| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/01/2006 - 05/02/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42532 | Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROBERTSON, INC
Region: 4
City: JONESBORO State: AR
County:
License #: AR-987BP0512
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/27/2006
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ILTAB (EMAIL) (NSIR)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, announced today that one radioactive gauge is missing from a job site in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The gauge may pose a health risk to persons if handled or carried for an extended period of time. The missing gauge is in a yellow plastic transport case and weighs approximately 90 pounds.
"The gauge is described as a Troxler Electronic Laboratory Model 3440 (Serial #36212) soil moisture/density gauge containing 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Americium-241/ Beryllium.
"State police, local government officials and law enforcement agencies, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management have also been notified."
The gauge appears to have been missing for at least a week.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42537 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BURTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/01/2006
Notification Time: 05:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: 04:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2006 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
HOLZ (DHS)
BAGWELL (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN AN ISOPHASE BUS DUCT LASTING 11 MINUTES
"The Unusual Event was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 10 minutes (after discovery) within the protected area. The fire was located on the Isophase Bus Duct near the Main Transformer. A load reduction to 80% rated thermal power is in progress on Unit 1. The fire was extinguished at 0450 with dry chemicals extinguishers."
The licensee believes the fire was on cabling in the Isophase bus duct due to overheating. The licensee has been monitoring hot spots on the duct cabling for several days. The fire did not apparently impact any other systems and observers are at the location monitoring for any change in conditions. No Tech Spec Limiting Conditions of Operations resulted from the fire and there is no impact on Unit 2 operations (which is currently at 100%). Termination criteria will be based on management judgment and safety assessment.
* * * UPDATE FROM P. UNDERWOOD TO M. RIPLEY 0727 EDT 05/01/06 * * *
"Unusual Event terminated at 0655 [EDT].
Fire extinguished.
Reactor power reduction continuing.
Management evaluating continued operation."
The unit is currently at 77% power and plans are to reduce power to 60% pending their evaluation of continued operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (K. Landis), NRR EO (M.J. Ross-Lee), IRD Manager (P. Wilson), DHS (S. York), and FEMA ( M. Roland). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42542 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: R. P. TODD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 05/02/2006
Notification Time: 02:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: 20:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) TRAINS INOPERABLE
"Event: At 2029 hours, Oconee Unit 3 was in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The administrative controls which comprise one train of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) were not yet in service, but a dedicated LTOP operator was in place as a Tech Spec required compensatory measure. Instrument Technicians performing a procedure erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which removed the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) from service while required for LTOP. This placed Unit 3 in a one-hour action statement per Technical Specification 3.4.12, Condition H.
"Initial Safety Significance: This is potentially a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (LTOP). Both the automatic PORV train and the Admin Control train were inoperable per Technical Specifications. However, a dedicated LTOP operator was in place meeting the compensatory measures requirement for continued operation per TS 3.4.12, Condition F related to the Admin Control requirement. No event occurred while in this condition which would challenge the LTOP function.
"Corrective Action(s): Operator at the controls recognized the loss of indication and contacted the Instrument Technicians. They verified their error and returned the instrument to service within one hour."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |