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Event Notification Report for November 17, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/16/2006 - 11/17/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42914 42962 42987 42988 42994 42995 42996

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42914
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY D. COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/17/2006
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2006
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"Unit HPCI system declared inoperable. During performance of the quarterly surveillance, HPCI pump operability, the HPCI system was secured when the "HPCI Turbine Oil Pressure Low" alarm was received and confirmed. Turbine governor end bearing oil pressure was 2 PSIG. The alarm setpoint is 6 PSIG and procedure limit is 10-12 PSIG. Pressure adjust valve was throttled open to raise pressure to 11 PSIG. The HPCI system was not immediately declared inoperable since an evaluation was being performed to determine if 2 PSIG turbine bearing oil pressure was adequate. Evaluation by the vendor will not be complete until 10/18/06. At 1655 hours, HPCI declared operable after a successful run with adequate oil pressure. HPCI is a single train system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.



* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY NRC ON 11/06/06 AT 1106 EST DUE TO EVENT ENTRY ERROR * * *

Original report was entered in error on 10/17/06 with Unit 2 versus Unit 1. Changed EN #42914 to accurately reflect the affected unit (Unit 1).

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY E. BURKETT TO KOZAL ON 11/16/06 AT 1039 * * *

"EN #42914 was submitted by Southern Nuclear Operating Company based upon a conservative decision to declare the HPCI system inoperable pending further evaluation to support its operability. Southern Nuclear Operating Company retracts EN #42914 based on the following discussion.

"During a subsequent review of the parameters by the HPCI Turbine Vendor, Dresser-Rand, and site engineering it was concluded that the HPCI system would have been capable of performing its intended safety function with the lower turbine governor end bearing oil pressure.

"During the operation of the system, the visual local indication was approximately 2.5 PSIG oil pressure at the governor end bearing. A review of the data showed that with a governor end oil pressure of the procedural minimal of 10 PSIG, the predicted oil flow rate would be 1.08 gpm with a minimum film thickness of 0.48 mils and a maximum bearing temperature of 228 deg F. With a degraded oil pressure of 2.5 PSIG, the predicted oil flow rate would be 0.54 gpm with a minimum film thickness of 0.46 mils and a maximum bearing temperature of 233 deg F.

"Based on the calculated data, the turbine governor end bearing would have performed satisfactorily for at least 8 hours at an oil pressure of 2.5 PSIG. Using the design basis success criteria, HPCI operation is successful if the system can inject water through the core Feedwater line for a total of 4 hours over a 24 hour period. The 4 hour mission time for HPCI is based on the design basis - if HPCI fails, it is backed up by the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) in combination with Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection. The HPCI system is not credited for long term injection or late injection.

"Although the oil flow rate was reduced by 50% and the minimum film thickness reduced by 4%, the bearing temperatures were predicted to only increase a maximum of 5 deg F. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the bearing was not damaged during the operation with low oil pressure when the turbine was run for 9 minutes at 2.5 PSIG governor end bearing oil pressure."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42962
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PACIFIC ECOSOLUTIONS (PECOS)
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL J. ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 10:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)

Event Text

WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

This event was received via e-mail

"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated enclosure within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the enclosure were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the enclosure directing the work. At the end of the day, the supervisor noted he was contaminated. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate to the individual's lung was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3.

"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. No release to the public or the environment occurred. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.

"Media is aware of the incident.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)

"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. One worker has an apparent over exposure of 97.5 Rem CDE to the Lung. No release to public or environment."

* * * UPDATE FROM WASHINGTON STATE (FRAZEE) TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL AT 1746 ON 11/16/06 * * *

"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated room, (previously reported as an enclosure within the room) within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the room were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the room directing the work. A very high contamination level was detected (greater than 2 million dpm/wipe) in the room at about 10:00, and the building was evacuated shortly after that. At about this time, an air sample that was in the area of the workers was counted and determined to have a very high alpha activity (10 E-9 Ci/ml). The supervisor and the workers were taken to a survey area and found to be contaminated on the face. Contamination was detected on the respirators. The workers were successfully decontaminated by the on site health physics department. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3. Subsequent counts on the first individual were lower (about 9nCi), and the subsequent 2 workers follow-up counts decreased from about 6.9nCi to 3.2nCi and from 1.5nCi to 0.5nCi. The final dose received will depend on the efficiency of the chelate treatment and other factors. One additional person who was in the building was analyzed for internal Am-241 contamination, and was found to be <0.092nCi, below the detection limit of the instrument.

"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.

Update as of 14 November:

"The three employees are still being treated with a chelating agent. This week should be the last week. At this time, there is no update on the original activity or the activity left in the body, except that the amount of activity in the lung is decreasing. It will be several weeks before the final dose can be calculated by the licensee's consultants, which will be based on the initial lung count, the bioassay results (urine/fecal), and the effectiveness of the chelate at removing the americium from the body. At this point, we assume there are three individuals who may have exceeded their annual dose limit of 50 Rem to the bone. The final dose received by the three individuals will be calculated when sufficient information is accumulated. The three workers have returned to work exhibiting some emotional stress and slight effects from the medical treatments.

Plant Status

"The plant is being restarted incrementally after a safety shutdown imposed by the company. After DOH approval, two process lines have been restarted: the super compactor on the mixed waste side of operations and an inspection and sorting process, also on the mixed waste side. The licensee is completing items identified on the mixed waste thermal systems safety evaluation, and expects to restart those processes in the next few days. In addition, they are completing items identified on the low level thermal systems, but a restart date is pending. The low level processes that were affected by this accident are not being restarted, until the contamination in the building is controlled. The building that the material is in is being decontaminated, and continues to be a respirator area. The contaminated room is still inaccessible, however, a plan was completed to re-enter the room to assess the extent of the contamination. This initial entry was conducted on 11-14-06 by senior members of the Health Physics staff. As a result of the surveys conducted during the reentry, the extent of the problem they face is better understood. A plan is being developed to decontaminate the room.

"The investigation is continuing, and the actual cause of the event does not appear to be a single cause, but rather compounding mistakes, errors in judgment and complacency for the seriousness of this type material. Corrective actions that are being taken by the licensee at this time, are primarily based on self evaluation, using the workers and technical staff. In addition, at this time DOH is requiring the company to retrain the radiological technicians as well as the workers in the different waste processes prior to restart of any process. DOH is working with the company to identify the root causes of this incident.

"No release to public or environment. Air sample analysis results for a particulate sample in the building exhaust stack was 9.2E-3 Ci/ml gross alpha.

"The building is being decontaminated, and additional containment tents are being installed around the contaminated room.

"Media is aware of the incident. Tri-City Herald (Kennewick Washington) article was published November 4, 2006.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)

"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. The first worker had an initial internal deposition result of 11.7 nCi. Two additional workers have been confirmed as having an internal deposition: initial results were 6.9 nCi and 1.5 nCi. Subsequent counts of all three involved personnel were lower. All three workers were given chelating treatment. The final dose will be calculated by the Battelle internal dosimetry program, following extensive testing. Other workers who were in the area are being tested. The estimated dose to the endosteal (white bone matter) from 11.7nCi is about 95 rem CDE."

R4DO (Johnson) and NMSS EO (Camper) notified.

Washington State Report # WA-06-063.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42987
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: PRECISION ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: DESOTO PARISH State: LA
County:
License #: LA-4413-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 11/13/2006
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED SOURCE

The state provided the following information via fax:

"Precision Energy Services abandoned a 2 Ci source of Cs-137 (serial number 06926B) down a hole at a depth of 3064 feet. The tool string got stuck on September 20, 2006. The first attempt to retrieve the stuck tool string succeeded in retrieving the Am/Be neutron source but also caused the tools to break apart. The section of the tool string with the Cs-137 source was stuck at a depth of 3064 feet. Red-dyed cement plug was set with open-ended drill pipe at 3060 feet to 2860 feet. Production casing was run and cemented at 2850 feet, with float shoe, 41 feet of cement filled shoe joint, and float collar. The deflection device was dropped on the float collar and 20 feet of red-dyed cement was dumped on the device on November 1, 2006. An identification plaque will be placed on the well."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42988
Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BUILDING & EARTH SCIENCES, INC.
Region: 1
City: ALBERTVILLE State: AL
County:
License #: 1266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID A. TURBERVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2006
Event Time: 12:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
DUNCAN WHITE (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (NSIR)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM ALABAMA - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Information was received via facsimile

"SUBJECT: Stolen Gauge Containing Radioactive Material - Alabama Event 06-46

"On the morning of November 13, 2006 at 8:00 am, (deleted) of Building and Earth Sciences, Inc. notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control Duty Officer that a Troxler Model 3430 moisture density gauge was stolen from the back of pickup truck that was parked at a commercial storage location in Albertville, Alabama. Building and Earth Sciences, Inc. is authorized to possess and use radioactive material under their Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 1266. Preliminary information indicates that the gauge was discovered stolen approximately 1:30 pm on the afternoon of November 12, 2006. (Deleted) indicated that the Albertville Police Department had been notified and responded to the incident. The gauge was believed stolen sometime between 12:45 pm and 1:30 pm on November 12, 2006. The stolen gauge was identified as a Troxler model 3430, serial number 37367 with 8 millicuries of Cs-137, and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be. (Deleted) indicated that a number of other items were stolen from the victim including three motorcycles and an air compressor.

