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Event Notification Report for May 31, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/30/2006 - 05/31/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42451 42545 42608 42609 42610

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42451
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JULIE HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/29/2006
Notification Time: 06:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2006
Event Time: 00:01 [PST]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 50 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT 3 SHUTDOWN DUE TO POTENTIAL SAFETY INJECTION TANK GASKET ISSUE

"On March 27, 2006, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 while starting up from a refueling outage, [Southern California Edison (SCE)] discovered that the gasket used to seal the manway cover for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) T-008 had become partially dislodged. The gasket is a 'flexitalic' type gasket which consists of a long section of crushable wire that is coiled and compressed between the manway cover and the safety injection tank flange. For SIT T-008, the flexitalic gasket had uncoiled and extended down into the SIT and prevented SIT outlet check valve MU040 from fully sealing in the closed position. On March 28, SCE inspected the remaining three SITs (SITs # 007, 009 and 010) and found the flexitalic gaskets degraded but intact and not interfering with other components.

"When this condition was discovered at Unit 2, San Onofre Unit 3 was operating at approximately 100 percent power. Similar flexitalic gaskets are also used for the manway covers on the four SITs at Unit 3. At 0001 PST on March 29, 2006, SCE conservatively declared both trains of the emergency core cooling system at Unit 3 inoperable. This placed Unit 3 in a TS 3.0.3 shutdown action statement. Plant Operators began the required Unit 3 shutdown at about 0050 on March 29, 2006. SCE is providing this phone notification to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications."

The electric grid in the area is stable and Emergency Diesel Generators are available on Unit 3. There is no maintenance being performed on systems required for shutdown on Unit 3.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 12:14 ON 5/30/2006 FROM L. CONKLIN TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On March 29, 2006, SCE reported the initiation of the shutdown to the NRC Operations Center (Event Log No. 42451).

"At the time, SCE was concerned that if the gaskets were uncoiled they might have interfered with operation of the ECCS.

"After completing the plant shutdown, SCE inspected and found the gaskets degraded but not extending into the SIT and its discharge piping. In addition, subsequent evaluations by the SONGS NSSS vendor Combustion Engineering (now Westinghouse) determined the degraded gaskets (even if uncoiled and interfering with SIT outlet check valve from fully closing) would not have prevented the ECCS from performing its required safety function.

"Consequently, SCE was not required to declare Unit 3 ECCS inoperable and SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 42451). SCE will submit a voluntary LER to document this condition.

"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 are in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power. The San Onofre Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report."

Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42545
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: ILLINOIS DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 3
City: PEORIA State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01100-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/02/2006
Notification Time: 16:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/02/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
ILTAB (Email) ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST OR STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was received from the state via e-mail:

" [The licensee's] Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), Illinois Dept. of Transportation (Radioactive Material License No. IL-1100-01), called to report [to Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency] that a Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3440, serial no.16550 [Cs-137 Source S/N 50-5822, 8 millicuries; Am-241/Be Source S/N 47-11975, 40 millicuries] was stolen from one of their vehicles assigned to their Edwards subsite (Peoria area). The open bed Dodge Ram truck was at a Peoria asphalt plant when the discovery was made. The user went to use the device this morning at the site and when he opened the back of his vehicle to remove the gauge, he noted the gauge was missing from the transport container although initial appearances suggested the container was still secure and intact. The transport container is bolted and padlocked to the bed of the vehicle. In addition the transport case has a locking hasp which is padlocked. This locking device was damaged and the gauging device subsequently removed. It is not known at this time when the device was actually stolen. It was last used on April 17, 2006. Peoria County Sheriffs personnel have been contacted as well as the Illinois State Police.

"[The RSO's] investigation this afternoon showed that no other tools or equipment had been taken from the vehicle although other items contained in the transport case were missing such as the reference block, and cleaning kit. The operator indicated that he could not consciously remember verifying the security of the transport container since the last time the gauge was used in April, only that it appeared to be locked. He was able to confirm that the handle of the gauge had been secured and padlocked following its last use."

Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency Item No: IL060020

* * * UPDATE AT 16:20 ON 5/30/2006 FROM D. PERRERO TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On May 29, 2006 the Agency was contacted by the Peoria Fire Department (PFD). The PFD had responded to a request from the Peoria Police Department to investigate a moisture/density gauge which had been found by a member of the public in Kickapoo Creek. Upon investigation by the PFD, it was determined that the radiation levels from the device were as expected for an intact device with no shielding failure. The device was taken into custody and secured by the Peoria Police Department in a remote portion of their Police Property Division. The information on the identification plate on the device was used to positively determine ownership as the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). On Tuesday morning, the IDOT Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and advised of the situation. Arrangements were immediately made for him to personally go to Peoria to identify the gauge, inspect its condition and safely transport the gauge back to their Springfield, IL offices for further repair and evaluation. Upon his arrival he determined that the gauge handle was still locked in the safe position and there was no structural damage to the gauge. The gauge was field tested with negative results for contamination due to leakage. IDOT intends to have the gauge cleaned, serviced, calibrated and put back into service after replacement of the electrical components.

"Pending receipt of the final report from the IDOT RSO which details the correct action taken to prevent a recurrence, we are considering this matter closed."

Notified NMSS (Morell), R3DO (Kozak) and ILTAB (via E-mail).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42608
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN KINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 02:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION

"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 0245 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station was notified of inadvertent single siren activation by a Washington County Sheriff Deputy. No actual Emergency exists and no testing is in progress. Local radio station KFAB was notified to broadcast an inadvertent siren activation message. Siren number 27, which is located 5.5 miles South of Blair, NE on State Highway 133, was activated as a result of adverse weather conditions. Crews have been dispatched to repair the failed siren."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42609
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DON VOGT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 08:13 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

LOSS OF POWER TO TRAIN "A" 4 KV SAFETY BUS

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR50.73.

"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 08:13 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 experienced a Loss Of Power (LOP) to Train 'A' (PBAS03) 4 KV safety bus. At the time of the LOP the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) had just been manually removed from the PBAS03 bus following a maintenance surveillance run and was still operating in a post run cool down mode. The PBAS03 bus was still powered from the off site power source and was at rated voltage. An invalid Load Shed signal was received from the Train 'A' Load Sequencer, which opened the normal off site supply breaker to PBAS03 bus, and stripped all of the Ioads off the bus. Next, a valid LOP signal developed, since the PBAS03 bus was de-energized. The EDG 'A' received a valid emergency run mode signal and returned to rated frequency and voltage; however its output breaker did not reclose on bus PBAS03. This reclosure was blocked by the Train 'A' Load Sequencer which had 'stalled' and was not able to provide the permissive for the DG output breaker to close. The failure of the load sequencer is currently under investigation by the PVNGS engineering department.

"Offsite power was available to both safety buses throughout the event; however the invalid Load Shed signal blocked immediate restoration of off site power to the Train 'A' bus. The other (Train 'B') safety bus is being supplied by offsite power; however Train 'B' EDG is not available due to planned outage related maintenance. The offsite electrical grid is stable. Efforts are currently in progress to restore the Train 'B' DG for a redundant power source. In addition, efforts are in progress to clear the Load Shed signal off the Train 'A' bus to allow restoration of power from the off site power source.

"Palo Verde Unit 1 is shutdown and Defueled in a mid-cycle repair outage. The entire core is off loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool and is currently being maintained with inventory and cooling by the Train 'B' components powered from off site power. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."

At 13:04 MST the 'B' EDG was restored and operable. The licensee also indicated that Train 'A' offsite power is expected to be restored within about 1 hour, or 16:20 EDT.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42610
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH TURBINE VIBRATION

"At approximately 1700 hours on May 30, 2006, with Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 operating normally at 100% power, main turbine vibration increased to a value above the procedure limit and reactor operators manually tripped the reactor in accordance with site procedure requirements. All control rods inserted and the auxiliary feedwater system automatically actuated per design. No other significant equipment issues were identified and the reactor was stabilized in mode 3.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the manual reactor trip (4-hour report) and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the RPS and AFW actuations (8-hour report).

"Watts Bar had been monitoring indications of slightly elevated turbine vibration on the main turbine, but the reason for the increase above the procedure limit of 14 mils is not known at this time. TVA will be investigating the cause of the increased vibration to make necessary repairs before turbine startup."

Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. No safety or relief valves lifted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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