Event Notification Report for March 11, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/10/2008 - 03/11/2008
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44056
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: CALVIN PITTMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/12/2008
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 14:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2008
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 14:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
TWO CYLINDERS IDENTIFIED WITH WEIGHT CHANGE PRIOR TO WASH
"Between 1979 and 1985, approximately 960 thin-walled cylinders were obtained by Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), transferred to Allied Chemical, and filled with near-normal assay material as part of a strategic feed reserve. These cylinders were transferred to Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP) for storage. They were shipped back to PGDP beginning in the early 1990s. All but three of these cylinders have been fed. In early 2003, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) was revised to evaluate the washing of the heeled cylinders.
"At 1457 hours on 3/11/2008, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that two non-fissile cylinders were identified in the ORGDP strategic reserve category that had a weight change while stored at ORGDP in violation of the NCSE for the C-400 cylinder wash operation. One leg of double contingency is based on it being unlikely that cylinders in this category would be introduced into the process while stored at ORGDP. The weight change indicated that these cylinders were introduced into the process at ORGDP. The other leg of double contingency is based on two individuals independently verifying that the cylinder had no weight change while it was stored at ORGDP. This control was not violated. The NCSE concern associated with these cylinders entering the process is the potential to introduce fissile material into the cylinder while stored at ORGDP and subsequent washing at the non-fissile C-400 cylinder wash. Even though one leg of double contingency was lost, these cylinders were not washed.
"The cylinder heel of one cylinder is approximately 11 lbs. at 0.711 wt% U-235 in solid form and the other cylinder is approximately 39 lbs. at 0.7 wt% U-235 in solid form.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-0730; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-06."
"Between 1979 and 1985, approximately 960 thin-walled cylinders were obtained by Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), transferred to Allied Chemical, and filled with near-normal assay material as part of a strategic feed reserve. These cylinders were transferred to Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant (ORGDP) for storage. They were shipped back to PGDP beginning in the early 1990s. All but three of these cylinders have been fed. In early 2003, the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) was revised to evaluate the washing of the heeled cylinders.
"At 1457 hours on 3/11/2008, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that two non-fissile cylinders were identified in the ORGDP strategic reserve category that had a weight change while stored at ORGDP in violation of the NCSE for the C-400 cylinder wash operation. One leg of double contingency is based on it being unlikely that cylinders in this category would be introduced into the process while stored at ORGDP. The weight change indicated that these cylinders were introduced into the process at ORGDP. The other leg of double contingency is based on two individuals independently verifying that the cylinder had no weight change while it was stored at ORGDP. This control was not violated. The NCSE concern associated with these cylinders entering the process is the potential to introduce fissile material into the cylinder while stored at ORGDP and subsequent washing at the non-fissile C-400 cylinder wash. Even though one leg of double contingency was lost, these cylinders were not washed.
"The cylinder heel of one cylinder is approximately 11 lbs. at 0.711 wt% U-235 in solid form and the other cylinder is approximately 39 lbs. at 0.7 wt% U-235 in solid form.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-0730; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-06."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44053
Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: APPLIED TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
Region: 1
City: JESSUP State: GA
County: WAYNE
License #: GA-0896-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOEL MIMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: APPLIED TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
Region: 1
City: JESSUP State: GA
County: WAYNE
License #: GA-0896-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOEL MIMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/11/2008
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2008
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
GEORGIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
The State of Georgia reported that one of their licensees, Applied Technical Services, was conducting radiography at the Rayonier Paper Mill in Jessup, GA. While filming a tank weld, the radiography camera fell approximately 24 feet to the ground. The licensee was unable to retract the source back into the camera.
The licensee isolated the area and covered the source with temporary lead shielding. Additionally, they established a 2 mR/hr boundary around the source which will be continuously manned until the manufacturer (QSA Global) representative arrives to secure the source and camera.
The licensee reports that no overexposures occurred during this incident.
The State of Georgia reported that one of their licensees, Applied Technical Services, was conducting radiography at the Rayonier Paper Mill in Jessup, GA. While filming a tank weld, the radiography camera fell approximately 24 feet to the ground. The licensee was unable to retract the source back into the camera.
The licensee isolated the area and covered the source with temporary lead shielding. Additionally, they established a 2 mR/hr boundary around the source which will be continuously manned until the manufacturer (QSA Global) representative arrives to secure the source and camera.
The licensee reports that no overexposures occurred during this incident.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44235
Rep Org: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Licensee: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Region: 1
City: WARNER ROBINS State: GA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID COLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Region: 1
City: WARNER ROBINS State: GA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID COLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/22/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
LOST LASER RECEIVER/TRANSMITTERS CONTAINING AM-241
"Two Laser receiver/transmitters were picked from stock for delivery to the Robins AFB Maintenance program. The two items were picked up from location and manifested for local delivery on 21 February 2008. The items were reported missing on customer complaint by the Avionics Repair shop on 11 March 2008. The item was originally marked as missing in the Automated Tracking System on 27 March 2008. Recent extensive searches have not discovered the missing items.
"Based on preliminary investigation, the items were manifested for delivery, but the local delivery truck did not show on the day it was ordered. The material remained in the Radioactive Material Shipping area for a couple of days. A hand-receipt transfer document was located but it did not have the driver's signature of receipt. Additionally, the transition of new personnel delayed the reporting of the loss to the DDC Radiation Safety Office.
"DDC Radiation Safety Office will work closely with the local Radiation Protection Officer to provide training to emphasis the requirements for timely reporting of incidents involving radioactive material."
INCIDENT NO: DDWG-2008-01
Item NSN: 1270-01-365-9471 containing two 8 microCuries Am-241 sources [16 microCuries total].
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NRC R4 (BROWDER) TO J. KOZAL AT 1108 ON 5/27/08 * * *
Upon investigation of this event it was determined that the licensee is Defense Logistic Agency and not the US Air Force. The header of the report has been changed accordingly.
Notified the R1DO (Rogge) and FSME EO (Bubar)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"Two Laser receiver/transmitters were picked from stock for delivery to the Robins AFB Maintenance program. The two items were picked up from location and manifested for local delivery on 21 February 2008. The items were reported missing on customer complaint by the Avionics Repair shop on 11 March 2008. The item was originally marked as missing in the Automated Tracking System on 27 March 2008. Recent extensive searches have not discovered the missing items.
"Based on preliminary investigation, the items were manifested for delivery, but the local delivery truck did not show on the day it was ordered. The material remained in the Radioactive Material Shipping area for a couple of days. A hand-receipt transfer document was located but it did not have the driver's signature of receipt. Additionally, the transition of new personnel delayed the reporting of the loss to the DDC Radiation Safety Office.
"DDC Radiation Safety Office will work closely with the local Radiation Protection Officer to provide training to emphasis the requirements for timely reporting of incidents involving radioactive material."
INCIDENT NO: DDWG-2008-01
Item NSN: 1270-01-365-9471 containing two 8 microCuries Am-241 sources [16 microCuries total].
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NRC R4 (BROWDER) TO J. KOZAL AT 1108 ON 5/27/08 * * *
Upon investigation of this event it was determined that the licensee is Defense Logistic Agency and not the US Air Force. The header of the report has been changed accordingly.
Notified the R1DO (Rogge) and FSME EO (Bubar)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source