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Event Notification Report for December 15, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/14/2006 - 12/15/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43021 43042 43043 43045 43048 43052

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43021
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM CASE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 12/03/2006
Notification Time: 15:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2006
Event Time: 08:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (DIVISION 3) EMERGENCY DIESEL INOPERABLE

"On December 3, 2006, at 0858 hours, control room operators received a Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Carbon Dioxide (CO2) (Fire Protection) system initiation signal. The CO2 system for the Division 3 EDG room was out of service at the time and so no CO2 was released into the room. At 0905 hours, a first responder notified the control room operators that there was no indication of a fire in the Division 3 EDG room. A walkdown of the associated EDG room ventilation system confirmed the ventilation system tripped with the CO2 initiation signal locked in. At 0919 hours, the Division 3 EDG was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered. The required TS actions were implemented. The Division 3 EDG is available with restoration of the ventilation system using the CO2 Override switch. The CO2 initiation signal is currently locked in, and the Division 3 CO2 Fire Monitoring Panel, with associated equipment has been quarantined for further investigation.

"The Division 3 EDG provides emergency AC electrical power to the High Pressure Core Spray system. This event is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the safety function of structures or systems required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * EVENT RETRACTED AT 1324 ON 12/14/06 FROM C. ELBERFELD TO P. SNYDER * * *

"The purpose of this call is to retract Event Number 43021. On December 3, 2006, at 1520 hours, a notification, Event Number 43021, was made to the NRC Operations Center by the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. A spurious Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Fire Protection system initiation signal resulted in a tripped condition for the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room ventilation system. Operators declared the Division 3 EDG inoperable and took the appropriate Technical Specification actions. The Division 3 EDG provides emergency AC electrical power to the High Pressure Core Spray system. The High Pressure Core Spray system is a single train safety system.

"After further evaluation, it was determined that operators could promptly restore the ventilation system, with the CO2 initiation signal locked in, if the Division 3 EDG was needed, and that the safety function of the system could still be fulfilled during the time in question. Because the condition reported in Event Number 43021 would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the condition is not reportable, and this notification is retracted. The evaluation (i.e., Reportability Review) for this condition is documented in Condition Report 06-10843.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Lara).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43042
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE HACKLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/11/2006
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2006
Event Time: 16:08 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

RAPID SHUTDOWN AND MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH REACTOR COOLANT PUMP STATOR TEMPERATURE

"On December 10, 2006, at 1608 PST, operators manually tripped the reactor while it was subcritical. This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the reactor protection system while subcritical. On December 10, 2006, with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, operators initiated an unplanned reactor shutdown due to indications of increasing stator temperature on reactor coolant pump 2-2. In accordance with plant procedures, when the reactor coolant pump stator temperature reached 300 degrees Fahrenheit, operators manually tripped the reactor and tripped the coolant pump 2-2. The reactor was subcritical at the time of the reactor trip but all rods had not been fully inserted.

"All control rods fully inserted in response to the reactor trip and all systems functioned as required. The auxiliary feedwater system was already in service as part of the shutdown. The grid is stable and with the exception of RCP 2-2, all major equipment including the 3 emergency diesel generators remain operable. Unit 2 electrical loads are being supplied by the normal startup power. The other 3 RCPs are maintaining forced circulation of the reactor coolant system. Investigations into the high RCP stator temperature are ongoing, the unit will remain in Mode 3 pending the results of these investigations. An estimated restart date is not known at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed and was onsite at the time of the trip. Unit 1 is unaffected and remains in Mode 1."

The licensee stated that a press release related to this event is likely.

* * * UPDATE TO HUFFMAN DURING PLANT STATUS ON 12/11/06 AT 0419 EST * * *

Licensee believes the cause of the high RCP stator temperature was due to a failed RTD.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. PARKER TO P. SNYDER AT 1531 ON 12/14/06 * * *

"Unit 2 was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at 0 percent power at the time of the manual trip. At the time of the Initial notification, all procedural requirements for declaring Mode 3 had not been met, but upon further review, PG&E has verified K effective was less than 0.99."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

The original report was modified by this change. The 'RX Crit' field was changed from 'Y' to 'N'. The 'Init Power' field was changed from '5' to '0'. The 'Curr Power' field was changed from 'Startup' to 'Hot Standby'.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43043
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: 3M CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: ST PAUL State: MN
County: RAMSEY
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG VERKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/11/2006
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/13/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
BEN SANDLER (TAS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PO-210 SOURCE

A 0.5 milliCurie Po-210 static eliminator source was lost by 3M Corporation. 3M was performing an inventory and determined the source to be missing on 11/13/2006. The state will follow up with additional details when supplied by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED VIA FAX BY CRAIG VERKE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1341 EST ON 12/12/06 * * *

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

" The lost device is a model P2042 Nucleospot nuclear static eliminator, manufactured by NRD Inc. The original activity of the source was five millicuries of Polonium-210 at the time of its manufacture in September of 2005. The current, decayed activity of the source is 0.5 millicuries. The static eliminators are leased by NRD for a one year period and returned to NRD at the expiration of the lease.

