Event Notification Report for August 22, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/21/2008 - 08/22/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44437
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: POUL CHRISTIANSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: POUL CHRISTIANSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/22/2008
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2008
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2008
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2008
Event Time: 16:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2)
STEVE ROSE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO HYDRAZINE SPILL
"At 1620 EDT, the following off-site agencies were notified of approximately 1.8 gallons of 35 weight-percent Hydrazine spillage into the storm drain system: National Response Center, State Emergency Response Commission, and Florida Department of Environmental Protection. The storm drain system discharges to an on-site settling pond. The amount of Hydrazine spilled was greater than the reportable quantity of 0.34 gallons of 35 weight-percent hydrazine. The leak has been identified and stopped, area has been cleaned. Notification due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), due to notification of off-site agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1620 EDT, the following off-site agencies were notified of approximately 1.8 gallons of 35 weight-percent Hydrazine spillage into the storm drain system: National Response Center, State Emergency Response Commission, and Florida Department of Environmental Protection. The storm drain system discharges to an on-site settling pond. The amount of Hydrazine spilled was greater than the reportable quantity of 0.34 gallons of 35 weight-percent hydrazine. The leak has been identified and stopped, area has been cleaned. Notification due to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), due to notification of off-site agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44434
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: State: MN
County:
License #: 1082-102-27
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JURAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: State: MN
County:
License #: 1082-102-27
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JURAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/22/2008
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2008
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/22/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED FROM RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was received from the State of Minnesota via email:
"Licensee was performing radiography on steam pipes in a bunker under the road (temporary jobsite). The bunker is accessed by two manholes in the street. At approximately 10:40 a.m. on 8/21/08 the licensee had a disconnect. The assistant under the supervision of the radiographer was cranking the source in, but did not feel it lock into place. The radiographer used the survey meter while the assistant cranked in and out. The readings on the survey meter did not change so they knew they had a disconnect and called the RSO.
"The RSO was notified at approximately 11:00 a.m. The RSO and another employee (former RSO) went to the scene. When they arrived onsite the readings at the manhole entrances were 80 mR/hr and 150 mR/hr, a couple of feet to the sides was background. The radiographer had roped off the area around the manhole entrances and the roped area was maintained until the RSO arrived on-site.
"The RSO, former RSO, and radiographer used telescopic poles to manipulate the camera, and guide tube into a position where the could lower bags filled with lead shot to shield the source. They were then able to enter the bunker and use a 'fishing' cable run through the camera and guide tube to grab the source. They exited the bunker and pulled the 'fishing' cable back until the source locked into the camera.
"The RSO and other employee were wearing dosimeters, direct reading dosimeters (DRDs), and alarming rate meters. At the end of the retrieval the RSO and former RSO had reading on there DRDs of 30 - 35 mR each. The radiographer had a reading on his DRD of 25 mR.
"In looking at the pig tail after the incident, the licensee thinks there is a faulty pig tail connection. The connection between the drive cable and pig tail needed to be forced to get connected, but once connected 'felt sloppy.' The licensee contacted the manufacturer and will be returning the source and cables to the manufacturer for investigation."
"Camera: QSA 660B"
"Source: QSA 424-9, Ir-192, 142 Ci"
The following information was received from the State of Minnesota via email:
"Licensee was performing radiography on steam pipes in a bunker under the road (temporary jobsite). The bunker is accessed by two manholes in the street. At approximately 10:40 a.m. on 8/21/08 the licensee had a disconnect. The assistant under the supervision of the radiographer was cranking the source in, but did not feel it lock into place. The radiographer used the survey meter while the assistant cranked in and out. The readings on the survey meter did not change so they knew they had a disconnect and called the RSO.
"The RSO was notified at approximately 11:00 a.m. The RSO and another employee (former RSO) went to the scene. When they arrived onsite the readings at the manhole entrances were 80 mR/hr and 150 mR/hr, a couple of feet to the sides was background. The radiographer had roped off the area around the manhole entrances and the roped area was maintained until the RSO arrived on-site.
"The RSO, former RSO, and radiographer used telescopic poles to manipulate the camera, and guide tube into a position where the could lower bags filled with lead shot to shield the source. They were then able to enter the bunker and use a 'fishing' cable run through the camera and guide tube to grab the source. They exited the bunker and pulled the 'fishing' cable back until the source locked into the camera.
"The RSO and other employee were wearing dosimeters, direct reading dosimeters (DRDs), and alarming rate meters. At the end of the retrieval the RSO and former RSO had reading on there DRDs of 30 - 35 mR each. The radiographer had a reading on his DRD of 25 mR.
"In looking at the pig tail after the incident, the licensee thinks there is a faulty pig tail connection. The connection between the drive cable and pig tail needed to be forced to get connected, but once connected 'felt sloppy.' The licensee contacted the manufacturer and will be returning the source and cables to the manufacturer for investigation."
"Camera: QSA 660B"
"Source: QSA 424-9, Ir-192, 142 Ci"