| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/29/2009 - 09/30/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45381 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: FORT COLLINS State: CO
County:
License #: 002-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES JARVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/24/2009
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2009
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
LANCE ENGLISH (EMAIL (ILTA)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received from the state via facsimile:
"On September 21, 2009 the Radiation Safety Officer for a Colorado Licensee - Colorado State University (CSU), provided verbal notification of a past error in its inventory of unsealed radioactive materials used in one of its laboratories on campus. The specific laboratory had been using unsealed radioactive materials since the 1980's and accumulated numerous containers of improperly characterized and labeled waste materials. The licensee followed up the verbal report with a written report dated September 18, 2009 that was received via fax by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment on September 22, 2009. Colorado State University is a broad scope non-human use research licensee and has approximately 150 labs using unsealed radioactive materials. The reported inventory discrepancy applies to only one of these labs.
"In accordance with Section 4.51.1.2 (equivalent to 10 CFR 20.2201) of the Colorado Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Radiation Control, within 30 days the licensee is required to report to the Colorado Department of Public and Health and Environment (CDPHE) any lost, stolen, or missing radioactive materials exceeding 10 times the Appendix 4C (equivalent to 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix C) quantities.
"Following completion of an in-depth, multi-year radioactive materials inventory review that was first initiated in 1997, re-established in 2004, and ultimately concluded in August 2009, CSU reported an inventory discrepancy of radioactive materials in one of its laboratories. The inventory review consisted of evaluation of thousands of records, and collection and analysis of greater than 1000 samples from greater than 700 vials, test tubes, and bottles of unknown substances potentially containing radioactive materials that had accumulated over many years in the specific laboratory. Upon completion of the data and inventory review in August 2009, the licensee reported that it could not account for approximately 24 milliCi of H3 (tritium), based upon an accounting evaluation of incoming radioactive materials and outgoing radioactive materials (disposal records). The licensee however, believes that the radioactive material was in fact disposed of properly with other waste materials, but cannot necessarily provide the records to demonstrate this. The licensee has stated that they do not believe the radioactive materials have been stolen, but rather the discrepancy is attributed to poor inventory and waste disposal records by the laboratory personnel over many years and personnel changes."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 45382 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BETABATT
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: L-05961
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/25/2009
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2009
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SEALED SOURCE OF TRITIUM
"On September 1, 2009, the Agency [Texas DEH] received a call from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control notifying them that during a routine inspection of a facility in Florida, they found tritium contamination on and outside of a container that contained a prototype tritium battery sent to them by a company in Alvin, Texas. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at the Texas facility was contacted by the this Agency. The RSO stated that the facility had shipped two of the six batteries they had made from their facility to Florida. He stated that they had not had contamination issues in the past with these batteries and he believed the contamination event was caused by the testing facility when they opened the outer battery housing to determine the cause of a failure. He stated that they had not experienced any significant contamination issues at their facility.
"On September 18, 2009, in response to additional information provided by the State of Florida, an Agency [Texas DEH] inspector conducted an onsite investigation at the facility in Alvin. The inspector performed a removable contamination survey in the area where the batteries are handled and stored. During his investigation of the event, the inspector learned that the seven batteries were manufactured in a city outside of the State of Texas. One was shipped to the facility in Florida directly, and six were shipped to the facility in Alvin, Texas.
"On September 24, 2009, the Agency [Texas DEH] received notification that the results of the tritium survey done at the facility indicated all swipes exceeded the limit for unrestricted use. The Agency [Texas DEH] contacted the licensee and informed the licensee of their results. Documents regarding previous radiological surveys for the battery storage area, leak test of the 3D diodes, receipt survey on the six 3D diodes that were sent from the manufacturer, and any Bioassays that have been performed on their staff were requested from the licensee.
"On September 25, 2009, at 12:45 PM (local) the Agency [Texas DEH] was notified by the licensee that the area had been isolated and that decontamination work would go on for an undetermined period of time. The licensee has begun providing the requested information. Updates will be provided as additional pertinent information is obtained."
Texas Incident #I-8668.
