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Event Notification Report for December 11, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/08/2006 - 12/11/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42165 43032 43034 43035 43036 43037 43040 43041 43042

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42165
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/22/2005
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2005
Event Time: 12:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)

Event Text

IMPROPER CRITICALITY SPACING FOR WASTE DRUM

"At 1205 CST, on 11-22-05 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that during waste drum remediation activities, a drum was discovered that was in violation of one leg of double contingency. Drum #39666W has been determined to contain up to (deleted) g (grams) U235 exceeding the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums. This drum was previously located in an NCS (Nuclear Criticality Safety) Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001 requirements. The drum was moved to the C-335 storage area under an approved Remediation Guide which established a safety basis for the movement of drums that had been roped off and posted per earlier direction. This drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area maintaining a minimum 2 foot edge-to-edge spacing under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency."

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS

"While the (deleted) gram U235 limit was exceeded for this drum; DAC-832-2A1280-0001 demonstrates that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical. The storage area is roped off and posted to prevent the addition of fissile material to the area; therefore another upset would be required before a criticality is possible."

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)

"This drum is currently stored in the Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, meeting double contingency. In order for a criticality to occur, two independent, unlikely, and concurrent events would have to occur."

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)

"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass."

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS)

"The drum has been determined to contain (deleted) grams U235. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical."

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES

"Although the drum contains greater than the WMO-001 limit of (deleted) grams U235 for NCS Spacing Exempt drums, it has been shown to be less than (deleted) grams U235 based on independent sample results. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array, are subcritical. Therefore, an additional process upset (i.e., spacing upset) would be necessary in order to have a criticality. Therefore, while the drum contained greater than (deleted) grams U235 in the spacing exempt array, the array has been shown to be subcritical for drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 thus maintaining one leg of double contingency."

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED

"At the time of discovery, the drum was being stored according to NCS approved spacing controls. The drum will continue to be handled according to approved controls until the U235 mass can be reduced to meet the NCS Spacing Exempt criteria per NCSA WMO-001.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
See Related Event Report #40700.

* * * UPDATE 1802 EST ON 2/13/06 FROM K. BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

"At 1100 [CST], on 02-13-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that two additional waste drums were discovered that exceed the allowed [deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Notified R2DO(Ayres) and NMSS (Camper).

* * * UPDATE ON 3/20/06 AT 1859 EST FROM B. WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

"At 1430, on 03-20-06, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The additional drum was determined to contain (deleted) grams U235. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ernstes) and NMSS EO (Pierson) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/20/06 AT 1750 EDT FROM B. WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

" At 1130, on 04-20-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The additional drum (#41663) was determined to contain (deleted) grams of U235."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/21/06 AT 2040 EDT FROM WALKER TO HUFFMAN * * *

"At 1333, on 4-21-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that seven additional waste drums had been discovered that exceed the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"Seven additional drums (41160W,41161W,41162W,41158W,41159W,40605W.41681W) were determined to contain in excess of the (deleted) gram limit of U235 but less than the (deleted) gram safety limit."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/28/06 AT 1802 EDT FROM WALKER TO A. COSTA * * *

"At 1430, on 04-28-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [DELETED] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"[This] one additional drum, # 43170W was determined to contain in excess of the [DELETED] gram limit of U235 but less than the [DELETED] gram safety limit."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Landis) and NMSS EO (Giitter).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/11/06 AT 1551 EDT FROM WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

At 0900, on 10-11-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum (#41470W) has been discovered that exceeds the allowed limit (but less than the safety limit) for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Decker) and NMSS EO (Essig).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/06 AT 1130 EDT FROM K. A. BEASLEY TO MACKINNON * * *


At 1000, on 10/24/06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [Deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Brain Bonser) and NMSS (Sandra Wastler).


* * * UPDATE ON 12/08/06 AT 1604 EST FROM K. A. BEASLEY TO KOZAL * * *

At 1140 on 12/08/06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum (42171W) has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [Deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NSCA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2RDO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43032
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: SAN LUIS OBISPO State: CA
County: SAN LUIS OBISPO
License #: 0496-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/05/2006
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2006
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

"On December 5, 2006, the licensee reported that an exit sign, currently containing approximately 5.5 Ci of H-3 was apparently lost or inadvertently disposed during remodeling of the University Library in October 2006. This sign was distributed by 'Self Powered Lighting' in Elmsford, NY (15 Ci in March 1989), Model 710-A, S/N A60. The sign was mounted in the east stairwell of the 4th floor of the University Library, and was present during the quarterly inventory July 31, 2006. During the October inventory, and while the building was being remodeled, the sign was missing. The University staff investigated, but were unable to determine the disposition of the sign. The wall where the sign was mounted was removed by a contractor during the remodeling. The RSO discussed the situation with the Construction Manager and the University's Project Management Staff to avert such occurrences during future remodeling activities. The University will notify RHB if the sign is located. The most likely scenario is that this sign was disposed with other construction debris."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43034
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UROLOGY CENTER
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 02200310002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK LIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/06/2006
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 12/05/2006
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT - LOWER DOSE THAN PRESCRIBED

