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Event Notification Report for November 10, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/09/2006 - 11/10/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42942 42976 42977 42978 42979 42981

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42942
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 12:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"During plant cooldown/depressurization in Mode 3, an Over Temperature (OT) Delta Temperature reactor trip signal was generated. The reactor Trip Breakers opened as designed (all rods were previously inserted). Additionally, a low Tavg/P-4 Feedwater Isolation Signal was generated and all Bypass Feedwater Regulation Valves closed (open for long-cycle recirculation operation). No Feedwater Isolation Valves were open at the time. All systems performed as designed.

"Actual loop Delta T's (Th - Tc) never exceeded 3.3 degrees F, well below the calculated OT Delta T setpoint. But plant Delta T calculations are based on narrow range Th and Tc instruments with scaling to low limits. When actual plant temperature was lowered to the lower limits of each instrument, calculated Delta T increased to the OT Delta T setpoint causing the reactor trip signal. Existing procedure guidance did not adequately ensure that the reactor trip breakers are open prior to initiating a partial plant cooldown.

"The plant was stabilized. The long-cycle recirculation was re-established and plant cooldown/depressurization was recommenced, as originally planned to 340 degrees F and 925 psig."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 11/9/2006 AT 12:19 FROM THOMAS G. PETRAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Alvin W. Vogtle, Unit 1, Operating License no. NPF-68, Event Notification #42942 is retracted. The event reported in the notification which occurred during the Unit 1 cooldown in Mode 3 was not representative of the conditions under which the Over Temperature Delta Temperature (OTDT) setpoint is intended to operate. The setpoint is intended to provide protection while the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. As the cooldown progressed from Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature (NOPT), eventually the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot and cold leg temperature indications reached the low end of their ranges or scales. Further reductions of temperature resulted in artificial indications of core power (delta-T) that cannot be relied upon as a valid input to the OTDT protective function.

"The actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is not considered to be a valid actuation. As such, this is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The Unit 1 Feedwater Isolation caused from the OTDT reactor trip is not a function is listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3)(iv)(B) as a system whose actuation is required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42976
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 04:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2006
Event Time: 22:54 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FAILURE OF CONTROL ROOM HVAC TO MAINTAIN CONTROL ROOM TEMPERATURE

"At 22:54 hours on November 8, 2006, the B Control Room HVAC Refrigeration and Condensing Unit (RCU) failed to maintain proper Control Room temperature and cycling excessively. The RCU is a single train system and therefore is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The RCU is required to operate during a design basis accident to maintain Main Control Room habitability/temperature. The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) of CREVS remains operable. This places unit 2 in a 30 day LCORA per Tech Spec 3.7.5 Required Action A.1."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Hospital Event Number: 42977
Rep Org: THE VALLEY HOSPITAL
Licensee: THE VALLEY HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: RIDGEWOOD State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-03845
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK LO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2006
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

IMPLANTATION SEED FOUND IN MEDICAL WASTE BAG

A single Cs-131 implantation seed (2.66 milliCuries as of 9/25/06) was found in a medical waste bag which had not yet left the hospital. All applicable areas were surveyed and no radioactive contamination was found. The licensee is performing a leak test of the seed and will forward the results. The hospital is performing an investigation into the incident.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42978
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2006
Event Time: 06:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 95 Power Operation 95 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM VALVE INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED

"At 0644 hours (CST), the Main Control Room (MCR) received an alarm that the Division 3 Shutdown Service Water (SX) system was not available. The MCR also received an indication that a Division 3 SX motor operated valve for the plant service water to the SX header isolation valve, 1SX014C, was not available and discovered that there was no light indication for this valve. This valve is required to reposition following a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system initiation. With the loss of power to the valve, this resulted in the Division 3 SX and the HPCS systems being inoperable. Since the HPCS system is a single train safety system, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the loss of power to the 1SX014C valve, however, preliminary indications are that an individual may have inadvertently bumped the breaker to the 'off' position.

"At 0742 hours, the investigation of the 1SX014C breaker indicated that the breaker was in the 'off' position (i.e., not tripped). The cubicle door for the 1SX014C breaker was opened. There were no abnormal or unusual indications in the cubicle. The 1SX014C valve was verified open; then the 1SX014C breaker was closed. The breaker was taken directly to the close position and not reset first. The 1SX014C breaker closed, indication returned to the MCR, and the alarm cleared. The breaker remained closed and HPCS system was returned to an available status.

"At 1047 hours, the Division 3 SX pump was started to confirm that operability of Division 3 SX and HPCS were restored by the actions taken to reclose the breaker at 0742 hours. The 1SX014C valve operated normally and Division 3 SX and HPCS were declared operable.

"The NRC Resident has been notified."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42979
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2006
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
MEL LEACH (IRD)

Event Text

FAILURE OF WARNING HORNS

"At 0500 on 11/09/06, during a routine monthly test of the Criticality Warning System (CWS), a segment of the system covering the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was found to have no functioning evacuation horns. Appropriate personnel were notified, the DCP processes were shut down, DCP personnel evacuated, and the area cordoned off. The activation of the evacuation horns in the balance of the plant were fully functional.

"A follow-up test was immediately scheduled for 0900. The building was evacuated and the emergency organization assembled in accordance with normal procedures. During this test, the DCP horns again failed to function.

"The Emergency Director determined that the processes stay shut down and all personnel remain out of the area while investigations and testing were conducted.

"The problem was located in the interface between the Data Acquisition Modules (DAM's) and the Auto-Call system that initiates the alarm signals. After a repair was completed, a re-test was completed which confirmed functionality of the DCP process area horns.

"Current plans are to resume normal operations beginning with the 1500 (evening) shift.

"This event is being reported within 24-hours pursuant to 10CFR70.50(b)(2) as a safety equipment failure."

The licensee will notify NRC Region II.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42981
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
                   FABRICATION & SCRAP
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County: PENTON
License #: SNM-1227
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001257
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 21:28 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2006
Event Time: 15:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
KEITH McCONNELL (NMSS)

Event Text

HYDROGEN ACCUMULATION DUE TO LOSS OF WATER SEAL

"On 11/9/06 at 0210 hours the Dry Conversion facility line 1 began starting up. At 0230 hours the fire alarm actuated in the Dry Conversion facility. Upon investigation, AREVA operations personnel discovered at approximately 0240 hours that the Hydrogen detector in the HF [hydrogen fluoride] Recovery room had tripped. Operations personnel immediately shutdown the process system. Operations personnel discovered that there was no water plug in the drain P-trap from the exhaust. Therefore, H2 from the reactor and calciner offgas leaked through the drain into the room with H2 enough to the point of setting off the H2 detector which has a set point of 20% of the LEL [Low Explosive Limit]. Hand held readings were taken and determined to be approximately 7% of the LEL at the lower elevation in the room to 25% of the LEL near the ceiling of the room.

"AREVA operations personnel contacted Environmental Health and Safety to determine the safety significance of the event. After reviewing the ISA for this system, EHS&L personnel deemed at approximately 1530 hours that the analysis of this system configuration meets the 24 Hour Reporting Criteria, 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was riot analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR 70.61.'

"Evaluations determined that it is possible that enough H2 gas could have filled the room to cause an explosion in the HF Recovery room potentially causing a rupture of the HF holding tanks and piping. If an operator were present (this room is occupied approximately 5 to 10 times a week for 10 to 15 minutes each time) at the time of the explosion, it would be possible for the operator to receive sufficient injuries from HFA exposure to potentially make this an intermediate or high consequence event.

"Although this system has an H2 detector which, actuates a fire alarm, it is not designated as an IROFS.

"The process equipment associated with this scenario is still shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10CFR 70.61. All other systems with the potential for H2 gas leaks are being re-evaluated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10CFR 70.61 is met.

"The material in the identified system that is in the tanks that could spill onto an operator is HF solution with trace amounts of Uranium.

"Safety significance is low. The HF Recovery, room is not normally occupied during operation, and then for only short periods of time (this room is occupied approximately 5 to 10 times a week for 10 to 15 minutes each time). There is no potential of an accidental nuclear criticality in the as found condition.

"The process equipment associated with this scenario is shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10CFR 70.61. Related process systems that might have a similar potential are under evaluation to ensure that the same potential does not exist in these areas."

The licensee will notify NRC Region II.

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