Event Notification Report for September 08, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/07/2006 - 09/08/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42835
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ELLIS VANN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ELLIS VANN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/08/2006
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 04:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2006
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 04:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC DILUTION (CAD) SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On September 8, 2006 at 04:01, DAEC declared CAD inoperable after determining SV-4332B, UPPER DRYWELL SPRAY CAD N2 OUTBOARD ISOLATION was inoperable while SV-4331B, LOWER DRYWELL SPRAY CAD N2 OUTBOARD ISOLATION was also inoperable. Actions to isolate both of these injection pathways as required by Technical Specifications made CAD injection into the Drywell unavailable. Day 1 of a 7 day LCO for Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 Condition A was entered. Per DAEC Technical Specifications bases, CAD is considered to be inoperable when both injection pathways into either the drywell or torus are not available. Since CAD is a single train safety system, this event is reportable as an 8 hour non-emergency event under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 8, 2006 at 04:01, DAEC declared CAD inoperable after determining SV-4332B, UPPER DRYWELL SPRAY CAD N2 OUTBOARD ISOLATION was inoperable while SV-4331B, LOWER DRYWELL SPRAY CAD N2 OUTBOARD ISOLATION was also inoperable. Actions to isolate both of these injection pathways as required by Technical Specifications made CAD injection into the Drywell unavailable. Day 1 of a 7 day LCO for Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 Condition A was entered. Per DAEC Technical Specifications bases, CAD is considered to be inoperable when both injection pathways into either the drywell or torus are not available. Since CAD is a single train safety system, this event is reportable as an 8 hour non-emergency event under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42967
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/06/2006
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 18:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2006
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 18:28 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
NEIL PERRY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
HALF SCRAM SIGNAL DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE
"On September 8, 2006 at approximately 1828, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 98% reactor power, an equipment malfunction occurred, resulting in the tripping of one of the two 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers. This caused a corresponding loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus, a half scram and primary containment isolation valve closures. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-60, 'Loss of RPS Bus B Power.' All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus.
"At 1859, the 'B' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply. At approximately 1905, the RPS half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset. Restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 98% power throughout the event and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Actions were entered for the affected equipment as required.
"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in primary containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of 'B' RPS bus: Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'B' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'B' Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line, Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto initiated).
"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs. an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification in lieu of a written LER.
"The loss of the 'B' RPS bus was caused by the tripping of one of the two in-series 'B' RPS motor generator EPA breakers. A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis was completed for the EPA breaker. Potential failure modes were evaluated and ruled out with the exception of failure of a subcomponent on the EPA breaker logic card. The logic card and breaker were replaced, restoring the 'B' RPS motor generator to service."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 8, 2006 at approximately 1828, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 98% reactor power, an equipment malfunction occurred, resulting in the tripping of one of the two 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers. This caused a corresponding loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus, a half scram and primary containment isolation valve closures. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-60, 'Loss of RPS Bus B Power.' All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus.
"At 1859, the 'B' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply. At approximately 1905, the RPS half scram and Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset. Restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 98% power throughout the event and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Actions were entered for the affected equipment as required.
"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in primary containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of 'B' RPS bus: Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'B' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'B' Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line, Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto initiated).
"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs. an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification in lieu of a written LER.
"The loss of the 'B' RPS bus was caused by the tripping of one of the two in-series 'B' RPS motor generator EPA breakers. A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis was completed for the EPA breaker. Potential failure modes were evaluated and ruled out with the exception of failure of a subcomponent on the EPA breaker logic card. The logic card and breaker were replaced, restoring the 'B' RPS motor generator to service."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42852
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK COVEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK COVEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/21/2006
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 10:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2006
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2006
Event Time: 10:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
PAT GWYNN (R4)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
PAT GWYNN (R4)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION: INAPPRORIATE CHANGE MADE TO EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL 3J BACK IN 1997 CAUSED AN EMERGENCY, ALERT, NOT TO BE DECLARED.
"On 9/08/2006 at 1015 during painting activities in a safety-related area the Methanol Short Term Exposure Limit was exceeded. In accordance with Callaway Plant procedures the location was determined to contain a Hazardous ATMOSPHERE. Subsequently, Callaway Plant Emergency Action Levels (EAL) were reviewed and it was determined that the event did not meet the EAL criteria for Callaway Plant EAL 3J related to release of flammable or toxic gases in a safety - related area.
"On 9/21/2006 following a debrief that was conducted by Region IV NRC personnel, it was determined at 1025 that an inappropriate change to the intent of EAL 3J was made in 1997. As a result of this discussion, it was determined that an Alert should have been declared in accordance with plant EAL 3J.
"Per guidance given in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Section 3.1.1. "Immediate Notifications", an ENS notification is being made within one hour of discovery of the event. No actual declaration of the emergency class will be made since the event has been concluded and the basis for the emergency no longer exists.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Licensee also notified State, Local Officials and other government agencies.
"On 9/08/2006 at 1015 during painting activities in a safety-related area the Methanol Short Term Exposure Limit was exceeded. In accordance with Callaway Plant procedures the location was determined to contain a Hazardous ATMOSPHERE. Subsequently, Callaway Plant Emergency Action Levels (EAL) were reviewed and it was determined that the event did not meet the EAL criteria for Callaway Plant EAL 3J related to release of flammable or toxic gases in a safety - related area.
"On 9/21/2006 following a debrief that was conducted by Region IV NRC personnel, it was determined at 1025 that an inappropriate change to the intent of EAL 3J was made in 1997. As a result of this discussion, it was determined that an Alert should have been declared in accordance with plant EAL 3J.
"Per guidance given in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, Section 3.1.1. "Immediate Notifications", an ENS notification is being made within one hour of discovery of the event. No actual declaration of the emergency class will be made since the event has been concluded and the basis for the emergency no longer exists.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Licensee also notified State, Local Officials and other government agencies.