United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2009 > April 2

Event Notification Report for April 2, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/01/2009 - 04/02/2009

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44851 44948 44950 44951 44952

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 44851
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: SHANNON SHEA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/13/2009
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/13/2009
Event Time: 15:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
TONY McMURTRAY (IRD)
MARYANNE DOYLE (DHS)
DENNIS VIA (FEMA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT - ENGINEERING ANALYSIS REQUIRES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN

"On February 13, 2009 at 1526 CST, Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notification of Unusual Event [NOUE] based upon EAL 4.2 - Both Diesel Generators NOT Operable. The station has entered Technical Specification 2.0.1(1) requiring the Unit to be placed in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.

"The cause of the NOUE is a potential common mode failure of the diesel generators. Design Engineering has identified an unanalyzed condition in which a High Energy Line Break in Room 81, Main Steam Lines Containment Penetration Room, or an auxiliary steam leak in Room 82, Turbine Building Ventilation Room, can potentially result in water entering both diesel generator rooms through the floor of Room 82 located directly above the diesel rooms, Rooms 63 and 64. This condition presents a potential common mode failure of the diesel generators due to loss of diesel generator auxiliaries from a single failure. The possibility of water leaking into Rooms 63, 64 and the Switchgear rooms prompted this declaration."

Compensatory measures to exit the NOUE will be to remove auxiliary steam from room 82 and blockading shut the door between rooms 81 and 82. These actions are expected to be completed within one to three hours.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1928 ON 2/13/2009 FROM SCOTT EIDEM TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

At 1828 CST, Fort Calhoun Station exited the Notification of Unusual Event. Both Diesel Generators were declared operable based upon establishing compensatory measures. Diesel 2 was confirmed operable by running in accordance with approved procedures. Diesel 1 was successfully run on February 11, 2009 per a monthly surveillance tests. No additional water intrusion had occurred into the diesel 1 room since completion of the surveillance test. Compensatory measures to prevent water intrusion into Room 82 include isolating auxiliary steam to room 82 to eliminate a source of water to room 82, installing a temporary barrier at the door between rooms 81 and 82 to prevent water from flowing from room 81 to room 82, should an HELB occur in room 81, and to open the door between room 81 and the turbine building to allow water to flow out of room 81 so as not to flow into room 82. Technical Specification 2.0.1 has been exited as of time 1828 CST."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Miller), IRD (McDermott, McMurtray), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Via).

* * * UPDATE AT 1539 EDT ON 4/1/2009 FROM ERICK MATZKE TO DONG PARK * * *

"This is a retraction [of the report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition]

"Fort Calhoun has performed a detailed evaluation of water intrusion through cracks in the floor of room 82 above the emergency diesel generators, as identified in part in the notification of 2/13/2009. This evaluation determined that no common mode failure mechanism existed and that the diesel generators were capable of performing their design safety functions."

The licensee informed the Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Rick Deese).

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 44948
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NORA GRANETO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 00:10 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2009
Event Time: 18:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

VALID DIESEL START SIGNAL RECEIVED DURING MAINTENANCE TESTING OF DIESEL

"A valid actuation of the D23 Emergency Diesel Generator bus undervoltage minimum actuation logic occurred following manual operator action to mitigate a bus overvoltage condition during emergency diesel generator post maintenance testing . Due to the output breaker being opened, the D23 EDG experienced a undervoltage start signal. EDG undervoltage actuation instrumentation actuated, however, the EDG was in PTL (Pull-to-Lock) EDG shutdown. The event was caused by a failure of the emergency diesel generator voltage regulator most likely due to an intermittent failure of the #1 rectifier bank."

The licensee stated that the D23 EDG was powering an isolated safety related bus for a post-maintenance test when the overvoltage condition occurred. The operator opened the EDG output breaker and placed the EDG in PTL. With the bus de-energized, a valid start signal was sent to EDG D23. However, EDG D23 did not actually start because it was in PTL. No safety related equipment was lost when the bus was de-energized because the bus had been unloaded prior to the test.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Hospital Event Number: 44950
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: VA TENNESSEE VALLEY HEALTHCARE
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2009
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOSS OF 30 MILLICURIES OF TECHNICIUM-99m

"A loss of permitted material by VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System at Nashville, Tennessee, occurred on March 16, 2009. The loss involved a unit dosage of 30 millicuries of Technicium-99m, in the form of a liquid radiopharmaceutical used for cardiac stress tests. Efforts were undertaken to find the lost dosage but were unsuccessful.

"As corrective action, the permittee (VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System) has performed an in-service on the security of radioactive materials with its nuclear medicine technologists. The in-service emphasized that radioactive materials must be controlled through direct supervision/attention or be locked in a secure area at all times."

VA Tennessee Valley Healthcare System Permit No. 41-00104-04


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 44951
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KING
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE/LOCAL AGENCIES REGARDING TRITIUM RELEASE ONSITE

"On April 1, 2009, the results of an ongoing hydrology study being conducted by Harris Nuclear Plant as part of the voluntary Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative revealed that a pipe leak in the buried Cooling Tower Blowdown line was releasing water containing tritium into surrounding soil. The maximum tritium activity level discovered was 2,120 pCi/L, well below maximum levels allowed by regulation. While the leak rate has not been determined, it appears to be small. The Cooling Tower Blowdown line is used for liquid effluent dilution as part of permitted, routine releases. The permitted liquid effluent release point is the discharge from the Cooling Tower Blowdown line into Harris Lake. This line is leaking upstream of the permitted release point. All leaking water is contained within the site boundary, and based on studies performed by an independent hydrologist, offsite migration is not anticipated.

"Immediate corrective actions include voluntary notifications, installation of additional monitoring wells at various locations to determine groundwater flow and to check for the presence of tritium. The water containing low levels of tritium is in a localized area immediately surrounding the Cooling Tower Blowdown line.

"The health and safety of the public are not affected by this event, as the activity levels discovered are significantly below maximum levels allowed by regulation. Harris Nuclear Plant is following the guidance contained in NEI 07-07 and has initiated this Event Notification as a result of our voluntary communication to State agencies in accordance with the Groundwater Protection Initiative."

The licensee informed the State of North Carolina (Division of Radiation Protection and Department of Water Quality) and the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also inform local agencies.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 44952
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: NOEL PITONIAK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/01/2009
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2009
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 92 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

UNPLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

"At 1805, due to lowering Condenser Vacuum caused by ingress of algae and seaweed, Unit 2 was manually tripped. Power had been reduced to 94% for the securing of one Circulating Water Pump (2A1). It was then identified that 2A2 Circulating Water Debris filter differential pressure was above administrative limits of 200 inches water. While the station was making preparations to reduce Circulating water flow on the 2A2 Circulating Water Pump, the unit began losing condenser vacuum. Plant was manually tripped at 92% power. All CEA's fully inserted on the trip. Auxiliary Feedwater automatically initiated on Low Steam Generator Level. No PZR PORVS opened. RCS Heat removal is now being maintained with Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass control system. All systems functioned normally, and plant is stabilized at normal operating Temperature and Pressure. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) due to PWR auxiliary feedwater system actuation."

There was no impact on Unit 1.

The licensee informed the Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012