See also Event Notification #45358 for the notification made by the State of Florida on the same event. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45388 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM VENABLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 11:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LOSS OF WATER FROM UPPER REFUEL POOL
"On 9/29/2009, at 1127 hours, with the plant in Mode 5, Refuel, upper pool filled for refuel activities, and no fuel handling or control rod movement activities in progress, River Bend Station operators manually started Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Charlie to facilitate filling of the upper pool. This action was necessary to offset a loss of upper pool water through a main steam line and into the drywell. Approximately 5000 gallons of water drained from the upper pool into the drywell. Initial investigation found that the leakage was past a partially de-flated main steam line plug, through Safety Relief Valve flanges, which were not fully torqued at the time. The steam line plug became deflated during ECCS testing when service air isolated to containment. The service air system provides a backup to the mechanical seal. The drywell was evacuated and actions were initiated to close containment. The steam line plug was re-inflated which stopped leakage to the main steam line and drywell. At no time during the event was River Bend Station out of compliance with Technical Specification requirements for the upper pool. River Bend personnel are performing further investigations into the cause of the event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45389 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING RESPONSES
"At 15:09 CDT, today the Technical Support Center ventilation system stopped running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is suspected to be an interlock between the fire detection system and the ventilation unit. The cause of the this condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45390 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 09/29/2009
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 18:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 53 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE FROM RCS
"At 1850 hours CDT, operators initiated a plant shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.4.5, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Operational Leakage, due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hours in MODE 1.
"At 1544 hours CDT, a control room operator noticed drywell pressure increased from 0.68 to 0.81 psig. At 1552, the drywell cooler differential temperature alarm actuated, drywell cooling HVAC chiller amps increased from 50 amps to 56 amps, and the Fission Product Monitor particulate and iodine indications were trending up. At 1555, operators entered the abnormal coolant leakage procedure and evacuated containment. At 1615, drywell floor drain leakage rate alarm actuated. At 1616, plant entered the 4-hour Technical Specification action to verify the source of the unidentified leakage source is not due to service sensitive type 304 or type 316 austenitic stainless steel.
"At 1730, operators started a power reduction in an attempt to verify the source of the leak. At 1850, the leakage source could not be verified to not be service sensitive stainless steel; entered TS Required Action to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. A reactor shutdown has been initiated. At 1930 floor drain leakage (unidentified leakage) was 3.3 gpm and stable. MODE 3 is expected to be entered by 0350 hours on 9/30/09."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45391 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2009
Event Time: 23:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text UNIT 2 MANUALLY SCRAMMED AFTER TRIP OF AN OPERATING CONDENSATE PUMP AND RAPIDLY LOWERING RVWL
"On 9/29/09, at 2323 [hours] Unit 2 was manually scrammed due to loss of one of the remaining two Condensate Booster Pumps due to low pump suction pressure. The cause for the Condensate Booster Pump low suction pressures is unknown at this time, but is under investigation. The operating crew was removing feedwater pump 2B from service when the condensate booster pump tripped. The condensate booster pump 2C was already out of service to support maintenance. After the reactor was scrammed manually, reactor water level lowered below the automatic scram set point (+2 inches) and below the automatic start for HPCI and RCIC (-45 inches). All expected Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation valves operated as required, isolation groups 2, 3, 6 and 8 were actuated. Both reactor recirculation pumps tripped due to the low reactor water level. HPCI and RCIC actuated as expected to restore reactor water level. Reactor pressure control was maintained on the turbine bypass valves, and no Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) were opened as a result of the transient.
"At this time the unit is stable in mode 3. Reactor water level is being controlled using one Reactor Feedwater pump. HPCI and RCIC have been returned to standby readiness. Reactor pressure is being automatically maintained by the main turbine bypass valves.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) (ECCS discharge to the reactor and Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation) and as an 8 hour non-emergency report due to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) (specified system actuations)."
Lowest observed Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was -50 inches. Following actuation of HPCI level recovered to +51 inches and then returned to the normal operating band of +33 inches. Safety-related equipment out-of-service prior to the scram included Core Spray Loop 1. All control rods fully inserted. Unit 2 is in a normal post scram electrical lineup.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan a press release. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45392 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF TODD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/30/2009
Notification Time: 04:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2009
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION FROM A SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY TEST SIGNAL
"On Sunday September 20, 2009 @ 1800 hrs EDT the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 was in Mode 5 and performing testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation. A jumper was installed per operations procedure 14238-1 for this testing. The jumper was inadvertently dislodged resulting in a B Train Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). There was not a valid radiation alarm signal present; only a test signal. Per Technical Specification 3.3.8 this function is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The actuation occurred during a maintenance activity and was not from a valid signal.
"This is reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) based on the following: Per 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid and: (i) Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii) Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.'
"The event occurred during a surveillance activity and resulted in an invalid actuation from a test signal. The actuation was invalid and the system was not removed from service during this activity. The actuation was considered complete and successful. The CVI signal for Train B automatically isolated the containment ventilation system as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |