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Event Notification Report for September 26, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/25/2008 - 09/26/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44510 44511 44512 44517 44519 44521

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44510
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: TYCO HEALTH CARE GROUP
Region: 4
City: NORFOLK State: NE
County:
License #: 07-02-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRYAN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/22/2008
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SMOKE DETECTOR FAILED TO OPERATE PROPERLY

Licensee was testing the smoke detector outside the vault that houses the irradiator. The detector failed to operate. The irradiator (1645 kCi of Co-60) was not in operation at the time of the test. This is being reported under 10 CFR 30.50 (b)(2).

NE Report # NE080009

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44511
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: FAGEN, INC.
Region: 4
City: GRANITE FALLS State: NE
County:
License #: GL0685
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/22/2008
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/03/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

"Fagen Inc. built the bioenergy facility in Ord, NE. Fagen Inc. purchased a number of tritium exit signs for the facility. After the facility was built, Fagan Inc. turned the facility over to VeraSun. VeraSun did an inventory [on 01/03/08] of the signs in the facility and discovered a missing sign (SRB Technologies, Model BX-20BK, Serial #C056713) [contains 20 curies of tritium].

"VeraSun contacted Fagen Inc. concerning the missing exit sign. Fagen contacted the supplier and other sites that Fagen had done work at. They have not been able to locate the sign. Fagen has discontinued using tritium exit signs in facilities they construct."

NE Item Number: NE080007

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44512
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: FAGEN, INC.
Region: 4
City: GRANITE FALLS State: NE
County:
License #: GL0693
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/22/2008
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
RICHARD TURTIL (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

"Fagen Inc. built the bioenergy facility in Fairmont, [NE]. Fagen Inc. purchased a number of tritium exit signs for the facility. After the facility was built, Fagan Inc. turned the facility over to Advance BioEnergy. Advance BioEngery did an inventory of the signs in the facility [on 03/28/08] and discovered a missing sign (SRB Technologies, Model BX020BK, Serial #C061355) [contains 17.5 curies of tritium].

"Advance BioEnergy contacted Fagen Inc. concerning the missing exit sign. Fagen contacted the supplier and, other sites that Fagen had done work at. They have not been able to locate the sign. Fagen has discontinued using tritium exit signs in facilities they construct.

Item Number: NE080008

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44517
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM SCHENK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/25/2008
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DUE TO A POWER FAILURE

"On July 31, 2008, at 7:30 p.m. CDT, power was lost on the reactor protection system (RPS) bus A. The plant was operating at 100 percent power at the time. The loss of RPS bus A interrupted power to the containment isolation actuation circuitry. This caused the Division 1 containment isolation valves in various balance-of-plant systems to automatically close, as designed. Plant operators implemented recovery procedures to shift RPS A to its alternate power supply, and restore the systems affected by the isolation to service. The containment isolation valves were confirmed to have actuated as required. Plant capacity was not interrupted by the containment isolation signal.

"The normal power supply for each RPS bus is a dedicated motor-generator set. The output of that generator is routed to the bus via two Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers arranged in series. Each EPA breaker has an internal power supply supporting the various trip functions designed into the breaker. Troubleshooting activities determined that the power supply in the upstream EPA breaker between the motor-generator set and the A RPS bus had failed, causing the undervoltage function of that EPA to actuate. The cause of the failure of the power supply has not been determined. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of the division 1 containment isolation actuation system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44519
Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT INC
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT INC
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 02-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES SCHUH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/25/2008
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
REBECCA TADESSE (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

IODINE-131 CAPSULE IN SHIELDED CONTAINER MISSING DURING SHIPMENT

Mallinckrodt reports that four Iodine-131 capsules were packaged and shipped to a consignee in Panama City, Panama on September 20, 2008. Each of the four capsules contained 18.7 millicuries of I-131 and were package separately in approximately 20 lb shielded containers. The shipment departed on a flight from St. Louis Airport which arrived in Miami, Florida at which point the packages were transferred to another flight that departed Miami and arrived at Panama City at approximately 1900 EDT on September 20, 2008. The tracking Airway Bill for the shipment indicates that only 3 of the 4 capsule packages arrived at Panama City. The licensee has requested a trace on the missing package. In addition, the airlines warehouses in St. Louis, Miami, and Panama City have been searched. The licensee is also pursuing a search of the customs warehouse in Panama City.

At this time, the licensee considers that one of the I-131 capsules is missing in shipment. There is minimal risk to the public as long as the capsule remains in the shielded container. The short half-life of the I-131 would put the current content of the capsule at about 11 millicuries. The licensee continues to work with the shipping airline to attempt to locate the package.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44521
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
                   FABRICATION & SCRAP
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: ALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/25/2008
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2008
Event Time: 07:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF THE DISCOVERY THAT A SPARK ARRESTOR FOR HEPA FILTER FIRE CONTROL WAS NOT INSTALLED

Event Description
"At 0720 hours on 9/25/2008, the Engineer responsible for the HVAC system informed a member of the EHS&L ISA Staff that the K-3 ventilation system did not have one of the two required wire-mesh spark arrestors, which we believe had never been installed.

Safety Significance
"The safety significance of this condition is low. The missing wire-mesh spark arrestor is one of the components of IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] 4530, which is one of two IROFS associated with an intermediate consequence environmental release as defined in 10CFR 70.61. The initiating event for this accident sequence includes failure of IROFS 4502 (control of combustible material and ignition sources) and a resulting fire that destroys a primary HEPA filter. This initiating event is listed as a 100-year event in the facility ISA. IROFS 4530 is expected to prevent a significant radiological release if the initiating event, a small fire that destroys a primary filter, occurs thereby challenging the integrity of the final bank of HEPA filters. The components of IROFS 4530 include HEPA filters which meet the resistance to heated air and spot flame resistance requirements of sections FC-5150 and 5160 respectively of ASME AG-1, and wire-mesh spark arrestors between the primary and final HEPA filters.

"ASME AG-1 section FC-5150 requires filters meeting this design criterion to be exposed to air heated to 700 +/- 50 degrees for not less than 5 minutes without catching fire. Section FC-5160 requires filters meeting this design criterion to have the frame, filter media, filter pack, and sealing materials exposed to a 2.5 inch blue flame (1750 +/- 50 degrees F) for not less than 5 minutes without sustaining combustion.

"In addition, if these IROFS are not available to perform their function, the enabling condition needed for an intermediate environmental consequence event is more than a total of 116 kg of uranium be present in the primary and final HEPA filters involved in the postulated fire. The uranium is conservatively assumed to be relatively higher activity blended low-enriched uranium (BLEU), i.e. high enriched uranium blended down to 5% 235U or less. The likelihood of all the uranium on the filters being BLEU material is low.

"Since 1995, primary HEPA filters in the K-3 system have been replaced over 1,600 times. Of these, only 6 have contained more than 2 kg of U. The highest contained about 2.7 kg.

Immediate Corrective Actions
"The differential pressures of the HEPA filters in the K-3 system were verified to be in acceptable ranges, indicating normal loading.

"A fire-watch was instituted to further limit potential ignition sources and to assure minimal amounts of combustible materials are used near, or in areas serviced by, the K-3 system.

"Wire-mesh to be used in fabricating a spark arrestor has been ordered for expedited installation.

Planned Actions
"A wire-mesh spark arrestor is expected to be installed Saturday, October 4."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012