| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/20/2008 - 03/21/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43992 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWIN URQHART
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 02/18/2008
Notification Time: 05:08 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2008
Event Time: 01:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 89 | Power Operation | 89 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO #2 TURBINE BYPASS VALVE FAILURE
"Unit two reduced power to 90% to perform monthly turbine testing surveillance on 2/18/08. All tests were completed satisfactorily with the exception of the main turbine #2 Bypass Valve (BPV). At 0120 hours, the #2 BPV stroked fully open per procedure, but the last 10% of travel to full open did not yield the expected response of BPV fast open from 90% to 100%. The fast acting solenoid did indicate expected state change to 'energized' at 90% valve open, but the BPV did not indicate fast open. Therefore the Main Turbine Bypass System has been declared inoperable and associated actions of Tech Spec 3.7.7 have been invoked. This spec requires compliance with LCO 3 .2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) limits for an inoperable main turbine bypass system as specified in the COLR (Core Operating Limit Report), are made applicable (within 2 hours) or reduce THERMAL POWER to <24% RTP within the following 4 hours. The MCPR limits were calculated by reactor engineering and installed in the process computer at 0347 hours. A decrease in reactor power was not required once the MCPR limit was installed.
"The COLR (ref.: TRM Appendix A) states Unit Two can be operated with EITHER the End- of- Cycle Recirc Pump Trips (EOC-RPTs) out of service OR the Turbine Bypass Valves inoperable, but not both. The EOC-RPTs were already out of service as allowed for current conditions of the operating cycle. Upon discovery of the inoperable Bypass Valve, it was recognized that this placed Unit Two in an unanalyzed condition for fuel thermal limit. The shift crew took immediate actions to confirm the surveillance was current for EOC-RPTs and placed them in service per approved plant procedures. This was accomplished at 0315 hours, which returned the unit to an analyzed condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. ANDERSON TO P. SNYDER ON 3/20/08 AT 0943 * * *
"During the surveillance testing of the main turbine bypass valves, one of the three main turbine bypass valves did not function as expected. The function of the main turbine bypass system was degraded but not lost. Upon discovery the required action statement (RAS) in Technical Specifications 3.7.7 and 3.2.2 were properly entered, and the required actions were taken within the allowed out of service time of two hours. Based on the initial review of the condition and the fact that the core operating limits report (COLR) described operation in the condition with the EOC-RPT out of service concurrent with loss of the main turbine bypass capability as an unanalyzed condition, a notification was made in accordance with the following reporting requirement:
"'10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.'
"The initial notification was a conservative action taken shortly after the condition was discovered. The condition was immediately identified during surveillance testing of the main turbine bypass valves, the required Technical Specifications RAS was entered and the actions completed within the allowed two hour time frame of 0120 - 0315 EST on 2/28/08. This prompt action prevented continued operation with EOC-RPT out of service and main turbine bypass inoperable and eliminated this potential to be in a condition where the design basis may not have been met.
"A more detailed review was subsequently performed which determined that the minimum critical power ratio thermal limit for having EOC-RPT out of service and main turbine bypass inoperable as calculated during the reload analysis was 1.42. At the time of the event the actual MCPR at that point in core life was 1.57. Even though prompt actions were taken as required, there was actual margin to the calculated MCPR limit of 1.42. Had a design basis transient occurred, the MCPR Safety Limit would not have been exceeded.
"Based on this information the determination has been made that the unit was not in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. This notification serves to retract the previous event notification # 43992 made on 2/18/2008 at 0508 EST."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 44005 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/23/2008
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNACCEPTABLE FLAW IN RPV CAP-TO-PIPE WELD
"At 1600 EST, it was determined by a phased array ultrasonic examination that an unacceptable flaw existed in reactor pressure vessel penetration N9. This penetration leads to a capped line and the flaw is in the cap-to-pipe weld. The flaw is 2.3 inches in length and reaches a maximum depth of 43.6 percent through-wall on a 5.75 inch OD pipe. The flaw was discovered during the routine ISI [In-service Inspection] examination of this penetration. The flaw has been found unacceptable per paragraph IWB-3514.4 of the 2003 Addenda of ASME Section XI and is therefore reportable. Upon discovery of the flaw, all penetrations of this type were examined with no further findings.
