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Event Notification Report for April 28, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/25/2008 - 04/28/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


44113 44156 44165 44166 44168 44169 44170 44171 44172

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44113
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TIGUE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: GLENWOOD State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0867
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/01/2008
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Arkansas via email (quotations omitted for readability):

The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, is reporting that one of their licensees, Tigue Construction Company, Inc., has a Troxler moisture/density gauge that is stolen/missing from a pickup truck some time during the day in or near Brinkley, Arkansas. The licensee became aware of the missing gauge at 15:30 on March 31, 2008 after loading the gauge in the truck at the office in Glenwood, Arkansas that morning. The licensee has stated that the gauge, transport case and chains are missing. The licensee made one stop in Little Rock and observed that gauge in the truck during that stop. The licensee has filed a police report with the Brinkley Police Department.

The Troxler gauge is a Model 3440, S/N 27381, and contains 40 milliCuries of Am-241:Be and 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137.

The Arkansas Department of Health prepared a press release on the event.

The licensee verbally indicated that the gauge was properly secured in the truck at the time. The Arkansas Department of Health is investigating the circumstances surrounding this event.

Arkansas Department of Health notified Brinkley Police Department, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management (Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Highway Patrol), State of Mississippi, State of Tennessee [and] NRC Region IV.

Arkansas has assigned Event Report ID No: AR-03-08-01

* * * UPDATE AT 1250 EDT ON 4/25/08 FROM MACK TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL * * *

"On April 17, 2008, the stolen Troxler Model 3440, Serial Number 27381, belonging to Tigue Construction, Inc., was retrieved from the Van Buren County Courthouse in Clinton, AR.

"The gauge had been found in a ditch, by a citizen, approximately 2 weeks prior to April 17, 2008, and retrieved by the County Emergency Management Staff. Due to significant storms and flooding in the county the notification to Arkansas Dept. of Health was delayed. The gauge and transport case were found without any locks.

"It is unclear how the gauge arrived in Clinton, AR. After being stolen in Brinkley, AR. The distance is 140 miles.

"Health Physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health retrieved the gauge and stored it in the Department's Radioactive Material storage area. Field analysis indicated the gauge was not leaking.

"On April 21, 2008, a representative from Tigue Construction, Inc., retrieved the gauge from the Arkansas Department of Health and will conduct a leak test prior to returning the gauge to service.

The Department considers this event closed."

R4DO (Cain), FSME (Zelac) and ILTAB (via e-mail) were notified.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44156
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PERMA-FIX NORTHWEST RICHLAND, INC.
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/22/2008
Notification Time: 19:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/17/2008
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)

Event Text

WASHINGTON AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ON A TRANSPORT TRAILER

The following information was received from the State of Washington via e-mail:

"Tritium (H-3) contamination was found on a trailer in the outside storage area of Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW), a radioactive material licensee in Richland Washington on April 17. A DOH inspector noticed liquid dripping from a trailer that had just been unloaded. The trailer had hauled empty radioactive waste drums from Atomic Energy Limited Canada (Chalk River facility in Ontario). The transport vehicle entered the United States at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan under an Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) import license and entered Washington at Spokane. The shipment had arrived at the PFNW facility in late February. It was manifested as a plastic fiber bag with drums inside. Initial surveys on February 28 noted tritium contamination inside the plastic fiber bag, but no contamination was noted outside the bag or on the trailer. Tritium was a primary radionuclide on the manifest. During off-loading of the drums and plastic liner on April 17, liquid was found in and on the drums (one drum is suspected of being at least partially filled with liquid). After off-loading, standing liquids were noticed by the licensee on the inside trailer bed, but not on the outer trailer floor and skin. After the truck was returned to the storage yard, liquid droplets were found dripping from the front of the trailer by the DOH inspector. Initial contamination levels (up to 1.8 million dpm of tritium) on the trailer front were substantially above the U.S. Dept of Transportation limits; but due to the limited quantity (less than one gallon of liquid), do not pose a health risk. There is no indication of leakage during the actual shipment.

