Event Notification Report for November 10, 2006

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AT LOW POWER

"On 11/10/2006 with a shutdown in progress to repair a degraded bearing on the turbine generator, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a power range nuclear instrumentation (NI) low range - high flux trip. Reactor power had just been lowered to below 10% power (P-10) where the power range (NI) low range trips become active. The bistable for power range NI N-42 had been tripped due to an unrelated failure on 11/09/2006. When P-10 automatically unblocked, a power range NI low range high flux reactor trip was generated. At the time of the trip, reactor power was well below the trip setpoint of 24.5% power.

"Following the trip, Main Feedwater Regulating Valve, FW-7A, did not automatically close as required on the reactor trip coincident with Low Tave (554F). The Reactor Operator reported FW-7A was mid-position and attempted to manually close FW-7A. It did not respond. As a result, levels in steam generator A rose to greater than 67%, which initiated feedwater isolation. The feedwater isolation signal tripped the running feedwater pump. With no feedwater pumps running, both Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B automatically started as required. The High-High steam generator level also resulted in a second reactor trip initiation signal. The Reactor Operator manually controlled Auxiliary Feedwater flow to steam generator A to restore normal level. Following the feedwater isolation, FW-7A fully closed.

"Following the trip, MS-201B1, the steam supply to main steam reheater B1 was locally isolated to limit the RCS cool down. This was a previously discussed contingency action. Main steam isolation valves remained open and normal condenser heat sink remained available.

"Further investigation as to the cause of the trip is in progress. Recovery actions per normal operating procedures are in progress."

The plant was being shut down at a rate of a half percent power per minute at the time of the trip. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip and no safety or relief valves lifted. The plant was aligned for the normal shutdown electrical lineup prior to the trip. The temperature on the generator bearing reached a maximum of 190F with trip guidance set at 225F.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SHIPMENT OF IODINE - 125 SEEDS LOST IN TRANSIT

The State provided the following information via email:

"On November 10, 2006, [a representative] of Bard Brachytherapy, Inc. (IL-02062-01) called to report that they had been advised by their customer, that a package intended for Milton Hospital, Milton, Massachusetts did not make it to its destination. The package had been offered to their courier, Airnet, the previous evening for next morning delivery. Using the company's package tracking system, it was determined that the shipment (DELETED) had been transferred from Airnet, to the American Airlines' O'Hare Airport Air Freight Hub in Chicago, IL., but no record of its departure existed. Physical searches of the airport facility by the carriers' staff did not immediately locate the package containing the radioactive material. The shipment consisted of 2 leaded pigs of I-125 sealed sources. One pig held 73 'seeds' with an activity of 66 milliCuries, the second held 80 'seeds' with an activity of 72 mCi. The two packages had been combined into an 'over pack' with a total activity of approximately 134 milliCi of I-125. The package was identified as a 'limited quantity' package with a dose rate of less than 0.5 milliR/h at the surface of the container. The box was approximately 15x12x12 inches in size. As of 17:30 CST the package remains missing.

"The customer, Milton Hospital, notified their local regulatory authority, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Radiation Control Program to advise them of the situation. Due to the quantity of I-125 involved, the U.S. NRC Operations Center was advised of this event. As a result, U.S. NRC event number 42984 was assigned. Bard is continuing to work with their courier and the carrier to locate the package. At this time American Airlines believes it is still in possession of the package as it does not show the airbill tracking number (DELETED) as arriving at any of its domestic hubs. The radioactive material involved is encapsulated in medical grade stainless steel and is approximately the size of a 0.5 cm length of pencil lead. It is used as a permanent implant to treat cancer of the prostate. Due to the energy of I-125, it posses a very limited external exposure hazard, and then only at very close distances of less then a foot. [The Bard representative] promised to keep the Agency informed of developments as they occurred by contacting the Agency's radiation duty officer."

Illinois Report No: IL060058

* * * UPDATE AT 1755 ON 11/11/2006 FROM D. PERERRO TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The package has been located at the airport in Boston, MA. The package is intact and is being returned to the originator in Illinois.

Notified the R3DO (Cameron), NMSS (McConnell), and ILTAB (English via E-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

EDG ACTUATION DUE TO ACCIDENTAL SWITCH MISPOSITIONING

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of any of the equipment specified in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). In this case, the equipment actuated was the four Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators (EDG) A, B, C, and D. These EDGs are common equipment for Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2.

"On November 10, 2006, personnel were performing surveillance requirement (SR) test 0-SR-3.8.1.6, Common Accident Signal Logic. At this time Browns Ferry Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled, and Unit 2 was operating at 100% thermal power. During conduct of this testing, at 0010 hours CST, all four of the common U1/2 EDGs were inadvertently started. This occurred when test personnel (non-licensed) inadvertently placed a keylock switch in the wrong position during the equipment restoration portion of the testing. The SR test step being performed was correct, but it was incorrectly implemented.

"All affected equipment operated per the plant design in response to the switch manipulation, with each of the four EDGs properly starting and running in response to the invalid start signal. No loss of normal plant electrical power occurred, and none of the EDGs connected to its associated 4-Kv shutdown board. The EDGs were shutdown in accordance with plant operating procedures approximately 13 minutes after their start.

" Since no actual plant condition existed which required the EDGs to start, and since the starts occurred inadvertently as a result of a human error during a test performance, this event is classified as invalid.

"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. [Reference BFN corrective action document PER 114498].

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * *UPDATED ON 3/13/07 BY KOZAL TO EXPORT TO NRC INTERNAL WEBSITE* * *