| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/27/2006 - 10/30/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42927 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: OHMART/VEGA CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 03214310020
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 10/23/2006
Notification Time: 11:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM OHIO: CONTAMINATION INCIDENT IN SOURCE HANDLING FACILITIES
Agreements State report received via e-mail
Event Cause: Inadequate Procedure
"The Bureau was notified at approximately 4:00 PM on Friday, 10/20/06 that the licensee experienced a contamination incident in their source handling facilities. The licensee stated that a 10 mCi Cesium-137 source had been breached during source disposal operations. The source was breached when a source holder was being cut or drilled to remove the source. Contamination was detected on the individual conducting the source removal operations, throughout the source storage room, and outside in the source handling area. Note that these are all controlled access/restricted areas within the facility. The contamination on the individual was located on the clothing, hair, arms and hands. The individual underwent onsite decontamination and was sent to a local hospital as a precautionary measure. As of today (10/23/06) there is still some residual contamination on the individual's finger tips; however, further scrubbing to remove this contamination may cause breakdown to the skin in that area. The individual is currently wearing gloves in an attempt to sweat out the residual cesium contamination. The individual is scheduled for a whole body scan on Wednesday, 10/25/06. The source handling area was secured and closed to all personnel over the weekend. A decontamination contractor has been retained by the licensee to arrive on site on Monday, 10/23/06. A Bureau of Radiation Protection inspector will arrive on site on Wednesday, 10/25/06 to assess the contractor's decontamination efforts and to further investigate the circumstances that caused the contamination event. This information is current as of 10:00 AM on Monday, 10/23/06."
"Corrective Actions: Not Reported
Contamination to person: 0.010 Curies, 0.37 GBq of Cs-137 (Personnel Contamination)
Surface Contamination: 0.01 curies, 0.37 GBq of Cs-137 (Temporary Rad. Controls)
Form of Radioactive: Sealed Source
Source Used: Fixed Gauge
Reporting Requirement: 20.2203 30 day report - Reports of exposures, radiation levels, and concentrations of radioactive material exceeding the constraints or limits.
Mode Reported: Telephone
Reference Number: H 2006-092
Entry Date: 10/23/2006
Coder Initials: SMJ
Reference Type: Agreement State Event Report.
* * * UPDATE FROM OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (MICHAEL SNEE) TO JOE O'HARA ON 10/25/06 AT 1036 EDT VIA E-MAIL * * *
"Two separate Cs-137 sources were involved in the incident. Both were in TN model 5178/5178A source holders. The licensee's employee could not open the holders to remove the sources for disposal. The employee misunderstood where the sources were located in the holders and cut one holder (containing a 11 mCi source) with a bandsaw while drilling into the other holder (containing a 26 mCi source). The saw cut into the source and the drill bit broke and stuck in the source capsule. The contamination was contained to the secure source handling area. A contractor is on site to perform the facility decontamination."
Notified the R3DO (Ring) and NMSS EO (Wastler)
* * * UPDATE FROM OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (STEVEN JAMES) TO JASON KOZAL ON 10/27/06 AT 1119 EDT * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"Bureau staff visited the site on Wednesday, 10/25/06 to meet with the licensee and the decontamination contractor to review the circumstances which led to the contamination of the facility and the licensee's worker, as well as the decontamination efforts taken to date. Further investigation will be conducted by the Bureau. The contaminated employee underwent a whole body count on Thursday, 10/26/06. The results of that scan indicated the presence of 3.61 nanocuries in the lungs. The count will be repeated in two weeks. Note that the individual has been described by the licensee as a 'heavy smoker.' The individual is scheduled to undergo two 24-hour urine collections over the coming weekend for analysis on Monday, 10/30/06. Dose estimates will be prepared by the licensee and their medical consultant after the urine samples have been analyzed."
