| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/02/2009 - 09/03/2009 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 45309 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NUCLEAR SOURCE AND SERVICES INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L02991
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 08/28/2009
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/28/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION IN AN UNCONTROLLED AREA
"On August 28, 2009, the [State] Agency was notified by the licensee that while performing radiological surveys in response to a shipping event, access to an area of their facility not normally controlled for radiological reasons was isolated due to the presence of radioactive contamination. The licensee believes that the radionuclide involved is Curium (Cm) - 244. The licensee is continuing their investigation and cleanup activities. The [State] Agency will provide updates when available."
Texas report # I-8661
* * * UPDATE ON 09/02/09 AT 1436 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO TEAL * * *
"NSSI became aware of our contamination problem as a result of the shipment of an empty transport container in support of the DOE Offsite Source Recovery Program (OSRP) which operates from Los Alamos. The NSSI facility is used by OSRP as the primary consolidation facility for the Program.
"NSSI shipped an empty 30 gallon 6M transport container to Penn State University at University Park, PA on August 20, 2009 by [a delivery company]. An attempt was made by the [delivery company] to deliver the package on August 24, but it was refused. The drum was accepted the morning of August 25, 2009.
"On receipt, contamination was noted on the lid with another spot on the pallet and on the banding holding the drum to the pallet. OSRP personnel were at the site and confirmed the contamination. [The delivery company] was also notified and arrangements were made to survey the delivering vehicle. No contamination was found on the truck.
"NSSI was notified midday and began to make measurements to determine if the contamination could be from the NSSI facility or whether it occurred during transit. NSSI tracked the drum back to its origination point in the NSSI facility and was able to confirm that the area immediately surrounding where the drum had been stored was contaminated. Further surveys and wipes showed activity across the storage area floor. Trace contamination was also found on the pallet banding equipment and on the OSRP source inspection and documentation table. Other spots of low contamination were found on a fork lift and a drum cart that was used to move the transport container that went to Pennsylvania. These areas were decontaminated so the equipment could be utilized.
"As the radionuclide has not yet been identified, decontamination is being limited to small spots on the concrete outside the Longhorn building and on equipment or shields that may have been removed from the contaminated area.
"NSSI has decided to delay any decontamination activities pending identification of the nuclide. Time will be required to get air sampling set up and operating and to coordinate with the decontamination personnel.
"At the moment, the radionuclide, quantity, and physical/chemical form involved has not been specifically identified. Surveys tell us the radioactive material is an alpha emitter. Gamma spectrum tells us that the nuclide is not Am-241. Long term gamma spectrum counts of wipes collected also tend to indicate the absence of Pu-238 and Pu-239 as there is always some Am-241 present with these nuclides. Liquid scintillation identifies the alpha energy as being higher than the 5.4-5.5 MeV from Am-241, the 5.4-5.5 MeV for Pu-238 and the 5.1-5.2 for Pu-239. Polonium 210 would also appear to be excluded as it's alpha energy is only 5.3 MeV. In addition, NSSI handles almost no Po-210. At this time, the primary suspect at this time is Curium-244 which has an alpha energy of 5.7-5.8 MeV. We do expect to have nuclide confirmation within a few days as the State of PA and Los Alamos both have samples for evaluation.
"At this point, we do not have any indication of personnel radiation exposure. We will be talking with Los Alamos internal dose assessment people early next week.
"Until we have nuclide information and further evaluate the contamination present in the restricted area, the involved area will remain closed to all NSSI personnel. NSSI is currently in the process of contacting the decontamination experts that assisted NSSI several years ago with an Am-241 contamination incident. We expect to be ready to start the decontamination process within the next 2-3 weeks."
See also EN #45321 for the Pennsylvania report on the same event.
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and FSME (McIntosh). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45323 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: THOMAS TANGUAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/02/2009
Notification Time: 19:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/02/2009
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SPDS COMPUTER
"This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' An example of a major loss of emergency assessment capability is when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) computer is unavailable for greater than eight hours.
"At 0830 EDT on Wednesday, September 02, 2009 the SPDS Computer was found by the computer department to have one of three interface modules failed. The interface module transports data from the radwaste computer to SPDS. The failure resulted in a loss of 187 SPDS points.
"All other SPDS points along with Plant Process Computer functions are available. Information Technology Department personnel are investigating the cause of the interface module failure, which is currently unknown.
"No other control room emergency assessment capabilities have been adversely affected. All Control Room panel indicators and annunciators are responding properly."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 45324 | Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/03/2009
Notification Time: 09:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2009
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2009 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ELECTRICAL SHORT CIRCUIT RESULTED IN PARTIAL HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION
"This event is being reported via a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In this case, the telephone report is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"During a maintenance activity to replace an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) relay, one of the two High Pressure Injection (HPI) valves (MU-V-16C) in the 'B' train partially opened. The HPI system consists of the 'A' and 'B' trains, with each train containing two HPI valves. The cause of the partial opening of the HPI valve was inadvertent contact with adjacent energized circuits during the replacement of the ESAS relay. This resulted in a momentary short circuit, which bypassed the normal actuation logic, causing the HPI valve to open approximately 0.17 inches before blowing the control power fuse that stopped the valve movement. The event resulted in the inadvertent transfer of approximately 1000 gallons of water from the Make-up Tank into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), before the valve could be restored to the closed position. No other valves or components actuated as a result of the inadvertent short circuit. RCS volume and pressure were stabilized and returned to normal.
"The 'B' HPI train had been declared inoperable and the unit entered a 72 hour LCO at 1:03 AM on 7/10/2009 due to configuration requirements needed for the planned ESAS relay replacement. The inadvertent partial 'B' train HPI did not impact the 'A' HPI train, and the unit remained at full power during this event. Following troubleshooting and replacement of the control power fuse, MU-V-16C was tested and restored to OPERABLE at 4:59 AM on 7/11/2009.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | |