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Event Notification Report for February 9, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/05/2010 - 02/09/2010

** EVENT NUMBERS **


45581 45651 45675 45680 45681 45682 45683 45684 45686 45687 45689 45690

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45581
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MISTRAS GROUP INC.
Region: 4
City: KENT State: WA
County:
License #: WN-IR011-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KELEE ATTEBERY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/18/2009
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 12/15/2009
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following report was received via email:

"The department received a notification from a radiography company [on 12/16/09] located in Kent, Washington, about an event [that occurred] while performing radiographic operations in a fabrication shop in Sedro Wooley, Washington. A 2 inch pipe fell onto the source guide tube and the radiography crew was unable to retract their source past the damage. The crew called the company's Radiation Safety Officer who sent an assistant to the site with lead blankets. The assistant was able to normally retract the source through the damaged area and into the shielded safe storage position of the radiographic exposure device. The dose to the assistant RSO was reported as 480 mRem. No other individuals were reported to have received an elevated dose. A full report from the company's RSO will be made after they perform a reenactment of the incident."

WA Incident Number: WA-09-093
Source material: 80 Ci, Ir-192

* * * UPDATE FROM BRANDIN KETTER TO VINCE KLCO ON 2/8/10 AT 1857 VIA EMAIL* * *

"A full report was received from the company on 12/18/09. TLD's worn by the three individuals involved in the incident were processed the next day by Landauer. Two of these individuals were the radiography crew who were working with the equipment when the source failed to retract. Their doses were reported as 79 mRem and 261 mRem. It was also reported that most of this exposure could probably be attributed to the previous 14 and 1/2 days of radiography work. The third person receiving a dose from this incident was the assistant RSO. This person received a dose of 22 mRem. Three other people in the company who responded to the incident site were reported to have received no dose. The damaged equipment was tagged and taken out of service."

Notified R4DO (Jones) and FSME (Shaffer).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45651
Rep Org: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE)
Licensee: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE)
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR ROMANO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/23/2010
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
S. PANNIER (E-MAIL) (NRR)
J. THORP (E-MAIL) (NRR)
O.TABATABAI (E-MAIL) (NRO)

Event Text

CIRCUIT BREAKER CHARGING MOTOR CRANK DOES NOT MEET HARDNESS SPECIFICATIONS

The following information was received via facsimile:

"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with ABB P/N 716532C00 Motor Crank procured as a commercial grade item from Sims Machining, and dedicated by ABB from a production run of 105 pieces produced October 21, 2009. These motor cranks are used in K-Line electrically operated circuit breakers with Ryobi or Wuxi motors. The motor crank is attached to the end of an electric charging motor. When the motor rotates the crank moves the charging pawl assembly in a cyclical manner. The cyclical movement of the charging pawl assembly in turn works with the ratchet pawls and converts the rotational torque produced by the charging motor into linear spring displacement. The linear spring displacement is used to charge the closing springs in the breaker mechanism.

"Myers Control Power LLC notified ABB Florence on November 25, 2009 of a hardness test failure of motor cranks supplied by ABB for commercial applications. An evaluation was performed by ABB and noted that the required heat treatment process was not performed on a lot quantity of 105 motor cranks received October 24, 2009 from Sims Machining. Of the 105 non-heat treated motor cranks, 100 have been accounted for. Five K-Line circuit breakers procured from ABB between 10/24/2009 and 1/06/2010 may have non-heat treated motor cranks installed. Work process errors allowed non-heat treated motor cranks to be used in manufacture of K-Line circuit breakers. The motor crank is heat treated to prevent the premature wear of the crank as the roller on the crank turns around the output shaft during the charging cycle. The failure to heat treat the motor crank can cause the output shaft of the crank to wear. This will result in the misalignment of the spring charging components or ultimate failure of the spring charging system during the charging cycle, leading to the inability to close the breaker more than once.

"ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:

a. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers (to complete 1/31/2010).
b. Review historical procurement and inspection records associated with the subject part, vendor and similar machined parts requiring heat treatment. (Action complete - no previous heat treatment process errors identified for both commercial and safety-related applications.)
c. Follow-up with Sims Machining to determine how future incidents can be prevented and other actions warranted to prevent recurrence. (Action complete - Vendor requires certificate of heat treatment prior to sending to approved supplier for plating services.)
d. Remove all non-heat treated motor cranks from inventory and work in progress for rework. (Action complete - 99 of 105 affected motor cranks reworked and 1 motor crank maintained for life cycle testing resulting in 5 suspect motor cranks escaping facility.)
e. Revise inspection process instructions to ensure heat treatment is identified as a critical characteristic for verification (to complete by 1/25/2010).
f. A cycle test is being performed to determine level of premature wear due to non-heat treatment. Results expected to be complete by 1/31/2010.

"Given the large number of applications for the affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if premature failure of the motor crank occurs. Licensees are requested to evaluate the history of circuit breaker operating cycles to determine if the circuit breaker motor crank should be replaced immediately, or to perform the replacement at the next convenient maintenance opportunity."

The HOO spoke to the point of contact for ABB on this issue and determined that the only two reactor licensees likely to have one of these discrepant breakers are Palo Verde and Surry.

* * * UPDATE FROM VICTOR ROMANO TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1344 EST ON 2/5/10 * * *

"ABB has taken the following corrective actions:

"a. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers. (Action complete - notification letters sent 2-1-20 I0)

b. Review historical procurement and inspection records associated with the subject part, vendor and similar machined parts requiring heat treatment. (Action complete - no previous heat treatment process errors identified for both commercial and safety-related applications)
cycle testing resulting in 5 suspect motor cranks escaping facility)

e. Revise inspection process instructions to ensure heat treatment is identified as a critical characteristic for verification. (Action complete)

f. A cycle test is being performed to determine level of premature wear due to non-heat treatment. (Action complete)


"Mechanical life testing of two non-heat treated motor cranks for premature wear was completed. The first crank was measured prior to being installed on the breaker. The output shaft of the crank was measured and found to be 0.370/0.371 before the test began. The breaker was stopped and the crank was removed after 2500, 7500, 10,000 and 12,500 operations. The output shaft was measured and the threaded end of the crank that screws onto the output shaft of the motor was inspected. There was no measurable/noticeable wear in either location.

"The second crank was measured and installed on the breaker. The output shaft on the crank was measured and found to be 0.370/0.371 before the test began. The breaker was stopped and the crank was removed and measured after 2500,7500, 10,000, 12,500 and at 14,500 operations. No wear was measured during or after the test as a result of thee accumulated operations. The output shaft was measured and the threaded end of the crank that screws onto the output shaft of the motor was inspected. There was no measurable/noticeable wear in either location. After 10,000 operations, it was noted in both cases that the body of the crank showed signs of wear where it comes into contact with the charging assembly. This wear was present as a result of the lack of heat treatment.

"The wear that was documented during the testing of the motor cranks should not be detrimental to the operation of the breakers. Both of the motor cranks completed the number of mechanical life operations required for certification to the ANSI standard, 12,500. It is recommended that the cranks in question be replaced during the next scheduled availability for the customers affected by this issue."

Notified R4 DO (Vincent Gaddy), R2DO (David Ayers), Part 21 Group (email)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45675
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY HERZOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/03/2010
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2010
Event Time: 13:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 30 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN REQUIRED DUE TO CONTROL ROD OUT OF ALIGNMENT

"A shutdown of South Texas Project Unit 1 was initiated at 13:44 hours [CST] on February 3, 2010. When in Action b.2. of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.1, 'Moveable Control Assemblies Group Height,' a second control rod, B-12, in Shutdown Bank A was declared inoperable when the rod came out of alignment with the remainder of the rods within its bank. The second control rod came out of alignment during the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1.2; a surveillance to determine operability by movement of the rod.

"For the above condition, Action c. of TS 3.1.3.1 was entered. When the requirements of the action could not be met, South Texas Project Unit 1 entered TS 3.0.3. and a plant shutdown was initiated.

"Prior to initiation of this event, South Texas Project Unit 1 was in Action b.2 [of TS 3.1.3.1] with rod C-5 of Shutdown Bank D trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by Action a. The inoperable rod, C-5, was aligned within 12 steps of the remainder of the rods within its group and the rod sequence and insertion limits as specified in the Core Operating Limits Report were being maintained."

At the time of this report, South Texas Project Unit 1 was at 30% power and decreasing. The plant will enter Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, at approximately 1800 CST. Shutdown was initiated when rod B-12 could not be aligned within 12 steps of the remainder of rods within its bank as specified in Action c. of TS 3.1.3.1.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM BOB SCARBOROUGH TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2220 EST ON 2/03/10 * * *

"At 1730 [CST] during performance of the Unit 1 shutdown, control rod H-2 in Bank 1C inserted from 246 steps, as indicated by the digital rod-position indication system, to 234 steps indicated without a demand signal applied to the control bank. The group step counter remained at 249 steps with no other rods in Bank 1C indicating movement.

"The shutdown continued normally from that point. Control rod H-2 stepped with the rest on the rods in the bank down to zero steps. All control rods in Unit 1 are at zero steps. The shutdown rods are currently withdrawn."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).


* * * UPDATE FROM KEN TAPLETT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1700 EST ON 2/5/2010 * * *

"This update corrects information provided earlier at 2230 EST on February 3, 2010 after reviewing post shutdown data. During the performance of the Unit 1 shutdown, control rod H-2 in Bank 1C inserted upon demand, as indicated by the digital rod-position indication system, but did not withdraw upon demand, as indicated. This occurred when controlling Bank 1C between 249 and 242 steps by alternating insertion and withdrawal demand signals to control reactivity. At approximately 1731, the shutdown continued normally from that point. Control rod H-2 stepped in with the rest of the rods in the bank down to zero steps. All control rods and shutdown rods in Unit 1 were subsequently driven in to zero step position."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45680
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado
Region: 4
City:  State: CO
County:
License #: 032-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/04/2010
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2009
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE EXPOSURE INCIDENT

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On November 12, 2009, two Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) employees removed a fixed gauge (including the source and detector) that was mounted on a pipe to measure scrubber slurry flow. The detector was not working correctly and needed to be repaired. During the process, the employees left the shutter on the source open and received a radiation exposure. Removing the source from the pipe and leaving the shutter open are not allowed by company procedures or the radioactive materials license.

"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) was contacted about the November 12, 2009 incident by the PSCo Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) on November 12, 2009. At the time CDPHE was contacted it was believed that the shutter had been closed during the work and that there was no unplanned employee exposure. CDPHE was informed that PSCo employees would perform no further work on the source holder and that it was secured at the location where it was taken down. Also, any further work to reinstall the source would be performed by an NRC certified entity. Public Service Company of Colorado (License #032-01) is a specific licensee of the State of Colorado Agreement State Program.

"On January 29, 2010 while talking to the instrument and control technician employees that had performed the (November 12, 2009) gauge removal, the PSCo RSO learned that the shutter had in fact been open during the work, and the shutter was locked after the source was taken down from its operating location. This was the first time the employee working on the gauge had informed anyone about the shutter being open while the employees removed the detector. On the afternoon of January 29, 2010 the PSCo RSO notified CDPHE via email to provide initial notification of the potential radiation exposure incident.

"On February 4, 2010 the RSO for PSCo submitted additional information to CDPHE regarding the incident including exposure estimates for the employees involved. The licensee estimated that employee #1 received an exposure of approximately 25 mrem, while employee #2 received an exposure of approximately 0.9 mrem.