"This information is current as of 3:00 pm CDT - November 13, 2006."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ALABAMA (TURBERVILLE) TO KOZAL VIA FAX ON 11/17/06 AT 0848 * * *

"On the morning of November 16, 2006, [Deleted] of Building and Earth Sciences,. Inc, notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control that the Albertville Police Department had found the Troxler model 3430 moisture density gauge that was stolen from the licensee on November 12, 2006. Building and Earth Sciences, Inc is authorized to possess and use radioactive material under their Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 1266. The police department was given as anonymous tip and found the device in its transport container located in an abandoned lot in Albertville, Alabama. [Deleted] surveyed the device and found radiation levels were acceptable. An inspection of the device confirmed that this was the device stolen from the licensee on November 12, 2006. It was noted that someone had poured bleach on the unit. This appeared to be the only damage to the unit. [Deleted] took possession of the unit and was advised to perform a leak test of the unit before placing it back in service."

Notified R1DO (Henderson), NMSS EO (Camper), R1 (White) via-email and ILTAB (Sandler) via-email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42994
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EUGENE MACE
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 11/16/2006
Notification Time: 01:38 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2006
Event Time: 00:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

SPDS UNAVAILIBLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"The Safety Parameter Display System and ERDS will be out of service for approximately 4 hours for scheduled maintenance. SPDS and ERDS parameters will be monitored by Control Board indications. Work will be continuous until SPDS/ERDS are returned to service. Alternate assessment and communication measures are available to compensate for these temporary impairments.

"This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. Cooper Nuclear Station is currently in a scheduled refueling outage. The operation of Cooper Nuclear Station is not affected by this planned maintenance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42995
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN UMPHREY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/16/2006
Notification Time: 03:02 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2006
Event Time: 00:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP AND DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION OF AN UNSUAL EVENT

At 0018 Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to a turbine trip. "At the time a clearance order was being performed for upcoming maintenance on P-13000-2 [transformer]. As a result of the turbine trip, RCS pressure rose to approximately 2420 psia causing the PORV's to open. Unexpectedly, a Pressurizer Safety Valve, RV-200 also lifted and reclosed when RCS pressure was lowered to approximately 1500 psia. As a result of the pressure decrease, a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) occurred. Once the Pressurizer Safety Valve reclosed, RCS pressure began to rise to return to normal values.

"Decay heat is being removed via normal methods through the Turbine Bypass Valves to the Condenser.

"Normal Feedwater is being used. No Auxiliary Feedwater actuation occurred.

"Two Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured as a result of the SIAS. The plant responded normally to the event. The plant is currently stable and operators are conducting a plant cooldown to mode 5."

All control rods fully inserted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM C. MORGAN TO W. GOTT AT 1039 ON 11/16/06 * * *

The automatic trip was due to high RCS pressure from the closure of the Turbine Intercept Valves. Both PORV's opened as designed. One remained open approximately 1.5 minutes causing RCS pressure to reduce to 1500 psia. The PORV should have closed at 2400 psia. Relief Valve 200 (RV-200) did not open as previously reported and was not the cause of the RCS pressure lowering. Acoustic monitoring indication were due to the close proximity of the PORV. Since the SIAS signal did not cause a reportable ECCS actuation, the reported 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) ECCS Actuation is retracted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (P. Henderson).


* * * UPDATE FROM C. MORGAN TO W. HUFFMAN AT 1200 EST ON 11/16/06 * * *

Upon further review, the licensee has determined that this event met the criteria for Unusual Event Emergency Action Level (EAL A.U.2.2.1) for identified RCS leakage greater than 25 gpm. The licensee met this criteria for the duration that the PORV valve remained open (less than 2 minutes). The licensee did not recognize that it had met the criteria at the time of the event and is reporting this as an after-the-fact emergency condition of unusual event per the guidance in NUREG-1022. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (P. Henderson), NRR EO (Ross-Lee), and IRD Manager (Leach).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42996
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES JOHNSTONE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/16/2006
Notification Time: 03:57 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2006
Event Time: 02:26 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP

"At 0226, North Anna Power Station Unit 2 automatically tripped on steam flow greater than feed flow with low steam generator water level on 'B' Steam Generator. This was caused by a Steam Flow Channel (Channel 3) Low failure. After the reactor trip, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps automatically started on Low-Low Steam Generator Level."

All control rods fully inserted. RCPs are in operation transferring decay heat to the steam generators. The steam generators are discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dumps. Main feedwater pumps are running to maintain steam generator water levels. Unit 1 was not affected.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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