Event Notification Report for March 20, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/19/2008 - 03/20/2008
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44082
Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC.
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID T. ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
NEIL PERRY (R1)
VERNE HODGE (NRR)
STEVE ORTH (R3)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
NEIL PERRY (R1)
VERNE HODGE (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL FAILURE OF CERTAIN ROSEMOUNT PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS
The following information was received via fax:
"Re: Notification under 10 CFR Part 21 for certain Model 3051N Pressure transmitters
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b) Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters listed in the attachment may exhibit erratic, unstable output prior to an off-scale failure. The affected transmitters were shipped from RNII between March 31, 2002 and November 20, 2002.
"1.0 Name and address of the individual providing the information:
"Mr. Marc D. Bumgarner
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"2.0 Identification of items supplied:
"Certain Model 3051N pressure transmitters identified in the attachment.
"3.0 Identification of the firm supplying the item:
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:
"The Model 3051N Smart Pressure Transmitter is dedicated for nuclear use consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. It is qualified for use in safety related applications per IEEE 323-1983 (mild environment) and IEEE 344-1987 for seismic applications as documented in its associated qualification reports.
"The Model 3051N pressure transmitter contains an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which performs the Digital to Analog Conversion (DAC). Procurement and production records indicate that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters manufactured between January 2002 and October 2002 have DAC ASICs which may contain phosphorus as the encapsulation material.
"ASIC industry experts have since determined that under certain conditions the phosphorus compound can lead to reduced insulation resistance of the integrated circuit, with potentially adverse impact on performance. As a result, ASIC and IC manufacturers eliminated the use of phosphorus in their products. Industry experts have examined the performance of phosphorus materials in electronic circuits under various conditions and estimated a potential ASIC failure rate of approximately 1% for the general population of phosphorus-containing electronic circuits.
"Three Model 3051N transmitters have recently been returned to RNII due to erratic, unstable, or off-scale output. Failure analysis identified the phosphorus-containing encapsulation material of the DAC ASIC as the cause of failure for these transmitters. These transmitters were installed and performing properly for 3-5 years before failure.
"Failure of the DAC ASIC depends on several factors, including:
"Phosphorus concentration
"Spacing of ASIC leads
"Voltage driving the ASIC (which affects operating temperature)
"Ambient temperature
"The observed failure rate of the DAC ASIC in Model 3051N pressure transmitters indicates a potential reliability concern. As a result, notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 to customers that purchased a transmitter from the potentially affected population. A transmitter with a failing DAC ASIC will annunciate itself by erratic or unstable output, followed by off-scale output (high or low).
"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:
"The use of phosphorus in the DAC ASIC was eliminated in October 2002.
"Model 3051N pressure transmitters affected by this notification may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:
"The end user is advised to determine the impact of this potential reliability issue upon its plant's operation and safety, and take action as deemed necessary. Affected transmitters may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. is committed to the nuclear industry and: remains dedicated to the supply of high quality products to our customers. If you have any questions, or require additional information related to this issue, please contact: Mike Dougherty (205) 865-1112, Gerard Hanson (952) 949-5233, Bob Cleveland (952) 949-5206, or Matt Doyle (952) 949-5204."
Facilities affected which were identified in the referenced attachments: Cook Nuclear Plant, Vermont Yankee, Quad Cities Nuclear Station, and Robinson.
The following information was received via fax:
"Re: Notification under 10 CFR Part 21 for certain Model 3051N Pressure transmitters
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b) Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) is writing to inform you that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters listed in the attachment may exhibit erratic, unstable output prior to an off-scale failure. The affected transmitters were shipped from RNII between March 31, 2002 and November 20, 2002.
"1.0 Name and address of the individual providing the information:
"Mr. Marc D. Bumgarner
Vice President & General Manager
Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"2.0 Identification of items supplied:
"Certain Model 3051N pressure transmitters identified in the attachment.
"3.0 Identification of the firm supplying the item:
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.
8200 Market Boulevard
Chanhassen, MN 55317
"4.0 Nature of the failure and potential safety hazard:
"The Model 3051N Smart Pressure Transmitter is dedicated for nuclear use consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. It is qualified for use in safety related applications per IEEE 323-1983 (mild environment) and IEEE 344-1987 for seismic applications as documented in its associated qualification reports.
"The Model 3051N pressure transmitter contains an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) which performs the Digital to Analog Conversion (DAC). Procurement and production records indicate that a limited number of Model 3051N pressure transmitters manufactured between January 2002 and October 2002 have DAC ASICs which may contain phosphorus as the encapsulation material.
"ASIC industry experts have since determined that under certain conditions the phosphorus compound can lead to reduced insulation resistance of the integrated circuit, with potentially adverse impact on performance. As a result, ASIC and IC manufacturers eliminated the use of phosphorus in their products. Industry experts have examined the performance of phosphorus materials in electronic circuits under various conditions and estimated a potential ASIC failure rate of approximately 1% for the general population of phosphorus-containing electronic circuits.
"Three Model 3051N transmitters have recently been returned to RNII due to erratic, unstable, or off-scale output. Failure analysis identified the phosphorus-containing encapsulation material of the DAC ASIC as the cause of failure for these transmitters. These transmitters were installed and performing properly for 3-5 years before failure.
"Failure of the DAC ASIC depends on several factors, including:
"Phosphorus concentration
"Spacing of ASIC leads
"Voltage driving the ASIC (which affects operating temperature)
"Ambient temperature
"The observed failure rate of the DAC ASIC in Model 3051N pressure transmitters indicates a potential reliability concern. As a result, notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 to customers that purchased a transmitter from the potentially affected population. A transmitter with a failing DAC ASIC will annunciate itself by erratic or unstable output, followed by off-scale output (high or low).
"5.0 The corrective action which is taken, the name of the individual or organization responsible for that action, and the length of time taken to complete that action:
"The use of phosphorus in the DAC ASIC was eliminated in October 2002.
"Model 3051N pressure transmitters affected by this notification may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"6.0 Any advice related to the potential failure of the item:
"The end user is advised to determine the impact of this potential reliability issue upon its plant's operation and safety, and take action as deemed necessary. Affected transmitters may be returned to RNII for replacement at no charge.
"Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. is committed to the nuclear industry and: remains dedicated to the supply of high quality products to our customers. If you have any questions, or require additional information related to this issue, please contact: Mike Dougherty (205) 865-1112, Gerard Hanson (952) 949-5233, Bob Cleveland (952) 949-5206, or Matt Doyle (952) 949-5204."
Facilities affected which were identified in the referenced attachments: Cook Nuclear Plant, Vermont Yankee, Quad Cities Nuclear Station, and Robinson.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44084
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 15:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSES LOSS OF POWER TO TEN EMERGENCY SIRENS
"On March 20, 2008, between 0813 and 0818 power to 10 of the 78 sirens in Washington County was lost. They lost power due to a vehicle hitting a power pole. None of the 10 have battery back up power. The sirens are located south of the city of Fort Calhoun, in southeast Washington County. By 1200 power had been restored to 8 of the 10 sirens. The remaining sirens are awaiting replacement of power poles supporting supply lines to restore power. Pole replacement is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local officials.
"On March 20, 2008, between 0813 and 0818 power to 10 of the 78 sirens in Washington County was lost. They lost power due to a vehicle hitting a power pole. None of the 10 have battery back up power. The sirens are located south of the city of Fort Calhoun, in southeast Washington County. By 1200 power had been restored to 8 of the 10 sirens. The remaining sirens are awaiting replacement of power poles supporting supply lines to restore power. Pole replacement is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local officials.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44079
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAKER ATLAS
Region: 4
City: PEARLAND State: TX
County:
License #: L00446-026
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: BAKER ATLAS
Region: 4
City: PEARLAND State: TX
County:
License #: L00446-026
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/20/2008
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 05:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2008
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/20/2008
Event Time: 05:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL)
MEXICO (VIA FAX)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL)
MEXICO (VIA FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NEUTRON GENERATORS AND LOGGING TOOL
A representative of Baker Atlas, a fishing and well-logging company, reported that a F-250 pick-up truck was stolen this morning between midnight and 5:30 a.m. central time. Contained in the truck were 4 neutron generators with a source strength of less than 1 curie each and one well logging source with a source strength of 100 milliCuries of Cs-137.
The State of Texas is following up on the report with more details to follow.
* * * UPDATE AT 1435 EDT ON 03/20/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following additional details were provided by the State of Texas via email:
"Event Description: On March 20, 2008, at 6:25 a.m., the agency received a telephone call from the licensee, reporting the theft of one of the company's vehicles, a Ford F-250 pick-up truck (licensee will find license plate number and submit later) from a hotel in Pharr, Texas, which had four neutron generators and one logging tool that contained a 100 milliCuries (mCi) radioactive material (RAM) stored on the truck. The licensee reported that the crew was from their Pearland, Texas site. The licensee stated the vehicle containing the sources was stolen from the LaQuinta hotel in Pharr, Texas between the hours of 12:30 and 5:00 A.M. on Thursday, March 20, 2008. The licensee immediately contacted the Pharr Police Department and filed a theft report. The licensee further reported that the initial police investigation shows that the vehicle has not crossed into Mexico.
"The licensee submitted the following information regarding the stolen equipment:
"A. The Cesium source is a Gulf Nuclear CS-2 with an original capsule number of CS2-985. This source was shipped with a tracking ID of S3H01 12. The activity is 3.7 GBq (100 mCi).
"B. The Pulsed Neutron Generators (SSDR, along with a section of our Transport Manual showing the container that the tools are carried in and a drawing of the tool section sent to Incident Investigation Program (IIP)). The tools in question are:
"1. Generator 370457 mounted in tool 8283PA-10041239 and containing tube 327.
"2. Generator 370453 mounted in tool 8283PA-370403 and containing tube 321.
"3. Generator 189707 mounted in tool 8283PA-190149 and containing tube 340.
"4. Generator 189496 mounted in tool 8283PA-370249 and containing tube 271.
"Each of these generators contains less than 37 GBq of H-3.
"The licensee stated that their company uses a tracking number system in place of the traditional model/serial numbers. The licensee will try to research the traditional numbers to submit later.
"Texas Incident #: I-8496
Notified R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (Burgess).
* * * UPDATE AT 1800 EDT ON 04/01/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The truck was recovered early morning on Saturday, March 30, 2008 just south of Falfurrias, TX. The search is on-going for the missing rad material.
Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME (White).
* * * UPDATE AT 1923 EDT ON 04/08/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO J. KNOKE * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"On April 6, 2008, [licensee] received a call from [their] security consultant stating that the Mission Texas Police Department (PD) had contacted him that a radioactive source had been located near the intersection of Bensen Palms Road and Orange Grove Drive. At 1:08 PM, Officer [delete] of the Mission PD contacted [licensee] and confirmed that the device appeared to be our stolen Cesium Source and that the padlock was intact. [Licensee] dispatched our local District Manager (DM) and an engineer to the location to take possession of the source and transport it to our storage location in Edinburg, Texas. The local DM confirmed that the source was intact and conducted an area survey to ascertain that no contamination had occurred.
"The local DM and the engineer will drive the area around the recovery, but at this time there is no sign of the missing Neutron Generators and associated tools."
Notified R4DO (Deese), FSME (Kock), ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3"
A representative of Baker Atlas, a fishing and well-logging company, reported that a F-250 pick-up truck was stolen this morning between midnight and 5:30 a.m. central time. Contained in the truck were 4 neutron generators with a source strength of less than 1 curie each and one well logging source with a source strength of 100 milliCuries of Cs-137.
The State of Texas is following up on the report with more details to follow.
* * * UPDATE AT 1435 EDT ON 03/20/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following additional details were provided by the State of Texas via email:
"Event Description: On March 20, 2008, at 6:25 a.m., the agency received a telephone call from the licensee, reporting the theft of one of the company's vehicles, a Ford F-250 pick-up truck (licensee will find license plate number and submit later) from a hotel in Pharr, Texas, which had four neutron generators and one logging tool that contained a 100 milliCuries (mCi) radioactive material (RAM) stored on the truck. The licensee reported that the crew was from their Pearland, Texas site. The licensee stated the vehicle containing the sources was stolen from the LaQuinta hotel in Pharr, Texas between the hours of 12:30 and 5:00 A.M. on Thursday, March 20, 2008. The licensee immediately contacted the Pharr Police Department and filed a theft report. The licensee further reported that the initial police investigation shows that the vehicle has not crossed into Mexico.
"The licensee submitted the following information regarding the stolen equipment:
"A. The Cesium source is a Gulf Nuclear CS-2 with an original capsule number of CS2-985. This source was shipped with a tracking ID of S3H01 12. The activity is 3.7 GBq (100 mCi).
"B. The Pulsed Neutron Generators (SSDR, along with a section of our Transport Manual showing the container that the tools are carried in and a drawing of the tool section sent to Incident Investigation Program (IIP)). The tools in question are:
"1. Generator 370457 mounted in tool 8283PA-10041239 and containing tube 327.
"2. Generator 370453 mounted in tool 8283PA-370403 and containing tube 321.
"3. Generator 189707 mounted in tool 8283PA-190149 and containing tube 340.
"4. Generator 189496 mounted in tool 8283PA-370249 and containing tube 271.
"Each of these generators contains less than 37 GBq of H-3.
"The licensee stated that their company uses a tracking number system in place of the traditional model/serial numbers. The licensee will try to research the traditional numbers to submit later.
"Texas Incident #: I-8496
Notified R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (Burgess).
* * * UPDATE AT 1800 EDT ON 04/01/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO S. SANDIN * * *
The truck was recovered early morning on Saturday, March 30, 2008 just south of Falfurrias, TX. The search is on-going for the missing rad material.
Notified R4DO (Lantz) and FSME (White).
* * * UPDATE AT 1923 EDT ON 04/08/08 FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO J. KNOKE * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"On April 6, 2008, [licensee] received a call from [their] security consultant stating that the Mission Texas Police Department (PD) had contacted him that a radioactive source had been located near the intersection of Bensen Palms Road and Orange Grove Drive. At 1:08 PM, Officer [delete] of the Mission PD contacted [licensee] and confirmed that the device appeared to be our stolen Cesium Source and that the padlock was intact. [Licensee] dispatched our local District Manager (DM) and an engineer to the location to take possession of the source and transport it to our storage location in Edinburg, Texas. The local DM confirmed that the source was intact and conducted an area survey to ascertain that no contamination had occurred.
"The local DM and the engineer will drive the area around the recovery, but at this time there is no sign of the missing Neutron Generators and associated tools."
Notified R4DO (Deese), FSME (Kock), ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3"