"On December 6, 2006 at 9:00 AM the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection received a phone call from The Urology Center, LLC Ohio License number 02200310002 reporting a possible medical event that was discovered on December 5, 2006 at approximately 12:00 PM. The licensee reported that the loading of seeds into the prostate gland was not performed properly, resulting in a total shift of the seeds to the intended treatment site. This resulted in a dose to the intended treatment site to be 40 percent less than the prescribed dose. The seeds were delivered to the prostate gland. A preliminary report is expected by 4 PM December 6, 2006. A detailed written report will be due in 15 Days. A Ohio Bureau of Radiation Inspector will perform an inspection the week of December 11."

The seeds used for the implant were I-125, curie content not known at this time. It is not known at this time if there will be any deleterious effects due to this treatment. The patient was notified at the time of the treatment.

Ohio event number: 2006-100

* * * UPDATE FROM FLANNERY (FSME) TO HUFFMAN AT 0706 ON 12/07/06 * * *

This event has been reviewed by the NRC medical review committee and determined to be a reportable medical event.

A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43035
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: VIRGINIA MASON MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: SEATTLE State: WA
County:
License #: WN-M048-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 12/06/2006
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2006
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CANCER THERAPY SEEDS

The State provided the following information via email:

"Date and time of Event: 29 November 2006 (reported to DOH on 5 December 2006)

"Location of Event: Seattle, Washington (main campus operating room)

"ABSTRACT: A Central Services employee, who was to only clean bodily fluids from the exterior of a cancer therapy seed applicator post-use, apparently also opened the spring-loaded device displacing the remaining seeds. The remaining seven seeds in the applicator (one was later found in garbage, six are still missing) popped out. The six seeds were apparently flushed down the drain by mistake. Surveys cannot locate the seeds at this time. Cause, contributing factors, and corrective actions have not been determined as of this writing. At this time no consequences are expected and there has been no media attention.

"Isotope and Activity involved: Iodine-125, sealed brachytherapy seeds. Six seeds, total of 97.7 MegaBq (2.64 millicuries).

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): None noted or expected.

"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Lost, mfg/model not yet known.

"Disposition/recovery: To be determined.

"Leak test? Original, by Manufacturer, within past six months.

"Release of activity? The seeds were apparently released to the waste water drain. No contamination was found.

"Consequences: None so far, none expected."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43036
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: APPLIED GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: SANDY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800298
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/06/2006
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2006
Event Time: [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LICENSEE LOST CUSTODY OF TROXLER GAUGE DURING TRANSPORT

The State of Utah reported that a member of the general public recovered a Troxler moisture density gauge on a street located near St. George, Utah. Apparently, the licensee was transporting the gauge through this area when it fell off the vehicle. The licensee was not aware that the gauge was no longer in their custody and continued traveling down the road. A member of the general public, a cable company employee, noticed the gauge and its transportation container lying in the street. The individual recovered the gauge, placed it back in the transport container, and contacted the licensee via the phone number on the package. The licensee arrived and took custody of the gauge from the member of the general public. The licensee reported that the source remained in the safe, shielded position. The licensee reported that the gauge was not damaged and is located in their St George, Utah office. The State is expecting additional details regarding the serial number, isotope, or activity of the gauge.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Hospital Event Number: 43037
Rep Org: ST. JOHNS MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: ST. JOHNS MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: ST. LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00794-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT TURCO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/07/2006
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2006
Event Time: 07:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ON PACKAGE EXCEEDING SHIPPING LIMITS

The RSO for St. Johns Mercy Medical Center reported that a package was received at the facility with external and internal contamination. The package originated from a radiopharmaceutical company, GE- Healthcare, St. Louis and contained 400 microCi of I-123 and 5 milliCi of Tc-99. The package was surveyed upon receipt and found to have contamination levels of approximately 3100 dpm per square centimeter on both external and internal surfaces. This contamination is greater than the limits permitted in 49 CFR 173.443 and are therefore reportable. The contamination was analyzed in a multichannel analyzer and is believed to be Tc-99. The radiopharmaceuticals in the package were not damaged or leaking and the contamination does not appear to be from the contents of the shipment.

The GE-Healthcare, St. Louis facility was contacted and informed of the contamination. The driver and the vehicle used to transport the package have been surveyed and no contamination found. No other contamination has been found at the St. Johns Mercy Medical Center. The hospital plans to hold onto the shipping package until the Tc-99 decays before it is returned to GE- St. Louis.

* * * RETRACTION FROM TURCO TO HUFFMAN AT 1045 EST ON 12/08/06 * * *

Upon further investigation, the RSO for St. Johns has determined that the package was likely contaminated by the technician that performed the receipt inspection at the St. Johns Mercy Medical Center. The gloves of the technician performing the initial survey swipes were apparently contaminated by activities at the facility prior to receiving the package. Therefore, the licensee is retracting this event. NRC Region III (Piskura) was notified by the licensee.

R3DO (Lipa) and NMSS EO (Morell) have been notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43040
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM FOUSE
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 12/08/2006
Notification Time: 22:42 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2006
Event Time: 18:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CREFS SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable at 1812 on 12/8/06 because the W-14A, F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan tripped during performance of the monthly technical specification surveillance test, TS-9.

"This fan is required to be operable for operability of the CREFS System. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9, Control Room Emergency Filtration System and both units have entered action condition A, 'CREFS Inoperable' with a required action to 'Restore CREFS to OPERABLE Status' with a completion time of 7 days.

"CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43041
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER SANCHEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/09/2006
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 05:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

INADVERTENT OPENING OF TWO ISOLATION VALVES

"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the Unit 2 Train B Containment Spray System.

"On October 30, 2006 at approximately 0600 hours, a Main Control Room (MCR) Senior Reactor Operator identified during a panel walk-down that the containment spray header isolation valve, 2CS007B, and the containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, 2CS019B, were open. This was an unexpected condition, which prompted Operations to investigate. A review of the Alarm computer points revealed that the valves opened at 0537 hours. The investigation determined that the most probable cause of this occurrence was attributed to, during the performance of maintenance inside of the 2PA10J panel, an Electrical Maintenance Department technician inadvertently making contact with the manual latch causing the actuation of the K643B slave relay that led to repositioning of the out-of-position valves.

"The following information provides the required details outlined in NUREG 1022 Revision 2:

"(a) The relay actuation for the 2B Containment Spray valves was not a valid ESF actuation. The actuation was the result of an inadvertent bump of the K643B relay and not the result of a valid ESF signal from the reactor protection system.

"(b) This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"(c) The specific train and system that actuated was 2B Containment Spray.

"(d) The train actuation was a partial actuation for three containment spray valves from the K643B slave relay due to an inadvertent bump of the slave relay manual latching mechanism with the following conditions identified:

" 2CS007B, 2B containment spray header isolation valve, changed from closed to open.

"2CS010B, 2B containment spray NaOH eductor inlet isolation valve, is normally open and did not change position, but received an open signal.

"2CS019B, 2B containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, changed from closed to open.

"The 2B containment spray system was in TEST in preparation for changing from Mode 5 to Mode 4.

"(e) The containment spray system did not start because the system was in TEST and the containment spray pumps were in lock out while in Mode 5. The three valves functioned as designed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43042
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE HACKLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/11/2006
Notification Time: 00:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2006
Event Time: 16:08 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/11/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

RAPID SHUTDOWN AND MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH REACTOR COOLANT PUMP STATOR TEMPERATURE

"On December 10, 2006, at 1608 PST, operators manually tripped the reactor while it was subcritical. This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the reactor protection system while subcritical. On December 10, 2006, with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, operators initiated an unplanned reactor shutdown due to indications of increasing stator temperature on reactor coolant pump 2-2. In accordance with plant procedures, when the reactor coolant pump stator temperature reached 300 degrees Fahrenheit, operators manually tripped the reactor and tripped the coolant pump 2-2. The reactor was subcritical at the time of the reactor trip but all rods had not been fully inserted.

"All control rods fully inserted in response to the reactor trip and all systems functioned as required. The auxiliary feedwater system was already in service as part of the shutdown. The grid is stable and with the exception of RCP 2-2, all major equipment including the 3 emergency diesel generators remain operable. Unit 2 electrical loads are being supplied by the normal startup power. The other 3 RCPs are maintaining forced circulation of the reactor coolant system. Investigations into the high RCP stator temperature are ongoing, the unit will remain in Mode 3 pending the results of these investigations. An estimated restart date is not known at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed and was onsite at the time of the trip. Unit 1 is unaffected and remains in Mode 1."

The licensee stated that a press release related to this event is likely.

* * * UPDATE TO HUFFMAN DURING PLANT STATUS AT 0419 EST * * *

Licensee believes the cause of the high RCP stator temperature was due to a failed RTD.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. PARKER TO P. SNYDER AT 1531 ON 12/14/06 * * *

"Unit 2 was in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at 0 percent power at the time of the manual trip. At the time of the Initial notification, all procedural requirements for declaring Mode 3 had not been met, but upon further review, PG&E has verified K effective was less than 0.99."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

The original report was modified by this change. The 'RX Crit' field was changed from 'Y' to 'N'. The 'Init Power' field was changed from '5' to '0'. The 'Curr Power' field was changed from 'Startup' to 'Hot Standby'.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012