cause the Unit 4 HHSI piping design pressure or Unit 4 HHSI piping supports design loading to be exceeded, thereby challenging the integrity of the Unit 4 HHSI discharge flow path to the reactor coolant system (RCS).

"The engineering evaluation determined that under the specific conditions in the Unit 4 HHSI piping on 3/25/2010:

"(1) Unit 4 HHSI piping design pressure would not have been exceeded should the HHSI pumps have started.

"(2) Unit 4 HHSI piping support design loading would not have been exceeded should the HHSI pumps have started.

"Therefore, the analysis of the void concluded that both the pipe and the support structural integrity would have withstood the pressure and axial loads due to the gas void and the HHSI system would have continued to perform its safety related function.

"The Unit 4 HHSI system discharge flowpath to the RCS remained operable at all times. Technical Specification 3/4.5.2, ECCS SUBSYSTEMS: Tavg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350 degrees F, Limiting Condition for Operation was satisfied at all times. Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 was not required at any time before or after the void discovery. The Unit 4 HHSI system remained capable of fulfilling the design safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident on Unit 4, and an immediate notification to the NRCOC, discussed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), was not required."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayres).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45858
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SHERWIN ALUMINA, LLC
Region: 4
City: CORPUS CHRISTI State: TX
County:
License #: 00200
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/20/2010
Notification Time: 15:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTERS STUCK OPEN

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"On April 20, 2010, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on April 19, 2010, while conducting calibrations on two continuous density measurement detectors, the associated nuclear gauge shutters were found to be stuck in the open position. Open is the normal position for these gauges. The gauges are Ohmart gauges containing 100 millicuries each of Cesium-137 (original activity). The gauges are model SR-A serial numbers 7613 GK and 8150 GK. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) has placed notification tags on the gauges to warn workers of the problem. The manufacturer has been contacted to provide repairs to the gauges."

Texas Incident # I-8732

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45863
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: OXEA CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: BAY CITY State: TX
County:
License #: 06073
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SHUTTER

"On April 21, 2010, the agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that while performing a scheduled shutter operation check, the shutter on a Ronan model SA1 nuclear gauge failed to close. The gauge contains five millicuries of Cesium (Cs) 137, and was installed in 1995. The gauge is in its normal operating position and a radiation survey conducted by the licensee indicated that radiation levels are normal. The gauge was leak tested and the test sent for analysis. The licensee stated that there is no risk of additional exposure to their workers. The licensee is working with the manufacturer to schedule the repair of the gauge during a shutdown starting on May 3, 2010."

Texas Incident #: I-8733

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45864
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #: OH02110250037
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 04/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2010
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE OVEREXPOSURE TO A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC

"Ohio Department of Health (ODH), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BPR) was notified of a possible overexposures to a member of the general public which occurred on 4/20/10 at the Ohio State University located in Columbus, Ohio.

"A patient received a temporary implant of Cs-137 and Ir-192 seeds on April 16-18, 2010. The patient's visitor (her fiancÚ) was instructed by the licensee that he could stay no longer than 2 hours with the patient in a twenty four hour period, and must stay behind the bedside shield during these visitations. On Tuesday, April 20, 2010, the licensee was informed by the Assistant Nurse Manager that the fiancÚ spent the night in the patient's room on two consecutive nights. In addition, the initial investigation by the licensee indicates that the visitor told the Assistant Nurse Manager that he slept in the same bed with the patient both nights. Nursing Management personnel are in the process of interviewing staff members that were involved directly with the care of the implant patient to verify that the fiancÚ was in the room overnight with the patient.

"A preliminary and conservative worst case dose estimate for the visitor is 6 Rad (6 cGy) whole body exposure, based on a 16-hour stay time (8 hours each night for two nights). ODH BRP will continue to collect information of this event and conduct an investigation. The licensee has initiated an internal investigation."

Ohio Report OH100005

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45869
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ED PIGOTT
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 04/23/2010
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/23/2010
Event Time: 08:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ERIC THOMAS (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FATALITY OF LICENSEE EMPLOYEE

"An FPLE Seabrook employee experienced a medical emergency on site and was transported offsite for care. Subsequent notification was received from the hospital that the employee had passed away.

"OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] was notified at 0848 [EDT] on 4/23/2010, under 29 CFR 1904, of the fatality of an employee caused by an apparent heart attack while at work."

The employee was entering into the Protected Area when she experienced the medical emergency, and as such the employee was not radiologically contaminated when transported offsite.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45871
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: GEOFFREY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/25/2010
Notification Time: 21:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2010
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ONE ALARM SIREN INITIATED SPURIOUSLY

"At 1805 on 4/25/2010, Surry Power Station (SPS) Operations department began receiving reports from individuals in Surry County that at least one Early Warning System (EWS) siren was sounding. A subsequent review has confirmed that, at a minimum, Siren # 18 spuriously sounded six times over a period of approximately 20 minutes. Station personnel contacted the Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), in addition to Surry County dispatch for confirmation. Surry County dispatch reported that a number of calls were received for a sounding EWS siren. Neither the Virginia State EOC nor SPS Security received an alarm indicating that the siren was spuriously sounding. The Virginia State EOC has notified its Public Information Officer of the spuriously sounding siren. All plant conditions/parameters are normal, and-no releases to the environment have occurred.

"The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified".

The emergency siren was on for approximately three hours before being locally disabled. There is still 100% coverage in the areas requiring siren notification.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45872
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PHIL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 01:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 20 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING AN NI CALIBRATION

"This is a 4 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an Automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (scram). At 2126 hours [CDT] on April 25, 2010, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped due to 2 of 4 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels tripped. At the time of the trip, reactor power, as indicated by heat balance, was ~20%, while excore Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) indicated ~30%. The RPS high reactor power trip setpoint was 50% power. An NI calibration initiated an automatic withdrawal command to the control rod drive system. The rod withdrawal, resulted in one RPS channel tripping on high reactor power and another RPS channel tripping on high reactor coolant system pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no safety systems, other than RPS, actuated. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No primary safety valves lifted. Seven secondary safety valves lifted and subsequently reseated. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.

"The NRC resident has been notified."

The licensee also informed the State of Arkansas and does not plan a press release.

The Unit 1 reactor trip was uncomplicated. Current means of decay heat removal is normal feedwater to the Steam Generators with steam discharge to the Main Condenser through Main Steam Bypass. The Main Generator was online at the time of the trip and the plant is currently in a normal post trip electrical line up. There is no indication of primary-secondary tube leakage. All systems functioned as required.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45873
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 14 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO HIGH TURBINE VIBRATIONS

"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual reactor scram due to rising vibrations on the #6 turbine bearing. A planned reactor shutdown was in progress with reactor power at 13.8% when turbine vibrations approached procedural limits which would require a manual scram of the reactor.

"The scram was uncomplicated; all control rods fully inserted. The reactor is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. Cooldown has been established to the condenser using main steam line drains. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

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