Notified the R3DO (Ring) and NMSS EO (C. Flannery) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42930 | Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH State: NC
County:
License #: 091-0121-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GRANT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 15:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2006
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BOOTH RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECONNECTED
"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 24 Oct. 2006 by the RSO for Flowserve US Inc. of a booth radiography source disconnect. The sealed source involved is reported as approximately 4.3 Curies of Ir-192. Discovery of the disconnect and subsequent actions were made in accordance with licensee policy and procedures. The licensee is controlling access to the booth, allowing for a safe and well considered response. The licensee is in contact with the vender of the camera and associated equipment in an effort to determine the best course of action (i.e. source recovery).
"The NC Radiation Protection Section is working in conjunction with the licensee and vender and will continue to update NRC as appropriate.
"The Flowserve Inc. RSO has reported that by following directions from vendor, the source was successfully retrieved and is in the safe, shielded and secure position. He further reports he is immediately replacing all similar equipment and returning the old equipment (including the specific malfunctioning equipment associated with this incident) to the vendor. Both Flowserve and the equipment vendor are planning after action reports to determine root cause if possible.
"North Carolina Ref. NC-06-33." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42932 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SMITH EMERY
Region: 4
City: STOCKTON State: CA
County:
License #: 3789-38
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2006
Event Time: 02:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via e-mail:
"At 2:30 a.m. a Smith Emery employee was taking backscatter measurements on Highway 99 North in Stockton, California just south of the Fremont off ramp. One lane was restricted to traffic while the Smith Emery employee took backscatter measurements to determine asphalt density. Shortly thereafter a semi-tractor and trailer crossed the barriers into the restricted lane and ran over the CPN MC3 gauge (#m37107963). The gauge outer case was destroyed and the source rod was broken off and carried away from the gauge down the road. The source rod contained 10 mCi of cesium 137. The 50 mCi americium source remained affixed to the portion of the gauge case that was intact. The licensee quickly notified the California Department of Emergency Services, who notified the Radiological Health Branch. Following the incident, the licensee restricted access to the area where the gauge was ran over and awaited the RSO to arrive. The RSO arrived around 6:30 am and with assistance from the Stockton FD, determined the gauge sources were intact and placed them in their transport case to transport to CPN, the gauge manufacturer. CPN leak tested the sources and their was no leakage or contamination found.
"CA Assignment number 102306" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42937 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY CASTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 10/27/2006
Notification Time: 05:06 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2006
Event Time: 03:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 28 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH MAIN FEED PUMPS
The licensee was performing load reject testing on the Unit 2 turbine generator when oscillations were observed on the plant steam dump system. These oscillations caused a high steam generator water level that caused both Main Feed Pumps (MFP) to trip. Upon receiving this indication the licensee manually tripped the reactor. All Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pumps started as expected.
All rods inserted as expected. Decay heat is being removed using AFW supplying both steam generators and steaming to the steam dumps. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42938 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES MORELAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/27/2006
Notification Time: 07:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2006
Event Time: 23:53 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF POWER TO THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 3 TRAIN B SAFETY BUSES WITH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ACTUATION
"The following event description is based on information currently available, if through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On October 26, 2006, at approximately 23:53 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Unit 3 Train B EDG occurred as a result of undervoltage on their respective safety buses. Both EDGs started and loaded as designed. No Emergency Plan declaration was made and none was required.
"The loss of power to the two safety buses was the result of an apparent spurious protective relay actuation of Startup Transformer X01 output breakers to Unit 1 NAN-S06 and Unit 3 NAN-S06 busses. Unit 1 NAN-S06 bus was being supplied by its Alternate breaker (1ENANS06F) and Unit 3 NAN-S06 was being supplied by its Normal breaker (3ENANS06C). Prior to the event, maintenance personnel were restoring potential Transformer (PT) fuses at Unit 1 breaker 1ENANS06, Cubicle G. Preliminary information is that the two simultaneous LOP conditions occurred when the outer doors were closed on 1ENANS06, Cubicle G. This condition apparently caused the output breakers of Startup Transformer X01 to open. There was no electrical fault or damage to any electrical components.