"The gauge involved in the incident was an Ohmart model SR-A, Source Holder Serial #2690CG, containing approximately 50 mCi (1.85 GBq) of Cs-137 (source mfg date is April 2002). The gauge was originally installed in the licensee's facility in October, 2002.

"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment has assigned incident number I10-02 to this incident and is continuing to investigate. The licensee (PSCo) has started an incident investigation to evaluate the incident and determine appropriate corrective actions."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45681
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: GEORGIA PACIFIC TOLEDO
Region: 4
City: TOLEDO State: OR
County:
License #: ORE-90708
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/04/2010
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2010
Event Time: 14:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAULTY SHUTTER ON FIXED GUAGE

Licensee, Georgia Pacific Toledo, notified the Agency [Oregon Department of Health and Radiation Protection] that the 6 month inspection on their K-Ray fixed gauge (model 7062B) revealed the shutter would not close correctly. The gauge was still able to perform it's function as a level indicator on a coal bin. Licensee called the manufacturer for repairs. Source is 50 mCi of Cs-137.

Incident Report # 10-0005

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Hospital Event Number: 45682
Rep Org: SINAI - GRACE HOSPITAL
Licensee: SINAI - GRACE HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: DETROIT State: MI
County:
License #: 21-00299-04
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM APPLEGATE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/05/2010
Notification Time: 21:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/05/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/05/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)
CNSC via Fax ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST I-125 MEDICAL IMPLANT SEEDS

While performing a medical procedure for treatment to a patient's prostate, several I-125 seeds were spilled onto the operating room floor. Using a Geiger counter, some seeds were recovered. However, five (5) seeds were not located.

The seeds had been calibrated today and each seed contained .336 milliCi of I-125. The seeds were sealed sources and no loose contamination was detected in the operating room.

The patient received the prescribed dose and post-procedure review of the patient determined that the lost seeds were not in the patient.

The Radiation Safety Officer is returning to the hospital to continue searching for the missing seeds.


* * * UPDATE FROM TIM APPLEGATE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2316 EST ON 2/5/2010 * * *

At this time the RSO has been able to locate four of the five missing seeds. He is planning on continuing his search until approximately midnight tonight.

Notified R3DO (Hills), FSME EO (Shaffer), and CNSC via Fax.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45683
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM DAUGHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/06/2010
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2010
Event Time: 09:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS

"At 0928 hours on February 6, 2010, 38 of 119 offsite sirens were determined to be unavailable primarily due to power outages from heavy snowfall. As of 1100 hours, 27 of 119 offsite sirens remained unavailable. Furthermore, 4 of the available sirens are currently on back-up battery power and are being monitored. Sirens will be recovered when power is restored.

"This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Beaver Valley Power Stations Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with required safety related equipment operable and no other equipment problems due to the adverse weather.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Per the licensee, the applicable county Emergency Management Agencies are aware of this situation and are prepared to implement alternate notification measures if needed.

* * * UPDATE FROM JIM DAUGHERTY TO DONG PARK AT 0829 EST ON 2/7/10 * * *

As of 0800 EST, power to 14 offsite sirens have been restored. 13 of 119 offsite sirens remained unavailable.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Jackson).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45684
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MARK HERSCHTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/08/2010
Notification Time: 05:33 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2010
Event Time: 00:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY SIREN SPURIOUS ACTUATION

"Emergency offsite siren, SC-11, in the City of San Clemente inadvertently activated for [approximately] 20 seconds. (Similar to 1/19/10 event) [EN #45636]

"Notification of California Office of Emergency Services and FEMA may occur."

The licensee is investigating the cause of the alarm. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 45686
Rep Org: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE)
Licensee: ABB INC. (MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE)
Region: 1
City: FLORENCE State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM CONLON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/08/2010
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2010
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
S. PANNIER (E-MAIL) (NRR)
J. THORP (E-MAIL) (NRR)
O. TABATABI (E-MAIL) (NRO)

Event Text

POTENTIAL FAILURE OF A BREAKER COMPONENT TO COMPLY WITH DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS

The following information was received via facsimile:

A breaker failed during operation at Plant Vogtle during operation. A failure analysis indicated that the resistors on the electronic board fail to an open circuit status. On January 14, 2010, a failure analysis indicated that the resistors fail to a short circuit status prior to failing open. In this failure mode, the internal temperature increases to a point where the plastic core melts and thereby can potentially block the operation of the internal plunger. In such a case, the breaker remains closed, but if the breaker is opened then a new closing command is not possible.

ABB is taking, or has taken, the following corrective actions:

A. As noted above, the only affected customer with a failed breaker is Southern Company's Nuclear Plant Vogtle, and ABB has discussed this issue with Southern Company. An interim report was issued on 1-18-2010.
B. As an interim solution, ABB will provide a standard close coil. This solution will be limited to applications that do not require the low impendence in the close coil for lamp applications.
C. An alternate solution is to add 'b' contact (normally closed) in series with the existing close coil.

While not having a history of failure, it is noted that similar breakers are used at Plant Hatch.

Given the large number of applications for the affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if a similar failure of the close coil occurs. As noted above, the failure has been limited to applications that require continuous close coil duty. No failures have been reported or produced in testing in applications with intermittent use of close coil duty. Licensees are requested to evaluate the application of affected breakers to determine priority of close coil replacement.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45687
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RAY SWAFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/08/2010
Notification Time: 18:52 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONFIRMED POSITIVE ALCOHOL TEST FOR A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 45689
Rep Org: AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Licensee: PHILIP SPORN PLANT
Region: 1
City: NEW HAVEN State: WV
County: MASON
License #: CL-655015-13
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERI MACKNIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2010
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
MARK SHAFFER (FSME)

Event Text

SHUTTER ON NUCLEAR GAUGE FAILED TO CLOSE

"Ash hopper nuclear level detector (NLD) on Unit 2 hoppers 9 and 13 (dual source) has its shutter failed in the open position. The gauge is a TN 5197, serial number B8031. The gauge manufacturer (Thermo Electron) had been notified and requested to assess and repair the gauge."

"Isotope: Cs-137
"Activity: 100 mCi"

No exposure to personnel occurred during this event and the detector is not easily accessible.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 45690
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MEIXELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2010
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO SOUTH CAROLINA DHEC CONCERNING TRITIUM FOUND IN GROUND WATER

"Event Description: Ground water monitoring wells were installed on the Oconee site and initially sampled in 2008 in support of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative (NEI 07-07). As part of an on-going investigation, a number of new monitoring wells have been installed and additional wells are in progress at Oconee. On February 8, 2010, Oconee was notified by the Duke Energy Environmental Lab that samples taken on January 26, 2010, from monitoring wells GM-7R and GM-7DR displayed tritium levels of 24,400 pCi/l and 35,400 pCi/l respectively, triggering the communication protocol of the NEI initiative. The threshold for initiating the communication protocol is 20,000 pCi/l. There is no public or plant worker risk associated with the GM-7R and GM-7DR well samples. Wells GM-7R and GM-7DR are not drinking water sources and therefore, there is no potential dose to the public or plant workers. Samples from surrounding monitoring wells indicate that tritium in ground water has not migrated off the plant site. Duke is continuing to investigate the source of tritium in wells GM-7R and GM-7DR. Tritium levels in samples from the remaining wells are below the communication protocol threshold. The licensee plans to notify the South Carolina DHEC state officials and local stakeholders of the sample results.

"Initial Safety Significance: There is no safety significance due to the tritium identified in ground water at Oconee. The subject wells are not drinking water sources, and there is no indication tritium has migrated off the Oconee site in the ground water.

"Corrective Action(s): The source of tritium in the ground water at Oconee is not understood at this time. Duke is continuing an investigation to identify the source and implement a corrective action plan."

The licensee will issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012