Event Notification Report for January 30, 2008

MULTIPLE EMERGENCY SIRENS LOST POWER DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER

"Due to severe weather (wind storm) in the area, a total of 8 of 78 sirens were reported out of service (loss of power) in Washington County, NE. An additional 6 sirens were running on their battery backup power supplies. The sirens have been returned to service. A large segment of the population was NOT affected."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE NOTIFICATION CAPABILITIES

At 1230 EST, the licensee discovered that offsite notification capabilities were lost. Upon discovery, they declared a Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) under EAL 7.3.2.

At the time of discovery, the licensee was in their adverse weather procedure due to winds exceeding 55 mph on site. The high winds caused a loss of electrical power to non-vital power block facilities, including the site PBX (Private Branch Exchange). The backup diesel generator for PBX power initially failed to start but was manually started at 1300 EST, and PBX functions were restored. No other vital equipment was adversely affected by the loss of non-vital power.

The licensee will remain in the NOUE until normal power is restored to the power block. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HARDING TO HUFFMAN AT 2017 EST ON 1/30/08 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2015 EST on 1/30/08 based on restoration of normal offsite power to the PBX. In addition, the backup diesel power supply to the PBX has been verified to be functional and available. The licensee has also stationed a spare backup diesel if needed. All phone lines have been tested and confirmed to be back in service with the exception to the RECS line (dedicated line to State and County Officials). Backup commercial lines to the State and County Officials are available.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Perry), FEMA and DHS notified.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS DECLARED INOPERABLE BASED ON POSTULATED MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK SCENARIO

"On 01/30/08, it was discovered that restrictor plates were not installed as required in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 interior doghouse floor drains. The restrictor plates are indicated as required on applicable flow diagrams. The purpose of the plates is to limit the amount of flow into the interior doghouse floor drains following a Main Feedwater (MFW) line break event in the doghouse. Without the restrictor plates installed, the amount of flow into the floor drains following a MFW line break could overwhelm the capability of the floor drain pump. Water could then flood into the AFW pump rooms and could render all three AFW pumps on the affected unit inoperable. Operations declared the 3 AFW pumps on both Units inoperable at 1220 today. TS 3.7.5.D states that with 3 AFW trains inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO required actions requiring Mode changes are suspended until on AFW train is restored to operable status. Both Units will remain at 100% power until repairs are complete. This condition does not prevent the AFW pumps from starting on an automatic or manual signal for any required plant events.

"An investigation into how this condition occurred is underway. As a result of this discovery, all three AFW pumps on each unit have been declared inoperable.

"Plant personnel are currently in the process of fabricating the required restrictor plates or blind flanges as necessary and installing them to conform to the drawing requirements. The restrictor plates/blind flanges are being installed and upon completion the affected AFW pumps will be considered operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. State and local government agencies will also be notified by the licensee.

ALERT DUE TO MOISTURE CONTACT WITH A URANIUM DIOXIDE MIXTURE OF UNFAVORABLE GEOMETRY

An uranium dioxide powder mixture was contained in a hopper of unfavorable geometry with moisture prevention criticality protection measures. After starting a process stream, moisture was unintentionally introduced into the hopper containing the uranium dioxide powder.

At 1840 Global Nuclear Fuels declared an Alert condition onsite as a result of this introduction of moisture to the uranium dioxide powder. The process stream was secured which stopped the introduction of moisture. No criticality occurred.

* * * UPDATE FROM S. MURRAY TO P. SNYDER AT 2110 ON 1/30/08 * * *

The uranium dioxide powder in the hopper was successfully discharged into a hybrid container of favorable geometry. At 2107 the licensee exited the Alert condition.

Notified R2DO (Bonser), NMSS (Weber, Mamish), IRD (Cruz), DHS (Haselton), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Smith), USDA (Timmons), HHS (Turner) and EPA (National Response Center) (Snowden).

POTENTIAL INOPERABLE SAFETY FUNCTION

"In regard to Part 21.21 Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation, [the licensee notified] the NRC of a defect that was detected on the Varian, Mammosource unit, Gammamed Plus (M1), ID#H64E168.

"The defect noted was the following:

"A daily check is performed to verify when the source guide tube is disconnected from the unit head, the source will not extend. This test is performed as recommended on p. 73 of the ESTRO Booklet No.8, ' A Practical Guide to Quality Control of Brachytherapy Equipment'. Disconnecting the tube (i.e. the lock that connects the source guide tube to the turret of the Mammosource) the dummy wire or the source wire should have been prevented from extending out. If the disconnect is within 2 mm of being connected the wire does extend out. This was documented on a check film using the Mick PerinaDoc phantom. As recommended in the Varian GammaMed HDR User Manual, P. 6-20, Varian BrachTherapy service was called.

"Notification:

"Varian Corp. was notified of this problem on 1/30/08 and a service engineer will be sent to the site to adjust the light sensor that communicates whether the source guide tube is connected. We are continuing treatment with two independent physicists verifying before treatment that the source guide tube is connected properly and securely."

* * * RETRACTION FROM WISHKO TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL AT 1431 EDT ON 3/13/08 * * *

"Verbal communication with an engineer from Varian Corporation stated that when the source guide tube is disconnected within 2 mm from the turret of the Mammosource, the source can extend. Since this is a design feature and accepted by Varian Corporation, I wish to withdraw my report of notification on a discovered defect."

R1DO (Lorson) and FSME (Wastler) notified.

LOSS OF ALL 81 OFFSITE SIRENS FOR APPROXIMATELY 80 MINUTES

"On 1/30/08 at approximately 0617 Eastern Standard Time, while conducting a routine public warning siren interrogation test, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) determined that the offsite emergency sirens were not capable of being activated. Initial investigations revealed that HNP lost power to the sirens due to a failure of the control module in the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) of the siren system. At approximately 0644, an interrogation test of the system was completed and the sirens were verified to be operating normally. This event was initially viewed as not reportable. Subsequent investigation conducted between 1/31/08 and 2/13/08 revealed that other equipment supplied by the UPS was lost for between 70 and 80 minutes. As there is no direct monitoring capability for siren power supplies, it is reasonable to conclude that the sirens had been lost for a period of time between 70 and 80 minutes. This event should have been reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) on 1/30/08. A completely new UPS system has been installed, and [the] siren systems are fully functional at this time."

The UPS was replaced on 2/7/08. Its loss on 1/30/08 affected all 81 sirens.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.