"3M uses about 40 of these devices in weighing balances in research laboratories at 3M Center, St. Paul MN. Receipt, shipment and annual change outs of the devices at the end of their lease is handled by a member of Corporate Health Physics (CHP). An individual in the laboratory where the device is used is designated as the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and is responsible for day-to-day use of the device. The RSOs conducts semiannual physical inventories of their devices, most recently in July 2006.

"The device in question was in use in a laboratory of the 3M Pharmaceutical Division in Building 260 on 3M Center. It was not in the balance where it was normally used when CHP attempted to replace it at the end of the lease in November 2006. It was then learned that the RSO for the laboratory had taken a different position at 3M and had not been in the laboratory since the physical inventory in July.

" CHP was not notified of the job transfer by the laboratory RSO. Therefore, there was a period of several months when there was no individual specifically responsible for the device. During that time we believe the device was moved to a different 3M laboratory for use there and placed in a drawer or other storage location by an employee who has since left the company. Since 3M announced plans for the sale of the Pharmaceutical Division, many research employees in that division have taken positions with other companies. The device may have been disposed of in the trash, though this seems unlikely as it has a radioactive material label. It also appears likely that it was stolen as it has no intrinsic value and little usefulness outside of a laboratory.

" Radiation exposure would not result from this device in an unrestricted area. The emitted alpha radiation is completely shielded by clothing or the dead skin layer on the outside of the body. The radioactive material is sealed in a capsule, which is further enclosed in the body of the device itself, thus preventing inhalation or ingestion. Wipe tests performed by 3M in January and July, 2006 showed no contamination at a minimum detection level of 1 x 10-6 microcuries.

" Actions taken to recover the lost device involved interviews with personnel in the laboratory where it was used and searches of that and surrounding laboratories. Emails were sent to persons working in the laboratories asking them to provide any information they had on the location of the device. Flyers with pictures of the device requesting its return were posted in the laboratories.

" Measures to ensure against a recurrence are:

- Reminders to laboratory RSOs and their management to notify Clip of any change in location of a nuclear static eliminator or in the job status of the RSO.

- Reminders were given to those working in the laboratories, during the course of the searches, of the need to leave the nuclear static eliminators in their assigned location."

Notified NMSS EO (Morell), R3DO (Lara), and ILTAB (via email).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43045
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: NO FRILLS SUPERMARKETS
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0189
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILLS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/11/2006
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 11/27/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB via email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The licensee provided the following information via email:

"The licensee discovered a missing self-luminous sign (Safety Light Model 2040, Serial number D76434) upon doing the annual inventory. They believe the sign was removed by the contractor during a remodeling project in the building about four months before. They believe the sign is in the landfill. They will replace all of the self-luminous exit signs with non radioactive exit signs in 2007."

Isotope - Tritium, Activity - 25 Curies.

Nebraska Event Number: NE060008

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43048
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: OKLAHOMA CARDIOVASCULAR
Region: 4
City: OKLAHOMA CITY State: OK
County:
License #: OK-27476-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/13/2006
Notification Time: 02:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2006
Event Time: 23:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE INVOLVING A Co-57 FLOOD SCANNER SOURCE

The Director of the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality Radiation Protection Agency contacted the NRC Operations Center to report a fire involving one of their material licensees. At approximately 2320 CST on 12/12/06, a fire alarm actuated at Oklahoma Cardiovascular, a mobile nuclear medicine business located in Oklahoma City, OK. The Oklahoma City Fire Department and the HAZMAT team responded to the alarm. The fire destroyed a vehicle containing a plastic coated Co-57 source (10 millicuries). The source is used as a "flood source" for sodium iodide scanners to test the function of the scanner by providing an even radiation field for the scanner to produce images. Three vehicles were parked in the garage, each having one Co-57 source inside each vehicle. The destroyed vehicle appears to be the source of the fire, and the fire department has extinguished the fire. The other vehicles don't appear to be significantly damaged. The Oklahoma City Fire Department is reading radiation levels above background. Oklahoma City Police Department is providing security overnight to prevent access to the area. The licensee doesn't know if vandalism or theft was involved. However, there is media interest in this event. The State of Oklahoma representative intends to go to the site in the morning and contact the NRC with any additional information.

* * * UPDATE AT 0953 ON 12/13/2006 FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The local hazmat team is still in control of the site. An Health Physicist has determined that the source is intact. A contact reading outside the sheath reads 0.2 milliRem/hr. All swipes were negative and readings elsewhere in the building indicated only background radiation.

Notified the R4DO (Smith) and NMSS (Morell).

* * * UPDATE AT 1120 ON 12/13/2006 FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO JOE O'HARA * * *

All Co-57 sources located at the facility are intact, and there is not spread of loose surface contamination. The sources did not melt but remained intact inside their shielding. The source located inside the vehicle which burned had decayed to 2 millicuries. The fire was not deliberately set and originated in a transformer located inside the garage.

Notified the R4DO (Smith) and NMSS (Morell).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43052
Rep Org: SCIENTECH, LLC
Licensee: NUS INSTRUMENTS, LLC
Region:
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN R. BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/14/2006
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2006
Event Time: 14:47 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
DAVID PROULX (R4)

Event Text

PART 21 - DEFECT FOUND IN BASIC COMPONENTS (FOXBORO REPLACEMENT MODULES) SUPPLIED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Scientech LLC company manufactures a replacement for obsolete Foxboro 66 R Lead/Lag unit - a TMD500, the time domain module in NUSI's Series 500 line. The Fully model number is of the form TMD500-xx/xx/xx/xx-xx-xx-yy, where xx defines certain input, output, and power options, while 'yy' selects the style of faceplate.

Two shipments were made to Ginna, one of five modules and one of nine modules, were made in mid-September of 2006. Ginna performed receipt inspection and tested the modules for proper operation. The tests confirmed that NUSI had configured the modules as required and the modules worked as expected.

Ginna Station installed the NUSI TMD500 modules in the reactor protection channels as part of a modification required for an extended power uprate.

After further testing twelve modules in total were installed; 4 modules configured for OPDT setpoint calculator, and 8 modules configured as lag units. Two lag modules units were installed in each of the four reactor protection channels on the output side of the Thot R/I modules, to dampen the effects of hot leg streaming. All of these modules were bought under one purchase order and received in September 2006.

On 11/2/06, several days after installation and calibration activities were completed, computer monitoring of the OPDT setpoints indicated that Channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator module was following Tavg as it increased from 550 degrees F. The magnitude was small - approximately 0.3 degrees F change for a 10 degree F change in Tavg. However, the output of the module should have been steady until Tavg reached 574 degrees F. Ginna Station Operations declared reactor protection channel 1 OPDT setpoint inoperable when this condition was identified. The module was replaced, the replacement calibrated, and the channel was declared operable.

On 11/6/06, several days later, computer monitoring of the channel 2 OPDT setpoint calculator showed it was exhibiting the same anomalous behavior that has occurred previously on the channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator. Operations declared channel 2 OPDT setpoint inoperable. Ginna requested a team from NUSI travel to site and address the problem. A team of one engineer, one assembler, and the QA Manager traveled to Ginna to inspect and hopefully correct the problem.

Troubleshooting by Ginna Station I&C personnel determined that the zero potentiometer wiper was shorted to the module case. The edge of the mounting fixture for the Lo Lim potentiometer had cut through the insulation of the wire going to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer.

The NUSI team arrived on site while Ginna personnel were making repairs, and provided advice. The team inspected the module originally found defective and removed from service; they found that the wire to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer was damaged. They reinsulated the wire with electrical tape in accordance with approved Ginna procedures and tested the module, confirming that it worked correctly. The NUSI team then returned to the Idaho Falls facility on the 11/08/06. NUSI initiated Non-Conformance Report 06N-090 and this 10CFR21 evaluation on 11/10/06.

Extent of Condition: There are four module types that use this style of faceplate:

TMD500-[options]-01 Time Domain Module, MTH500-[options]-01 Simple Math Module, CMM500-[options]-01 Complex Math Module, and HLS500-[options]-01 High/Low Select Module.

Modules in this category were sold to Ginna and Indian Point. These modules were also sold to Westinghouse for resale; the module identifiers were the same with the substitution of "9000" for "500" in the module number.

Per Scientech; Ginna, as stated above, is aware of the problem associated with the TMD500 but they have not been officially informed of a Part 21 being issued concerning the TMD500 problem. As for the Indian Point 2 and Westinghouse they have also not been informed of the Part 21 being issued. The major problem will be trying to trace down the where abouts of the "9000s" that were sold to Westinghouse.

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