"The manifest indicated the total shipment contained H-3 (6.59 mCi) and Cs-137 (7.79 mCi) as the predominant radionuclides. Only tritium contamination has been noted."

WA Report # WA-08-025

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44165
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 02:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 4/24/2008 at 0110 CDT, a concern with the flexible connection alignment between heat exchangers on the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was identified. At the time this condition was identified the 'A' Diesel was out of service for outage maintenance activities. During evaluation of this condition, and discussions with the vendor supplier for this flexible connection, additional questions arose and the condition of the identical connections on the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was questioned. Inspection of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator identified a similar problem, and at 0256 CDT on 4/25/2008, the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable, and the Plant entered TS 3.8.2, Condition B, for one required Diesel Generator being inoperable. All required actions regarding TS 3.8.2 have been complied with.

"The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator is still considered to be functional, and remains aligned for automatic start. The 'A' EDG is currently tagged out and work is ongoing to correct the alignment issue. Upon completion of repair to the 'A' EDG it will be restored to operation and the 'B' EDG will be removed from service to correct the alignment issue.

"The plant is currently in Mode 6, with RCS level greater than 23 feet above the Reactor Vessel Flange, and both required Offsite Power Sources remain operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44166
Rep Org: HIGH MOUNTAIN INSPECTION SERVICES
Licensee: HIGH MOUNTAIN INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: CASPER State: WY
County:
License #: 49-26808-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MCMANUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)

Event Text

POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DURING MONTH OF FEBRUARY 2008

Landauer notified licensee today at 0840 MDT that a dosimetry badge worn by one of their employees in the month of February 2008 read 6429 mR. The employee only worked for 3 days on several jobs where he could have received radiation exposure during the month. The employee has been suspended from any further work that could cause additional exposure until the investigation is completed. The licensee's exposure records show that the employee only received 50 mR from pocket dosimeter. The licensee is launching an investigation as to where the potential overexposure may have occurred and compare to other personnel that worked on the same jobs. The licensee notified NRC Region IV personnel (V. Campbell).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44168
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN FEIGL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

NON-CONSERVATIVE CORE SPRAY FLOW IN DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION LOCA ANALYSIS

"Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has been informed of a change in the vendor calculation of Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 2. On April 24, 2008, Westinghouse initially notified EGC of a potential non-conservatism with respect to the assumed core spray (CS) flow in the Westinghouse 10 CFR 50, Appendix K LOCA analysis for DNPS Unit 2. Based on further discussions with Westinghouse, EGC confirmed the error on April 25, 2008, at 1130. In selecting the limiting plant configuration for the DNPS Appendix K LOCA model, Westinghouse used the net flow at the CS sparger, instead of the runout flow minus leakage outside the shroud. As a result, Westinghouse used an incorrect input for CS flow for the ECCS LOCA analysis.

"Westinghouse has evaluated the impact of correcting the assumed CS flow on the DNPS Unit 2 limiting large break LOCA analysis. Preliminary results indicate an increase of 80 degrees F in the PCT value. This results in a final PCT value of 2230 degrees F, which is in excess of 10 CFR 50.46 (b)(1) limits. However, preliminary calculation results also indicate that a 3 percent reduction in the MAPLGHR limit would offset the 80 degree F increase in the limiting PCT. Dresden Unit 2 has been operating with more than 3 percent margin in MAPLHGR since November 2007 (i.e., the start of the current operating cycle - D2C21).

"Administrative limits wilt be established to maintain these margins.

"The LOCA analysis of record for DNPS Unit 3 utilizes the correct CS shroud leakage and CS flow delivered to the vessel through the CS sparger. Therefore, this non-conservatism does not affect DNPS Unit 3.

"Currently, there is sufficient operating margin for DNPS Unit 2 to ensure the PCT limit would not be exceeded. There are no other 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS criteria for DNPS Unit 2 that are impacted.