"Both Units 1 and 3 entered Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Condition A for one (of two) required offsite circuits inoperable. [The licensee is] proceeding with restoration of Normal offsite power to each safety bus in Units 1 and 3. Once offsite power is restored, the LCOs will be exited and the Unit 1 and 3 train B EDGs will be returned to standby.
"Both Unit 1 and Unit 3 were at approximately 100% power, at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to and following the EDG actuations. Unit 2 was defueled and was not impacted by the electrical disturbance. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42939 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/27/2006
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2006
Event Time: 03:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text CONTAINMENT PATHWAY DECLARED INOPERABLE FOLLOWING LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING
"This condition is being reported in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.
"During local leak rate testing (LLRT) of the 'B' reactor feed line to the reactor, both primary containment boundary check valves (RF-CV-13CV and RF-CV-14CV) failed LLRT. Efforts to quantify the leak rate were unsuccessful. The maximum leakage indicated on the test equipment used is 424 standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH). The allowable leakage (La) for Primary Containment is 317.41 SCFH. The affected primary containment pathway was declared inoperable. CNS is in MODE 5 for refueling with vessel level greater than 21 feet above the flange and the spent fuel pool gates removed. No fuel movements or operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel were in progress. Primary containment is not required per CNS Technical Specifications in this mode of operation.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42940 | Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: KARL EHRHARDT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/27/2006
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2006
Event Time: 09:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY NON OPERATIONAL DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) became non operational on October 27, 2006, at 0915 due to planned maintenance on the electrical power distribution for that facility. This call is required due to not being able to promptly restore the facility in the event of an accident as noted in NUREG 1022 Section 3.2.13. The maintenance should be completed by October 28, 2006.
"The backup EOF will be used during this maintenance."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42941 | Rep Org: ST LUKES HOSPITAL
Licensee: ST LUKES HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: KANSAS CITY State: MO
County:
License #: 24-00889-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GREG SACKETT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/27/2006
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/26/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
CINDY FLANNERY (NMSS)
| Event Text MEDICAL EVENT
"On October 26, 2006 an incident regarding a high-dose rate (HDR) mammosite treatment was discovered.
"At approximately 15:00 hours the physicist was verifying source positions and dwell times prior to treatment number eight of ten. The physicist noted that the first (most distal) source position was different from previous treatments (94.5 cm vs. 92.3 cm). When he queried the dosimetrists about the change, he was told that a different value was given for the measurement of the overall catheter length. The measured catheter length for the first seven treatments was 96.6 cm, while the most recent measurement gave 96.75 cm. The dosimetrist entered 95.15 cm (subtracting the 1.6 cm correction factor for the actual position of the most distal source dwell point within the catheter). However, this did not explain a 2.2 cm different in the first dwell position.
"The subsequent investigation into the discrepancy revealed that the usable catheter length entered into the planning computer was 93.0 cm rather than the correct value of 95 cm. This erroneous usable catheter length was used for the first seven treatments, which resulted in an unplanned dose to tissue proximal to the mammosite balloon. It is presently believed that a typographical error occurred in entering the usable catheter length into the treatment planning computer that was the root cause of the unplanned dose.
"The referring physician and patient have been notified of the event. The authorized user (radiation oncologist) is currently evaluating the clinical status of the patient. Further treatments are on hold pending a clinical decision."
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
* * * UPDATE FROM C. FLANNERY (FSME) TO W. GOTT AT 1641 ON 10/27/06 * * *
This event has been reviewed by the NRC medical review committee and determined to be a reportable medical event. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42942 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 12:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"During plant cooldown/depressurization in Mode 3, an Over Temperature (OT) Delta Temperature reactor trip signal was generated. The reactor Trip Breakers opened as designed (all rods were previously inserted). Additionally, a low Tavg/P-4 Feedwater Isolation Signal was generated and all Bypass Feedwater Regulation Valves closed (open for long-cycle recirculation operation). No Feedwater Isolation Valves were open at the time. All systems performed as designed.