"A weld overlay repair is planned and should be completed by 3/6/08."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. ANDERSON TO P. SNYDER ON 3/20/08 AT 0943 * * *
"On 2/23/2008 event number 44005 was made to report an unacceptable flaw in reactor pressure vessel penetration N9. The assumption made at that time was that the flaw seriously degraded the affected control rod drive (CRD) return line that was capped. This was based on the fact that the flaw was unacceptable from an ASME Section XI perspective and therefore reportable. Based on this assumption the event was reported in accordance with the following reporting requirement.
"'10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded;'
"The depth of the flaw was initially reported to be 43.6% through wall and the thickness of the wall was measured to be 0.75 inches. Phased array ultrasonic examinations in accordance with Appendix VIII of Section XI were used to fully interrogate and characterize the circumferentially oriented flaw. The final dimensions were 2.3 inches in length on the inner diameter and a maximum depth of 60% through wall. A flaw evaluation of the Unit 1 CRD return line nozzle cap weld was subsequently performed by Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., to evaluate the 'as-found' condition and to determine the implications of the flaw on the affected system at the time of shutdown. The evaluation considered the flaw size and the appropriate stresses for operation. No crack growth was required to be assumed since the 'as-found' flaw was compared against the allowable flaw size which was used to determine the acceptability of the flaw during plant operation. Since the weld is associated with the capped CRD return line nozzle, the applied stress at the affected location was due to pressure loading only.
"The flaw evaluation concluded that the requirements of Section IWB-3640 were satisfied for a flaw less than 75% through-wall. The 'as-found' depth of 60% through wall is less than the allowable depth of 75%. Based on this information, the Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. evaluation demonstrated that the flaw was acceptable per the ASME Code Section Xl, 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda requirements. Since the as- found flaw depth at the N9 weld is less than the allowable flaw depth, the required safety factors were met at all times during plant operation.
"Based on this updated information the conclusion has been reached that this flaw did not seriously degrade the plant or its principal safety barriers. Since the condition does not meet a reporting requirement, this notification serves to retract Notification # 44005 made on 2/23/2008."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 44065 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: VA MEDICAL CENTER - SAN FRANCISCO
Region: 4
City: SAN FRANCISCO State: CA
County:
License #: 03-23852-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWIN LIEDHOLDT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/15/2008
Notification Time: 00:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(2) - DOSE > SPECIFIED EFF LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
| Event Text POSSIBLE MEDICAL EVENT - LEAKING BRACHYTHERAPY SEEDS
"Description: Three patients were scheduled for transperineal permanent prostate seed brachytherapy implantations on March 14, 2008. Three separate packages of seeds in preloaded needles were received; surveys showed no surface contamination or contamination outside the inner sterile containers. On March 14, 2006, after 12 of 106 seeds were implanted in the first patient, a survey meter showed a small amount of radioactive contamination on the inside of the sterile packaging. This implantation was stopped. The survey meter showed contamination on the tips of three of the four needles that had been used, the greatest being 5000 cpm (420 Bq if an efficiency of 20% is assumed). This patient was administered stable iodine to block his thyroid in case of a leaking seed. The seed vendor was notified by telephone.
"To determine if the remaining patients should be implanted, the remaining two packages of seeds were opened and the interiors of the sterile packaging were surveyed. No contamination was found. An implant procedure was performed on the second patient. At the end of the procedure, the used needles were surveyed. A survey meter showed contamination on the tips of two of the needles; it was about 1000 cpm (83 Bq if an efficiency of 20% is assumed) on each. The seed vendor was again notified by telephone. A urine bioassay of this patient showed no radioactivity.
"Implantation of the third patient was cancelled.
"The needles of preloaded seeds were supplied by Best Medical International. The seeds contained I-125 and were Best Model 2301. The three batches of seeds were Lot Numbers 23017, 23019, and 23018 (not implanted).
"At this time, it is uncertain whether any seeds were leaking. A possibility is that the contents of the sterile packages were contaminated by the vendor, but no seeds were leaking.
"Effect on Patients: The VA is still evaluating this event. At this time, no adverse effects to the patients are expected.
"Patient notification: The permittee is in the process of ensuring that the referring physicians and patients were notified.
"We will notify the NRC Project Manager, Cassandra Frasier, of NRC Region III.
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44069 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CAROLINAS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #: 060-0014-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHARN JEFFRIES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 10:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING IODINE- 125 PROSTATE SEEDS
"Licensee identified 7 leaking Iodine-125 leftover prostate seeds from two patient doses: 3/11/08, 4 seeds. 3/12/08, 3 seeds. Patients were recalled, but showed no iodine uptake. Licensee phoned [state radiation protection officials]."
Seeds are approximately 0.3 micro Curies each.
Mills Pharmaceuticals (Core oncology-Oklahoma City) manufactures the seed sources. They are then sent to Medtech Diagnostic Services, Ft Meyers, Florida. Medtech loads the seeds into cartridges and sterilizes order. Medtech then sends the loaded cartridges to Carolinas Medical Center.
The state, licensee, and manufacturer are working together to determine where the seeds got damaged, whether at manufacturing, loading, or unloading.
"Incident Number 08-12."
* * * UPDATE FROM GERALD SPATE TO JOE O'HARA AT 1055 ON 3/20/08 * * *
The state called to correct an editorial error on the original report. The seed activity is 0.36 milli Curies vice 0.3 micro Curies.
Notified R1DO(Perry) and FSME(Burgess). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44073 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WHIDBEY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: COUPEVILLE State: WA
County:
License #: WM-M0217-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF LEAKING IODINE-125 SEED
The State of Washington Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection, provided the following information via e-mail:
"On 10 March 2008 a patient was implanted with approximately 80 I-125 seeds. On 12 March 2008 (or 13 March 2008, it remains unclear as of this writing), the patient complained of pain and difficulty urinating. A cauterization was performed via the urethra. Upon removal of the cauterization equipment, some seeds also exited via the urethra. One seed, in particular, was visibly different from the rest. This seed was, upon closer observation, noted to be shorter than the others and, in fact, had been damaged. Cause of the damage (shear force during insertion or perhaps a result of the cauterization) has yet to be determined.
"A survey of the area including the patient using a Technical Associates TBM-3 showed contamination of the equipment and bodily fluids, while an external reading directly over the thyroid showed levels above background."
The activity of the damaged I-125 seed was less than 300 microcuries. Licensee is assessing possible overexposure to the patient, organ dose calculations underway by licensee consultant. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44075 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PARAMOUNT State: CA
County:
License #: 5474-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 03/18/2008
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHIPPING CONTAINER ARRIVED DAMAGED WITH SOURCE OUTSIDE OF PIG AND CONTAINER
The State of California Radiologic Health Branch provided the following information via email:
"The licensee shipped a nominal 123 mCi Co-60 source via FedEx in a Type A package from a temporary job site in the State of Washington to their office in Paramount, CA. Upon arrival at the Paramount office, the Type A shipping container was observed to have been damaged, and the Co-60 source was found out of its shielded pig, and outside of the Type A container. Calculation assuming a point source shows that the radiation levels would have been ~170 mr/hr at one meter, ~1.8 R/hr at one foot, and ~1700 R/hr at one centimeter from the source.
"The Type A container is constructed of steel, with an inner lead storage pig, and was secured to a wooden shipping pallet. The Type A container has a collar that extends above the lead pig. The cover for the lead pig is secured by a rod that fits through the steel collar. The rod is secured in place by a lock on the rod. Upon receipt of the Type A container at the Paramount, CA facility, the wooden pallet was missing, the lock on the securing rod was missing, the securing rod was not inserted in the holes in the steel collar (therefore it was not securing the cover to the lead pig), and although the inner lead pig cover was in place, the source was found lying on top of the lead pig within the steel collar portion of the Type A container. It is surmised that the Type A container was dropped on the lock during transportation, such that the lock broke, the securing rod was displaced, the cover came off the lead pig, and the source came out of the lead pig. Either the Co-60 source lodged in the steel collar at that time, or the source fell out and someone picked it up and placed it on top of the lead pig within the steel collar of the Type A container (the latter appears more likely). The source is located at one end of an ~3 inch long rod.
"The licensee notified FedEx of the event. FedEx's consultant is investigating to determine where and how the damage to the Type A container occurred, and to evaluate the exposures to FedEx personnel. Transportation occurred exclusively on FedEx conveyances, so no significant non-FedEx personnel exposure is expected to have resulted during transportation. A licensee employee reinserted the source in the lead pig before removing the Type A container from the FedEx delivery truck. In doing so he handled the non-source end of the source rod with his bare fingers, while wearing extremity dosimetry. Calculated extremity dose is 100 to 200 mrem based on a 5-10 second handling time."
CA Report Number 031708 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44081 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN NIMTZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 03/19/2008
Event Time: 13:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR
A non licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44082 | Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
NEIL PERRY (R1)
VERNE HODGE (NRR)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL FAILURE OF CERTAIN ROSEMOUNT PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS
The following information was received via fax:
"Re: Notification under 10 CFR Part 21 for certain Model 3051N Pressure transmitters
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b) Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters listed in the attachment may exhibit erratic, unstable output prior to an off-scale failure. The affected transmitters were shipped from RNII between March 31, 2002 and November 20, 2002.
"1.0 Name and address of the individual providing the information:
"Mr. Marc D. Bumgarner
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"2.0 Identification of items supplied:
"Certain Model 3051N pressure transmitters identified in the attachment.
"3.0 Identification of the firm supplying the item:
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:
"The Model 3051N Smart Pressure Transmitter is dedicated for nuclear use consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. It is qualified for use in safety related applications per IEEE 323-1983 (mild environment) and IEEE 344-1987 for seismic applications as documented in its associated qualification reports.
"The Model 3051N pressure transmitter contains an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which performs the Digital to Analog Conversion (DAC). Procurement and production records indicate that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters manufactured between January 2002 and October 2002 have DAC ASICs which may contain phosphorus as the encapsulation material.
"ASIC industry experts have since determined that under certain conditions the phosphorus compound can lead to reduced insulation resistance of the integrated circuit, with potentially adverse impact on performance. As a result, ASIC and IC manufacturers eliminated the use of phosphorus in their products. Industry experts have examined the performance of phosphorus materials in electronic circuits under various conditions and estimated a potential ASIC failure rate of approximately 1% for the general population of phosphorus-containing electronic circuits.
"Three Model 3051N transmitters have recently been returned to RNII due to erratic, unstable, or off-scale output. Failure analysis identified the phosphorus-containing encapsulation material of the DAC ASIC as the cause of failure for these transmitters. These transmitters were installed and performing properly for 3-5 years before failure.
"Failure of the DAC ASIC depends on several factors, including:
"Phosphorus concentration
"Spacing of ASIC leads
"Voltage driving the ASIC (which affects operating temperature)
"Ambient temperature
"The observed failure rate of the DAC ASIC in Model 3051N pressure transmitters indicates a potential reliability concern. As a result, notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 to customers that purchased a transmitter from the potentially affected population. A transmitter with a failing DAC ASIC will annunciate itself by erratic or unstable output, followed by off-scale output (high or low).
"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:
"The use of phosphorus in the DAC ASIC was eliminated in October 2002.
"Model 3051N pressure transmitters affected by this notification may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:
"The end user is advised to determine the impact of this potential reliability issue upon its plant's operation and safety, and take action as deemed necessary. Affected transmitters may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. is committed to the nuclear industry and: remains dedicated to the supply of high quality products to our customers. If you have any questions, or require additional information related to this issue, please contact: Mike Dougherty (205) 865-1112, Gerard Hanson (952) 949-5233, Bob Cleveland (952) 949-5206, or Matt Doyle (952) 949-5204."
Facilities affected which were identified in the referenced attachments: Cook Nuclear Plant, Vermont Yankee, Quad Cities Nuclear Station, and Robinson. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44084 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO TEN EMERGENCY SIRENS
"On March 20, 2008, between 0813 and 0818 power to 10 of the 78 sirens in Washington County was lost. They lost power due to a vehicle hitting a power pole. None of the 10 have battery back up power. The sirens are located south of the city of Fort Calhoun, in southeast Washington County. By 1200 power had been restored to 8 of the 10 sirens. The remaining sirens are awaiting replacement of power poles supporting supply lines to restore power. Pole replacement is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local officials. | |