"This notification is being made as a result of the 10 CFR 50.45 (a)(3)(ii) requirement to report this issue in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (i.e., 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)).

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44169
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM OUTAGE

"Limerick Generating Station experienced a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which provides real time plant data to the NRC Operations Center, from approximately 17:30 until 21:30 on 4/25/08. The plant monitoring system (PMS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) in the main control room were functional for the duration that ERDS was out of service, providing the Limerick Operators with all required data for monitoring the plant had an actual event occurred. In addition, all external phone lines were functioning to allow contact with the NRC Operations Center had an actual event occurred."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 44170
Rep Org: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABS
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABS
Region: 4
City: PEARL CITY State: HI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RONALD PICKERING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 22:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE

A technician for the licensee was taking asphalt density measurements at the Lua Lua Lei Naval Magazine Base in Hawaii. He was using a Troxler 3450 gauge (nominal 8 mCuries Cs-137 and 40 mCuries Am-241/Be) which was placed in the back of his pickup truck in anticipation of taking additional measurements. He was subsequently informed that no additional density measurements were needed. He completed his paper work and got into his truck and drove off the site. He drove about 1 mile before he realized that he had not secured the gauge in the back of the truck. He stopped and discovered the gauge was missing and had apparently fallen out of the truck bed. He retraced his route but was not able to locate the gauge.

The RSO is in the process of requesting assistance from local authorities in helping to locate the missing gauge.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44171
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN BRUCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/26/2008
Notification Time: 05:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

NON-ISOLABLE RCS BOUNDARY LEAKAGE FROM INSTRUMENT LINE

"On April 25, 2008, DC Cook Unit 1 was in Mode 4 heating up the RCS after a refueling outage. Personnel were performing a containment walkdown, with the RCS at 1000 psig, looking for leakage. Wisps of steam were seen coming from a 3/4 inch RCS flow instrument line weld, between the RCS loop piping and the instrument isolation valve. The leakage is less than 0.1 gpm. The leakage can not be isolated from the RCS and has been declared to be RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage. Entry into the RCS Operational Leakage Technical Specification, 3.4.13, was made at 2210 on April 25, 2008. This Technical Specification requires being in Mode 5 within 36 hours.

"The plant is cooling down and depressurizing as required by Technical Specifications.

"The plant is currently evaluating the appropriate repair method for this condition.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44172
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/26/2008
Notification Time: 15:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2008
Event Time: 13:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION DISCOVERED DUE TO IMPROPERLY INSTALLED FUSE WIRING IN CLASS 1E AIR CONDITIONING UNIT

"While trouble shooting, it was discovered that fuses for a remote switch to start the 'B' Class 1E air conditioning unit were installed in series and therefore not installed per design. Drawings show these fuses wired in parallel, rather than in series. In the series configuration, if an electrical short occurs on the Control Room side of the circuit and blew the fuse, the 'isolated' portion of the circuit, fed from the next fuse, would also loose power. Therefore, the circuit could not be re-energized and the unit could not be started in the event of a Control Room Fire.

"The Class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning units are included in the post fire safe shutdown design to ensure adequate room cooling for the operating train of safety related electrical equipment. The air conditioning units provide a support function for Class 1E electrical equipment required for safe shutdown. The loss of the Class 1E air conditioning units does not directly result in loss of capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Rather, room heating beyond design limits could reduce the life of electrical components within the switchgear.

"Qualification data exists to show that some components within the switchgear will survive the expected room temperatures and be functional following a loss of room cooling. Data does not exist for each and every component within the switchgear, so a conclusive argument cannot be made regarding equipment functionality following a loss of room cooling. Therefore, this condition resulted in an unanalyzed condition that could potentially affect post-fire safe shutdown equipment availability.

"There are no compensatory measures required since the unit is not operating. The configuration will be corrected prior to changing to mode 4."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012