"Actual loop Delta T's (Th - Tc) never exceeded 3.3 degrees F, well below the calculated OT Delta T setpoint. But plant Delta T calculations are based on narrow range Th and Tc instruments with scaling to low limits. When actual plant temperature was lowered to the lower limits of each instrument, calculated Delta T increased to the OT Delta T setpoint causing the reactor trip signal. Existing procedure guidance did not adequately ensure that the reactor trip breakers are open prior to initiating a partial plant cooldown.
"The plant was stabilized. The long-cycle recirculation was re-established and plant cooldown/depressurization was recommenced, as originally planned to 340 degrees F and 925 psig."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42943 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 21:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 17:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION
"An 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being made due to discovery of a previously unanalyzed plant condition. The chemical volume control system (CVCS) charging line is a high energy line susceptible, within design space, to a rupture that could result in pipe whip and an impingement condition. The containment penetration (M-3) for the charging line is directly below the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) header penetrations (M-5 & M-6). Due to this proximity, a failure of the charging line could impact the SI-1503 class HPSI line (M-6) causing damage to the header and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its design function. The two HPSI headers are different class piping with the M-5 penetration being a 2500 psig (SI - 2501 Class) line and the M-6 penetration being a 1500 psig (SI-1503 Class) line. The 2500 psig line is constructed of robust enough piping to not be susceptible to failure, however both HPSI headers are cross connected prior to location of concern. Although both HPSI and CVCS breaks are isolable, operator action would be required to identify and isolate the break location. The possible result of a high energy line break of charging piping could result in all three pipe headers being inoperable until manual action could be taken to isolate leakage on the 1500 psig HPSI line. Plant is currently shutdown for refueling outage with scheduled startup of November 21, 2006."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42944 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/29/2006
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2006
Event Time: 13:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF NOAA TRANSMITTER
The facility lost the Ames Hill NOAA transmitter due to weather conditions. Compensatory measures are in place and the vendor has been notified and is enroute to shift the power supply to back up.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM K. MURPHY TO W. GOTT AT 1522 ON 10/29/06 * * *
The Ames Hill NOAA transmitter was restored at 1505.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (J. Noggle) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42945 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: EUGENE SKELTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/29/2006
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2006
Event Time: 15:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | M/R | Y | 80 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
"Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 80% power following refueling holding for stabilization xenon in preparation for incore - excore calibration. An alarm condition for steam generator 2-03 indicating Steam - Feedwater flow mismatch was observed. Manual control of the feed regulating valve was taken, but operators were unable to control feed flow while steam generator 2-03 level continued to decrease. A manual reactor trip was initiated and the reactor was tripped. Auxiliary feedwater automatically started on low-low level in steam generators. All systems responded normally during and following the trip. Unit 2 is being maintained in Mode 3 pending the event investigation."
All control rods fully inserted. RCPs are in operation transferring decay heat to the steam generators. The MSIV's are open with the steam generators discharging steam to the main condensers using the steam dumps. AFW is maintaining steam generator water levels. Unit 1 was not affected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42946 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK FIOCCO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 01:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2006
Event Time: 20:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC START OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DURING MSIV TESTING
"This is an 8 hour notification being made to report that a valid ESF auxiliary feed actuation occurred. Salem Unit 2 is in Mode 4 with RHR providing shutdown cooling. 21, 22, and 23 reactor coolant pumps are in service providing forced circulation.
"While performing a main steam isolation valve stroke test for maintenance concurrent with main turbine valve surveillance testing, 22 steam generator narrow range level indication shrunk to 7%, which is below the low level trip setpoint of 14%, causing an automatic start of 21 and 22 auxiliary feedwater pumps. There was no other testing or evolutions in progress at the time of the event that contributed to the automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
"Steam generator parameters at the time of the event where 0 psig and 223 degrees (T-cold). Main condenser vacuum was established.
"23 auxiliary feedwater pump was tagged for maintenance and did not start.
"22 steam generator level was restored to normal level and the 21 and 22 auxiliary feedwater pumps secured.
"There were no personnel injured."
During this event, the main turbine governor valves were off their closed seats when the MSIVs were stroked.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |